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Abstract: 
This study is essentially a critique of how the three dominant paradigms of 
explanatory international relations theory – (neo-)realism, liberalism, and 
systemic constructivism – conceive of, analytically deal with, and explain ethnic 
conflict and sovereignty. By deconstructing their approaches to ethnic identity 
formation in general and ethnic conflict in particular it argues that all three 
paradigms, in their epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies through 
reification and by analytically equating ethnic groups with states, tend to 
essentialise and substantialise the ethnic lines of division and strategic 
essentialisms of ethnic and ethno-nationalist elites they set out to describe, and, 
all too often, even write them into existence. Particular attention, both at the 
theoretical and empirical level, will be given to the three explanatory frameworks 
explanatory IR has contributed to the study of ethnic conflict: the ‘ethnic security 
dilemma’, the ‘ethnic alliance model’, and, drawing on other disciplines, 
instrumentalist approaches. The deconstruction of these three frameworks will 
form the bulk of the theoretical section, and will subsequently be shown in the 
case study to be ontologically untenable or at least to fail to adequately explain 
the complex dynamics of ethnic identity formation in ethnic conflict.By making 
these essentialist presumptions, motives, and practices explicit this study 
makes a unique contribution not only to the immediate issues it addresses but 
also to the wider debate on the nature of IR as a discipline. As a final point, 
drawing on constitutive theory and by conceiving of the behaviour and motives 
of protagonists of ethnic conflict as expressions of a fluid, open-ended, and 
situational matrix of identities and interests without sequential hierarchies of 
dependent and independent variables, the study attempts to offer an alternative, 
constitutive reading of ethnic and nationalist identity to the discourses of 
explanatory IR. 
These themes that are further developed in the empirical section where, 
explanatory IR’s narratives of ethnic group solidarity, ethno-nationalism, and 
national self-determination are examined and deconstructed by way of the case 
study of the relations between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Iraqi 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties in the wider context of the political status of the 
autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. With this ambition this study makes an 
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original empirical contribution by scrutinising these relations in a depth unique to 
the literature.  
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Introduction 
 
Research foci and rationale of the study 
Back in 1995, when the post-positivistt challenge to established theories of 
IR was in full vogue, Steve Smith wrote: 
In my view this is the main meta-theoretical issue facing international theory today. 
The emerging fundamental division in the discipline is between those theories that 
seek to offer explanatory accounts of international relations, and those that see 
theory as constitutive of that reality. At base this boils down to a difference over 
what the social world is like; is it to be seen as scientists think of the “natural” 
world, that is to say as something outside of our theories, or is the social world 
what we make it? Radically different types of theory are needed to deal with each 
of these cases, and these theories are not combinable so as to form one 
overarching theory of the social world M In my judgement this really is a 
fundamental divide within social theory.1 
Addressing the distinction between explanatory and constitutive theory 
Smith observes, Colin Wight commented: 
But just whom does the “we” refer to here? Setting this distinction in opposition to 
explanatory theory that attempts to explain international relations, we can presume 
that Smith means “we” IR theorists, not “we” members of society. But this seems 
implausible. It seems to suggest that “we” IR theorists make the world of 
international relations.2 
To me Smith’s argument is not implausible. On the contrary it is the key 
argument of this study that we IR theorists as categorizers and analysts are co-
protagonists of the social phenomena and processes we set out to describe; we 
do not ‘make’ the world of international relations, but, like the actors that are the 
subject of our analysis, we take part in influencing and shaping it. In clear 
rejection of the scientific objectivism and rational positivism of explanatory 
theories, this study commits to a constitutive theory of IR that renders us 
analysts as much part of social discourse on the issue to be analysed, and 
therefore subject of analysis as the social groups and actors we categorize and 
examine. We all are part of the social world we analysts try to understand and 
explain, and in my opinion, what would be implausible, is to assume that our 
explanations have no impact on the processes and discourses we study, that 
12 
 
we can remain objective, neutral, and detached to them, while in fact we 
arguably can be as subjective, involved, biased, prejudiced, and party to them 
as our subjects of analysis. 
The social phenomenon that is the object of analysis of this study is ethnic 
conflict and its subject of analysis are those ethnic entrepreneurs that engage in 
an ethnicised discourse, advance and thrive on it, and we IR theorists that seek 
to understand and explain their actions alike. While it would be implausible to 
argue that ethnic entrepreneurs, be it, in reference to our case study, Kurdish 
nationalist leaders or members of the Turkish military-intelligence apparatus 
have read either Smith or any other IR theorist for that matter to let their highly 
theoretical deliberations guide their thinking and policies, it would be equally 
implausible to posit that our thought processes occur in a social vacuum, are 
not filtered down through the media, the advocacy of think tanks via political 
decision makers, and the exchange in personnel between the scientific 
community and public servants, to name just a few, until they reach in a more 
accessible form politicians and the general public. Ironically, on the contrary, 
academia in the 21st century is mostly concerned with proving the impact factor 
of its deliberations to business, philanthropic donors, the ministers holding the 
purses of the higher education budgets, students expected to pay ever higher 
tuition fees, and the general public. How can we IR theorists proudly 
demonstrate these impact factors in every grant proposal we pen, yet at the 
same time cling to the fallacy of a detached scientific objectivism that posits us 
outside the social discourse we seek to explain? 
As far as IR scholars’ impact on the understanding of and policies adopted 
in response to ethnic conflict by decision makers is concerned one does not 
have to belabour the prominent example of President Clinton declaring Robert 
Kaplan’s infamous Balkan Ghosts3 required reading for members of his 
administration in dealing with the wars of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s 
that cemented the unfortunate and fallacious narrative of ‘ancient ethnic 
hatreds’;4 what is one of the subjects of this study, the Iraq War and the ethno-
sectarian conflicts it triggered, offers an unprecedented plethora of examples of 
IR scholars trying to influence and shape the positions and policies of regional 
and international actors – from the ‘Six Wise Men’, British academics that 
counselled Tony Blair against invading Iraq in 2003,5 to countless neo-
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conservative scholars in the US, Francis Fukuyama and Bernard Lewis among 
them, doing the opposite with the Bush administration, to hardly a week passing 
in the decade since the invasion of Iraq without academics being questioned on 
developments in the war-torn country by journalists, in expert testimonials 
before parliamentary inquiries or, on their own accord, penning another op-ed to 
gain a wider audience for their take on things. 
 The prominence of IR in accounts of ethnic conflict, I would argue, stems 
from the widely held perception of the discipline to be most qualified to explain 
issues of war and peace in the international arena. ‘The study of international 
relations can tell us much about ethnic conflict,’ argue Jesse & Williams in 
advocating for a primacy of IR and its ‘theories and approaches to explain 
ethnic conflict’.6 In another primer on ethnic conflict Cordell & Wolff take the 
same line when observing, ‘theories of international relations offer useful tools 
and insights in the study of ethnic conflict and conflict settlement’.7 More than 
any other discipline, they continue, ‘IR theory is primarily concerned with issues 
of war and peace’ in world politics, and state behaviour has a significant impact 
on the origins, development and duration of ethnic conflicts – whether causal, 
escalating or mitigating – as do norms, values, practices, institutions, 
legislations, and forms of governance at the local, regional and international 
level.8 Although the reasons they offer for IR’s primacy in explaining the 
complex dynamics of ethnic conflict appear compelling, others would argue that 
IR is not particularly well equipped for the analysis of identity conflicts. IR is a 
notorious latecomer to debates on questions of identity – the concept did not 
feature prominently as an eminent category in IR-specific approaches until the 
so called ‘fourth great debate’ and the post-positivist challenge of the early 
1990s.9 One would not have to go so far as John Stack’s observations that, 
‘ethnicity is as alien to the study of international relations as would be Sigmund 
Freud’s musings in Civilization and Its Discontents’,10 to ascertain that 
explanatory IR’s theoretical approaches to identity are epistemologically grossly 
underdeveloped. Zalewski & Enloe sum it up aptly when concluding, ‘all three 
paradigms [neo-realism, neo-liberalism, structuralism] are too restricted 
ontologically, methodologically, and epistemologically, and in ways which 
ultimately render them unable to theorize or think adequately about identity.’11  
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The main argumentative thrust of this study is to take up this critique of the 
approach to ethnic conflict of the three major explanatory theories of IR – (neo-
)realism, (neo-)liberalism, and systemic constructivism – and to provide a 
detailed critical examination of the epistemologies, ontologies, models, and 
frameworks they employ in their analysis of ethnic conflict.12 In fact, it is the 
ontological, methodological, and epistemological restrictions cursorily identified 
by Zalewski & Enloe above that are the main focus of this study. In this sense 
then, the conception of this study as a contribution to a constitutive IR theory of 
ethnic conflict, first and foremost, is an epistemological and ontological critique 
of how explanatory theories of IR perceive of, explain, and deal with ethnic 
conflict. This will be done, after outlining explanatory IR’s approach to ethnic 
identity, ethnic conflict, and nationalism in general terms, by deconstructing the 
three main frameworks explanatory IR has contributed to or utilizes in the 
analysis of ethnic conflict: the ‘ethnic security dilemma’, the ‘ethnic alliance 
model’, and, drawing on other disciplines, instrumentalism. 
To be clear about this study’s ambition, though, not only would it be 
impossible to show how certain texts of explanatory IR theory shape the world 
views and actions of individual ethnic entrepreneurs, ethno-nationalist leaders, 
or decision makers engaging in and advancing an ethnicised discourse, to do 
so would run counter to the self-perception of this study as constitutive theory 
which is defined precisely by eschewing and confuting universal claims to 
causality; it would become guilty of expressly the attempt to harness constitutive 
theory for causal or explanatory theory Smith criticises in Wendt’s work.13 On 
this distinction Lene Hansen elaborates: 
Mainstream approaches [i.e. explanatory theories] adopt a positivist epistemology. 
They strive to find the causal relations that “rule” world politics, working with 
dependent and independent variables M [Constitutive theories], by contrast, 
embrace a post-positivist epistemology as they argue that the social world is so far 
removed from the hard sciences where causal epistemologies originate that we 
cannot understand world politics through causal cause-effect relationships M 
Constitutive theories are still theories, not just descriptions or stories about the 
world, because they define theoretical concepts, explain how they hang together, 
and instruct us on how to use them in analysis of world politics.14 
With that aspiration in mind, what I will limit myself to here, is to 
demonstrate how closely aligned the ontologies of ethnic conflict of explanatory 
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IR theories are with the world views and ideologies of difference of ethnic 
entrepreneurs. For I argue that IR more than any other discipline is prone to 
what Rogers Brubaker calls ‘groupism’ and a ‘clichéd constructivism’ when 
dealing with identity politics in the social sciences,15 a constructivism in name 
only – limited to the introductory section or expressed in customary yet 
seemingly perfunctory disclaimers – but the main analysis, at large, continues to 
be done under essentialist and substantialist presumptions of ethnic identities, 
often bordering a primordialism slipping in through the backdoor. Despite 
advances to the contrary in sociology and anthropology, and two generations of 
critical theory scholarship, the three dominant schools of thought in IR still tend 
to treat ethnic groups as organic, static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous and 
bounded units and largely equate conflicts between said groups with conflicts 
between states. The essentialist and substantialist presumptions of groupism in 
how explanatory IR approaches ethnicity and ethnic conflict, I hypothesise in 
what is the core argument of this study, manifest themselves on three levels: (1) 
operationalising ethnicity as either the dependent variable, that is perceiving it 
as exogenous to the social phenomena studied and reducing it to merely a 
political tool, or the independent variable and therewith according it with pre-
eminent explanatory power; (2) equating ethnic groups with states; and (3), as a 
consequence thereof, all too often equating ethnic conflict with ethno-nationalist 
conflict by postulating that a disenfranchised group’s desire for the control of 
territory and in the long run sovereign statehood is the prime cause of the 
conflict at hand.  
To herausarbeiten – in the sense of elaborating an argument by teasing out 
information, by chipping away the surfaces like a carver who reveals the 
features and contours of a statue cut-by-cut – the workings, effects, and 
rationale behind such groupism in the discourses on ethnic conflict and 
sovereignty of explanatory IR is the prime objective of this study. While these 
are discussed in great depth in theory in the first section, such a debate cannot 
and should never remain at the theoretical level since the essentialist practices 
criticised here have very direct and often dramatic implications on the conflicts 
we analysts set out to study and for the people who are its main protagonists 
and victims. For this reason, and in order to substantiate and illustrate the 
arguments made here by way of the example of one of the most widely 
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analysed ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflicts of our times, ample room is given 
to the empirical case study. As elaborated below, the case of the relations 
between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) and 
the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP, Partîya Demokrata Kurdistan) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, 
Yeketî Niştîmanî Kurdistan), as well as on the political identity cum current 
status of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, constitute an ideal case with which to 
examine the workings and effects of groupism in explanatory IR discourses on 
ethnic conflict and sovereignty. As a matter of fact, it very well has the potential 
to serve as the cautionary tale par excellence about the epistemological, 
ontological, and methodological flaws of such essentialist approaches in 
explanatory IR scholarship.  
The above three contentions of the key argument of this study, put 
differently, encompass the two main points of critique herein levelled at how 
explanatory IR perceives and explains ethnicity and ethnic conflict. First, that in 
its epistemology, ontology, and methodology when dealing with ethnic identity 
and ethnic conflict, explanatory IR is guilty of reification, and secondly, that its 
system-immanent normative determinism of state centrism creates a reality 
that, intentionally or not, accentuates the ethnicised discourse and exacerbates 
the ethnic lines of division it originally set out to study. Reification, one of the 
cardinal errors in social research, can be defined as ‘the apprehension of 
human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possible 
supra terms’;16 or in the words of Anthony Giddens, the ‘reified discourse refers 
the “facticity” with which social phenomena confront individual actors in such a 
way as to ignore how they are produced and reproduced through human 
agency’.17 For the tendency to reify ethnic groups in particular, Craig Calhoun 
remarks: 
We habitually refer to ethnic groups, races, tribes, and languages as though they 
were clearly unities, only occasionally recalling to ourselves the ambiguity of their 
definitions, the porousness of their boundaries, and the situational dependency of 
their use in practice. The point is not that such categorical identities are not real, 
any more than the nations are not real, it is, rather, that they are not fixed but both 
fluid and manipulable. Cultural and physical differences exist, but their 
discreetness, their identification, and their invocation are all variable.18 
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The primary site of reification in explanatory IR’s dealing with ethnic conflict 
I identify is state-centrism. While explanatory IR’s state-centric ontology will be 
discussed in great detail in the theory section,19 suffice it to say for now that 
‘state-centric theories of international relations assume that states are the 
primary actors in world politics M the claim is that states M are sufficiently 
important actors that any positive theory of international relations must place 
them at its core’.20 Yet this assumption about the primacy of the state in IR 
theory comes with considerable epistemological and ontological baggage. First 
and foremost, state-centrism in mainstream IR ‘reduce[s] the essence of 
international relations to state-centred interpretations’.21 As Richard Ashley has 
famously observed for neo-realism: 
For the neorealist, the state is ontologically prior to the international system. The 
system’s structure is produced by defining states as individual unities and then by 
noting properties that emerge when several such unities are brought into mutual 
reference. For the neorealist, it is impossible to describe international structures 
without first fashioning a concept of the state-as-actor M The state must be treated 
as an unproblematic unity: an entity whose existence, boundaries, identifying 
structures, constituencies, legitimacies, interests, and capacities to make self-
regarding decisions can be treated as a given, independent of transnational class 
and human interests, and undisputed (except, perhaps by other states).22 
State-centrism thus explains international relations almost exclusively – at 
best it inserts the above mentioned clichéd constructivist caveats – through the 
prism of the state, a state whose existence ontologically predates the system of 
which it is part; in other words, ‘as an ontologically abstract category, the state, 
through the state-centric prism, becomes also a static category. International 
relations is reduced via the state-centric prism to an individualistically conceived 
collection of its parts – that is states – and thus as a collection of static 
entities’.23 I argue in this study that explanatory IR – for reasons that will be 
elaborated in detail – by equating the ethnic group with the state, has translated 
from the state onto the ethnic group this static conceptualization of social units 
as clearly bounded, organic, substantive, distinct, homogeneous, and static 
categories endowed with social agency, whose properties and genesis are not 
problematised but treated as given – or to be more precise, by doing so, as with 
the state, it has contributed to reifying the ethnic group through its narratives. 
This equation of state with ethnic or ethno-nationalist group that was made 
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possible, in modernist fashion, by ascribing the nation with the defining 
objective of becoming a state, brings with it then for the study of ethnic or ethno-
nationalist conflict the same epistemological and ontological fallacies of 
reification as state-centrism does in general for the study of the state and 
international relations at large. 
Given the centrality of the state in explanatory IR’s analysis of ethnic and 
ethno-nationalist conflict, both as the social unit with which explanatory IR 
equates the ethnic group as a unitary actor and as the ultimate objective to be 
attained, defines the ethno-nationalist group, it becomes imperative to dedicate 
ample room to a critical analysis of the concept of sovereign statehood in 
explanatory IR. This coupling in analysis of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict 
with sovereign statehood constitutes a unique contribution of this study to a 
critical theory literature that to my knowledge, has only taken on each concept 
and category separately, but not so far dealt with them in conjuncture. Yet, it is 
a conjuncture dictated by the representation of both concepts and categories in 
explanatory IR which establishes this linkage in the first place. Consequently, I 
argue, any deconstruction of how explanatory IR explains ethnic and ethno-
nationalist conflict would be fatally incomplete if not accompanied by a 
deconstruction of sovereign statehood, which, allegedly, the former is all about.  
In sum then, this study can be understood as critical reading and 
deconstruction of ethnic identity (and consequently ethnic and ethno-nationalist 
conflict), together with the interrelated concept of the sovereign nation state in 
explanatory IR. The main thrust of my critique centres on the argument that by 
portraying ethnic conflict in a groupist and deterministic way – that is by 
depicting ethnic groups as organic, static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous 
and bounded units with social agency, as unitary or unitarily acting doers that 
can be equated with states whose defining objective is to become a state, to 
acquire exclusive control, i.e. sovereignty over a territory and population – 
explanatory IR scholars in their state-centrist ontology and through the practice 
of reification create the very reality they set out to describe. In other words, I 
argue explicitly here that explanatory IR scholars as co-protagonists of ethnic 
conflict not only play into the hands of ethnic elites by unquestioningly adopting 
their ‘strategic essentialisms’24 as factual for their analysis, but that they often 
take part, through their scholarship, in writing into existence in the first place the 
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ethnic lines of division, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ worldview that constitutes them, 
on which these ethnic elites thrive. These theoretical deliberations are then 
taken up in the empirical section of the study where, in order to substantiate 
them, I will deconstruct the (strategic) essentialisms of ethnic elites by way of 
the case of relations between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
parties, the KDP and the PUK, as well as on the political identity cum current 
status of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, illustrating why the afore deconstructed 
frameworks of explanatory IR – ethnic security dilemma, ethnic alliance model, 
instrumentalism – not only fail to explain their relations and ethnic conflict in 
general but, what is more, substantially misrepresent and distort realities on the 
ground. Instead, drawing on Fierke,25 I will show why and how a fluid matrix of 
identities and interests, that acknowledges both as socially constructed and 
explicitly does not operationalise ethnic identity as either dependent or 
independent variables, better captures the parties’ relations and, I would argue, 
ethnic identity and conflict in general. The case study then, in its scope and 
depth, itself a unique contribution to the literature, constitutes the second half of 
this study. 
 
Methodology and case study 
These ambitions necessitate a brief clarification of what is meant here by 
discourse and deconstruction. Norman Fairclough reminds us that ‘discourse is 
not simply an entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an 
understanding of it by analysing sets of relations’.26 He continues: 
Discourse is itself a complex set of relations including relations of communication 
between people who talk, write, and in other ways communicate with each other, 
but also M describe relations between concrete communicative events 
(conversations, newspaper articles etc.) and more abstract and enduring complex 
discursive “objects” (with their own complex relations) like languages, discourses 
and genres. But there are also relations between discourse and other such 
complex “objects” including objects in the physical world, persons, power relations 
and institutions, which are interconnected elements in social activity or praxis.27 
Michel Foucault bases his assessment of knowledge production on how he 
conceptualises discourse, in particular that ‘nothing has any meaning outside 
discourse’,28 that matters in the social world only gain meaning through 
20 
 
discourse, or in the words of Laclau & Mouffe, ‘we use discourse to emphasize 
the fact that every social configuration is meaningful’’.29 Discourse therefore 
may be understood as ‘a specific series of representations and practices 
through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations 
established and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’.30 In 
Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault further developed the concept of 
‘discursive formations’ that not only included the objects under discussion but 
also demarcated how these discussions were structured, who was seen as in a 
position to discuss these objects authoritatively, and ultimately the value 
individual statements within the discussion were given.31 ‘The types of objects in 
their domains were not already demarcated, but came into existence only 
contemporaneous with the discursive formations that made it possible to talk 
about them’;32 in fact, discourses ‘shape the contours of the taken-for-granted 
world, naturalizing and universalizing a particular subject formation and view of 
the world’.33 Since for Foucault power and knowledge are closely 
interconnected in all social interactions and relations expressed through 
discourse, a comprehensive understanding of discourse therefore must not only 
capture the ‘systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of 
action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the 
worlds of which they speak’34 but also ought to address questions of structure 
and agency that form the basis of every discursive relation, formation, and field 
together with the systems of power and knowledge by which they are 
constituted.  
At this moment an important clarification seems necessary, though. To 
recognise identities as social constructs and discursive formations is not to say 
that they are not real. On the contrary, they are very real, but only insofar as 
they are constituted by discourse; they have no meaning prior and exogenous 
to discourse as this widely quoted analogy from Laclau & Mouffe illustrates: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought M An earthquake or the falling of 
a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independent of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in 
terms of natural phenomena or expressions of the wrath of God depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field.35 
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Much has been written on whether deconstruction can be understood as 
method or not.36 Jaques Derrida himself has described it as ‘pas de methode’,37 
yet as Martin McQuillan reminds us, ‘the word pas in French means both “not” 
and “step”, so this ambiguous phrase can be translated as either “not a method” 
or “a methodological step”. Thus, deconstruction is simultaneously M not a 
method and a step in, or towards, a methodology’.38 If this appears already 
confusing and if it is already a challenge to consummately capture the essence 
of discourse, to put deconstruction in a nutshell becomes even more toilsome, 
all the more since ‘one might even say that cracking nutshells is what 
deconstruction is’.39 Originating in the structuralist theory of linguist Ferdinand 
de Saussure, the notion that Western philosophy and with it most of our 
discursive objects is structured along a series of binary opposites in a 
hierarchical relationship with each other – in which ‘the second term in each pair 
is considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first’40 – such as 
presence/absence, inside/outside, speech/writing, identity/difference, 
domestic/foreign, hierarchy/anarchy, order/chaos, is the basis of Jaques 
Derrida’s deconstructive approach.41 Each element of these dichotomies is co-
constitutive of the other; that is, one cannot make sense of what presence 
means without having an understanding of absence and vice versa. One cannot 
conceptualise the self of one’s identity without reference to the other, from who 
the self is set apart. Yet, these ‘binary opposites are not the way things really 
are but the way they are represented by Western thought and through the 
habitualization and sedimentation of this thought are presented as natural’.42 In 
a nutshell then – if it has to be put into one – a ‘deconstructive approach’ for the 
purpose of this study means ‘critically examining the discursive processes of 
materialization that produce settlements; such as the idea of pre-given subjects 
– upon which the criteria for judgement are based’43 or to put into question what 
is presented in discourses as natural by scrutinizing the binary opposites on 
which this representation is based. In that then in this study, when analysing the 
strategic essentialisms of ethnic elites or the writings of explanatory IR scholars 
on ethnic conflict as texts within a wider discourse ‘the question asked is not, 
“what does [the text] mean?” but “what does it presuppose?”’44 By 
herausarbeiten that a representation in a certain text as part of a wider 
discourse does not reflect natural facts but is based on ideologised 
presumptions, by showing that it depicts not reality but one particular reality, 
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and by examining the systems of power and knowledge that constitute the wider 
discourse of which it is part, that text becomes deconstructed. And what 
explanatory IR presupposes in how it makes sense of ethnic conflict is 
groupness, for ethnicity to be either exogenous or the pre-eminent, determining 
variable in relations between and within assumed ethnic groups, and to 
ontologically equate those presupposed ethnic groups with states in their 
analyses of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflicts.  
This deconstructive approach highlights why certain key concepts – in this 
case groupness – are no longer serviceable within the paradigms in which they 
were originally developed, yet at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, 
instead of being replaced their use is continued in their now deconstructed 
form.45 ‘By means of this double, stratified, dislodged and dislodging writing,’ in 
the words of Derrida, ‘we must also mark the interval between inversion, which 
brings low what was high, and the eruptive emergence of a new “concept”, a 
concept that can no longer be and never could be, included in the previous 
regime’.46 Consequently, the aim of deconstruction is never to develop new 
meta-theories, models, or frameworks that replace the ones that have been 
identified as no longer serviceable, that is ‘the production of [truer] positive 
knowledge’,47 but, after herausarbeiten the social context and discourse in 
which they were generated, to continue operationisling them with the caveat of 
the insights deconstruction has yielded with regard to their production and 
utilization. In other words, deconstruction should be understood as a moment of 
passage from one concept to another, in which, in lieu of a ‘better’ concept, the 
concept is still used ‘under erasure’48 until a new one has been developed – 
which cannot be the task of deconstruction, since to do so would violate its very 
principles, that is its inherently critical attitude to any kind of meta-theory. 
While committed to a constitutive epistemology and applying deconstruction 
as a ‘step towards a methodology’, and while heeding Fierke’s call for a 
‘constitutive discourse analysis’ that requires for us to ‘”look and see” the matrix 
of identities and interests and the process by which they are gradually 
transformed through historical interactions’,49 this study makes no pretence of 
comprehensively adopting discourse analysis for its methodology.50 To make 
such a claim I would have had to apply the same degree of textual analysis to 
the empirical case study as to the theory section. While for the theory section 
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the objective is to show how closely aligned the narratives of ethnic conflict of 
explanatory IR and ethnic entrepreneurs are, for which textual analysis and 
discourse analysis appear appropriate, they would not fit the empirical case 
study, where I illustrate why a matrix of identities and interests better captures 
the realities of relations between Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties and to explain 
ethnic conflict in general than operationalising ethnic identities as dependent or 
independent variables, and by doing so seek to substantiate the argument 
made in the theory section.  
As far as the role of ethnic elites is concerned, in simplified terms, there are 
two ways to go about empirically deconstructing an ethnicised discourse of 
supposed ethnic groups in conflict. One could demonstrate that the binary 
opposites, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies that constitute this discourse are 
constructed by questioning the fixedness of purportedly impermeable, 
unalterable, and inveterate ideational boundaries and divides between groups, 
thus disputing at large the categorization into groups based on these 
boundaries and divides. This, what is often misleadingly called an ‘inter-group’ 
approach, has, for example, been magisterially deconstructed for the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s by Gagnon.51  Alternately one could focus on the so 
called ‘intra-group’ dimension, the supposed coherence of and solidarity among 
an assumed group in face of an alleged common enemy. It is the latter 
approach that has been chosen for the empirical section of this study that sets 
out to analyse the relations between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-
nationalist parties, the KDP and the PUK, in particular in light of the sanctuary 
the former enjoys on the territory of the latter since the early 1980s. At each 
stage of their relations I show the social constructedness of Kurdish ethno-
nationalist identity by herausarbeiten that rather than a clear sequence of 
identities and interests as explanatory IR wants to make us believe, they 
constitute a complex, ever shifting, and non-sequential matrix of identities and 
interests. By illustrating the ambiguities and complexities of relations between 
these three parties that were more often outright antagonistic than they were 
showing solidarity and that do not fit the simplistic explananda of either 
instrumentalism or of taking ‘common’ ethnicity as the independent variable in 
analysing ‘intra-group’ relations, I intend to not only draw into question the 
portrayal of Kurdish groupness in the literature but to challenge at large the 
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categorization in explanatory IR texts of the Kurds as one ethnic group or 
nation. This segment of the case study constitutes the as of yet most detailed 
analysis of relations between KDP/PUK and the PKK available in the extant 
literature. It goes without saying, though, that the picture would ultimately not be 
complete without bringing Turkey into the equation, which is why also Turkish-
Iraqi Kurdish relations are given ample room for analysis in the case study. 
The case study of their relations in the wider context of the status and 
identity of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was chosen for three reasons. First, the 
so called ‘Kurdish Question’ constitutes the most internationalised ethnic conflict 
in the Middle East, affecting four nationalising states52 – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria – in one of the world’s most strategically and economically important 
regions. Also, and for the purposes of this study most significantly, the PKK 
sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan is routinely referred to in the literature as a textbook 
example of common ethnicity determining the conflict behaviour of actors in the 
internationalization of an ethnic conflict, that is parties or National Liberation 
Movements (NLMs) of supposedly the same ethnic group forming a so called 
‘ethnic alliance’ against a ‘common’ enemy, or less explicitly, collaborating 
across borders against the ‘mutual’ foe with their behaviour and actions being 
predominantly rooted in group cohesion and solidarity. This prominence in the 
literature then renders it a case study ideally suited to deconstructing models 
that take ethnicity as the independent, if not determining variable to explain 
social agents’ behaviour in ethnic conflicts and to empirically illustrate the 
theoretical flaws in this approach.   
Second, the rapidly shifting fortunes of the Iraqi Kurdish NLMs from ragtag 
guerrilla to presiding over the so called Kurdish de facto state, to governing the 
freest political entity in Kurdish history as part of federally structured Iraq, to 
playing the role of kingmaker in inner-Iraqi power struggles during and after the 
U.S. occupation, all over the course of a mere fifteen years, allows us to study 
the transformative processes of ethno-nationalism, the fluctuations in the 
ethnicised discourse and how the gaining of political status affects not only a 
nation’s self-perception but also how these shifts in political identity alter its 
relations to its supposed ethnic kin during a relatively short and thus more easily 
observable period of time. Third, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq with its 
ambiguous political status and contested sovereignty provides a better study 
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subject than so called ‘established’ states to examine state sovereignty as a 
historical process, as socially constructed, situational and never fully completed. 
By the same token, with its status in permanent flux, one can also better relate 
to the processual interplay of identities, interests and political status that are co-
constitutive of each other than in ‘established’ and recognized states, where 
these developments are often wrongly seen as having reached some form of (at 
least temporary) completion. 
At this point readers may interject that a single case study is hardly 
sufficient to disprove an entire set of established theories. Bearing these 
limitations in mind, I understand the case study of PKK-KDP/PUK relations 
together with the political status cum identity of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as 
an ‘extroverted case study with generic concepts’, an approach introduced by 
Richard Rose, who, referring to Toqueville’s Democracy in America as a classic 
example, calls it ‘the most frequent form of analysis in comparative politics’.53 
The crucial point here is that such a case study ‘is not explicitly comparative, 
but comparable’,54 if it is intended and possible to come to theoretical or 
conceptual generalizations from the single case study that can be applied to 
other cases. Or in the words of Peters, ‘the purpose of the extroverted case-
study then becomes to explore fully this one case with the existing theory in 
mind, with the expectation of elaborating or expanding that body of theory with 
the resulting data’.55 What I set out to achieve with this study, though, is to go 
beyond just expanding a body of theory but, after first having applied a 
deconstructive reading of the theories in question, to use the extroverted case 
study to empirically substantiate this deconstruction of the theory in question. 
Ultimately, all theory should be a function of the empirical data, though. The 
data for the empirical part of this study, the extroverted case study on the 
relations between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movements from 
the late 1970s until the present and on the current status cum political identity of 
the Kurdistan Region, was assembled over the course of five years. In line with 
the research foci of this study, equal emphasis is given to a critical reading of 
the actions, declarations, motives, and writings by Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
elites and scholars analysing the subject alike, both employed as expressions of 
the ethnicised discourse studied here. This results in a limited applicability of 
the customary distinction between primary and secondary sources in this study, 
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since secondary sources by scholars or journalists on Kurdish ethno-
nationalism constitute primary sources for this study’s purpose of critically 
examining the role of these scholars as co-protagonists of the ethnicised 
discourse and conflict under investigation. Thus, in addition to already published 
material, ranging from monographs to the output of research institutes and think 
tanks to media coverage in print, radio, and film, including interviews with 
decision makers, the nucleus of the qualitative, empirical research are 
interviews conducted in the field between 2010 and 2012. In all I have 
conducted approximately 40 interviews with former and active decision makers 
of the three Kurdish NLMs in question, scholars, and journalists across Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Turkey, Europe, and the United States – due to the rapidly 
deteriorating human rights situation and for their own safety, I decided not to 
disclose the identity of those journalists interviewed in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
method employed for the selection and recruitment of the interview participants 
is ‘snowball sampling’, widely-used in ‘sociological studies into hidden 
populations who may be involved in sensitive issues or illegal activities M Yet 
the method is also used in political science and the study of elites, where the 
most influential political actors are not always those whose identities are 
publicly known’.56 Originally a representative number of ‘gatekeepers’ were 
identified, whose accessibility as well as their extensive networks and 
reputations in the respective organization or among the diaspora showed great 
promise for making inroads into often particularly occlusive and close-mouthed 
groups. These ‘gatekeepers’, after having established a requisite level of trust, 
suggested a number of interviewees from within the organization they 
represented who then, upon having been approached and interviewed, 
indicated a third level of possible participants, and so on.57 The problem with 
this method is that the participants themselves determine the sample and thus 
have a disproportional influence on the data collected, which in the worst case 
could lead to an unwholesome bias of the study at large. I tried to counter this 
tendency by including as many and often as diametrically opposed groups as 
possible, such as current KDP/PUK members versus former members who had 
renounced their parties, and by then collating the data from one party with the 
other as well as secondary sources whenever available. Where applicable this 
data is enriched by personal ethnographic observations from the field research 
in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. 
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As, alas, with most works in political science this analysis too focuses 
primarily on elites. This fact is particularly deplorable for the studies of 
nationalism and ethnic conflict, where pretence dictates for any ‘adequate 
theory of ethnic conflict [to] be able to explain both elite and mass behaviour’,58 
yet execution routinely focuses on the former to the detriment of a thorough 
analysis of the latter – despite the fact that, in line with what is being said in 
chapter one, a nation or ethnic group is first of all constituted by the people’s 
belief in it. Yet this study, although well aware of this shortcoming, cannot be 
the place to comprehensively make up for this deficit, and, as with additional 
case studies substantiating the findings made here, it remains to be hoped that 
future research will give a more comprehensive account of all strata of Kurdish 
society in the present ethnicised discourse in Iraq and Turkey. 
 
Chapter outline 
The study is divided into three parts, of which the first (chapters one to 
three) is a theoretical analysis of how explanatory IR conceptualises ethnic 
conflict, the motives behind its reifying, state-centric, and essentialising 
representation of ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, and sovereignty, together with 
an introduction into alternative modes of representation from critical theory and 
post-structuralist approaches. The second part (chapters four to seven) is 
mostly descriptive, while in the third, empirical section (chapters eight to eleven) 
the themes examined in Part One are again taken up and put in the context of 
the empirical case study.  
Chapter one, drawing on the classics from sociology and anthropology such 
as Max Weber and Frederick Barth, gives a definition of what is meant in this 
study by ethnicity and nation, highlight differences between primordialism and 
modernism, delineates ethnic elites’ strategic essentialisms and characterises in 
greater detail the concept of groupism in order to then demonstrate how it 
manifests itself in the approaches to ethnic conflict of neo-realism, neo-
liberalism, and systemic constructivism. This problematisation of their inherent 
essentialism and state-centrism is augmented in the second chapter by a 
comprehensive overview of the concepts, models, and frameworks the three 
paradigms employ in analysing and explaining ethnic and ethno-nationalist 
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conflict together with the latter’s supposed objective of acquiring and 
maintaining statehood by critically examining and double-reading explanatory 
frameworks such as the ‘ethnic security dilemma’, the ‘ethnic alliance model’, 
and instrumentalism as well as the construct of sovereign statehood and 
debatable categorisations as failed and de facto states. Chapter three 
summarizes the effects of groupism and offers an alternative reading of ethnic 
identity as a fluid matrix of identities and interests, introducing the theoretical 
lens under which the case study will be examined.  
The second part commences with critical reflections on the origins, nature, 
and inherent tendencies to ‘pathological homogenisation’59 of the two 
nationalising states in question in this study, Turkey and Iraq, and juxtaposes 
their nationalist discourses with each other as well as with the genesis of 
Kurdish ethno-nationalism in both countries up to the 1970s. This admittedly 
cursory review of the nationalist state discourses and of those supposedly pitted 
against them in pursuit of national self-determination allows us to re-examine 
the modernist definitions of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict given in chapter 
one and to dispel some common myths about Kurdish ethno-nationalism that 
are routinely employed by the nationalising states as well as some scholars 
directly or indirectly legitimising these misconceptions and prejudices. Chapters 
six and seven are then dedicated to an introduction of the main social agents 
discussed in this study, the most prominent Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties in 
Iraq and Turkey, the KDP, PUK, and PKK. 
Part three constitutes the main body of the extroverted case study on the 
relations between the PKK and KDP/PUK and the status as well as identity of 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq with chapter eight focusing on the origins of 
relations between the three Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties up to the Anfal 
campaign during the Iran-Iraq War. Here it already becomes apparent that the 
strict hierarchical causality of identity and interests explanatory IR purports in 
the study of the behaviour and actions of parties in ethnic conflicts is not 
tenable, and that the relations between the three parties are better conceived of 
as a complex matrix of identities and interests without a hierarchical sequence 
or the one generating the other.60 The workings and dynamics of this matrix are 
further illustrated in chapter nine which discusses their relations during the 
1990s with the birth hour of the so called Kurdish de facto state in Iraq and the 
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Kurdish civil war as the most prominent themes under investigation. Chapter ten 
shifts focus to problematising the origins of the rapprochement between the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ) government in Turkey after the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, the sea change in the nationalist discourse of the PKK after the capture 
of Abdullah Öcalan Chapter eleven represents something of a wrap up of the 
main themes of this study by revisiting the central arguments made in the theory 
section and putting them in context with today’s identity and status of the 
Kurdistan Region in the triangle of relations between the Iraqi central 
government, Turkey, and the PKK. The study concludes with deliberations on 
what this study’s portrayal of the Kurdistan Region’s status and identity can tell 
us about sovereign statehood as a socio-political construct at large and about 
the nature of ethno-nationalist conflict in general and closes with the hope that 
the contribution to the discussion of these subjects made here will trigger a 
rethink in our discipline of its epistemologies, ontologies, and methodologies, 
ideally leading to us categorisers and analysts, while always remaining co-
protagonists of the social world we describe, at least refraining from 
exacerbating its deepest divisions and most violent expressions. 
A study this wide in scope and ambition with such complex themes as 
ethnic identity and conflict and state sovereignty, together with a wide host of 
sub-themes, will by its very nature always remain incomplete. Some of the sub-
themes, while of evident relevance, are touched upon here only cursorily, and 
references are made to the extensive array of contributions in the literature on 
topics such as, for example, the nuances of the post-structuralist body of 
thought in relation to social identities, the legal aspects of national self-
determination, strategies and tools of state-building, or on the complexities of 
the socio-political composition of Iraq beyond the Kurdistan Region. These 
limitations, like the restriction to a single significant case study, were necessary 
in order to remain focused on the core arguments of the inquiry, yet, in the spirit 
of the study as a whole, should be understood as possible points of departure 
for future research.  
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One 
  
31 
 
  
32 
 
1.) ‘Groupism’ or How Explanatory International Relations 
Theory Explains Ethnic and Ethno-nationalist Conflict 
 
Ethnic groups and nations 
Since the Gulf War of 1991 sparked global interest in their fate, most 
writers, scholarly and popular, have denoted the Kurds as the world’s largest 
ethnic group without a state or state-less nation. This designation seems to rest 
on two presumptions: first, that Kurds from the four parts of what is subjectively 
or colloquially called Kurdistan are one organic, substantive, distinct, 
homogeneous, bounded group, identifying themselves and perceived as a 
social unit; second, it suggests – how implicit or legitimate, whether active or 
symbolic is debatable – a claim to statehood. Such essentialist presumptions 
are usually thought to be the preserve of scholars of a primordialist view on 
ethnic groups and nations which is claimed to be largely demode and obsolete 
today.61 Primordialists hold ‘that nations [are] around “from the first time” and 
[are] inherent in the human condition, if not in nature itself M Nations [are] 
seen as forms of extended kinship and as such [are] ubiquitous and coeval 
with the family’.62 In the Kurdish case this can be illustrated by one scholar 
contending that the thousand year span from the 5th century BC until the 6th 
century AD, ‘marks the homogenisation and consolidation of the modern 
Kurdish national identity, [t]he ethnic designator Kurd is established finally, and 
applied to all segments of the nation’.63 Given such extravagant claims 
unperturbed by historical facts, it is hardly surprising that Anthony Smith comes 
to the conclusion, ‘primordialism has either a flawed theory or none, and little or 
no history, being reductionist or largely speculative and ahistorical’.64 And yet, 
despite its obvious ontological flaws, primordialism, contrary to some claims,65 
has not fallen out of favour in the social sciences. On the contrary, 
primordialism or, what it is often referred to in contemporary parlance as 
essentialism,66 still enjoys considerable popularity in the social sciences, in 
particular in the discipline of IR. In addition to the socio-biologist approach,67 
one of the key texts on ethno-nationalism,68 and, with some restrictions, the 
today most widely referenced work on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz’ Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict,69 either directly advocate or can be associated with an 
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essentialist understanding of ethnicity and nation. Here, ethnic groups are 
viewed as organic, static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous and bounded 
units whose objective characteristics or identity markers that simultaneously 
define them and set them apart from other groups are observable and, to a 
certain extent, empirically measurable. Consequently, an essentialist definition 
of ethnicity ‘embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it 
covers “tribes”, “races”, “nationalities”, and “castes”’, and membership within 
these groups ‘is typically not chosen but given’.70 This notion of kinship ‘makes 
it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances’,71 and the 
cohesion of such a group is usually measured through the variable of inner-
group solidarity among its members. In addition to its prominence among a 
wide range of scholars, primordialist/essentialist portrayals of ethnic conflict 
dominate the popular and political discourse in the media and among policy 
makers, and, naturally and most significantly, are the preserve of nationalist 
elites:  
For the nationalists, nationality is an inherent attribute of the human condition M. 
They believe that humanity is divided into distinct, objectively identifiable nations. 
Human beings can only fulfil themselves and flourish if they belong to a national 
community, the membership of which overrides all other forms of belonging. The 
nation is the sole depository of sovereignty and the only source of political power 
and legitimacy. This comes with a host of temporal and spatial claims – to a unique 
history and destiny, and a historic homeland.72 
In the Kurdish case such essentialist claims by nationalist elites to the unity, 
cohesion and destiny of the nation, irrespective of the divisions modern 
nationalising states have imposed on its members, are illustrated by, for 
example, the prominent Kurdish politician and human rights activist Leyla Zana 
claiming the Kurdish nation to be represented by three leaders: Abdullah 
Öcalan, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal Talabani.73 This triumvirat of nationalist 
leaders is declared to control the fates of all Kurds, whether they hail from 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria or the diaspora. Those leaders are averred to 
authoritatively speak on behalf of all Kurds, as, for example, when Masrour 
Barzani, groomed for one day succeeding his father Massoud as President of 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, recently declared: 
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If I tell you that you can find a Kurd that doesn’t have a dream of having his own 
state, I think I wouldn’t be telling you the truth. And I think the Kurds deserve to 
have their own independent state, like any other nation.74 
Yet, contrary to what we are told in the literature, where in the social 
sciences we are made to believe that ‘we are all’, to a greater or lesser extent, 
‘constructivists now’ (Brubaker 2009: 28), primordialist/essentialist 
understandings of ethnicity, and consequently ethnic and ethno-nationalist 
conflict, not only survive in the public and political but also in the scholarly 
discourse. This persistence of essentialism in the study of ethno-nationalist 
conflict, I argue, can to no small degree, be ascribed to the dominance of 
explanatory IR in explaining issues of war and peace in the international 
domain and to its pre-eminence in informing policies in response to ethno-
nationalist conflicts. To trace and deconstruct these narratives of ethno-
nationalist conflict in explanatory IR is the prime objective of this study. 
For presumptions about the unity, social cohesion, solidarity, and ultimately 
destiny of a nation are not limited to a primordialist view of ethnicity. As will be 
shown, they also feature prominently in the paradigm that is imputed to be the 
diametrical opposite of primordialism/essentialism: modernism. Modernism as 
applied to these questions can be understood as a very loose umbrella term for 
a variety of quite diverse perspectives on ethnicity and nationalism,75 many of 
which will be discussed in turn. Suffice it to say here, even at risk of gross 
simplification, that for modernism ‘nationalism, in short, is a product of 
modernity M and so [are] nations, national states, national identities, and the 
whole “inter-national” community’.76 Individual scholars’ perspective may differ 
on nuances, on whether nationalism can be understood as a reaction to the 
uneven development and class divisions that accompany the novel form of 
production that is industrial capitalism; whether nationalism is an expression of 
an increasingly liberal, literate and educated bourgeoisie that oppose the 
ancient regime of absolutist monarchies, which then makes it inseparably 
interlinked to the idea of the modern, sovereign and inevitably democratic state 
based on a constitutional order rather than royal prerogative; whether it can be 
traced to the Kantian principle of self-determination within the larger context of 
the European Enlightenment propagating individual and societal freedoms; or 
whether nations are a product of social engineering of modern elites in an 
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attempt to homogenize and control the masses,  but what they all share is ‘a 
belief in the inherently national, and nationalist nature of modernity M in this 
view, modernity necessarily took the form of nations and just as inevitably 
produced nationalist ideologies and movements’.77 The modern era is therefore 
inseparably linked to the new ideology of nationalism, to this new form of 
humans organizing themselves in communities and polities grounded in a new 
kind of collective identity, and thereby creating a new global order.  
The final point made here is of particular importance in the context of how 
explanatory IR explains identity and state formation: the concomitance, almost 
equation of modern, sovereign state and nation, where the one is contingent on 
the other in an almost symbiotic relationship. This view is distinctly expressed 
in the definition of nationalism of Ernest Gellner, who famously declared, 
‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and 
the national unit should be congruent’.78 It is even more explicit in the works of 
Anthony Giddens,79 Michael Mann,80 and John Breuilly, where the latter 
stipulated that nationalisms are ‘political movements seeking or exercising 
state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’.81 For him the 
principal of these nationalist arguments, that ‘the nation must be as 
independent as possible, [t]his usually requires at least the attainment of 
political sovereignty’,82 is the defining criterion for a nation.  
In the Kurdish case then, the Kurds failure to achieve statehood is seen as 
a result of their not having progressed far enough on the rocky but supposedly 
redeeming path of modernity. Authors like Hussein Tahiri who repeatedly 
stigmatises Kurdish society as ‘too backward’ and ‘not ready yet’ to constitute a 
nation,83 and Ali Kemal Özcan who identifies ‘“treason” as an inseparable 
element of the Kurdish ethnic personality [sic!]’,84 decry the tribalist 
segmentaristation of Kurdish society and their political leaders’ petty 
particularisms that have lead to birakuji, the interminable series of ‘fratricidal’ 
wars in which Kurdish NLMs are often reduced to proxies of external powers, 
as the root causes for the Kurdish failure to achieve statehood. These scholars, 
mostly though not exclusively Kurdish graduates of ‘Western’ universities and 
thus, often part of the diasporic discourse, appear to vent their personal 
frustrations when they suggest that if only the Kurdish leaders adopt a more 
universalist outlook and the Kurdish people feel and act more in pan-Kurdish 
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solidarity, they may eventually be rewarded with the ultimate prize modernity 
has to offer: statehood. Such normative determinism not only carries forward 
the Orientalism of which Western authors are usually accused,85 denying the 
Kurdish parties autonomous agency and condemning them to perpetual 
victimhood – victims of the tribalist structure they are too ‘backward’ to 
overcome, or pawns of external exploitations and machinations;86 in the 
majority of cases analysed, they are claimed to be a combination of both. What 
is more, the nation’s sole destiny, one may even say its purpose, is reduced to 
acquiring and maintaining sovereign statehood. If it fails in this defining 
objective it is either because of external factors, such as when the forces 
opposing national self-determination prove overwhelming, or because it is 
deemed not sufficiently modern, that is it consequentially does not merit the 
designation as a nation. 
It seems then as if the major difference between primordialism and 
modernism lies in the question, ‘when is a nation?’, and related to that but to a 
lesser degree, ‘what is a nation?’, but that on the question ‘what is a nation’s 
raison d'être?’ both major paradigms are in accordance: the quest for 
sovereign statehood defines the nation in our times. This congruence between 
primordialism and modernism in what the nation ultimately means cannot be 
emphasised strongly enough; it will form the basis for this study’s critical 
reading of how explanatory IR explains ethno-nationalist conflict as implicitly a 
conflict about national self-determination, about an ethnically defined nation 
acquiring sovereign statehood. Before developing this thought further though, 
one needs to turn to the other, related sociological concept that forms the 
theoretical basis of the ethnically defined nation in ethno-nationalist conflicts: 
the ethnic group. 
With a concept as complex as ethnicity that has preoccupied the social 
sciences for at least the better part of the past century and in order to provide a 
solid theoretical foundation for the subsequent critical reading of how 
explanatory IR explains ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict, it seems prudent 
to start with the origins of the concept, to go back to the classic theorists who 
first discussed it. One of the founding fathers of modern sociology, Max Weber, 
famously defined ethnic groups as ‘those human groups that entertain a 
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical 
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type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonisation and 
migration; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood 
relationship exists’.87 This definition is an unambiguous rejection of 
primordialism/essentialism that understands ethnic groups and nations as 
actual forms of extended kinship, as Weber explicitly states further on when 
clarifying that ‘it differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed 
identity’.88 What constitutes the ethnic group then in the truest sense of the 
word is the belief in common descent by the group, and without such belief 
there can be no ethnic group. Like an ideology,89 the group identity is sustained 
by this shared belief system, a belief in common ancestry and kinship bonds 
that is constantly reinforced and reconfirmed by collective memories, 
narratives, symbols, and importantly also political action.90 For Weber 
continues, ‘ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates 
group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere M it is primarily 
the political community, no matter how artificially organised, that inspires the 
belief in common ethnicity’.91 Weber seems to suggest here  
that the belief in common ancestry is likely to be a consequence of collective 
political action rather than its cause; people come to see themselves as belonging 
together M as a consequence of acting together. Collective interests thus do not 
simply reflect or follow from perceived similarities and differences between people; 
the active pursuit of collective interests does, however, encourage ethnic 
identification.92 
 This debate about causes and consequences will be revisited when 
discussing the major differences between the main paradigms of explanatory 
IR and how they conceptualise identity and the social group. 
Since political action does not occur in a social vacuum, this emphasis on 
collective political action, directed inward and outward, as a defining criterion 
for an ethnic group leads to the second classic theoretical contribution to 
understanding ethnicity. In one of the key texts of modern anthropology 
Frederick Barth observes, ‘the critical focus of investigation from this point of 
view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff 
it encloses M If a group maintains its identity when members interact with 
others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling 
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membership and exclusion’.93 Siniša Malešević highlights the importance and 
novelty of Barth’s approach:  
Before Barth, cultural difference was traditionally explained from the inside out – 
social groups posses different cultural characteristics which make them unique and 
distinct M Culture was perceived as something relatively or firmly stable, persistent 
and exact. Cultural difference was understood in terms of a group’s property M 
Barth turned the traditional understanding of cultural difference on its head. He 
defined and explained ethnicity from the outside in: it is not the “possession” of 
cultural characteristics that makes social groups distinct but rather it is the social 
interaction with other groups that makes that difference possible, visible, and 
socially meaningful.94 
Barth thus directs attention away from what he calls ‘cultural stuff’ as 
constitutive of an ethnic group to – drawing on Weber’s collective political 
action – the group setting itself apart from others through interaction with them, 
through interactive processes of differentiation that not only give meaning to 
the others but also to the group itself. ‘Cultural difference per se does not 
create ethnic collectives: it is the social contact with others that leads to 
definition and categorization of an “us” and a “them”’.95 Thus ethnic groups are 
‘in a sense created through that very contact [with other groups]. Group 
identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are not – in 
other words to non-members of the group’.96 In this vein, ethnic identity is 
contextual and circumstantial. What is more constitutive for the process of 
ethnic identification is not the social and cultural features of a perceived group 
but external influences.97 They determine whether a certain form of identity 
matters, that is becomes activated, or remains dormant. These questions of 
identity formation will be further elaborated throughout this first part of the 
study, but for the moment, in order to analyse how explanatory IR 
operationalises these concepts, one may summarise these classic definitions 
of ethnicity as follows: when taking the ethnic group as the unit of analysis in 
explanations of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict, what scholars are 
supposedly actually studying are belief systems constituted through inter-ethnic 
processes of differentiation with others. In this instance the classic texts on 
ethnicity resonate in Benedict Anderson’s conceptualization of the nation as an 
‘imagined community’. For Anderson, the nation is  
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imagined because [its] members will never know most of their fellow-members M 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion M; it is limited because 
even the largest M has finite, if elastic, boundaries beyond which lie other nations 
M; it is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age [of] 
Enlightenment and Revolution M nations dream of being free, and M directly so. 
The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state; finally, it is imagined 
as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship.98 
Given these similarities it must have become apparent by now that the 
ethnic group and the nation are two quite closely related social concepts. As 
has been detailed, both ethnic group and nation are social groups defined by a 
shared belief system or ideology and political action directed inward as well as 
outward. However, from a modernist perspective they fundamentally differ in 
the nature of that political action. As Steve Fenton puts it, ‘“ethnie” shares 
much with “nation” but lacks the sense of self governing entity; if an ethnic 
group (ethnie) wishes to rule itself it needs to start calling itself a nation’.99 A 
similar distinction is made by Barrington who states, ‘a nation is more than an 
ethnic group, differing from such a group because of a nation’s belief in its right 
to territorial control’.100 The two main paradigms, primordialism/essentialism 
and modernism, but the latter in particular, in our contemporary world consider 
the desire for self-government, for national self determination as constitutive for 
a nation, and in the state centric system of modernity, it is argued, such self-
government can only ultimately mean sovereign statehood. The distinguishing 
criterion of the aims of conflict, central to the subsequent reading of how IR 
explains ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict is summed up aptly by Varshney, 
‘ethnic groups M can live without a state of their own, making do with some 
cultural rights (e.g. use of mother tongue in schools) or affirmative action, but 
the nation means bringing ethnicity and statehood together’.101 From a 
modernist perspective then, an ethno-nationalist conflict can therefore be 
understood as a violent conflict between two (or more) ethnically defined 
nations about acquiring sovereign statehood; an ethnic conflict, on the other 
hand, is a political conflict turned violent between two ethnic groups about a 
certain issue, usually political status, that does not necessarily feature 
acquiring statehood as the objective of one party. According to this reading of 
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ethnic and nationalist identities the two categories are not the same, and they 
should not be used interchangeably.  
And yet, although on the whole embracing a modernist understanding of 
nationalism, explanatory IR habitually uses the concepts of ethnic and ethno-
nationalist conflict interchangeably. This is evident in the Kurdish case when for 
example, and in addition to other studies discussed below, Nader Entessar 
entitles his standard work on Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran, and Syria Kurdish Ethnonationalism.102 As will be detailed in Part Two, 
though, of all Kurdish nationalist movements throughout history and in all four 
respective countries only one party, the PKK, pursued a strictly ethno-
nationalist – that is an irredentist and secessionist – agenda with the declared 
objective of creating an independent Kurdish state; all other so called ethno-
nationalist movements sought an accommodation on cultural and political 
rights with the respective central government and within the existing state 
structure. From a strictly modernist perspective then, they should not be called 
ethno-nationalist since their objective was not ‘to bring ethnicity and statehood 
together’;103 sovereign, that is exclusive, territorial control was not part of their 
political program.  
Such inaccuracies of definition mean explanatory IR’s categorizations of 
ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict appear more grounded in ideologically 
based presumptions and normative value judgements than in clearly 
designated criteria; some ethnic groups, often based on their geo-strategic 
importance, are termed a nation, while others are not, long before their 
empowered incumbents have even voiced the desire to become one. Yet by 
doing so, by letting their presumptions about their object of analysis guide their 
categorization, by anticipating ethnic elites’ future demands, these scholars of 
explanatory IR not only reify those demands, they actually write them into 
existence and thus directly intervene in the ethnic conflict they set out to study. 
 Having highlighted this ontological flaw in explanatory IR’s categorization of 
ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict, whose far-reaching consequences will be 
detailed in depth below, I would argue, though, that the exacting modernist 
distinction between ethnic group and nation is analytically untenable in any 
event. In most cases it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to 
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precisely determine the moment when demands for statehood are made for the 
first time – a watershed that, in my opinion, can often only be identified ex post 
– and whether the actor making these demands could claim to speak on behalf 
of the entire community, that is when an ethnic group becomes a nation or an 
ethnic conflict turns ethno-nationalist. If, on the other hand, instead of such 
rigid parameters, ethnic identity and nationhood are understood as socio-
political constructsand therefore by their very nature as dynamic, fluctuant, 
contextual, as ‘points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which 
discursive practices construct for us’,104 that are ‘never a final or settled 
matter’,105 are ‘decentred, fragmented by contradictory discourses and by the 
pull of other identities’,106 there would be no need for such artificial and, as 
suggested, highly normative settings of debatable benchmarks. Ethno-
nationalist demands for statehood or demands for cultural and political rights 
based on an ethnic definition of the community would both be understood as 
expressions of an overall ethnicised discourse, a dynamic discourse that is 
accentuated or attenuated according to context, that can wax and wane 
between maximalist and moderate positions, that changes back and forth with 
circumstance;  a discourse that, contrary to the rigid but inconsistently applied 
distinction used in explanatory IR, can ultimately be understood to be ethnic as 
well as ethno-nationalist precisely because these terms do not denote invariant 
points on a linear trajectory from ethnic group to nation, to statehood – as the 
modernist paradigm would want it to be – but intermittent moments of an 
forever dynamic and never completed discourse. For this reason, in explicit 
refutation of the normative equation of ethnic group with nation and a la longue 
with the state common in explanatory IR discourses, this study has deliberately 
adopted the term ethnic/ethno-nationalist conflict with the caveat of 
emphasising its discursive, instead of clearly demarcated and linearly 
progressing, nature.  In doing so it adheres to what has been said in the 
Introduction, that the goal of a deconstructive approach is not to invent a novel 
terminology or new concepts but to continue using those discussed in their now 
deconstructed form.          
A key question that remains after these introductory deliberations is why, 
when the above discussed classic texts of sociology and anthropology offer so 
clearly a rejection to essentialist understandings of ethnicity, they feature so 
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prominently in common-sense views as well as political and scholarly 
discourses on ethnic/ethno-nationalist  conflict, in particular in the discipline of 
IR. 
 
Groupism 
This question, fundamental to how ethnic conflict is understood and 
explained in IR, can be rephrased to make the inherent problem scholars are 
struggling with more explicit: since the basis of these social groups, ethnic 
group or nation, is a belief system, a form of identity or an ideology, to what 
extent can they then be treated as real, as substantial, and ultimately as actors 
in ethnic conflicts? This question has been problematised extensively over the 
past decade by Rogers Brubaker who uses the term ‘groupism’ to describe the 
tendency in the social sciences to treat social groups as real and substantial. 
Since the groupist challenge to how explanatory IR explains ethnic and ethno-
nationalist conflict informs one of the major points of critique of this study, 
Brubaker’s considerations will be given sufficiently large room here to 
subsequently raise some important caveats to his argument. By groupism he 
means:  
[T]he tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, 
chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis M to 
treat ethnic groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and 
agency can be attributed M to reify such groups , speaking of Serbs, Croats, 
Muslims, Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, of Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland, of Jews and Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories, of 
Turks and Kurds in Turkey, or of Blacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics and Native 
Americans in the United States as if they were internally homogeneous, externally 
bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purpose.107  
But of course we do, one may interject here, since we have just established 
that the common purpose of acquiring sovereign statehood defines a nation, as 
equally do cultural markers such as language, religion, myths, symbols, and 
narratives established as constructed boundaries in interaction with others 
define the ethnic group. But since belief systems are never universally held, 
what then of those members of the group who do not share these markers, 
who do not believe in this common purpose of acquiring sovereign statehood; 
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are they then by definition not members of the group or nation? What about 
those Palestinian Israelis who feel allegiance to the Israeli state instead of a 
potential future Palestinian? What about mixed marriages and their children in 
the United States? What of those Kurds who do not feel that Abdullah Öcalan, 
Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani can speak with authority on their behalf, 
and what about Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the biggest Kurdish guerrilla 
movement, who himself until late in his life only spoke a very broken Kurdish? 
Are they by definition then not Palestinian, Black, White, Hispanics, or Kurds, 
because they do not share these cultural markers or beliefs? In his critique of 
groupism Brubaker then not only highlights the fact that identities in the real 
social world are never as clear cut as some theories would have them to be – 
that in itself should be considered common sense in the twenty-first century, 
but unfortunately all too often is not, and will be discussed in great detail in 
chapter four – but rises the equally important question of representation. For 
what he criticises is not how these individuals are seen by other members of 
the group and how they are categorised within that ethnic group or nation, but 
how we supposedly detached social scientists deal with them.  
To be sure, for ethnic elites homogeneity, group cohesion and solidarity and 
the undivided allegiance of its members to the ethnic principle is as much a 
defining criterion as the polarizing principles of identity formation based on ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ dichotomies. As a matter of fact they not only complement but 
constitute each other, based on the principle ‘amity inside, enmity outside’.108 A 
similar point was already made by Sampson, when ‘any increase in group 
cohesion seems to be gained at the price of heightened hostility towards 
outgroups’.109 Kecmanovic elaborates:  
The fact is that the identification of the group enemy smoothes, buffers, or 
completely neutralises intragroup antagonisms. Discriminative aggressiveness 
against strangers and the strengthening of bonds among group members go hand 
in hand and mutually reinforce each other. One might even say that there is no 
closeness within the group without an enemy from without the group.110  
To be sure, this understanding of identity based on difference, even enmity, 
made most explicit in Julia Kristeva’s famous assertion that the exclusion of 
others ‘binds the identity of a clan, a sect, a party, or a nation’, being both at 
the same time, ‘the source of the pleasure of identification (“this is what we are, 
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therefore this is what I am”), and of barbaric persecution (“that is foreign to me, 
therefore I throw it out, hunt it down, or massacre it”)’,111 is not without 
controversy or disagreement and will be taken up again in chapter four. For the 
moment it is important to record that such ‘strategic esstentialisms’ in the 
terminology of Gayatri Spivak,112 are understandable, even normal in an 
ethnicised discourse. The use of an essentialised version of oneself – 
individual or group – for the sake of self-representation in order to achieve 
political gains, while not without internal and external controversy, is part of 
their job description. In the eyes of ethno-nationalist elites, unity, or at least 
maintaining the pretence of it, is the single most important goal and interest 
that constitutes and defines a nation or ethnic community. Yet strategic 
essentialism should not be understood as fake, as theatrical performance, as 
nothing but a show put on to mend internal fences, as I often encountered in 
discussions. Since those ethnic elites often have grown up within an already 
heavily ethnicised discourse and among cultural markers such as myths of 
origin or narratives of ancient hatreds between groups in which they genuinely 
believe, a phenomenon Anthony Smith calls the ‘participants’ primordialism’,113 
these essentialisms, while strategically employed, may appear thoroughly 
normal to them, as the natural way things are and are meant to be. And even if 
they did not share all of these notions, it is not difficult to see how the role they 
perform every day, propagating these beliefs of unity, cohesion, solidarity, and 
common purpose, can readily translate into a habitus. While such 
preconditions and transformations are easily traceable, ‘for Spivak the 
concomitant risk is that the essentialist use of master [concepts] such as 
woman, worker or nationalist to mobilize the disempowered groups may ossify 
into a fixed identity’.114 If ethnic group formation is based on an ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ dichotomy, on politics of differentiation, and on maintaining and 
reconstituting cultural boundaries in an ethnicised discourse, these politics 
typically involve acts of exclusion, not only against the easily identifiable other, 
but also against those within the group that do not fully share the group’s 
essentialised beliefs, a process of segregation that ultimately has them 
becoming part of the other. Such acts of separation, one may say, are the 
lamentable but nonetheless commonplace product of identity politics or an 
ethnicised discourse. 
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Yet, for us social scientists, our requirements like our aims, should be 
different. 
Ethnic common sense – the tendency to partition the social world into putatively 
deeply constituted, quasi-natural intrinsic kinds M is a key part of what we want to 
explain, not what we want to explain things with; it belongs to our empirical data, 
not to our analytical toolkit M We obviously cannot ignore such commonsense 
primordialism. But that does not mean we should simply replicate it in our scholarly 
analysis or policy assessments.115  
When we scholars uncritically accept the rhetoric of ethno-nationalist elites, 
we run the risk of becoming complicit in their attempts to ethnicise the 
discourse. If we scholars, rather than calling it into question, adopt the ethnic or 
nationalists elites’ strategic essentialism as the basis of our enquiries or take on 
‘categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis’,116 we 
contribute to the reification and substantialisation of the those elites’ 
primordialism and to the reproduction of its logic.117 To be sure,  
as analysts we should certainly try to account for the ways in which – and the 
conditions under which this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of 
group feeling, can work. But we should avoid unintentionally doubling or reinforcing 
the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such 
groups in social analysis.118  
In sum, and to put not too fine a point on it, one may conclude, while ethnic 
elites, by essentialising the group they claim to represent, are acting within the 
confines of their supposed social roles, we as scholars and analysts, by 
subscribing to their claims without challenging these strategic essentialisms fail, 
I would argue, in our duty to critically analyse them; and it is this failure that is 
the main point of critique of this study. 
 
The neo-realist and neo-liberal paradigms 
I would further argue that explanatory IRis particularly prone to such 
groupist practice. In explanatory IR’s approaches to ethnicity the essentialist 
and substantialist presumptions of groupism manifest themselves on three 
levels: (1) operationalising ethnicity as the dependent or independent variable 
and therewith according it with limited or pre-eminent explanatory power, (2) 
46 
 
equating ethnic groups with states, and (3), as a consequence thereof, all too 
often equating ethnic conflict with ethno-nationalist conflict by postulating that a 
desire for sovereign statehood of a disenfranchised group is the cause of the 
conflict at hand and the disenfranchised group’s aspiration. As will be shown 
throughout this study these levels and the inherent presumptions that inform 
them lead to the reification of ethnicised discourses, politicised ethnicity, ethnic 
divisions, and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies that often form the basis of 
ethnicised discourses. The practice of groupism in explanatory IR on these 
three levels will be discussed at great length in the following chapter, but for the 
moment it seems imperative to offer a broad overview of the main arguments 
and points of critique made in this study.  
Concurrent with or instigated by Brubaker’s critique, scholars have 
problematised the quantification of ethnicity in large n-studies on intra- and/or 
inter-state conflicts – usually based on record sets such as Ted Robert Gurr’s 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) project or the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) 
dataset – that operationalise the ethnic group as their unit of analysis as if it 
were a substantial entity and not a socio-political construct, and in consequence 
explain its actions as derivative of the fact that ethnicity is the element defining 
and cohering the group.119 In such studies, the action of the respective parties, 
antagonistic or collaborative – the dependent variable – is a function of their 
being part of an ethnic group – the independent variable – and follows and 
reifies the same ethnicised logic: a logic of presupposed internal homogeneity, 
cohesion, solidarity, unity, and common purpose in opposition to the 
constructed other, that is groups of the same qualities yet of a different ethnic 
ascription. What is particularly conspicuous here is that these simplistic and 
essentialist approaches that operationalise ethnicity as the independent variable 
in explaining ethnic conflicts and by implication accept the conversion of 
ethnicity as the independent into the determining variable; that is ultimately, if 
groupist-think is brought to its tautological conclusion, ethnic and ethno-
nationalist conflicts are explained with ethnicity. An illustration of such flawed 
and potentially harmful reasoning would be the infamous ‘ancient hatreds’ 
Robert Kaplan claims to have identified as the root cause for conflicts of the 
1990s in the Balkans.120 
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The second dimension of groupism and the selection of the ethnic group as 
unit of analysis in the study of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict is the belief in 
the unitary actor. ‘Although participants’ rhetoric and commonsense accounts 
treat ethnic groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief 
protagonists of most ethnic conflict M are not ethnic groups as such but various 
kinds of organizations M and their empowered and authorized incumbents’.121 
These organizations, in the broadest sense, can be states and autonomous 
polities that can be further subdivided into branches of government, ministries, 
political parties law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the armed forces, 
etc.; they can be insurgencies, paramilitary groups, terrorist organizations, 
armed bands and gangs, etc.; they can also include social movement 
organizations, NGOs, churches and other religious communities, unions and 
advocacy groups, various branches of the media, in the widest sense even 
loosely structured Facebook groups. But these organizations  
cannot be equated with ethnic groups. It is because and insofar as they are 
organizations, and posses certain material and organizational resources, that they 
(or more precisely their incumbents) are capable of organized action, and thereby 
of acting as more or less coherent protagonists in ethnic conflict. Although common 
sense and participants’ rhetoric attribute discrete existence, boundedness, 
coherence, identity, interest, and agency to ethnic groups, these attributes are in 
fact characteristic of organizations.122 
 In sum, Brubaker holds that the actors in ethnic conflict are not ethnic 
groups but individuals and organizations who ethnicise the political discourse. 
For, echoing Weber and Barth, ethnicity is a belief system, a way of seeing the 
world, a point of view of these individuals and organizations but not substantially 
real, or only real as part of a discourse and for as long as they are imagined, 
believed in. ‘In this sense identity does not, and cannot, make people do 
anything; it is, rather, people who make and do identity, for their own reasons 
and purposes’.123 Consequently, social groups ‘do not have the same 
ontological status as individuals. Human individuals are actual entities; groups 
are not. They cannot behave or act, and they do not have a definitive, bounded, 
material existence in time and space’.124 
The fallacy of essentialist simplifications of treating ethnic groups as unitary 
actors, of according them a definitive, bounded, and material existence, may be 
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better illustrated with a short analogy from IR’s second image, the state, with 
which explanatory IR notoriously equates ethnic groups. Take, for example, the 
statement, ‘in 2003 the United Kingdom went to war with Iraq’ which could 
appear superficially speaking correct. Given the fact, though, that in the crucial 
House of Commons debate on 18 March, 149 MPs opposed the government 
motion to go to war – the largest parliamentary opposition to a government 
motion in almost two hundred years – that three ministers of PM Blair’s cabinet 
resigned in protest over it, that in London alone one million protestors went into 
the streets on 15 February to demonstrate against the war – the biggest public 
rally in the city’s history – and how the decision to go to war has troubled and 
divided British society ever since,125 it would certainly be more accurate to 
couch these events in terms along the lines of, ‘in 2003 the British government 
under Prime Minister Tony Blair succeeded, amidst sizeable opposition, in 
effectively using its dominance of the political and public discourse to push 
through a motion in parliament to commit British troops to toppling the Ba’athist 
regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq’. If it is already problematic, as the example 
illustrates, to speak of a state as a unitary actor, it is even less tenable to do so 
with an ethnic group that usually lacks the democratic decision making bodies 
of a state and where often an insurgency with a questionable and autocratic 
Führerkult, such as the PKK, claims to exclusively represent the group.  
And yet for neo-realists in IR, not unlike ethnic elites, one may say in 
admittedly simplified terms, national cohesion is supposed to be a pre-given not 
further questioned. Not only do domestic politics rarely matter, and sovereign 
nation states are perceived and treated like a ‘black box’,126 as unitary, rational 
actors in an anarchic international system. This focus on the ‘third image’ of 
realism in IR, the structure of the international system, at the expense of the 
other two, the individual and the state, has not always been the case. On the 
contrary, they feature prominently in the writings of such classic realist thinkers 
as Machiavelli and Hobbes and are still given ample room in Kenneth Waltz’ 
Man, the State, and War.127 This changed, though, with his Theory of 
International Politics,128 which, together with Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical 
Society,129 is widely considered to be the founding text of structural or neo-
realism. In it Waltz posits that differences between states ‘are of capability, not 
function’,130 and that ‘international politics consists of like units duplicating one 
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another’s activities’.131 What matters from this perspective are no longer the 
different characters of actors in the international system – they are seen as 
quintessentially the same, as ‘like units’, and egoistic maximizers of material 
interests – but the anarchic nature of the international system, and what forms 
of behaviour this anarchic structure induces. With this narrow lens on 
international relations becoming salient in the 1970s questions of identity, that is 
the character of actors in the international system, have become neglected in 
explanatory IR to our discipline’s detriment.132 In sum, with domestic factors and 
the identity of actors considered irrelevant, neo-realism perceives of the state as 
a unitary, substantive, distinct, homogeneous, bounded actor in the international 
system, thus, when equating them with states, reifying the politics of ethnic 
division of ethno-nationalist elites,133 echoing what has been identified earlier as 
groupism. One of the most eminent critics of neo-realism, Richard Ashley,  
wrote about neo-realism’s tendency for reification:  
The state must be treated as an unproblematic unity: an entity whose existence, 
boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimacies, interests, and 
capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated as a given, independent 
of transnational class and human interests, and undisputed (except, perhaps by 
other states).134 
I argue that the same tendency for reification, and therewith groupism, also 
characterises neo-realism’s approach to ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict. In 
one classic reader on IR theory, groupism is even declared to be one of the 
‘three core assumptions’ on which the (neo-)realist school of thought is based: 
Groupism: Humans face one another mainly as members of groups M people need 
the cohesion provided by group solidarity, yet that very same in-group cohesion 
generates the potential for conflict with other groups. Today the most important human 
groups are nation states, and the most important source of in-group cohesion is 
nationalism.135 
Neo-realism and neo-liberalismstill enjoy considerable influence in 
explanatory IR. Interestingly, neo-liberalism originated from a pluralist critique of 
structural or neo-realism that took issue with its conceptualization of states as 
unitary and rational actors and strove to give the role of transnational and non-
state actors greater room in analysis.136 These pluralistic traditions were 
relegated to the background, though, in Robert Kehoane and Joseph Nye’s 
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Power and Interdependence137 that tried to play neo-realism at its own game by 
on the one hand adopting the neo-realist tenet of the state as the unitary actor, 
yet on the other to demonstrate via ‘regime theory’ that cooperation between 
states in an anarchic international structure not is only possible but, drawing on 
the theory of Kant’s ‘liberal zones of peace’, actually quite common – an 
intellectual thrust that was further fleshed out in Stephen Krasner’s International 
Regimes138 and Robert Kehoane’s After Hegemony .139 ‘Neoliberalism’, then,  
is a variant of liberal IR theory that focuses on the role international institutions play 
in obtaining international collective outcomes M In order to examine international 
cooperation, neo-liberalism subscribes to a state-centric perspective which, like 
structural realism, considers states to be unitary, rational, utility-maximizing actors 
M that is, states are treated as unified entities with particular, specific goals rather 
than composites of many different domestic actors and competing interests.140 
 That means, like for neo-realists, that the sovereign nation state in the 
anarchic international system is the main unit of analysis for scholars in the neo-
liberal paradigm, yet unlike neo-realists and echoing somewhat the classic 
liberal/pluralist tradition, the importance of the domestic decision making 
process is at least acknowledged. As has been pointed out though, this 
acknowledgement amounts to very little since domestic pluralism is confined to 
a homogenizing corset of hierarchical decision making that, in the end, has the 
state speaking with one voice in the international arena in the rational pursuit of 
its national self-interest; the state may not be a unitary actor but its policies are 
ultimately unitary. ‘Despite their willingness to rely on domestic level 
explanations and a more inclusive set of actor types than realists do, most 
neoliberals also tacitly adhere to a reified approach to agency’.141 Indeed, the so 
called ‘neo-neo debate’ between neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the 1980s, 
more than their differences, highlighted the similarities between both paradigms, 
in particular their state-centrism and rigorous empiricist positivism.142 In the 
words of Lacher, ‘no aspect, of the neorealist/neoliberal mainstream of 
International Relations scholarship, apart perhaps from its positivist orientation, 
has provoked its critics more than the commitment to the analytical centrality of 
the state in the study of world politics’.143 Given the attempts from scholars of 
both paradigms in the 1980s to explicitly generate a common epistemological 
and ontological ground,144 I concur with Wæver who rather than a ‘neo-neo 
debate’ identifies a ‘neo-neo synthesis’ with state-centrism and the 
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conceptualization of the state as a unitary actor among the defining 
commonalities.145 In sum,  
what is clear is that neoliberals and neorealists are much closer together than their 
neo-neo forebears [classic realism and liberalism] M the “neos” both rest their 
position on what are taken to be the facts of anarchy and the rational egoism of 
states M certainly the two positions are close enough to be seen as offering 
different understandings of what is essentially the same (rational choice) research 
programme.146 
In conclusion, whether states or ethnic groups at the unit of analysis level, 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism in IR treat both as rational, unitary – or unitarily 
acting – agents in pursuit of self-interests in a predominantly hostile 
international system.147 In the case of ethnic groups, ethnic conflict is explained 
through the lens of groupism, that is group cohesion, group solidarity and the 
portrayal of the ethnic group, like a state, as a unitary actor. Kenneth Bush 
observes:  
Communal groups are represented as the functional equivalent of states: unitary, 
power-seeking (M) actors in a Hobbesian world In other words, communal groups 
are viewed as being analogous to the state epistemologically and ontologically. Like 
states, such groups are seen to constitute stable and unified entities, and to act as 
coherent and separate totalities.148 
Drawing on the famous billiard ball analogy, originally coined by Arnold 
Wolfers,149 that illustrates how explanatory IR theory has focused exclusively at 
the ‘third image’, the international system’, at the expense of the ‘second 
image’, the domestic composition of states – in a billiard game what matters are 
not the individual properties of the balls, which essentially are the same, but 
their external dimension, their interaction with each other – Bush argues that 
explanatory IR theory in its analysis of ethnic conflict has simply made the new 
unit of analysis fit its already existing epistemological and ontological 
framework.150 
Thus, the billiard ball model, which is based on relations between separate states 
as unified entities, now includes interethnic group relations, each of which 
constitutes a unified and separate totality – that is, self-contained and self-
propelling entities. In effect, realism simply adds the notion of ethnic identity to its 
basic assumption that the position of a collectivity, whether it be a state or a group, 
in an anarchical system is the primary causal variable in the area of security.151 
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As will be discussed at great length in the following chapter, the examples 
of the two main explanatory frameworks neo-realism and neo-liberalism in IR 
have contributed to the study of ethnic conflict – Barry Posen’s ethnic security 
dilemma and David Davis and Will Moore’s ethnic alliance model – attest to this 
presumption. Davis and Moore, for example, state ‘we contend that it is useful 
to conceptualise ethnic linkages among people across state boundaries as 
functionally equivalent to alliances between states’,152 and ‘these alliances 
should behave much as alliances between states have been hypothesized to 
behave in international relations’.153 
As for the third level of groupism in explanatory IR, the equation of ethnic 
conflict with ethno-nationalist conflict and postulating a pursuit of national self-
determination, understood as gaining independence and sovereign statehood, 
here neo-realism and neo-liberalism share the essentialist determinism of 
modernism elaborated above. Again, for two paradigms so inseparably wed to a 
normative and deterministic state centrism as neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
that routinely equate ethnic groups with states in their analysis, it is not at all 
surprising that they often erroneously reduce ethnic conflict to a mere pursuit of 
sovereign statehood. Before elaborating this thought further when discussing 
sovereignty and state centrism in IR in greater detail it is imperative to turn our 
attention to the third major paradigm of explanatory IR: constructivism and its 
approach to ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict. 
 
The pitfalls of too narrow a constructivism 
All that has been discussed here so far could easily be interpreted as 
making a case for a constructivist understanding of identity. Unquestionably 
there are profound merits to a constructivist reading of ethnic conflict, primarily 
because constructivism, in contrast to the materialist rationalism of neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism, puts the identity of the subject at the centre of its analysis. 
Constructivism was first and foremost born out of a critique of materialist 
rationalism ,154 replacing its above detailed ‘logic of consequences’, that is a 
group’s rational pursuit of a goal for the maximization of an, in the widest sense, 
materialistically defined interest, with a ‘logic of  appropriateness’, that is the 
pursuit of interests that are seen as a function of the subject’s identity shaped 
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by beliefs, shared values, norms, and through practices and interaction with 
others. While neo-realism and neo-liberalism assume the identity of the subject 
of their analysis at large as resulting from those interests, as a pre-given not 
worth much further reflection since, in simplified terms, ‘we are who we are 
because of what we want’, constructivists advocate the exact opposite: ‘we 
want what we want because of who we are’, or in the words of Alexander 
Wendt, the pioneer of constructivism in IR, ‘interests presuppose identities 
because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since 
identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests’.155  And who 
we are, is ‘shaped by the cultural, social, and political – as well as material – 
circumstances in which [we] are embedded’,156 that is, first and foremost 
through our interaction with others in a social relationship, and how we give 
meaning to things, and implicitly ourselves, through dialogue, through ‘collective 
interpretations, practices, and institutions’157 that result in norms and become 
institutionalised. ‘A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that 
people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings 
that the objects have for them,’;158 yet these meanings or ideas, and the 
practices that follow from them, are not only contextual and situational, that is 
they can change over time and space; they are also ‘not so much mental as 
symbolic and organizational, they are embedded not only in human brains but 
also in the “collective memories”, government procedures, educational systems, 
and the rhetoric of statecraft’.159 They are, in sum, ‘social facts, rather than 
purely material ones, that exist because of the meaning and value attributed to 
them’.160 And if ideas and meanings are socially constructed, so are identities 
and consequently also interests, which they inform; an insight that corresponds 
with the classics on ethnic identity of Weber and Barth discussed earlier.  
The role of identity is key to the constructivist approach to society, and its 
pioneer in IR, Alexander Wendt conceptualized four forms of identity.161 The 
first, role identity, has no intrinsic properties but derives its meaning from 
interaction with others, as elaborated above, and in accord with Barth. ‘Only 
through recognition can people acquire and maintain a distinct identity. One 
becomes a Self, in short, via the Other’.162 This mutual recognition co-
constitutive of self and other leads to generalizations of self and other and to the 
second form of identity Wendt calls collective identity, where the meanings and 
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properties of ‘a generalized Other [form] part of their understanding of [a 
generalized] Self’.163 Again, the process of identification occurs through 
differentiation, but on this second level on a wider basis that extends beyond 
the original group to similar selves via different others; for example the 
perception of NATO as a military alliance of democratic states within a certain 
region in juxtaposition to non-democratic states that do not adhere to the 
principles of human rights, etc..164 This example is particularly applicable in light 
of the importance constructivists give to norms in processes of identity 
formation, what has been above called a ‘logic of appropriateness’, where ‘what 
is rational is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within 
institutions or other social structures’.165 The third and fourth level, type identity 
and corporate identity, are grounded in Wendt’s distinction between ‘social 
terms of individuality’ and ‘individuality per se’,166 where he identifies certain 
properties of identity that are claimed to be pre-social. Those are called 
corporate identities with intrinsic values and ‘self-organizing, homeostatic 
structures that make actors distinct entities’,167 an essence or core of identities 
that these entities ‘in all times and places have in common’,168 yet that only 
derive a wider meaning in the social context through interaction and 
intersubjective understanding, and as such are contingent. ‘The former [social 
terms of identity] refers to the features of the Self that depend on recognition by 
the Other M The latter connotes to the self-organizing properties of the entity, 
existing independent of and prior to the social system’.169 It is the last forms of 
identity that turn out most problematic in Wendt’s framework since they 
evidently contradict the first three levels and, to a certain extent, the entire 
constructivist concept of identities as social constructs.170  
On the surface, though, the constructivist challenge to the essentialist and 
materialist rationalism of neo-realism and neo-liberalism is formidable and its 
key tenets are claimed today to be ‘largely internalized in the discipline of IR’.171 
In recapitulation, they are: (1) the social constructiveness of ideas, meanings, 
norms, identities, and interests; (2) a sound rejection of rationalism and 
positivism, since, if the above are social facts, they are difficult to measure 
empirically and it is impossible to clearly distinguish between facts and values; 
(3) an adjustment of the structure-bias of neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
towards a more balanced understanding of the interplay between agency and 
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structure in the analysis of the social world. In his groundbreaking critique of 
neo-realist and neo-liberal conceptualizations of the inherently anarchic 
international system, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, Wendt declares: 
Self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy 
and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not 
structure. There is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and 
instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure 
has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics 
are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of 
it.172 
Here and in an earlier essay173 Wendt, drawing on Gidden’s theory of 
structuration,174 takes great pains to ‘make the actual behaviour and properties 
of states “problematic” rather than simply accepting them as a given’175 and to 
demonstrate how ‘a social structure leaves more space for agency, that is for 
the individual or state to influence their environment, as well as to be influenced 
by it’.176 This is to say that in refutation of the Waltzian neo-realist dictum of ‘the 
structure as an independent force external to the acting unit’,177 of the structure 
determining the actors, Wendt portrays them as mutually constitutive, as the 
product of the inter-subjective interaction between actors on a structural level. In 
sum, agents and structures have ‘equal ontological status’.178 It therefore seems 
patently reasonable when Lars-Erik Cederman claims that, in contrast to neo-
realism and neo-liberalism, ‘to find exceptions from reified actors [in IR], one 
has to turn to M constructivist theory’ and in particular the writings of Alexander 
Wendt.179 
Alas, the very opposite is the case. In fact, what is often called a 
‘systemic’,180 ‘thin’,181 after its key theorist, Wendtian, or in this study, narrow 
constructivism arguably may become as guilty of essentialising and of reifying 
the actor as its neo-realist and neo-liberal counterparts. The reason for this 
tendency lies in the above mentioned fourth level of Wendt’s conceptualization 
of identity that openly contradicts the previous three. This contradiction stems 
from Wendt’s attempts to charter a ‘media via’182 through the debate between 
what is commonly referred to in IR as ‘rationalists’ and ‘reflectivist’, to carve out 
for constructivism a ‘true middle ground’ between these two approaches,183 ‘to 
bridge the still vast divide separating the majority of IR theorists from 
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postmodernists’,184 by combining a positivist epistemology with a post-positivist 
ontology – an experiment in having it both ways that inevitably has to fail, 
leading Maja Zehfuss to conclude, ‘Wendt’s constructivism does not work’.185 
The crux of the problem with Wendt’s balancing act on identity is that he 
conceives of state identity as at the same time constructed and changeable, as 
an expression of role, collective, and type identity, but also as a pre-social, pre-
given stable corporate identity, and after having spent literally hundreds of 
pages in Social Theory of International Politics elaborating that identities 
resulting from social interaction are more basic than interests, he declares that 
he is less interested in ‘state identity formation’ than in the workings of the state 
system, ‘the structure and effects of states (or “international”) systems’,186 
where states have essential properties ‘prior to and independent from social 
context’, thus not ‘considering the constitution of states in the first place’.187 
From this perspective, it is impossible to explain how fundamental changes occur, 
either in the nature of international society or in the nature of state identity. By 
bracketing everything domestic, Wendt excludes by theoretical fiat most of the 
normative and ideational forces that might prompt such change.188 
 Ultimately, in effect then, Wendt’s narrow constructivism does not differ 
much in its rationalist positivist and state-centric meta-narrative on identity from 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism. 
Wendt’s flip-flopping on identity has confused scholars and students of IR 
ever since then, but Christian Reus-Smit errs when he critically remarks that 
‘Wendt’s writings represent the only true form of this rarefied example of 
constructivism’.189 On the contrary, voicing a commitment to the constructed 
nature of identity but then proceeding to treat identities as relatively stable pre-
givens, thus refusing to incorporate in their ontologies what the social 
constructedness of identities actually means, that they are the product of social 
discourses and that there cannot be identities prior to these discourses, is a 
tendency strikingly common in the social sciences. This ‘clichéd 
constructivism’,190 a constructivism in name only – limited to the introductory 
section of texts or expressed in customary yet seemingly perfunctory 
disclaimers – but where the main analysis, at large, continues to be done under 
essentialist and substantialist presumptions of ethnic identities, often bordering 
a primordialism slipping in through the backdoor, is particularly pervasive in 
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explanatory IR’s writings on ethnic conflict. This becomes for example evident in 
a series of recent prominent large n-studies based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations data set at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the related 
Ethnic Armed Conflict data set at Harvard University.191 Not only is it telling that 
the GeoSim agent-based models developed by Lars-Erik Cederman that form 
the core of his team’s survey of ethnic conflicts was first developed to simulate 
interstate relations, similar presumptions about unitarily acting ethnic groups 
that form the basis of neo-realist/neo-liberal readings of ethnic conflict and 
group solidarity also characterise these n-studies’ narrow constructivist 
understanding of ethnic identity. On the one hand the authors want ethnicity to 
be understood as ‘a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a 
belief in common ancestry and shared culture’, that is socially constructed, but 
then proceed to caution, ‘we do not distinguish between degrees of 
representativity of political actors who claim to speak for an ethnic group, nor do 
we code the heterogeneity of political positions of leaders claiming to represent 
the same community’;192 thus the authors, like Wendt, not only bracket the 
‘domestic component’, i.e. the social discourse that brought about these ethnic 
identities, but further their studies, like neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches, 
treat ethnic groups as unitary actors and indirectly equate them ontologically 
with states. In a nutshell, they share the same meta-narrative.193 
Such ‘clichéd constructivism’ becomes also distinctly manifest in a school of 
thought commonly referred to as instrumentalism that I locate at the transition 
from (neo-)realism to constructivism.194 Here, the image of the nation as an 
‘imagined community’ and of identity as a social construct is taken a step further 
towards an ‘invented tradition’ in the Hobsbawmian sense,195 of identity having 
ultimately no intrinsic and little explanatory value. In the instrumentalist 
understanding of ethnicity, ethnic identities, 
are creations of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials 
from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent, in order to protect their well 
being or existence, or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups and 
for themselves.196 
Analogous to Alexander Wendt’s narrow constructivism, subsumed under 
the catchphrase ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, one may characterize 
instrumentalism as subscribing to the slogan ‘ethnicity is what ethnic elites 
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make of it’. They exploit ‘national traditions’ they have ‘invented’ for their own 
avails and to rally the masses to their leadership.197 In sum, in the eyes of 
instrumentalists, culture is reduced to a means to consolidate and homogenise 
societies; ethnic communities are merely ‘informally organised interest 
groups’;198 and ethnicity is nothing but a replaceable political tool, a resource; 
there is nothing particular, nothing fundamental about it as any ‘old shred and 
patch would have served as well’.199 This modernism, carried to extremes, is 
grounded in the classic elite theories of Robert Michels,200 Gaetano Mosca,201 
and Vilfredo Pareto.202 Here, a view of society determined by a strict 
hierarchical order of a minority, disproportionately drawn ‘from upper-status 
occupations and privileged family backgrounds’,203 dominating a largely 
apathetic majority that subordinates to authority, is presented; an order that in 
its essence remains stable through time as it constitutes the most basic 
principle of society and is neither fundamentally altered by social change nor 
form of government. According to Pareto, the ruling minority, the oligarchy or 
elite, is distinguished by having the ‘highest indices in their branch of activity’, 
that is they rise well above the average in their education, accomplishments, 
wealth, and organisational ability that allows them to transform their common 
will into action; a cohesive, bureaucratic organisation that first established with 
the purpose of attaining a certain objective, becomes an end in itself and 
persists and governs to justify and maintain its own existence.204  
Instrumentalism therefore exhibits a tendency to also presume of the ethnic 
group as a static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous and bounded unit and as 
a unitary actor, and like neo-realism, concedes to ethnicity no explanatory value 
in itself since it is merely seen as a political tool of elite manipulation for elites to 
justify political actions ex post. These ethnic or ethno-national elites are egoistic 
interest and profit maximizers who base their actions on tactical and strategic 
considerations and cost-benefit analyses – the most important for an elite 
obviously being to stay in power; they determine their policies ‘first based on 
tactical dictates, and then look to their identity repertoire for characteristics M 
that would allow for the construction of justifying narratives.’ Yet, echoing 
Gellner, ‘when power considerations call for it, these [well-worn narratives], 
communities and traditions will be cast aside and new ones imagined in their 
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place’,205 rendering identities always subordinate to material interests and easily 
replaceable. 
The problems with such a simplistic understanding of how identity works are 
obvious. First, instrumentalism’s logic is not only circulatory and tautological, it 
also fails to explain why and how these ‘invented traditions’ and constructed 
narratives ethnic and ethno-national elites employ to justify their policies would 
resonate with the masses, how the feelings of communality and solidarity that 
constitute them as a group came about in the first place or, echoing Benedict 
Anderson, to capture ‘the fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two 
centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die 
for such limited imaginings’.206 In instrumentalism, the masses are treated as 
‘passive creatures prone to easy manipulation M they are largely viewed as 
homogeneous, ignorant, dependent conglomerates, with child-like qualities’.207 
At best then, the social reductionism of instrumentalism, by simply 
presupposing Wendt’s corporate identity or the like as a pre-given order of 
things elites then exploit for their own ends, can be understood as neo-realism 
with a small constructivist caveat: ideational factors and identities only matter in 
the egoistic pursuit of material interests as far as identity and culture are 
reduced to politics and how they can be studied as such. Consequently, many 
instrumentalists, like neo-realists, founder with their ontological explanations as 
to how it is tenable to treat ethnic groups as their unit of analysis and their 
theories ‘are epistemologically and conceptually too thin, M incomplete, and as 
such unable to provide a more comprehensive theory of ethnic relations’.208 
What is more, if ethnicity and ethnic groups are only what ethnic and ethno-
nationalist elites make of them, such narrow constructivism, as has been 
pointed out in IR,209 runs risk of again indirectly reifying the structure via the 
agent. A narrow constructivism ‘fails to deliver on its promise to take us beyond 
reification, because in order to escape the reified logic of anarchy, it reifies the 
state’.210 Applied to ethnic identities this sort of constructivism and related 
approaches such as too narrow an instrumentalism, in order to escape the logic 
of essentialised groups, reify the ethnic elites and thus indirectly their strategic 
essentialisms by making them omnipotent, by, paraphrasing the title of Nicholas 
Onuf’s famous constructivist work,211 rendering ethnic identity discourses a 
world exclusively of their making. Thus, the outcome of the challenge of such 
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narrow constructivism to the essentialisms of the neo-neo synthesis ironically all 
too often runs risk of repeating the mistakes of neo-liberalism: the importance 
and plurality of internal actors, such as elites, is acknowledged, yet by declaring 
these actors omnipotent in shaping the ethnicised discourse, by reifying them 
and conceding to them an exclusivity of representation, those actors are 
portrayed again as if acting unitarily. In essence, in its ‘clichéd constructivism’ 
and by making similar presumptions about unitarily acting ethnic groups that 
form the basis of neo-realist and neo-liberal readings of ethnic conflict and 
group solidarity too narrow a constructivism and instrumentalism, again purport 
a very similar meta-narrative to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, one it originally 
set out to challenge. 
A more nuanced approach to ethnic identity and what is essentially still an 
instrumentalist reading thereof is offered by Daniel Posner, whose team studied 
electoral systems, voting patterns, and ethnic diversity in relation to economic 
growth and public goods provision in several Central African countries.212 The 
main merits of Posner’s findings in relation to this study is that he puts equal 
weight on analysing the motives behind political action of the masses as of 
elites playing the ethnic card. In his approach, the constituents of elites are no 
longer passive victims of elite manipulation; instead he shows them to be as 
instrumentalist as the elites in their utilization of ethnicity as a political tool to 
attain an improvement of their position. Second, he portrays identities as 
contextual, putting emphasis on ‘ethnicity as fluid and situation bound’, as 
‘rather than being hard wired with a single ethnic identity, individuals posses 
repertoirs of identities whose relevance wax and wane with changes in 
context’.213 In his conceptualization of identity ethnicity is but one of a variety of 
identities elites and their constituents can draw on, operationalise, and 
instrumentalise in pursuit of their material or ideational interests, although 
Posner clearly has more to say on the former than the latter. Yet, in sharp 
contrast to Christia’s deterministic instrumentalism, where, ‘when power 
considerations call for it, these [well-worn narratives], communities and 
traditions will be cast aside and new ones imagined in their place’,214 Posner 
highlights the limits to how easily elites can ‘imagine’ new forms of identity by 
reminding us that they can only resort to an already pre-existing repertoire of 
identities and not simply ‘imagine new ones’.  
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By juxtaposing Christia’s approach with Posner’s it becomes evident why I 
have localized instrumentalism at the transition from realism to constructivism. 
In Christia’s case, an individual or group’s identity clearly is a function of their 
interests, and identity itself is reduced to a political tool, whereas for Posner, for 
whom ethnic identity is ‘an admission card for membership to a coalition of 
particular size and a source of information about the political coalitions to which 
others belong’,215 one’s interests also determine what form of identity is 
employed in a given context, yet the repertoire of identities at one’s disposal, 
although fluid and alternating, is limited, which puts ‘his’ instrumentalism closer 
to the constructivist tenet of identies shaping interests. He contends that, ‘when 
I assert that individuals are able to change their identities strategically in 
response to situational incentives, I am not claiming that people can choose any 
identity they want. Their choices are limited to the identities that are in their 
repertoire’,216 which suggests identies pre-existent to interests. A similar point is 
made by Susan Olzak who reminds us of the limits to identity claims since 
‘ethnic mobilization expressed through ethnic conflict and protest requires 
commitment to a particular identity over some extended time period (and costs 
may rise with levels of commitment)’.217 Again, this indicates that, contrary to 
the belief that new forms of identity can simply be imagined when politically 
expedient for elites, that ethnicity can be easily replaced with an alternative form 
of identity when the situation calls for it, since in the above quoted words of 
Gellner, any ‘old shred and patch would have served as well’, but that 
committing to one expression of identity is a long term process that can come 
with considerable costs and personal investments and thus is not easily 
discarded. These qualifications to instrumentalism made by Posner and Olzak 
are crucial because, while shifting our attention from the structure to the agency 
of elites and their constituents in ethnic politics, they insert the crucial caveat 
that in their agency these elites are not omnipotent but have to act within the 
confines of pre-existing identity structures not only in relation to their roles but 
also their constituents’, whose identities they seek to instrumentalise to gain 
power and who instrumentalise their identities to align themselves with the 
powerful. Posner and Olzak’s instrumentalism therefore can be described as 
more genuinely constructivist than the ‘cliched constructivisms’ identified by 
Brubaker; with their more nuanced approach to agency in identity formation 
they make a critical point whose relevance will become evident when discussing 
62 
 
the limitations to KRG politicians’ freedom of choice in post-2003 Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  
Having said that, though, despite their constructivist disclaimers, ultimately, 
for Posner, as for instrumentalists in general, ‘ethnic identity is simply a means 
to an end’. For them, 
‘ethnic identities will not be chosen because of the psychological attachment that 
actors have toward them or because of the success of some crafty political 
entrepreneur in convincing voters that a particular identity is more important than 
others. They will be chosen because the identity gains them entry into a more 
[beneficial] coalition than the other identities that they might have drawn upon.’218 
As elaborated above, I do not believe matters to be that simple, that ethnicity 
can be reduced to merely a means to a political end. Conceiving of identities 
and sets of believes as nothing but an ‘admission card’ to a ‘minimum winning 
coalition’, to a group sizeable enough to affect political change in pursuit of at 
the end mostly material interests,219 fails to explain votes for the Green Party 
outside Brighton in the upcoming Britisjh election, nor does it shed light on the 
motives of dozens of Kurds self-immolating in the aftermath of Abdullah 
Öcalan’s arrest, nor, I would argue, can it account for the formation of the PKK 
in the first place, who in the late 1970s can certainly not be described as a 
sizeable group or part of any ‘minimum winning coalition’. 
The discussion so far of the groupist pitfalls of too narrow a constructivism 
has already called attention to the conjuncture that their deficiencies are not 
limited to the ontological realm but also extend to its epistemology. By reducing 
identity to a pre-given and static corporate identity that due to its exogenous 
character has little explanatory value to account for variations in actors’ 
behaviour, state or group conduct is again, as in the neo-realist and neo-liberal 
paradigms, explained through rational and material interests, where questions 
of identity are relegated to the repertoire of political rhetoric of elites – as 
demonstrated in the instrumentalist approach. By ‘bracketing out’ the other 
three dimensions of identity, this form of constructivism hardly differs from neo-
realism and neo-liberalism, and via Wendt’s ‘scientific realism’ ironically adopts 
their positivist and empiricist methodology constructivism originally set out to 
refute. With positivism comes the belief in scientific objectivism, the myth of the 
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detached analyst empirically studying, recording, and explaining social conduct 
without having a stake or taking part in it,220 which forms my main point of 
critique in the approach of Brubaker discussed earlier.221 Brubaker correctly 
cautions against the process of reification in the social sciences when taking 
social – in this context ethnic – groups as units of analysis. Yet, when trying to 
draw clear lines between identity and process of identification, not only does he 
struggle to impose a theoretical, and I would argue with Jenkins fictitious order 
on a ‘human world in which indeterminacy, ambiguity, and paradox are part of 
the normal pattern of everyday life’,222 running risk of superseding the ‘reality of 
the model’ with a ‘model of reality’,223 he also appears to worship the false idol 
of scientific objectivism. When warning that essentialist reifications of identity 
groups in the scholarly discourse ‘reflects the duals orientation of many 
academic identitarians as both analysts and protagonists of identity politics’,224 
he seems to imply that by not taking ‘categories of ethnopolitical practice as our 
categories of social analysis’,225 we can remain neutral, detached and objective 
observers of identity politics who stay clear of taking any part in it. He clearly 
and correctly distinguishes between groups – how members of a collective 
identify themselves – and categories226 – how they are defined by others – but 
then seems to overlook the fact that, as has been established earlier,  
categorisation is as much part of identity as self-identification M categorization 
makes a powerful contribution to the everyday reality – the realization M of groups. 
Attributions of group membership feature routinely in how we categorize others, 
and the categorization of out-groups is intrinsic to in-group identification. Who we 
think we are, is intimately related to who we think others are, and vice versa.227 
 This process of categorization as co-constitutive of the process of self-
identification, however, is not limited to the social groups from which a certain 
group sets itself apart, the direct, as it has been called here, constitutive other. If 
group identification goes hand in hand with group categorization, it would be 
evidently illogical to assume that the way we as scholars, together with 
international politics and the media, categorize a collective would have no 
impact on how this collective sees itself, on its process of self-identification. Yet 
this is precisely what the myth of positivism and scientific objectivism wants us 
to believe, that a clear line can be drawn between the scholarly categorizer and 
the categorized, that they are two social spheres apart, where the one engages 
in identity politics and the other discretely and dispassionately records, analyses 
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and explains those identity politics – an artificial segmentation of the social 
world that is not only demonstrably fallacious but also patently absurd. 
In this study, on the other hand, inclined to a post-positivist tradition that 
clearly rejects the notion of scientific objectivism, knowledge production, which 
includes processes of categorization, is always seen as inseparably interlinked 
with modes of power and politics of representation.228 From this perspective, we 
scholars as categorizers, whether we engage in reification or not, inherently 
matter to the categorized, we inevitably are protagonists of identity politics. It is 
the very nature of identity and identity discourses, as defined above, that 
renders us categorizers and explainers part of it, makes us subjects of  the 
identity discourse we seek to describe, irrespective of our intellectual or 
ideological position, political or scholarly agenda, or adherence to imaginary 
principles of scientific objectivism. To believe anything else would be a failure to 
recognize our nature as human beings in interaction with others and our role in 
the social world of which we are part. Consequently, to critically examine the 
role of explanatory IR scholars as protagonists of ethnic conflict is one of the 
aspirations central to this study.  
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2.) Concepts, Models, and Frameworks 
 
Ethnic security dilemmas 
Symptomatic of the ways in which explanatory IR approaches, makes 
sense of, and explains ethnic conflict that have been discussed in theory in the 
previous chapter are the two main explanatory frameworks explanatory IR has 
contributed to capture the dynamics of the onset and development of ethnic 
conflicts. In both, the ‘ethnic security dilemma’ and the ‘ethnic alliance 
framework’, supposed patterns of state behaviour are extrapolated to ethnic 
groups. In both ethnic groups are equated with states as relatively substantive, 
distinct, homogeneous, bounded and unitary actors or unitarily acting agents. In 
doing so they display at least two of the key characteristics of groupism this 
study has identified earlier and subsequently sets out to challenge. 
.In the late 1980s and early 1990s IR scholars found themselves confronted 
with the fact that conflicts in world politics were no longer predominantly 
between states and that the Cold War lens, through which intra-state conflict 
had been explained for the better part of fifty years, namely as proxy wars of 
two competing power blocks, no longer held any purchase. What is more, these 
‘new wars’229 appeared mostly rooted in ideational factors, were largely 
understood as conflicts of identity, primarily religious or ethnic, and/or 
emanating from the implosion of multi-ethnic, multi-religious states such as the 
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.230 This posed an ontological challenge to neo-
realism which held that domestic factors and ideational values of actors in world 
politics mattered little to explain their behaviour in the international arena. 
Instead of intellectually packing up and going home though, neo-realist scholars 
responded to that challenge by approaching and explaining these ‘new wars’ in 
the same way they had already approached and explained the Cold War and 
every international conflict since 1815: by propounding that, when studying 
international conflict in the longue durée, ideational factors, whether 
nationalism, liberalism, religion, or ethnicity, were of secondary importance, 
what determined the behaviour, conflictual or cooperative, of actors in world 
politics, whether states, nations, ethnic groups, or religious communities, was 
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the egoistic pursuit of  material interests. And, like individual human beings, the 
most fundamental material interest of any organized collective, superior to all 
other motives, is supposedly the interest to survive, the drive to self-
preservation. On this premise, Barry Posen set out to explain the collapse of 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious states of the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
he transferred the classic neo-realist explanatory model of the ‘security 
dilemma’ from the level of states to the level of ethnic groups, treating them, as 
far as their behaviour and structure are concerned as unitary actors, as 
ontologically convertible into states, with few epistemological and ontological 
reservations. Confronted with a situation of anarchy ensuing from state 
collapse, Posen argued, ‘a group suddenly compelled to provide its own 
protection must ask the following questions about any neighbouring group: Is it 
a threat? How much of a threat? Will the threat grow or diminish over time? M 
The answers to these questions strongly influence the chances for war?’.231 The 
classic security dilemma, as developed for explaining rational state 
behaviour,232 then stipulates that any action one state/group engages in to 
increase its own security in an unpredictable and hostile environment of 
anarchy could be interpreted by a neighbouring state/group as a threat to its 
own security, as compromising its chance of survival by placing it in a weaker 
position via the first group. According to neo-realism, this climate of fear almost 
inevitably leads to a race for ever more security and makes conflict between 
both states/groups more likely.233 Posen saw no reason why what is good for 
states, would not also be good for ethnic groups, why these patterns of state 
behaviour would not also apply to ethnic groups, why the explanatory 
framework of the security dilemma would not also explain the behaviour of 
ethnic groups in a system of anarchy, and consequently expanded the model 
and its implications – from arms races, to political mobilization in order to 
reinforce group cohesion, to windows of vulnerability and opportunity that make 
pre-emptive war more likely, to incentives for ‘defensive expansion’, a 
euphemism for politics of ethnic homogenization by force – to ethnic groups in 
conflict.234 
Notwithstanding the fact that the entire construct of the security dilemma 
revolves around the pre-condition of anarchy by presupposing a rationality of 
fear as the determining variable in explaining actors’ behaviour, for which neo-
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realism has been criticised by generations of scholars in general235  and 
Posen’s ‘ethnic security dilemma’ in particular236 – despite these general 
shortcomings, Posen’s model features prominently in leading neo-realist 
accounts of ethnic conflict,237 has been utilized and adapted by a myriad of 
scholars from quite diverse intellectual backgrounds,238 and, at large, can be 
considered the standard device with which neo-realism makes sense of ethnic 
conflict. Yet, what concerns this study more is another presumption the ethnic 
security dilemma makes: that ethnic groups can be equated with states as 
substantive, distinct, homogeneous, bounded and unitary actors or unitarily 
acting agents in international relations. Not once does Posen seem to be 
troubled by ontological questions as to whether it is tenable to apply a model 
developed to explain state behaviour to ethnic groups, and whether it is 
ontologically sound to analytically treat ethnic groups in the same manner as 
states, as unitary actors (regardless of whether states should be treated as 
such in the first place). These questions have concerned scholars like Paul 
Roe, who advocate substituting the unit of analysis in studies of state security 
with ‘societal security’, in particular in the context of ethnic conflict.239 The 
approach of settling for society, rather than the state, as the unit of analysis in 
security discourses originates from the wider context of securitization theory 
associated with what is colloquially often referred to as the ‘Copenhagen 
School’.240 As it pertains to reflections on the security dilemma what can be 
registered here is that the concept of ‘societal security’ first shifts the analytical 
interest from discussing merely material interests as security issues to 
ideational factors, for examples acknowledging threats to one’s identity as a 
security threat, and therefore directly addresses issues neo-realism deliberately 
brackets out from its analysis. Secondly, like neo-liberalism whose models for 
explaining ethnic conflict will be taken up shortly, it acknowledges a plurality of 
views, interests, and identities, and even actors to constitute its unit of analysis.  
Echoing McSweeney241 and Peaoples & Vaughan-Williams,242 I argue that 
the concept of ‘societal security’ of the Copenhagen School, of society as the 
referent object of security discourses, operationalises too static a concept of 
identity, failing to take sufficiently into account the constructed nature and 
inherent transience and fluidity of identity, and consequently is not only guilty of 
groupism but also, like the framework of the ethnic security dilemma at large, of 
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reifying ethnic lines of division of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ constructed in an ethnicised 
discourse. Like neo-liberalism then, it mirrors too closely for comfort neo-
realism’s groupist presumptions – after conceding agency to it in the first place 
– about its unit of analysis, state or society, as an ultimately unitarily acting 
agent and therefore replicates many of neo-realism and neo-liberalism’s 
ontological and epistemological fallacies. 
Roe’s attempts to apply the ethnic security dilemma to the concept of 
societal security by allowing ideational factors such as identity greater room for 
analysis, in fact for them to be understood as security issues and independent 
variables themselves, reminds one of another variation of neo-realist/narrow 
constructivist approaches to ethnic conflict that has already been mentioned: 
instrumentalism. Now, when discussing concepts and models of explanatory IR 
to explain ethnic conflict, I would like to revisit it by way of a recent study on 
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, in which Fotini Christia investigates patterns of 
alliance formation and factionalization between and within ethnic groups in 
Bosnia and Afghanistan, and subsequently endeavours a generalization of her 
findings to civil wars dating back as far as the nationalist revolutions of 1848.243 
While I have situated instrumentalism at the transition from neo-realism to 
narrow constructivism, Christia sees hers solidly grounded in neo-realism, 
presenting it as ‘essentially a neorealist account of group behaviour in 
multiparty civil wars. Like neorealists, I posit that alliance choices are [primarily] 
driven by relative power considerations’.244  With the egoistic pursuit of relative 
power and material interests as the main explanatory variables for alliance 
formation between ethnic groups in civil wars and postulating that the rationale 
and motives for factionalization within groups are ultimately the same as for 
alliance formation between groups,245 she deploys the full arsenal of neo-realist, 
narrow constructivist, and instrumentalist models to substantiate her conjecture: 
from the ethnic security dilemma, to  a ‘minimum winning coalition logic’246 – 
groups or factions not necessarily siding with the strongest alliance, but the one 
sufficiently powerful enough to win, yet at the same of manageable size to 
guarantee a share in the division of power and sinecures after the war – to 
‘bandwagoning’247 where a weaker party to a conflict realizing that the costs of 
opposing its adversary outweigh the benefits and succumbing to an alliance 
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dictated by necessity where future spoils of joined conquest are shared 
proportionally (Waltz 1979; Walt 1990; Mearsheimer 2001).248  
Like neo-realists, Christia also ‘suppose[s] that substate actors in civil wars 
behave like sovereign states in the anarchic international system’,249 and the 
‘ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, and M ideological identities [that form the 
bases of these groups] are presumed to stay relatively fixed’,250 without further 
elaborating why such presuppositions can be ontologically made. Not once in 
her study does the question arise as to what extent it is ontologically tenable, 
despite decades of shifting alliances and internal factionalization, to still treat 
those ethnic groups in Bosnia and Afghanistan as ‘relatively fixed’ political 
entities, to attribute them with agency, and operationalise them as the main unit 
of analysis. Their existence and continuity is simply considered a primordialist 
pre-given, as a Wendtian constructivist corporate identity. Likewise, ideational 
factors only feature in her analysis as elements shaping the course of conflicts 
as political tools employed by elites to justify their actions – alliance formation or 
factionalization – ex post to an apparently apathetic and docile constituency, 
whose agency Christia  seems not to think worth consideration. ‘Notions of 
shared identity M prove endogenous [only to some extent] to alliance 
preferences: Elites pick their allies first based on tactical dictates, and then look 
to their identity repertoire for characteristics they share with their [new] friends 
M that would allow for the construction of justifying narratives’.251  This 
bracketing of ideational factors, relegating them to the political sphere only, 
denying them any explanatory value, begs the question, why bother at all? Why 
not limit one’s analysis to studying purely material interests? The answer, one 
may hypothesize, is, that if neo-realism wants to treat ethnic groups as units of 
analysis and to equate them with states, then primordialist and narrow 
constructivist narratives of identity as a pre-given value such as the Wendtian 
corporate identity, provide them with the ontological coherence necessary to do 
so. I further posit that in this approach the unit of analysis is made to fit the 
paradigm, a cardinal error to any scientific enquiry.. 
Similar to Christia’s Afghan warlords and ethnic elites in Bosnia, the 
behaviour of the leaders of Kurdish political parties, at first sight, seem to fit the 
pattern of material interests, pre-eminently to secure power, superseding 
ideational factors and those only being utilized to justify their actions ex post. 
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One way to look at the genesis of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the twentieth 
century is to portray it as a seemingly endless sequence of shifting alliances 
and group factionalizations, in which Kurdish parties who felt disenfranchised or 
expected greater returns from switching sides struck alliances with their 
ideational antagonists, the nationalising states set on quelling their struggles for 
self-determination. From the 1950s on, Iraqi Kurdish parties repeatedly sided 
with the Shah’s government in suppressing Kurdish groups in Iran and the 
Assad regime in brutalizing Syria’s Kurds in exchange for support against 
Saddam Hussein; during the Iran-Iraq War the KDP teamed up with Tehran in 
fighting the Iranian KDP and the PUK, who initially sought its fortunes with 
Baghdad; while Saddam Hussein’s regime perpetrated chemical warfare and 
genocide against its own Kurdish population, the PKK intensified its contacts 
with the Ba’athist dictator; and in the 1990s the KDP relied on Saddam 
Hussein’s troops to re-take Erbil for them from a PUK-PKK-Iranian alliance, just 
four years after fighting the central government’s troops to the death in 
collaboration with the PUK. On the face of it, one may have to agree with 
Michael Gunter’s assessment that ‘the Kurdish people have been the victim of 
leaders guilty of selfish partisanship and greed,’252 as well as with Christia’s 
postulate that material interests supersede ideational factors in the behaviour of 
ethnic elites, and sympathise with those Kurdish scholars quoted earlier who 
see Kurdish aspirations for independence betrayed by the petty particularisms, 
power and profit seeking greed, and selfish materialism of their leaders. As the 
analysis of Kurdish ethno-nationalism and the relations between Kurdish 
political parties in this study will reveal, though, matters are not that simple, and 
the essentialist generalizations of instrumentalism, RCT, neo-realism, and too 
narrow a constructivism do not suffice to explain the rather complex social 
dynamics at work here that, drawing on Fierke and as mentioned in the 
Introduction as well as being elaborated in more dertail shortly, should rather be 
conceptualised as a complex matrix of identities and interests.253  
 
Ethnic alliances 
Diametrically opposed to those models that treat ethnicity first and foremost 
as a function of conflict behaviour of ethnic groups and relegate ideational 
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factors to the mere political sphere and elites’ rhetoric, is the ‘ethnic alliance’ 
model. This rather neo-liberal and narrow constructivist concept operationalises 
shared ethnicity as the independent and determining variable to explain the 
behaviour of ethnic groups in conflict; that is, picking up an earlier observation 
on groupism, it tautologically explains ethnic conflict through ethnicity.  
Like neo-realism and Christia’s instrumentalism, though, the ‘ethnic alliance’ 
model first equates ethnic groups with states as relatively fixed, substantive and 
distinct actors invested with social agency in the international system. Davis & 
Moore, in two articles on dyads, or a pair of states with transnational ethnic ties, 
of which the first was pointedly titled Ethnicity Matters,254 contend that 
‘transnational ethnic alliances serve as a conduit for conflict behaviour’.255 They 
hold that ‘it is useful to conceptualise ethnic linkages among people across 
state boundaries as functionally equivalent to alliances between two states’, and 
second, purport that ‘conflict between a state and an ethnic group will escalate 
to the international level when other elite members of that same ethnic group 
play a role in policy making in another state and that state finds the first state to 
be politically relevant’.256 In other words, the likelihood of violent conflict 
between two neighbouring states increases, if in one state (A) – say, in the case 
study, Turkey – a disenfranchised ethnic minority fights state oppression, while 
in the other state (B) – in the case study Iraq, then the Iraqi Kurdish ‘de facto 
state’, and after 2003 the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq – a co-ethnic 
group of said minority holds considerable power or dominates the political 
structure. The policies of A via its minority then not only constitute part of B’s 
‘Politically Relevant International Environment’257 but they determine its actions 
via A. As a consequence, Davis and Moore claim that B and the oppressed 
minority in A will form an ethnic alliance against state A, and the internal conflict 
within state A will diffuse to the point where the likelihood of it escalating to the 
international level rises. The authors test this hypothesis by contrasting three 
dependent weighted variables – conflict, cooperation, and net interaction 
between the dyadic states – from the Conflict and Peace Databank of Edward 
Azar258 that measures levels of interaction between states with data from the 
Minorities at Risk set of Ted Robert Gurr with individual ethno-political groups 
as its unit of analysis.259 Notably, they at first caution that ‘we do not believe that 
the ethnic composition of the dyads is the most critical determinate of such 
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[cooperative or conflictual] behaviour’,260 and come themselves to the 
conclusion that the ethnic composition of dyads matters only ‘at the margins’ .261 
Then, however, in a rather difficult to comprehend attempt at creative 
reinterpretation, and trusting that future quantitative research with more 
extensive data will prove their hypotheses, they maintain that ‘the impact of 
ethnic alliances is not spurious’.262  
There are many ways one could methodologically challenge the ‘ethnic 
alliance’ model. First, as has already been discussed in the context of 
constructivism in the previous chapter, one may wonder whether the rather 
generalizing instrument of pure quantitative analyses is best suited to decode 
such highly complex, contextual, circumstantial, fluctuating, and ultimately often 
constructed relations between and within presumed ethnic groups and in 
consequence thereof ethnically framed conflicts. Furthermore, like the large n-
studies and datasets criticised in the previous chapter, the source of data for 
Davis & Moore’s model, Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk set, 
operationalises ethnic groups as substantive, distinct, homogeneous, bounded 
units of analysis. Then one may cite that Davis & Moore themselves admit what 
limited generalisations one could make from their findings as their entire set of 
data originates from a single year [sic] of reference, 1978 [sic] – more extensive 
and recent findings seem to at least superficially confirm them, though.263 Third, 
as the authors themselves recognise, the ethnic composition of their dyads 
mattered only marginally for the measurable political behaviour and foreign 
policy of analysed states.  
Karen Petersen re-examined Davis & Moore’s model and, after modifying 
some variables with an improved measure of the foreign policy behaviour of the 
original dyads and adjusting control variables, discovered a slightly stronger 
amplitude towards conflict and decreased net interaction between dyads of 
states with one ethnic group in common, which leads her to allege that ‘ethnic 
alliances do in fact matter’ and ‘may not operate at the margins’.264 Her findings 
concur with Saideman’s, whose more nuanced utilisation of the Minorities at 
Risk dataset and actual application of his hypotheses to three empirical case 
studies show that ‘a group with kin dominating a nearby state is at least 10 
percent more likely to receive support’.265 He, too, admits, though, that generally 
speaking ‘we cannot say with confidence that the particular identity of a group 
73 
 
causes it to get more or less support’.266 And yet, despite only marginal 
empirical evidence for such presumptions, explanatory IR scholars seem to 
never tire of working the bogey man of ethnic alliances forming against the 
status quo and ethnic minorities with irredentist aspirations acting as ‘fifth 
columns’ for the territorial ambitions of neighbouring states. Although not 
specifically called an ethnic alliance, group solidarity based on shared ethnicity 
is also the independent variable and main explanatory factor in other key texts 
on the internationalisation of ethnic conflicts.267 They all to some degree share 
the ontological and epistemological fallacies of groupism, mainly to equate 
ethnic groups with states and to attribute them with agency as unitarily acting 
protagonists in conflict, then proceeding to tautologically explain this ethnic 
conflict with ethnicity, that is assuming the actions of these actors are dictated 
by the principles of group solidarity based on shared ethnicity. Here a picture is 
presented in which ‘ethnically intermixed areas are magnets for kin state 
interventions’,268 and ‘potential rescuers’ will be tempted ‘to jump through any 
windows of opportunity that may arise (M) to rescue [their kin] now by force’.269 
In the case of the PKK presence in Iraqi Kurdistan for example – which 
Salehyan270 lists as an archetype of common ethnicity determining the conflict 
behaviour of actors in the internationalization of an ethnic conflict – the myth of 
the PKK as a ‘fifth column’ without legitimate cause and controlled by foreign 
elements in pursuit of a region-wide pan-Kurdish secessionism was used for 
decades prior to 2007 by the Turkish nationalising state to justify addressing the 
so called ‘Kurdish Question’ in Turkey by violent means and for countless 
military interventions into Iraq.271 Like other groupist explanatory models in its 
attempts to make sense of ethnic conflict then, the ethnic alliance framework 
reifies the politics of ethnic division that are the primary root cause of the conflict 
they set out to interpret, thus either legitimizing the supposedly irredentist 
agenda of the secessionist ethnic elites or the totalitarian politics of the 
assimilationist nationalising states or, as happens frequently, both. 
An interesting qualitative counter-argument to the ethnic alliance model is 
made in Rajat Ganguly’s Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts. Ganguly – 
drawing on case studies from Pakistan’s role in Kashmiri secession attempts, 
India’s support for Bangladesh’s secession, Afghanistan and Iran’s interventions 
on behalf of Baluch separatism in Pakistan, Afghanistan’s role in a wider so 
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called ‘Pashtunistan’, and finally India’s ambivalent stance towards Tamil 
secessionism in Sri Lanka – categorises the reaction of a ‘kin state’ to a co-
ethnic insurgency in a neighbouring country in four patterns: diffusion and 
encouragement, isolation and suppression, reconciliation, and diffusion or 
isolation through inaction and non-intervention.272 Diffusion and 
encouragement, which Ganguly holds to be the most common practice of a kin 
state reacting to a co-ethnic insurgency in a neighbouring state, he sub-divides 
between direct support – through military or material means, supplying 
technical, logistic, and financial assistance, and in the most extreme form, 
granting sanctuary on its territory – and indirect support, i.e. politico-diplomatic 
assistance. While to him affective motives for diffusion and encouragement are 
easily explainable by group solidarity across borders, instrumental reasons he 
lists as pre-existing rivalries between the two states, in which the ethnic conflict 
is used as a pretext and the insurgency often as a proxy – a similar point being 
made by Salehyan, who terms this ‘security delegation’.273 Other instrumental 
reasons are the dynamics of domestic politics – public opinion, popular demand 
or ‘ethnic outbidding’ – as well as the context of international relations. Most 
interestingly, and contrary to the majority of the literature, Ganguly argues that 
external support from an ethnic kin state on a long term perspective is to the 
disadvantage of the insurgency as the target state will respond to the enhanced 
challenge and elevated international attention by intensifying persecution and 
upping its repressive apparatus as a zero-sum mentality to the conflict takes 
over politico-strategic considerations. The normative international system also, 
as will be discussed shortly, is system-immanently hostile to any attempts at 
secession and has a wide arsenal of coercive measures at its disposal to exert 
pressure on the kin state. This pressure renders the kin state a notoriously fickle 
patron who hardly ever provides support in the scope required to defeat the 
target state.274 Ganguly’s more nuanced analysis of the dynamics between 
presumed sub-groups in ethnic conflict, in particular their cooperation and even 
‘intra-group’ conflict across international borders is however impaired by his 
unadulterated primordialism that perceives of ethnicity as a ‘given’, a ‘natural 
phenomenon’, and ‘cultural attributes’ shared by people as ‘objective’275. 
Consequently, due to these primordial kinship ties, and despite the variety of 
expressions to which relations between subgroups within an ethnic group can 
amount, for Ganguly, common ethnicity does not allow for a kin state’s neutrality 
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in an ethnic conflict. Even ‘doing nothing’ on the side of the kin state will always 
be seen as partisan, and keeping its cool ‘usually strengthens the hand of the 
central government against the secessionists’,276 i.e. the kin state is perceived 
to indirectly support the target state and to give it carte blanche to ‘resolve’ the 
conflict by ‘methods of eliminating differences’, as McGarry & O’Leary have 
somewhat euphemistically termed them.277 Ganguly’s deterministic portrayal of 
the dynamics of ethnic conflict then, despite the interesting qualifications made 
in some places, amounts to the same logic and narrative as the ‘ethnic alliance’ 
model: ethnicity as a primordial pre-given that not only is not further questioned 
but whose stringency is subscribed to without further questioning, thus resulting 
in a reification of the ‘strategic essentialism’ and the politics of ethnic division 
and group solidarity of the ethnic elites as well as their ‘participants’ 
primordialism’.  
Another explanatory model that explains ethnic conflict with ethnicity is the 
already mentioned concept of ‘ethnic outbidding’.278  
Ethnic outbidding is a situation in which competing elites try to position themselves 
as the best supporters of a group’s interests, each accusing the others of being too 
weak on ethnic nationalist issues. When conditions foster ethnic outbidding, the 
exit of ethnically defined supporters can change the balance of power domestically; 
most, if not all, politicians are compelled to take extreme stands favouring the 
ethnic group’s interests.279 
These dynamics of ‘outbidding’ each other with ever more extreme and 
radical positions among ethnically defined parties and elites, according to the 
literature, can easily lead to the ethnicised discourse and with it the political 
situation spiralling out of control and gaining a momentum of its own that makes 
violent conflict between those presumed groups more likely. In the context of 
the case study, the concept of ethnic outbidding is explicitly applied to the PKK 
by Adamson.280 However, aside from its demonstrated limited applicability,281 
ethnic outbidding is merely an expression and manifestations of the conflict that 
must not be mistaken as its causes; it builds on, exacerbates, and escalates an 
already existing ethnicisised discourse within a deeply divided society along 
ethnic lines, and therefore can be understood as another expression of afore 
discussed strategic essentialisms of ethnic elites. In addition to being distinctly 
tautological by explaining ethnic conflict with ethnicity, it is of very finite 
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explanatory value since it does not address how the ethnicised discourse that 
constitutes it came about in the first place. As Donald Horowitz remarks himself, 
intragroup party proliferation usually awaits the emergence of an ethnic issue that 
spurs party formation and assures the new party some following. Such an issue 
generally relates to intergroup relations. Unless party formation is practically 
ordained by the existence of sharp subethnic divisions, the pivotal event at the 
point of intraethnic party formation is usually an accusation that the existing ethnic 
party has sold out group interests by its excessive moderation toward other ethnic 
groups.282 
Again, at first sight the ‘Kurdish case’, one of the most prominent examples 
of an internationalized ethnicised conflict, and in particular the PKK sanctuary in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, seem to fit the pattern of ethnic alliance formation as if taken 
from a textbook and is consequently routinely cited as a model case for these 
dynamics.283 Of the countless instances of banditry, pillaging raids, minor 
insurrections, insurgencies, and rebellions the one or the other self-proclaimed 
Kurdish insurgency has been involved in along the border regions of Iran, 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria since World War One, hardly any has not had an 
international dimension or has not escalated to the international level; that is 
sought shelter across the border, shared intelligence, received logistical support 
and armaments, and joined forces on a temporary basis. All major Kurdish 
rebellions have been supported and sustained by affiliated or temporarily allied 
Kurdish insurgencies from the bordering state and many of these rebellions 
have escalated to regional conflagrations that not only dragged in local but also 
great powers such as the USSR, Israel, and the USA during the Cold War.284  
Consequently and to counter these supposedly secessionist insurgencies a 
‘balance of threat’285 was formed by the nationalising states. Stephen Walt’s 
‘balance of threat’ can be understood as an adaptation of the neo-realist 
‘balance of power’ concept.286 In this instance, states form a defensive pact or 
alliance to counter, not a rising hegemon that could upset an existing ‘balance 
of power’, but a mutual threat to the status quo and their common interests, for 
example the threat of supposedly pan-Kurdish ethno-nationalism undermining 
the existent state structure and borders in the region. As early as 1937 then, 
Turkey signed the Treaty of Sa’dbad with Iraq and Iran ‘to coordinate their 
defence policy’ against Kurdish uprisings that could spill over from one state 
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into the others’ territories;287 a coordination and collaboration among the three 
countries that was extended in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 and led to occasional 
joint military operations against Kurdish insurgencies.288 The latter, in particular, 
can be understood as an actual alliance in the political sense of the term, as it 
established a ‘mutual military assistance’ clause against ‘internal revolts liable 
to threaten common security’.289 After Turkish-Iraqi relations had degenerated in 
the aftermath of the 1958 revolution, in 1983, the practice of Turkey securing 
from Iraq the right to pursue Kurdish insurgents onto its territory was revived 
under Saddam Hussein – then too weakened by the Iran-Iraq War to effectively 
control the Kurdish north – and, after Saddam Hussein’s downfall, was one of 
the first concessions the Turkish government called for from the post-2003 Iraqi 
government.290 Given the sum of these cross-border counter-insurgency 
operations over the past 60 years with the single goal of keeping Kurdish 
separatism at bay, it might seem the balance of threat  of the status quo 
preserving nationalising states against presupposed irredentist Kurdish claims 
and activities, and in converse argument, the Kurdish ethnic alliance, has been 
a factual reality. As I have already demonstrated elsewhere though,291 closer 
scrutiny of the Kurdish case study will show that the ethnic alliance model, like 
its neo-realist and instrumentalist counterparts, is either ontologically untenable 
or falls short of comprehensively explaining the complex dynamics and 
processes of (self-) identification as well as protagonists’ behaviour in ethnic 
conflict. 
 
The sovereign nation state 
As has been elaborated in the Introduction and in the previous chapter, the 
concept of the sovereign nation state as the main unit of analysis and 
constitutive element of the modern, anarchic, that is non-hierarchical, 
international system is central to the three paradigms of explanatory IR: neo-
realism, neo-liberalism, and a narrow constructivism. Extrapolating from one of 
its key thinkers, Hedley Bull,292 one might even say, ‘IR is a discipline founded 
on the existence of state sovereignty at both a normative and a factual level’.293 
In a similar vein one of the most prominent critics of explanatory IR’s state-
centrism, Richard Ashley, notes:  
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For the neorealist, the state is ontologically prior to the international system. The 
system’s structure is produced by defining states as individual unities and then by 
noting properties that emerge when several such unities are brought into mutual 
reference. For the neorealist, it is impossible to describe international structures 
without first fashioning a concept of the state-as-actor.294 
And the essential quality of explanatory IR’s conceptualization of the state-
as-actor is sovereignty, or in the words of Gillian Youngs, ‘what matters is that 
the state is an identifiable entity, thus clearly bounded. In order to act, it has to 
be considered sovereign, that is, possessing the power to act’.295 Sovereign 
nation states are seen as the logical consequence, the product of the ideology 
of nationalism; as has also been shown in the previous chapter, the modernist 
understanding of nationalism can essentially be defined as the doctrine about 
acquiring statehood for the nation, statehood as the objective constituting the 
defining criterion for a nation. The essential qualities of this sovereign statehood 
are for it to be absolute and exclusive, expressed in Max Weber’s famous 
definition of the state ‘as a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.296 This 
understanding of sovereignty as ‘Janus-faced’,297 as having an internal and at 
the same time external component that are mutually constitutive is summarized 
by Hinsley: 
[Internal and external sovereignty] are complementary. They are the inward and 
outward expressions, the obverse and reverse sides of the same idea M the idea 
that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community M and 
no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.298 
In other words, state sovereignty not only connotes the presence of 
absolute authority at the domestic level and its absence at the international 
level, it is defined by this very corollary. In the anarchic international system all 
states are seen as equal in international law, not in the degree of power they 
can exert but in the inviolability of their sovereignty over the territory they claim, 
or as Frankel puts it, ‘irrespective of their power and size, in legal theory all 
states enjoy sovereignty in equal measure’.299 If a state chooses to share its 
sovereignty with another international body or evolve aspects of it in, for 
example, the supra-national European Union, it does so of its own vocation and 
can withdraw from this legal arrangement if and when it pleases. Yet, any 
divisibility of sovereignty over its territory against the state’s will is understood to 
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be illegitimate; in the end, in Morgenthau’s words, ‘if sovereignty means 
supreme authority, it stands to reason that two or more entities M cannot be 
sovereign within the same time and space’.300 This view, at the core of the 
classic canon of explanatory IR, summarized in the dictum, ‘the state, as a 
subject of international law, posses sovereign power’,301 endorses the 
absoluteness and exclusivity of sovereign statehood in the Weberian sense. It 
then is a community’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, read jurisdiction, 
over the territory it controls, from which the right to non-interference is deduced: 
If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that other states have a duty to 
respect that right by, among other things, refraining from intervention in its 
domestic affairs M The function of the principle of nonintervention in international 
relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the principle of state 
sovereignty.302 
Concomitant with its dual dimensionality, sovereignty is also a principal of 
international law, where it is conceived as an institution constituted by two sides 
of the same coin, ‘sovereignty as an organizational rule to regulate the 
international traffic between states M; and its role in the identification of political 
entities as actors on the international plane’.303 Much has been written in IR on 
the differentiation of sovereignty as a political and as a legal principle,304 a 
somewhat artificial distinction, I would argue with Simpson,305 since all law is 
man-made and therefore inherently political, a point already made by 
Morgenthau when he observed, ‘there is a profound and neglected truth hidden 
in Hobbes’ extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law, and 
there is neither morality nor law outside the state’.306 Consequently, ‘[the state’s] 
privileged status and power as international legal persons is defined by the legal 
order, while sovereign states as its main subjects can define the contours of 
that very order’.307 This perspective, in which sovereignty can simply be 
ascertained to factually exist or not,308 and in which states constitute the main 
subjects of international law, also determines the exclusivist norms of 
international law to justify and ensure the continuation of their existence. In 
other words, international law and the international system which it is supposed 
to regulate, is made by states for states. 
Explanatory IR acknowledges that this modern state system and the 
sovereign nation state that constitutes it are the product of historical change; it 
80 
 
goes to great length in tracing its development from Medieval feudalism to the 
early modern Treaties of Westphalia, to the Congress of Vienna, to how the 
doctrine of self-determination spawned decolonization,309 and it recognizes the 
process of state-formation and nationalism. As has been outlined, incorporating 
modernist theory, explanatory IR understands acquiring statehood and attaining 
sovereignty to be the defining objective of the nation, its main purpose. This 
processual character of the state is evident when Alexander Wendt, for 
example, describes the state as ‘an ongoing political program designed to 
produce and reproduce a monopoly on the potential for organized violence’,310 
yet on the same page he declares, ‘since states are the dominant form of 
subjectivity in contemporary world politics this means that they should be the 
primary unit of analysis for thinking about the global regulation of violence’.311 
Like neo-realism and neo-liberalism, despite acknowledging its historical 
genesis, which should give reason to conceive of differing historical trajectories, 
Wendtian constructivism conceptualizes all states as essentially the same in the 
contemporary international system.312 Not unlike Francis Fukuyama in The End 
of History, who portrayed Western liberal democracy as ‘the end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government’,313 the modern sovereign 
nation state is seen as the culmination, the end-product of a linear historical 
process of state-formation that today, in essentially the same form, spans the 
entire globe and whose evident perfect nature renders it conceptually ever-
lasting. In this sense then, Biersteker identifies this generalizing and 
essentialising principle, ‘the tendency to treat states as fundamentally similar 
units across time and place’,314 as one of the key characteristics the three 
paradigms of explanatory IR have in common, expressed in, for example, 
Kenneth Waltz’s notorious claim that the state of anarchy in the international 
system renders any differentiation between states unnecessary. He declares, 
‘anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units, and that 
implies their sameness M so long as anarchy endures, states remain like 
units’,315 that is ‘autonomous political units’316 with the same objectives. This 
presumption of the sameness of all states in the contemporary international 
system as a result of the system’s anarchic structure obscures the processual, 
evolving character of the state; put differently, ‘it would appear that the 
sovereignty principle has served to reify the state and abstract it from reality, 
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thereby obscuring its role as both agent and product of a dynamic and still 
unfolding historical process’.317  
To be sure, IR again acknowledges historical changes to sovereignty,318 as 
for example the sprawling literature on globalization319 and (humanitarian) 
intervention320 attests, and Stephen Krasner goes so far as to declare the 
sovereignty principle an ‘organized hypocrisy’,321 demonstrating that 
intervention in another state’s internal affairs has always been a quintessential 
part of international politics. Yet again, indicative of explanatory IR’s 
generalizing and essentialising approach to the international system of 
sovereign nation states,322 Krasner’s conceptualization of sovereignty remains 
static: 
It does not help us comprehend the possibility of change in the operational 
meaning of sovereignty, and it does not suggest (or allow for) any typology for the 
different forms of sovereignty over time and across place. Like the tendency to 
treat states as fundamentally like units, Krasner’s conceptualization of sovereignty 
is essentially fixed and unchanging. It does not help us understand the significance 
of challenges to sovereignty or the possibility of its transformation.323 
In fact, IR’s ‘fascination’324 with state sovereignty as a universal and 
consistent principle of international order is so deeply ingrained that even a 
post-structuralist like R.B.J. Walker, whose workis dedicated to the 
deconstruction of sovereignty, finds it difficult to ‘envisag[e] alternative political 
identities’.325  
A minority view in IR, on the other hand, holds that sovereignty is a socio-
political construct: 
We agree with other scholars M that territory, population, and authority – in 
addition to recognition – are important aspects of state sovereignty. Unlike most 
scholars, however, we contend that each of these components of state sovereignty 
is also socially constructed, as is the modern state system. The modern state 
system is not based on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the 
production of a normative conception that links authority, territory, population 
(society, nation), and recognition in a unique way, and in a particular place.326 
If one conceives of the nation as an ideological basis for the state as a 
socio-political construct, an ideational factor, a way of seeing the world, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it leads one to ponder on whether the 
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objective of that socio-political construct, its realization is not a construct in 
itself, whether Biersteker and Weber are not justified in understanding it as the 
product ‘of a normative conception’ rather than a fixed and pre-given political 
entity.  
The claim to sameness and universality of the sovereign nation state rests 
mainly on two epistemologies: 1) the presupposed anarchical structure of the 
international system that, as has been shown, renders states essentially the 
same as far as their function, objective, and value-maximizing nature within the 
international system is concerned, and 2) an extrapolation and generalization of 
the European experience of nationalist state-formation to the universal level. 
The latter presumption, drawing on the classics on state formation and 
nationalism,327 is rooted in the previously discussed modernist view of 
nationalism that seeks to carve out universal tendencies and generalizable 
patterns from the formation of nation states in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Europe – mainly processes of industrialization and modernization, the 
advent of mass literacy in the local vernacular, mass mobilization of the armed 
forces, the spread of demands of democratic representation, bureaucratic 
centralization, and the refinement of systems of taxation – and to then identify 
the proliferation of similar tendencies and patterns across the non-European 
world.328 These generalizing and essentialising presumptions have been 
criticized for the selectivity with which empirical cases in their support are 
chosen,329 and on a more general level by the rich post-colonial literature which 
holds that, due to the colonial experience, processes of state formation in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe are not comparable with the 
trajectories of de-colonized states in the twentieth century.330 Yet, ‘the tendency 
within the field of state theory is to focus mainly on the Western capitalist state 
without attempting to even understand the specificity of the post-colonial 
state’.331 In explanatory IR this tendency to extrapolate from the European 
experience in state-formation to generalizable patterns in the rest of the world is 
particularly striking in the works of Cohen, Buzan and Huntington,332 where, for 
example, Buzan draws parallels between the violent formation of states in early 
modern Europe with today’s conflicts in the developing world.  
Even a moment’s reflection, though, should make plain that the narratives 
of state formation of Huntington, Buzan, Tilly, Mann, Anderson, Gellner, and 
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others of the modernist provenance  –  save European settler colonies such as 
the U.S., Canada, and Australia, etc. – are not applicable to the majority 
world.333 While in Europe modern statehood was the result of centuries of 
violent struggles, statehood in the majority world came in the form of the rather 
sudden bang of decolonization when the colonial powers realized that cost-
benefit analysis of colonial rule was no longer economical and devised cheaper 
means of indirect rule.334 Consequently, borders were drawn and imposed on 
the new states by the colonial powers, industrialization and modernization was 
limited to a few export-oriented industries and cash crops that at large remained 
in the hands of investors from the former colonial powers, literacy in the 
vernacular – if codified at all – was the prerogative of a narrow elite, and as far 
as systems of bureaucratic centralization and taxation existed, they had been 
set up and reflected the needs of the former colonial power. What is more, the 
very nature and objective of the nation differed from the European experience to 
the majority world. While liberal secularism and increasing demands for popular 
representation were integral parts of European nationalism and to some extent 
were realized in universal suffrage, ‘state sovereignty for post-colonial states, 
with few exceptions, has been a token expression of self-rule. The integral link 
between contemporary [neo-]imperialism and Western capitalist development 
has deepened and cemented the North-South divide and has promoted uneven 
development within and between post-colonial states’,335 or in the more flowery 
language of Crawford Young, ‘a genetic code for the new states of Africa was 
already imprinted on its embryo within the womb of the African colonial state’.336 
Perhaps the most significant feature of this ‘genetic code’ of the post-colonial 
state is the role of the local elites that championed decolonization, the same 
elites that earlier collaborated with the colonial power in the exploitation of local 
resources and the indigenous population, and that continued to do so, serving 
and profiteering from what Amin-Khan calls the ‘capitalism-imperialism 
nexus’.337 From this perspective, coined the ‘excentric view’ of decolonization by 
Robinson,338 colonialism prospered for as long as the colonial power was able 
to recruit local collaborators, and these local collaborators benefitted from the 
colonial structure; once these mutual benefits started to subside and material 
returns in terms of status, power and economic sinecures abated, the system 
proved no longer sustainable for both sides and was replaced with a more cost-
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efficient one, yet the structures of division, exploitation and dependence at the 
domestic and the international level persisted.339 In sum,  
in most post-colonial societies, the ruling elite (composed of landholders, 
indigenous capitalists, and civil and military bureaucrats) were successors-in-
interest of colonial rulers. The post-colonial elite M were former collaborators with 
colonial rulers M this had afforded them privilege during their years of collaboration 
M so the post-colonial elites were unwilling to abandon their tried and tested 
colonial state structures for fear of losing their power M by transplanting these 
colonial structures into the new post-colonial state, it has entrenched the 
capitalism-imperialism nexus M [and led to the post-colonial elites] hav[ing] 
become mired in even deeper collaboration with Western capital and [neo-
]imperialist Western states.340 
Irrespective of whether one subscribes to this neo-Marxist reading of post-
colonial elites continuing to serve Western capitalist interests or rather sees 
them as integral parts of a global capitalist Empire,341 two more features 
constitutive of the post-colonial state can be identified: a system-immanent 
authoritarianism and the nationalities question in most post-colonial states 
remaining unresolved which in turn leads to a proliferation of violent ethno-
nationalist conflicts in the developing world. A wide host of post-colonial 
theorists have problematised how authoritarian regimes in the developing world 
can be seen as a concomitance of the authoritarian colonial legacy and the 
structural context of global capitalism and strategic expediencies of the Cold 
War, in which the West ‘relied’ on complicit elites that combined the modes of 
production, control of resources, government, and military power.342 
Complementary to authoritarianism is the colonial legacy of systems of ‘divide 
and rule’, in which the former colonial powers had privileged certain ethnic 
groups over others in order to assure compliance, collaboration, and 
exploitation. The colonial restraints had not allowed questions of identity and 
difference to be addressed in a non-violent discourse at the indigenous level, 
which is why these questions erupted with the sudden bang of decolonization, 
often in violent conflict, when the local inequalities of the colonial era and its 
aftermath were settled by force – as we have come to see for example most 
tragically in Rwanda,343 and as the case study of Iraq will illustrate. The result of 
these ethno-nationalist challenges to the state were attempts at ‘pathological 
homogenization’344 – see below – by the ruling elites and the central 
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government that often solidified cleavages and led to an escalation from ethnic 
to ethno-nationalist conflicts against the straightjacket of multinational states 
decolonization had imposed on societies in the developing world. ‘These 
developments of the decolonization period have prompted some observers of 
state and national identity formation to claim that instead of a nation(s) forming 
a state (as was the case in Europe), the state was created before a nation was 
even “imagined” – as in a state-nation’.345 The concept of the ‘state-nation’,346 
highlighting the fact that a state with inviolable borders was imposed on the 
developing world in the process of decolonization before there was a nation that 
could have ‘imagined’, in the Andersonian terminology, such a state, makes 
perfectly plain the different experiences of state-formation in Europe and the 
non-European world. The fact that explanatory IR not only fails to account for 
the different trajectories of European nation states and post-colonial states, and 
how the colonial legacy shaped the latter, but claims universal validity for the 
former is illustrative of its inherent Eurocentrism. This Eurocentrism becomes 
even more apparent when explanatory IR attempts to explain the ‘failure’ of 
non-European sovereign nation states. 
 
Failed states and de facto states 
The double negative impact of authoritarianism and of the colonial legacy of 
ethnic divisions has routinely led to the sovereignty of post-colonial states being 
challenged in pursuit of demands of democratic representation or of ethnic 
pluralism or a combination of both. In response to these challenges the 
assimilationist nationalizing post-colonial state often resorts to what Heather 
Rae calls ‘pathological homogenization’ as a means of state-building; ‘the 
methods state-builders have used to define the state as a normative order and 
to cultivate identification through targeting those designated as outsiders for 
discriminatory and often violent treatment’347. The violence of the assimilationist 
nationalizing post-colonial state is then met with violent means by the 
oppressed ethnic minority or segment of society demanding greater pluralism 
leading to an ever escalating spiral of violent conflict, of which ethnic conflict as 
discussed in this study is but one prominent expression. ‘The creation of 
outsiders’, then, Rae continues, ‘is a political process in which “difference” 
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becomes translated into “otherness” and therefore a threat to be disposed of in 
one way or the other’,348 an aspect to the process of group identification that 
has already been addressed in chapter one. However, the extent to which 
‘pathological homogenization’ plays a significant, and according to Rae even 
constitutive part of the state- and nation-building  process in post-colonial states 
has been overlooked in the literature, which largely  contents itself with labeling 
these states as inherently ‘weak’, ‘failed’,349 or ‘quasi states’, the latter being a 
term coined by Robert Jackson,350 in one of the most salient examples of the 
Eurocentrism in explanatory IR identified above. 
The general understanding of sovereignty in explanatory IR and 
international law today differentiates between an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ 
dimension of sovereignty,351 as well as between a ‘constitutive’ and ‘declaratory’ 
theory of statehood.352 While the ‘constitutive theory’ that requires recognition of 
a state by its peers as a criterion for its legal existence today is considered 
largely outdated353 – a question to which I will return shortly – the ‘declaratory 
theory’, as enshrined in the Montevideo Convention of 26 December 1933, 
defines states as persons of international law and invested with recognised 
agency in international relations that are constituted by four qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government, and (d) the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. If a political entity is in 
possession of both properties of sovereignty, an internal one, which means (c), 
being invested with the authority to exercise exclusive administrative control 
over (a) its population and, in the words of Max Weber, ‘the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force’354 within (b) a defined territory, and the external 
dimension, (d), the means to entertain relations with its peers, it de facto and de 
jure fulfils the criteria of statehood. A ‘failed’ or Jacksonian ‘quasi state’ then 
posses ‘external sovereignty’, that is it has been recognised by its peers as a 
sovereign state – a status that cannot be revoked – but lacks ‘internal 
sovereignty’, that is the authority and legitimacy to exercise exclusive 
administrative control over the population and territory it claims.355 In sum, in the 
strict Weberian sense, it would not be a sovereign state at all, a dilemma 
Jackson recognises: 
International society can enfranchise states that usually require general recognition 
of a government’s independence. But international society cannot empower states 
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to anything like the same extent since this for the most part involves internal 
relationships. State building is primarily a domestic process occurring over a long 
period of time that can only be brought about by combined wills, efforts, and 
responsibilities of governments and populations.356 
In other words, Jackson acknowledges the normativity in the international 
sovereignty regime in the fact that at the time when these societies were 
decolonised and statehood bestowed upon them virtually overnight, they lacked 
the societal preconditions for successful state- and nation-building. Jackson 
also appreciates the fact that once irrevocable statehood had been bestowed 
upon these polities, due to the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of states, the international community forfeited most means to influence 
the state- and nation-building process in post-colonial states, and, arguably 
even contributed to bad governance and the exploitation and violation of 
citizens’ rights and freedoms by their own governments by providing them with 
a cloud of legitimacy through recognition.357 What Jackson conveniently 
overlooks, though, is that the circumstance of not being ‘ready yet’ for statehood 
is not a deficiency inherent to these societies but a direct consequence of the 
colonial legacy.358 On the contrary, he argues: 
Quasi states possess arms but they usually point inward at subjects rather than 
outward at foreign powers M quasi states by definition are deficient and defective 
as apparatuses of power. They are not positively sovereign or naturally free M The 
quasi state is an uncivil more than a civil place: it does not yet possess the rule of 
law based on the social contract. The populations of quasi states have not yet 
instituted a covenant. If no covenant exists, there can be neither subject nor 
sovereign nor commonwealth: no empirical state.359  
Jackson’s entire concept of quasi states is inherently Eurocentrist and 
borderline racist, resembling the Orientalism identified by Edward Said in socio-
political discourses ever since the dawn of the Enlightenment,360 for, ‘by also 
assigning the first world to the position of empirical states and the third world to 
that of quasi states, Jackson relies on a simplistic schema that constructs the 
first world as liberal, democratic, and progressive while the third world is 
relegated to stereotyping’,361 as the above passage attests. This Eurocentrism 
and Orientalism, however, is not limited to Jackson’s juxtaposition of ‘empirical’ 
to ‘quasi states’ but is merely representative of the majority of explanatory IR’s 
take on questions of sovereignty in post-colonial states, evidenced by, for 
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example, the argument of another influential theorist of explanatory IR, Hedley 
Bull: 
Quasi states still share some of the characteristics that led European statesmen in 
the last century to conclude that they could not be brought into international society 
because they were not capable of entering into the kinds of relationship that 
European states had with one another.362 
In light of such borderline racist declarations one cannot help but speculate 
that explanatory IR literature on sovereignty in post-colonial states not only 
seeks to draw a line between the developed and enlightened West and the 
under-developed and backward rest, where the former is portrayed in the best 
imperialist fashion as an ideal the latter would be well advised to emulate, but 
that it amounts to an outright defence of Europe’s imperialist past as Füredi 
surmises: 
The negative comparisons with the Third World were complemented by studies 
which suggested that it was the internal weakness of societies rather than 
colonialism which constituted the real problem. The substance of the argument was 
that the Third World was congenitally incapable of looking after its own affairs. 
Chaos, decay, and corruption were the characteristics associated with independent 
post-colonial states M Problems were always portrayed as the fault of Third World 
societies. The evidence that imperialism had left behind a legacy of difficulties was 
invariably rejected.363 
The direct opposite, nonetheless inherently related to failed or quasi states, 
is the concept of so called ‘de facto states’ since both are the consequences of 
the conveniently forgotten or rejected ‘legacy of difficulties’ with which 
imperialism and decolonization has endowed post-colonial states and societies. 
‘De facto states’, a term that, among others,  encompasses cases as diverse as 
Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Transnistria, 
Northern Cyprus, and Taiwan, can be defined as those peculiar political entities 
in the international system that can successfully claim what failed states lack, 
‘internal sovereignty’ or the authority and to some extent legitimacy to exercise 
exclusive administrative control over a certain population and territory, but lack 
‘external sovereignty’, that is they are not recognised by the international 
community as sovereign states. They are the direct result of the clash of two 
principles of the post-colonial order in international relations and international 
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law: the right to national self-determination and the inviolability of existing 
borders.  
During the nineteenth century it became acutely apparent to liberals that 
how the international system was structured at the time with multiple imperialist 
empires ruling over hundreds of millions of subjects of different nationalities 
violated the very liberal principles of the Enlightenment that had determined the 
birth of nations in Europe; in fact this violation of principles arguably had 
triggered World War One.364 With the demise of three of these multi-ethnic 
empires in World War One – namely the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian 
Empires – U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and other liberal thinkers and 
decision makers understood an opportunity to restructure the post-war 
international system along the lines of national self-determination as famously 
articulated in the President’s Fourteen Points on 8 January 1918.365 The key 
problem with this new doctrine – among many others – was, succinctly summed 
up by Jennings, that ‘on the surface, [the principle of self-determination] 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people’.366 This 
question of how to define the people, the nation on which the right to self-
determination would be bestowed, has troubled the principle of self-
determination ever since.367 In the aftermath of World War One nations were 
predominantly ethnically defined and who would qualify for self-determination 
and a sovereign state of their own was based on how ‘ready’ for self-
governance the people in question were deemed, leading to independent states 
for Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians, and Southern Slavs in Europe, 
whose societies could claim a distinguished liberal tradition, and the mandate 
system in the Middle East where societies were seen as not yet fit for 
democratic self-rule.368 The mandate system in the Middle East – to be 
discussed in more detail in Part Two – resembled the colonial system in so far 
as great powers were instituted as stewards of people seen as not yet having 
the capacity for self-governance, but the administrative borders of these 
mandates were drawn not on ethnic principles but according to the strategic 
considerations of the great powers administering the mandates on the peoples’ 
behalf. Consequently, when these societies were finally ‘released’ into 
independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the borders of the new states did not 
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reflect the ethnic composition within these regions but the administrative 
boundaries of the colonies and mandates. As a result of the nature of the 
decolonization process, a myriad of ethno-nationalist conflicts and attempts to 
redraw borders along ethno-nationalist lines of division were predictable to 
which the international community tried to respond by declaring the borders of 
the new states sacrosanct. Accordingly, the international system and 
international law, which like any law is man-made and as the prerogative of 
international elites with vested interests in maintaining the status quo is highly 
normative and arbitrary, today presumes states as actual beings and as 
organic, substantive, distinct, permanent, and bounded entities. Once external 
sovereignty, that is recognition by its peers, has been bestowed upon a state, it 
cannot be revoked. From an international law perspective, what is a state 
remains a state no matter to what extent it can perform ‘internal sovereignty’, by 
default it continues to perform ‘external sovereignty’. Likewise, the boundaries 
of existing states are considered sacrosanct – enshrined in the uti possidetis 
juris principle369 – which prevents the emergence of new states, no matter 
where their processes of nation- or state-building has led them.  
A consensus had held in international society that the right of self-determination 
was a matter to be resolved under all conditions within existing international 
boundaries, no matter how ethnically artificial or nationalistically oppressive (M) 
International law doctrine (M) generally confirmed this political and moral 
consensus that the ‘self’ in self-determination was meant to signify in all 
circumstances the existing states constituting international society. The only 
acceptable exceptions to this legal norm of limitation were in situations of 
secession by agreement.370 
If what is an open-ended process is perceived as static, if what is dynamic 
and evolving is regulated to remain fixed, though, such a condition, as per the 
laws of physics, inevitably leads to tension. Self-evidently, in post-colonial 
states with their nationalities questions unresolved, the principle of the 
inviolability of borders has not led to the prevention of ethnic conflict but merely 
to successful secessionist entities not being recognised as independent states 
by the international community, since their very act of coming into being, 
secession, is seen as violation of international law. If these processes of nation- 
and state-building are obstructed in their ‘natural’ progress, in continuing to act 
out their perceived identity, by an international law and system that regards 
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nations and states as static and punishes violations of international norms, such 
as secession or irredentism with non-legitimisation, i.e. non-recognition,371 
these processes are system-immanently forced to pursue alternative routes to 
the institutionalisation of their sovereignty. Such an alternative route is, 
according to the literature, the ‘de facto state’. 
Lacking conceptual consensus, these paradoxes of the international system 
are confusingly referred to by scholars as ‘de facto states’,372 ‘unrecognised 
states’,373 ‘contested states’,374 ‘state-like entity’,375 ‘de facto independent 
territory’,376 or in a striking semantic contortion, ‘unrecognised quasi states’.377 
Semantics do matter here though, as their terminology reveals at least as much 
about the normativism of the respective scholars as about the phenomenon 
they essay to describe. Scott Pegg, who first treated the emergence of these 
peculiar political entities in the post-Cold War arena, comprehensively defines 
them ‘de facto states’, ‘a secessionist entity that receives popular support and 
has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given 
population in a defined territorial area, over which it maintains effective control 
for an extended period of time’.378 By focusing on the illegitimacy of his ‘de facto 
state’, i.e. its birth by way of secession being in violation of international norms 
and laws, Pegg not only excludes cases where an argument for secession is 
difficult to make – Taiwan and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq being the most 
prominent examples – but also seems to buy into the essentialism of the state-
centred discourse prevalent in international relations theory and political 
science, which leads him to fatalistically conclude, ‘the de facto state is 
illegitimate no matter how effective it is’.379 Tozun Bahcheli et al., while 
employing the same term, ‘de facto states’, are more critical of the ‘legal fiction 
of sovereign states’,380 who, in their eyes, inevitably have to adapt to new 
realities; consequently, their ‘de facto states’ are ‘states in waiting’. Yet, as 
James Harvey points out,381 and as will be elaborated at great length in Part 
Three of this study, the Kurdistan Region has not emerged through a 
secessionist conflict, has not formally declared its independence, nor have its 
officials undertaken active steps in precipitating it, which renders the dichotomy 
‘de facto state’ – ‘de jure state’ of little use, as in the case of the Kurdistan 
Region, where there is nothing to de jure recognise but its constitutional basis in 
the federal state of Iraq, which is not challenged by any member of the 
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international community. By the same token, the designation ‘unrecognised 
state’ advocated by Caspersen and Stansfield appears not very serviceable.382 
As they recognise that ‘the absence of a formal declaration of independence 
can be a strategic attempt to increase for manoeuvre and the prospect for 
international support’ (ibid.: 4), they include the Kurdistan Region in their cases; 
a ‘demonstrated (M) aspiration for full, de jure, independence’ instead of a 
formal declaration, they hold, suffices to qualify it as an ‘unrecognised state’.383 
From this perspective, a de facto or unrecognised state is nothing more but a 
state in waiting, a proto-state, a polity who has successfully gained control over 
its territory and – albeit unrecognised by other states – exercises sovereignty in 
this territory, yet whose sole raison d'être  is to become a fully fledged, 
recognised sovereign nation state. The desire to become a state is simply 
assumed, often without much or with at best questionable empirical evidence; 
for in the state-centric perception of the social world of explanatory IR, what 
else would a nation that has successfully gained control over a territory aspire 
to but a state? Since in the modernist definition a nation is constituted by an 
aspiration for statehood, in the deterministic normativism of explanatory IR, 
alternative expressions of sovereignty such polities might harbour are not even 
considered. As I will set forth in Part Three of this study, though, I question this 
aspiration for de jure independence in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan together with, 
in general, the strict qualitative sequence from A to B to C, from secessionist 
liberation movement to unrecognised or de facto state to independence – or the 
aspiration thereof – as Caspersen & Stansfield and other authors of a 
explanatory IR provenance are propagating.  
Clearly the most problematic term for such entities has been introduced to 
the debate by Pål Kolstø. Drawing on Robert Jackson’s concept of quasi states, 
Kolstø makes a highly questionable case for terming them ‘unrecognised quasi 
states’. In a normativism already criticised in relation to Jackson’s ‘quasi states’ 
he proposes that ‘if any of the unrecognised quasi states of today’s world 
should succeed in achieving international recognition, most of them will not end 
up as “normal” or fully fledged states but instead transmute into recognised 
quasi states of the Jacksonian variety’.384 It is not surprising that de facto states 
generally get such bad press. In a state-centric international system, still 
dominated in scholarship and practice by the decree that holds sovereign states 
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as organic, substantive, distinct, static, and bounded entities and as the 
principal actors of the international system, de facto states are not only an 
anomaly but, as will be further elaborated in chapter four, challenge the system 
on two fundamental levels. On the one hand, they represent the dynamic nature 
of the process of nation- and state-building in which statehood is just a 
momentary phase, not a constant, and expose the international community of 
nation states as socio-political constructs, as, contrary to how explanatory IR’s 
advocates would want to have it, not factual. In fact, I would go so far as to 
argue, they are the case in point par excellence for the fallacy of the 
explanatory IR paradigm of the sovereign nation state as a fixed, pre-given 
political entity. On the other hand, their creation constitutes a violation of the 
status quo, of the sacrosanct international system that guards state sovereignty 
and the inviolability of territories and borders like dogma. The very existence of 
de facto states is not only an affront to Jackson’s empirical states that 
undermines their construct of the international community from within; in many 
cases, they have also come about as the product of civitacide, the slaying or at 
least dismemberment of one of the states from which they emerged – a view 
subsumed in Gaspar Tamás interpretation of ethno-nationalism as ‘ethno-
anarchism’ that only ‘destroys states M and fails to replace them with 
anything’.385 Hence, de facto states are often perceived as outlaws, as the 
pariahs of the international system, as ‘transient anomalies’386 whose status, 
until resolved by, for example a reintegration into the state from which they 
originate, either by way of a negotiated political solution or by force, remains in 
the limbo of non-recognition.387 Yet, at the very latest, when this limbo persists, 
when what is portrayed as a ‘temporal anomaly’ becomes permanence, as is 
the case with Taiwan, or, to some extent, with Republika Srpska in Bosnia or 
the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, that the concept of all states as ‘like units’, of the 
‘empirical state’ as a fixed, pre-given, static, and bounded unit that is central to 
how explanatory IR explains and conceives of the social world and the 
international system as well as to its self-image as a discipline, 
epistemologically and ontologically becomes no longer tenable.  
Provisionally summing up these deliberations then, aside from an  inherent 
Eurocentrism and often racialised systems of categorisation, what has been 
established in this section then is that explanatory IR’s central framework of 
94 
 
sovereign nation states as fixed, pre-given political entities that essentially are 
‘like units’ and exhibit a universal sameness in their defining characteristics is 
ontologically untenable. In fact, its very own categories and concepts of failed 
states and de facto states attest to them being not any of the above. 
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3.) Conclusion 
 
The effects of groupism  
After having demonstrated how explanatory IR conceptually treats ethnicity, 
ethnic conflict and state sovereignty, both epistemologically and ontologically as 
well as in terms of concepts, models, and analytical frameworks, and after 
having established a profound tendency to groupism in explanatory IR, and 
before proceeding with the case study, I want to sum up the deliberations made 
in this study so far by establishing in no uncertain terms the effects of such 
groupism, calling attention to the role of explanatory IR scholars who study 
identity politics as co-protagonists of these identity politics, and by shining a 
light on the consequences of a groupist epistemology and ontology on their 
objects of study, the supposed ethnic group in conflict. Earlier it has been 
established that by analytically treating ethnic groups as organic, substantive, 
distinct, homogeneous, and bounded units with social agency, explanatory IR 
scholars uncritically accept the rhetoric of ethno-nationalist elites; rather than 
calling it into question, they adopt the ethnic or nationalists elites’ strategic 
essentialism as the basis of their enquiries and contribute to the reification and 
substantialisation of the those elites’ primordialism and to the reproduction of its 
logic. But what does this process of reification and substantialisation mean in 
practice, what are its effects on the object of study for those explanatory IR 
scholars who study ethnic conflict, what are the very actual consequences of 
their  adopting the strategic essentialisms and participants’ primordialism of the 
ethno-nationalist elites they set out to study, of analytically treating ethnic 
groups as organic, substantive, distinct, homogeneous, and bounded units with 
social agency, and all too often analytically equating them to states? In a first 
instance then, explanatory IR scholars who approach and explain an ethnic 
conflict in groupist terms reify, and substantialise how ethno-nationalist elites 
want the group to be seen by the outside world and, to put not too fine a point to 
it, they are complicit in the solidification and substantialisation of the constructed 
ethnic lines of division, of the imagined ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies and the 
resulting identity politics that form the basis of their essentialised world views. In 
reifying and substantialising those essentialist and primordialist (self-
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)perceptions of ethno-nationalist elites, explanatory IR scholars legitimize those 
(self-)perceptions and portrayals, this ethnicised discourse, and since the 
authority, the claim to leadership of ethno-nationalist elites is grounded in these 
constructed ethnic identities such scholars also indirectly legitimize their 
leadership, their position to speak authoritatively on behalf of the group. In sum, 
by reifying and substantializing the ethnicised discourse, by reproducing and 
confirming its logic, mainstream IR scholars, inadvertently or not, do the ethno-
nationalist elites’ bidding by authenticating and legitimizing their claim to 
representation, power, leadership and authority.  
What is more, explanatory IR tends to substantiate, reify, and legitimize 
those ethnic elites’ claims for the sovereign control over a certain territory. It has 
been noted earlier that explanatory IR notoriously kept struggling with forms of 
identity in its conceptualization of the international system. However, with the 
rise of ideational conflicts in the 1990s, such a position of conceptual 
negligence was no longer tenable. While at large ignoring, as it had always 
done, class and religious identities and permitting gender an existence at the 
margins of the disciplinary discourse – it focused on the one form of identity it 
considered itself best situated to problematise: ethnicity. This concentration on 
ethnic identities at the expense of other forms of identity, I hypothesise, is not 
only rooted in the self-perception of IR as the social science discipline 
dominating the scholarly discourse on issues of war and peace in the 
international domain but also because ethnic identity, rather than non-territorial 
class, religion, and gender, is presumed to be translatable into state-centric 
terms and rationalist positivist explanatory models. By translatable I do not refer 
to the nature of ethnic identity, on which explanatory IR, as has been shown, 
still has very little of meaning to say other than raking up primordialist 
conceptions of the ethnic group and nation, but rather the presumed purpose 
and objective of ethnic conflict – and conflict is what explanatory IR mostly 
deals with when studying ethnicity. If it were ontologically possible to reduce 
ethnic conflict to merely a power struggle over territory, as for example Monica 
Duffy-Toft does,388 claasical IR, for whom power struggles over territory have 
been at the centre of its research agenda and expertise, could apply the same 
rationalist positivist models, concepts and frameworks it has applied to states, 
also to ethnic groups. In this sense, Duffy-Toft argues: 
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Understanding ethnic war therefore requires an understanding of how two actors 
come to view control over the same piece of ground as an indivisible issue. For 
ethnic groups, the key factor is settlement patterns M [they] bind the capability and 
legitimacy of an ethnic group’s mobilization for sovereignty. Where both capability 
and legitimacy are high M ethnic groups are likely to consider control over disputed 
territory an indivisible issue and demand sovereignty. However, states are likely to 
view control over a territory M as an indivisible issue whenever precedent setting 
effects come into play, M i.e. the state fears establishing the reputation that it 
allows the division of its territory. Only when both an ethnic group and a state M 
view the issue of territorial control as indivisible will violence erupt. If, however, the 
ethnic group does not demand sovereignty M ethnic war is less likely.389 
In the next paragraph Duffy-Toft clarifies that ‘ethnic groups (and nations) 
are not states’, and that ‘although reducing ethnic groups to the ontological 
equivalent of states may make for elegant and parsimonious theories, my 
research makes it clear that such theories can be of only limited use’.390 What 
Duffy-Toft fails to realize, though, is that indirectly she is doing precisely that, 
ontologically equating ethnic groups with states, since she ascribes to ethnic 
groups an aspiration for sovereignty, which is generally seen as the prerogative 
of the nation and in consequence of the state. She claims that the pursuit of 
sovereign statehood by an ethnic group – who she defines also in groupist 
terms – against a state who defends the indivisibility of its territory is what turns 
an ethnic conflict violent. Thus, in one go, she not only ontologically equates the 
ethnic group with the nation but also with a proto-state, presuming not only its 
desire to control a territory in question in alternative terms, an autonomous 
region for example, but to become the unqualified sovereign of this territory, that 
is a new state. This chain of reasoning, of first conceptualising ethnic groups in 
groupist terms, and then ontologically and analytically equating them with 
nations and proto-states, is not limited to Duff-Toft’s work, which is only given 
as a particularly revealing example, but runs like a red threat through most of 
the explanatory IR literature on ethnic conflict. What is more, I argue, treating 
ethnic groups in groupist terms and ontologically equating them with nations 
and consequently with proto-states is the defining criterium of explanatory IR’s 
conceptualization of ethnic groups. I further argue that this ontological equation 
is what allows explanatory IR to continue applying the same rationalist positivist 
concepts, methods, and frameworks it applies for analysing states to ethnic 
groups. For, if ethnic conflict can be ontologically equated to inter-state conflict 
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as a power struggle over territory, the same theories and tools for resolving 
these conflicts as to conventional territorial conflicts can also be applied; that is 
by reducing ethnic conflict to a territorial conflict, it appears to be made 
manageable. 
What actually happens though, is that the portrayal of ethnic groups in 
groupist terms, of conceptually equating them with states, becomes tantamount 
with a substantialization, reification and legitimization of their claims for 
sovereign control over a certain territory as well as to speak with authority on 
behalf of a organic, substantive, distinct, homogeneous, and bounded 
group.This process of legitimization, though, works both ways; that is, as 
discussed earlier, if we accept identity formation as a Barthian process of social 
differentiation between the self and the other391 and as a Weberian form of 
collective political action,392 a legitimization of the territorial claims, perceptions, 
images, narratives and portrayals of the self implicitly leads also to a 
legitimizations of territorial claims, perceptions, images, narratives, and 
portrayals of the other.393 Yet this other is not value-neutral. As outlined in the 
Introduction, the notion that Western philosophy is structured along a series of 
binary opposites in a hierarchical relationship with each other in which ‘the 
second term in each pair’ is not only co-constitutive of the first but as such is 
also ‘considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first’,394 forms 
the basis of Jaques Derrida’s paradigm of deconstruction.395 Consequently 
then, if one applies Derrida’s logic of deconstruction, also outlined in the 
Introduction, to how explanatory IR analytically treats ethnic groups in conflict, 
by reifying, substantialising, reproducing and legitimizing the self in identity 
discourses explanatory IR also reifies, substantialises, reproduces and 
legitimizes the negative attributes of the other, and its perception as the enemy, 
its vilification. It has been pointed out that any study of a minority group in, for 
example, a state is incomplete without giving equal attention to the study of the 
ethnic identity of the majority group.396 From that logically follows when applied 
to ethnic conflict that by reifying, substantialising, reproducing, and legitimizing 
the self-perception of the oppressed minority, explanatory IR’s groupism also 
reifies, substantialises, reproduces, and legitimizes the perception of the 
majority and/or the nationalising state as an assimilationist oppressor; or, in 
reverse, by reifying, substantialising, reproducing, and legitimizing the majority 
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and/or the nationalising state’s struggle for the survival of ‘its’ state, explanatory 
IR reifies, substantialises, reproduces, and legitimizes the perception of the 
minority as irredentist secessionists. In sum then, supposedly detached and 
scientifically objective explanatory IR scholars, in their groupist ontologies and 
epistemologies, in their taking ethnic groups as organic, substantive, distinct, 
homogeneous, and bounded units possessing  social agency, are complicit in 
the ethnicised discourse, both at the level of the supposedly secessionist 
minority and the supposedly assimilationaist and oppressive majority and/or 
nationalising state, and reify, substantialise, reproduce, and legitimize both 
sides’ politics of division – as will be illustrated in the case study by 
deconstructing the (self-)perceptions of the Turkish state, Iraqi Kurdistan, and of 
the Kurdish political parties and insurgencies. 
However, there is more to the picture than explanatory IR scholars as co-
protagonists in ethnic conflicts reifying, substantiating, reproducing, and 
legitimizing already existing ethnic lines of division in an ethnicised discourse. 
Recapitulating what has been said in the Introduction about Foucault’s concept 
of ‘discursive formations’ in the process of knowledge production,397 namely that 
objects of discourse only come into existence through their discursive 
formations including its inherent social configurations of power, authority, and 
hierarchy, when talking about explanatory  IR’s role in shaping the discourse of 
ethnic conflict, these discursive formations and their inherent social 
configurations need to be taken into account. Explanatory IR scholars who 
study, analyse, explain, and write on ethnic conflict are naturally part of this 
discursive formation, they are, in the terminology of this study, co-protagonists 
of ethnic conflict by virtue of their position to speak authoritatively about issues 
of war and peace in the international system, as well as by virtue of their role as 
categorizers of the categorized, in this case the ethnic group. However, the 
differentiation between social group and social category as self-defined and 
other-defined social entities is not as clear-cut and straightforward as some 
primers in the social sciences or a Brubakarian constructivism – see chapter 
one – may suggest. On the contrary,  
categorisation is as much part of identity as self-identification M categorization 
makes a powerful contribution to the everyday reality – the realization M of groups. 
Attributions of group membership feature routinely in how we categorize others, 
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and the categorization of out-groups is intrinsic to in-group identification. Who we 
think we are, is intimately related to who we think others are, and vice versa.398 
. Consequently, in their groupist epistemologies and ontologies on ethnic 
conflict, explanatory IR scholars do more than contributing to already existing 
ethnicised discourses, and they do even more than reifying, substantialising, 
reproducing, and legitimizing already existing ethnic lines of division and the ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ dichotomies, together with the strategic essentialisms of ethno-
nationalist elites and/or nationalising states in which they are grounded. If the 
discursive formations on ethnic conflict – of which IR scholars are a constitutive 
part and in which they are co-protagonists – only gain meaning through the 
discourse itself, and if the act of categorization is constitutive of the process of 
self-identification, then it is IR scholars who take part in bringing these very 
identities into existence, who take part in their creation and construction.  
Since this is the core argument of this study about how explanatory IR 
analytically treats ethnic conflict, these conjunctures, in complete repudiation of 
the positivist rationalist essentialism discussed earlier, cannot be emphasised 
strongly enough when identifying the effects of a groupist approach to ethnic 
conflict. Those effects are: (1) Any scholar, whether adhering to a groupist 
perspective or not, participating in the discourse on ethnic conflict by way of 
studying, analysing, categorizing, explaining, or writing about it, is intrinsically 
part of the discursive formation on ethnic conflict and therefore actively takes 
part in the construction, and creation of the forms of identity he/she sets out to 
study, analyse, categorise, explain, or write about. (2) From that it follows that 
the epistemologies and ontologies under which this studying, analysing, 
categorising, and writing about is done, matter profoundly; if done from a 
groupist perspective, that is by taking on ‘categories of ethnopolitical practice as 
our categories of social analysis’,399 by analytically treating ethnic groups as 
organic, substantive, distinct, homogeneous, and bounded units with social 
agency as well as analytically equating them with states, such a portrayal 
reifies, substantialises, reconfirms, and legitimizes the politics of division, 
strategic essentialisms, and ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies in which these ethnic 
identities are grounded as well as the categories/groups’ empowered agents. 
(3) Since the binary opposites of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ are never value-neutral such 
a reification, substantialisation, reconfirmation, and legitimization of the binary 
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opposites in identity discourses themselves also intrinsically leads to a 
reification, substantialisation, reconfirmation, and legitimization of the values 
that come with it, that is the negative attributes of the other, its perception as the 
enemy, its vilification.  
 
 and alternatives to it 
As cautioned in the Introduction, the aim of deconstruction is never to 
develop new meta-theories, models, or frameworks that replace the ones that 
have been  deconstructed, which cannot be the task of deconstruction, since to 
do so would violate its very principles, that is its inherently critical attitude to any 
kind of meta-theory. Therefore, readers who expect at this stage the concepts 
and models of explanatory IR on (ethnic) identity to be replaced with a new, 
neater definition are bound to be disappointed; to develop new definitions is not 
the task of this study – as a matter of fact, it would contradict its aspiration and 
methodology – and consequently will be left to others. 
This limitation, however, does not prevent, after expounding the deficiencies 
of explanatory IR’s approach to (ethnic) identity, and after revealing why 
explanatory IR does what it does, that is contextualising its approach – as has 
been done in the previous chapters – from pointing out alternative 
conceptualizations of (ethnic) identity from IR literature that harmonise more 
closely with the classic understanding of ethnicity, introduced in chapter one, 
which explanatory IR chooses to neglect for the reasons diagnosed. Chapter 
one has elaborated that Max Weber describes ethnic groups as human 
collectives defined by their ‘subjective belief in a common descent’;400 in other 
words for him ethnicity is not an essential, pre-given characteristic, as it is for 
most of explanatory IR, but a belief system, an ideology, a way of seeing the 
world that gets strengthened and solidified through collective behaviour, through 
acting together as a group. Likewise, it has also been shown in this passage 
that Frederick Barth views ethnic groups as emerging through social interaction 
with others, by constructing social boundaries that define as much who belongs 
to the group as who does not, that, in fact, the process of constructing social 
boundaries – understood as system of inclusion and exclusion – is constitutive 
of the group formation and identification process; in other words that the self 
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cannot exist without the other and vice versa, that they are mutually constitutive. 
Ethnic groups, thus, are ‘in a sense created through that very contact [with other 
groups]. Group identities must always be defined in relation to that which they 
are not – in other words to non-members of the group’.401 If it is the interaction 
with others that constitutes the ethnic group, if group formation and ethnic 
identification is processual, relational, circumstantial, and contextual – and not,  
as explanatory IR portrays them, relatively stable, pre-given, substantial, 
bounded, and at large homogenous units that can be attributed with social 
agency – then ethnic identities are logically the very opposite of stable, 
substantial, and a pre-given but are one of multiple and dynamic identities, 
‘points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive 
practices construct for us’,402 that are ‘never a final or settled matter’,403 are 
‘decentred, fragmented by contradictory discourses and by the pull of other 
identities’404 – and are accentuated or attenuated according to context. In sum, 
they are not factual but socio-political constructs and ‘discursive formations’, in 
keeping with Craig Calhoun, for whom ethnic groups and ‘nations are 
constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking 
and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to 
mobilise people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and 
practices’.405 
All this amounts to a sound rejection of essentialist groupism in explanatory 
IR, of ascribing the ethnic group with social agency, of analytically equating it 
with the state, and of ethnic identity as the independent variable to explain 
ethnic conflict. In his survey of the recent literature on ethnic conflict that 
operationalises ethnic identity as the independent variable Kanchan Chandra 
comes to the conclusion: 
Ethnic identity – and concepts related to ethnic identity such as ethnic diversity, 
ethnic riots, ethnic parties, ethnic violence, ethnic conflict, and so on – either does 
not matter or has not shown to matter as an independent variable by most previous 
theoretical work on ethnic identity M In most instances, the mechanisms driving 
our explanatory theories about the effect of ethnic identity assume properties such 
as the fixedness of ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity and a shared history, 
which are not associated with ethnic identities M The outcomes our theories seek 
to explain, then, must be caused by some other variables that act independently or 
interact with ethnic identity.406 
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This assesment applies to explanatory IR frameworks such as the ethnic 
alliance model that most palpably seeks to explain ethnic conflict and the 
formation of ethnic alliances with ethnic identity as the independent variable, 
thus tautologically explaining ethnic conflict with ethnicity. It also applies to the 
ethnic security dilemma, on which Chandra observes: 
This argument assumes that ethnic categories, like states, are fixed entities. If 
individuals could change their ethnic identies, then one response to the collapse of 
the state would be to switch to less threatening identities rather than go to war. The 
argument also implies that ethnic groups are more likely than other types of groups 
to have a common history. Otherwise, the security dilemma should be an 
explanation for intergroup conflict in the wake of state collapse in general, rather 
than ethnic conflict in particular. However, neither fixity nor a common history are 
intrinsic properties of ethnic identities .., This argument, thus, cannot be read as an 
argument about the effect of ethnic identities per se. The effect of ethnic identities 
here is contingent on some extrinsic variable that produces fixity in ethnic identies 
and a perception of a common history.407  
If the effects of ethnic identity are contingent on an extrinsic variable which 
means that for the occurrence of ethnic conflict ethnic identity cannot serve as 
the explanans, that it has been demonstrated to fall through as the independent 
variable explaining the occurrence of ethnic conflict, ethnic identity should be 
operationalised as the dependent variable, instrumentalism argues. As has 
been shown, instrumentalism covers a wide spectrum of approaches, from 
Christia reducing ethnic identity to merely a political tool that can easily be 
traded for any other form of identity if the situation calls for it – thus rendering 
the elites who do the trading omnipotent in shaping the discourse, and by doing 
so reifying the structure via the agent – to Posner and Olzak’s more nuanced 
application of instrumentalism that puts equal emphasis on the motives of elites 
and masses and highlights the limitations to either of them playing the ethnic 
card. They show that individuals and groups, elites and masses alike, in any 
given context can only operationalize identities from a pre-existing repertoire 
and that this choice comes with costs and long-term commitments. Yet, the 
trouble with instrumentalism in general – aside from its positivist belief in a strict 
causality – remains their prioritizing of mostly material interests to dictate 
people’s choices and calling on identities. Posner, for example, states, 
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I am not denying that ethnic identities are sometimes sources of extremely strong 
feelings M In many contexts M viewing ethnic identity change as a product of 
strategic calculations about coalition size will be counter-productive and lead to 
misinterpretations of the motivations of social behaviour M I [do not] want to 
suggest that emotions such as fear, hatred, or resentment do not trump rational 
calculations in motivating ethnic behaviour in some contexts.408 
 Yet his analysis is almost exclusively dedicated to economic incentives 
such as patronage systems, the expectation and distribution of sinecures and 
public goods provisions as the independent variables to explain why a certain 
type of identity has been activated in this context. Posner admits as much  
when clarifying, ‘like ethnicity itself, the applicability of the strict instrumentalist 
approach I adopt is situational M My rationale for adopting a purely instrumental 
view of ethnicity in this study is simply that, while not appropriate for every 
explanation, it is appropriate for the expressly political context that this book 
treats’.409 That is all fair and fine and does not in any way diminish the 
contributions of Posner’s work commented on earlier. What it illustrates, though, 
is that instrumentalism does not provide a general theory of ethnic identity since 
it is only applicable in a certain, finite context. By its proponents’ own admission, 
it fails to explain the affect-side of ethnic identity, for example why situations 
may arise in which someone refuses to abandon his or her ethnic identity even 
in exchange for material benefits or political advantages, why people may 
stubbornly stick to their ethnic identity against their economic or security 
interests, why ideational factors may outweigh cost-benefit analyses.  
A possible solution to this conundrum of ethnic identity demonstrably failing 
to sufficiently explain the complexities of ethnic conflict as either the dependent 
or Independent variable is offered by Alexander Wimmer, who develops an 
intricate processual multi-level approach, where ethnic boundary construction 
can be seen as either dependent or independent variable, depending on 
context:410  
A multilevel process theory does not offer a simple formula relating ‘dependent’ to 
‘independent’ variables as in mainstream social sciences, for example, by 
predicting the degree of political salience of ethnicity from levels of gross domestic 
product, democratization, or ethno-linguistic heterogeneity M Rather, it is a 
generative model where variables are ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ depending on 
which phase in the cycle of reproduction and transformation [of ethnic boundary 
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making] we focus. The model thus M emphasize[s] that in order to understand the 
logic of social life we should focus on the processes that generate and transform its 
variying forms.411 
While Wimmer’s contribution has much to recommend itself and shares 
many commonalities with the processual approach advocated in this study two 
crucial reservations are to be made, both in relation to Wimmer’s positivist 
epistemology. Wimmer’s model still adheres to the principle that all social action 
and its underlying motives are grounded in a hierarchical sequence of cause 
and effect, that cause and effect can be clearly differentiated and categorized, 
that they can be operationalized as variables in order to explain these actions 
and motives, and finally that we analysts are capable of doing this 
differentiating, categorizing, operationalizing of variables, and explaining in a 
detached, objective and rational fashion.  
I believe neither of this to be the case. Grounded in constitutive theory I 
would argue that the social world is too complex, too much in constant flux to be 
neatly delineated into variables, into clear-cut divisions of empirically 
measurable cause and effect, into distinct and finite categories, and, perhaps 
most importantly, that we social scientists by applying objective and rational 
benchmarks can adequately explain it. We are an intrinsic part of the social 
world we seek to explain, are co-constitutive of it, are its co-protagonists like the 
actors in our studies whose actions and motives we interpret. We are biased 
towards a certain view long before we conceive of a research project, and our 
selection of variables and the results our research produces are just a reflection 
of this bias, of our inherent subjectivity, and therefore can only offer a personal 
narrative, one ‘reality’ among many others, at best a snapshot with very limited 
capacity for generalizations. This intellectual honestly implies an admission that 
instead of explaining the social world we can only offer a perception of it, and an 
admission that the causes and effects of social action are not as readily 
quantifiable and translateable into variables as positivist epistemology suggests. 
And since they are not, I would propose, in line with constitutive theory, to do 
away with dependent and independent variables, hierarchical sequences of 
cause and effect, and clearly bound entities as categories of analysis. They do 
not reflect the diversity, fluidity, and complexity of the social world, and neither 
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does the fallacious notion of scientific objectivity and of the detached scientists 
as rational observer and equitable ‘explainer’. 
Instead, drawing on Fierke, I intend to make a case for perceiving the 
process of identity formation in the social world as a fluid and complex matrix of 
identities and interests without hierarchical sequence of identities and interests 
as dependent and independent variables. She elaborates: 
A causal relationship requires the isolation of of independent and dependent 
variables. A constitutive discourse analysis, by contrast, requires that we ‘look and 
see’ the matrix of identities and interests and the process by which they are 
fradually transformed through historical interactions. These interactions do not by 
definition magnify the difference between identities; they may also attempt to 
renegotiate a different type of relationship between self and other.412 
Aside from presenting an alternative to the positivist principle of explanatory 
IR of classifying the social world into quantifiable variables and clearly bounded 
categories by allowing for a more fluid, diverse, complex, and less hierarchical 
and standardized make-up of the social world, the alternate epistemology and 
ontology of constitutive theory would therefore, after deconstructing the binary 
opposites around which our social world is supposedly constructed, consider 
other forms of human coexistence, forms more grounded in congruities rather 
than differences. Most importantly, constitutive theory directs our attention away 
from the ‘what’ identity is, discussed ad nauseam and, as has been shown, 
rather unconvincingly, to the more fruitful examination of ‘how’ identity works. 
Fierke continues: 
Conventional social scientific approaches treat entities as discrete and isolated M 
[But] identities are not isolated. They are constituted within a world populated by 
other identities, particular kinds of objects and particular forms of action M 
[Constitutive theory highlights those] by drawing out the structure of relationships, 
objects and actions, the everyday assumptions that constitute a world ‘made 
strange’, such that the analyst can observe its workings from more of a distance. In 
undertaking a study of this kind [i.e. a constitutive theory-based], the analyst is not 
observing ‘the’ world, as it exists objectively, but [is] rather looking at how ‘a’ world 
works in practice, including the power relationships and hierarchies that hold it 
together, the forms of legitimacy by which this power is maintained, or the 
challenges by which a particular constellation of identity and action is undermined 
and potentially transformed.413  
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This constitutive perspective on ethnic identities has guided the first part of 
this study that put the role of the analyst and his attempts, grounded in positivist 
explanatory IR epistemologies and ontologies, to construct a world ‘made 
strange’ in order to take a step back and examine it ‘objectively’ from a 
distance, centre stage, and it will also instruct the empirical case study. Here, 
though, rather than a textual analysis, our attention will shift to demonstrating 
why a positivist approach with identities and interest operationalized as 
dependent and independent variables demonstrably fails to explain the relations 
between Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties and the PKK from the early 
1980s until the present. At each stage of these relations we will pause and, 
echoing Fierke’s above call for a constitutive approach and what it entails, 
reflect on why their relations are better viewed through the prism of a fluid and 
complex matrix of identities and interests, how the interplay of these factors 
works, analyzing the structures and hierarchies of power that constitute the 
parties’ domination of the respective Kurdish discourse for self-determination, 
and how Kurdish identities shifted and were transformed by intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors during this period.  
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4.) State Formation and the Origins of Kurdish Ethno- 
nationalisms in Iraq and Turkey 
 
Turkey’s Sèvres Syndrome 
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, resulting from its defeat in World 
War One, was the cataclysmic event of the twentieth-century Middle East. 
Centuries-old political and socio-economic structures were replaced by new 
entities, most profoundly the modern, sovereign nation-state. Over the course of 
less than two years, about half a dozen new states were created on drawing 
boards in European chancelleries, where the victors of the great carnage tried 
to reconcile the idealistic principles of American President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points, calling for the national self-determination of the peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire, and the popular demands of a new era with their traditional 
imperialistic ambitions. It is this contradiction in principles, world views, and 
directions that determined the fragmented process of state formation in the 
Middle East, while its legacies form the root-cause of countless ethnic and 
ethno-nationalist conflicts that keep haunting the region until today. 
The Armistice of Moudros on 30 October 1918 ended the hostilities 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente in the Middle Eastern theatre of 
World War One. On 10 August 1920, representatives of the Ottoman Empire 
reluctantly signed the Treaty of Sèvres that deprived the Sublime Porte of 72 
percent of the territory it had controlled before the war. It foresaw the creation of 
several independent Arab – as well as an Armenian and Kurdish – states under 
mandate of the League of Nations. In regard to the Ottoman Empire’s Kurdish 
population the Treaty of Sèvres stipulated: 
Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three 
members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively 
shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a 
scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the 
Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter 
determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia M 
Article 64: If within one year of coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the 
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Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the 
population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council 
then considers that these people are capable of such independence and 
recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute 
such recommendations, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas M If 
and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the 
Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish 
state of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included 
in the Mosul vilayet.414 
For the first time, the idea of an independent Kurdish state was realistically 
within the grasp of its people and enjoyed international support.415 Yet it was not 
meant to be. 
Unlike the German Reich or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a good part of 
the Turkish political establishment and army refused to accept a peace by 
decree and took up arms against the Entente’s imperialist power grabs. In the 
Turkish War of Independence (1919-22), the Turkish Nationalists around 
Mustafa Kemal ‘Atatürk’ not only mobilized large swaths of the population for 
their cause but also dealt the Greek invaders and their allies devastating blows. 
Needless to say, Turkish nationalism or Turkism did not emerge out of the blue 
with the ‘Young Turk’ Revolution of 1908, but, as all nationalisms, had various 
‘precursors, proto-nationalist movements, and ideologies that prepare[d] the 
ground for the emergence of [Turkish] nationalism’.416 In fact, post-World War 
One Turkism or Kemalism should not be understood as a clear brake from 
Ottomanism nor from the more pronounced Turkish nationalism of the ‘Young 
Turk’ movement that, dominating the governing Committee for Union and 
Progress (CUP), de facto ruled the Empire since 1908. While doing away with 
its supposedly antiquated structures of governance, Turkism at first held out a 
‘new interpretation’ of Ottomanism’s basic principles, yet at the same time 
‘attribut[ed] a central role to the Turkish ethnic group within the Ottoman 
whole’.417  
In several important, interrelated aspects, Kemalism though, departed from 
traditional CUP doctrine. First, while acknowledging the primacy of education 
and the Turkish language,418 Kemalism, echoing Heather Rear’s ‘pathological 
homogenisation’ discussed earlier, put emphasis on forced assimilation. Every 
Muslim subject of the new Turkish state – ‘Christians [were considered] as 
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unsuitable material for becoming “Turkish”’419 and consequently expelled in a 
mass-exodus420 – could become a Turk; those who refused to adopt the Turkish 
Leitkultur were treated like the non-Muslim minorities: they were expelled or 
eliminated in the name of a founding ideology, that, over the course of a few 
years, had become distinctly racist and social-Darwinist, with ‘lesser people’ 
preordained to pay their debt for the ‘survival of the fittest’.421   
The extent to which the political space became ethnicized in the early days 
of the Turkish Republic has to be understood as a function of the pathological 
paranoia inherent to the Kemalist perception of watan, the fatherland, or as 
Omer Taspinar calls it, ‘state borders nationalism’.  
‘State borders nationalism’, which fundamentally stresses the indivisibility of nation 
and state within the republic’s territorial borders, continues to be the defining 
principle of Turkish nationalism. Given its major preoccupation with territorial 
sovereignty and the fear of disintegration, Turkish ‘state borders nationalism’ 
considers the granting of ethnicity-related minority rights as a betrayal of the 
indivisible unity between the state and its nation. As a result, even symbolic 
compromises regarding minority rights are considered as a prelude to 
separatism.422  
This paranoia via ethnic and/or religious minorities, originating from the so 
called ‘Eastern Question’ during the late days of the Ottoman Empire, World 
War One and the War of Independence, in which Assyrians, Armenians, 
Greeks, and to a lesser extent Kurds had conspired with one or an alliance of 
Western powers against the Empire or the viability of a Turkish watan, became 
the leitmotiv of Kemalist state and security doctrine. Indeed, Turkish politicians 
and the army continue to be plagued by what has been called in the literature 
the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’.423 Fatma Göçek defines the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ as a 
nexus of ‘those individuals, groups or institutions in Turkey who interpret all 
public interactions – domestic or foreign – through a framework of fear and 
anxiety over the possible annihilation, abandonment or betrayal of the Turkish 
state by the West’.424 Drawing on the Bourdieuian concept of habitus, Jung and 
Piccoli expand:  
One essential aspect of the Kemalist habitus is its perpetuation of the Kemalist 
experience of external conspiracy and internal betrayal. The historical culmination 
of this experience as well as its social transmission to the National Movement was 
the Treaty of Sèvres. Although never implemented, the clauses of Sèvres, calling 
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for a territorial division of Turkey, became the incarnation of both the Ottoman 
defeat and the Turkish national resistance M The Sèvres syndrome developed into 
a cornerstone of the Kemalist world-view, making it essential for an understanding 
of Kemalist perceptions of threat.425 
What is remarkable in this context is not only the persistence of the ‘Sèvres 
Syndrome’ into our times,426 but that Sèvres actually became a founding myth 
of the Turkish Republic. After all, the Turkish nationalist forces defeated the 
Greek invaders and their Entente allies and wrested from the West the much 
more favourable Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), in which Turkey’s enemies 
officially recognised the Turkish Republic that had managed to carve out double 
the territory than what had been stipulated at Sèvres. Why then would a 
moment of defeat that was never implemented rather than the victory at 
Lausanne become one of the defining founding myths of the Republic? Göçek 
speculates that the Turkish nationalist government, torn between a population 
‘traumatised by a decade of wars capping a century of pain, suffering and 
humilation’427 at the hands of the West and its own designs for imposing on this 
very population a project of rapid transformation and Western modernization, 
had to create an official, state-sanctioned valve for public sentiment to express 
itself – a valve that gained a momentum of its own, turned into a founding myth, 
and became a national syndrome. 
What is for the purposes of this study a more central aspect, is the fact that 
the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ did not remain limited to Turkey’s relations with the West 
but became aggrandised into a general perception of ‘bemoan[ing] Turkey’s 
location in a “bad neighbourhood’, and as ‘besieged by a veritable ring of 
evil’.428 This pathological fear of external conspiracies against the Turkish 
watan, the sacred territory of the fatherland – whether Western or regional – is 
accompanied by a widely held perception of any internal opposition to Turkish 
state doctrine being either stirred from abroad or this internal opposition actually 
acting as a ‘fifth column’ for foreign interests. This perception of domestic 
problems as exogenous, as instigated abroad, is particularly relevant in the 
context of the two major challenges the Turkish politico-military establishment 
since the 1980s has identified for the survival of the state: Islamism and ethnic, 
i.e. Kurdish separatism. The attitude towards the so called ‘Kurdish Question’ in 
Turkey that any political demands or dissent of its Kurdish minority are not 
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home-grown, and therefore cannot be solved in political dialogue, that any 
ethnicised discourse is steered by external enemies, and that any party 
engaging in such a discourse is a foreign agent or acting on behalf of foreign 
interests is best summed up in a statement by former President Süleyman 
Demirel who categorically asserted, ‘there is no other political solution to 
[Kurdish demands] than to render these people ineffective by force’, and that 
the West is ‘trying to involve the Sèvres Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the 
region M and that was what [the West] meant by political solutions’.429 Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit, after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, took the same line, 
when declaring, ‘there is no Kurdish problem in the country, but only PKK 
terrorism supported by the outside in order to divide Turkey’.430 Consequently, 
and as will be detailed throughout the third part of this study, this perception has 
strongly shaped the attitude and response of the Turkish politico-military 
establishment to any autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq that first and foremost 
was seen as a safe haven for Kurdish insurgencies and as a first step towards 
an independent Kurdish state that would then actively pursue the re-unification 
of all Kurdish lands and thus the division of the Turkish watan.431 What is 
equally noteworthy is that, by the same token, the ethnic alliance model and 
related groupist frameworks that operationalise group solidarity based on 
shared ethnicity as their independent and, as has been detailed, determining 
variable to explain the behaviour of parties of the same ethnic group in ethnic 
conflicts – in this case the Iraqi Kurdish polity and its relations with the PKK – 
not only buy into the pathological paranoia of the Turkish state but actively 
contribute to the misrepresentation of legitimate Kurdish grievances in Turkey 
as exogenous. In other words, ironically, it is often Western scholarship and 
explanatory IR that is demonstrably complicit in the Turkish politico-military 
establishment manipulating the myth of the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ and the 
discourse of denial, exclusion and persecution that comes with it.  
 
On the ‘artificiality’ of the Iraqi state 
‘Of all the major states in the Middle East, Iraq faced the most formidable 
obstacles to state formation’,432 Simon Bromley observes in his comparative 
account of the processes of state formation in the post-World War One Middle 
East. He continues: 
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The sheer arbitrariness of the country’s formation, together with the absence of any 
developed tradition of state stability and the degree of ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity M produced an extremely refractory inheritance for state-building. In 
addition, as a major oil producer during the critical period when the state’s authority 
was finally imposed on society, the rentier aspects of the Iraqi polity further 
increased its ability to opt for coercion over less brutal forms of mobilisation and 
control. The consequence has been the creation of the most controlled and 
repressive society in the Middle East.433 
It is true that Iraq, perhaps more than any other state in the Middle East, is 
an arbitrary creation of the imperialist designs and compromises of the World 
War One victors, and while in the randomness of its borders, the heterogeneous 
composition of its population, and its rulers’ proneness to authoritarianism it 
resembles many post-colonial states in Africa, it exceeds their inherent 
instability in the fact that its British imperialist overlords imposed on its society a 
completely alien ruling dynasty with no social or historical ties to Iraq’s 
population whatsoever.434 Never in the history of the lands between the Persian 
Gulf and the Zagros Mountain Range has there been a single, coherent, 
political entity of its own. From the times of Nebuchadnezzar to Mehmed VI., the 
last sultan to reign from the Sublime Porte, it had always been part of larger 
empires in which the manifold localist and often competing identities of its 
people were overlaid by greater unifying ideologies and Weltanschauungen. 
With these common bonds severed after World War One, unlike Turkey – 
forged on the anvil of Kemalism – Iraq lacked and arguably still wants for a 
founding ideology furnishing the state with internal legitimacy and evoking 
loyalty from its citizens. Worse, when creating Iraq, the British, eager to 
establish an overland connection between the Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf as a link to India, and who as the occupying force in Basra and Baghdad 
were seen as the logical choice for running the yet-to-be established Mandate 
of Mesopotamia, imposed at the Cairo Conference of March 1921 on a majority 
Shi’i population an alien Sunni ruler, their old war-time ally, Faisal, the son of 
Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca.435 By doing so, they established the fatal 
pattern characteristic for Iraq of the Sunni Arab minority ruling over and 
oppressing a Shi’i Arab and Sunni Kurdish majority; a pattern culminating in the 
reign of terror of Saddam Hussein. 
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The British state-building exercise on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris 
– one is hard pressed to believe they ever genuinely intended to build a nation 
there – was flawed from its conceptualization. It was established on two 
overriding principles: an ‘empire on the cheap’436 – to extract a maximum of 
profits with a minimum of input – and resulting from that, the application of 
‘divide-and-rule’ maxims, a re-tribalization of society, and playing particularistic 
local interests off against each other.437 They set Shi’i against Sunni, Kurds 
against Arabs, and exploited existing feuds between tribes to their own ends.  
Rather than neutralizing ethnic and religious differences within the heterogeneous 
Iraqi society M the British reinforced them by elevating Sunni Arabs over other 
groups M To control unruly tribal groups and Faisal’s power the British played off 
tribes against one another, instigating land disputes and encouraging internal 
hostilities.438   
Until the mid-1940s, the British ‘divide-and-rule’ strategies, imported from 
North-western India, today’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan439 
– at the time of the Raj, an as conflict-ridden land bordering notoriously unruly 
Afghanistan as Kurdistan was to belligerent Turkey – played out as expected. 
While the Turkish state to the north obliterated the traditional role of the sheikh 
and pursued an ambiguous policy towards Kurdish tribes, the British indirect 
rule over Iraq nurtured tribal structures and elevated the sheikhs as state-
sanctioned rulers. In its short-sighted desire for ‘empire on the cheap’, i.e. local 
allies running the show for British interests instead of stationing troops there 
permanently at a dear price, London became paymaster in a trickle-down 
system of patronage, basing its control over Iraq on corrupt aghas and sheikhs 
for whom charity began and ended at home,440 particularly in Southern 
Kurdistan.441 
As much as the political structure and population composition of Iraq 
reflected not historic and societal conditions on the ground but the strategic 
needs of the British quasi-colonial system – in fact, if anything they were 
deliberately set to work in opposite direction to weaken national cohesion and 
therefore minimize the potential for local resistance – so did Iraq’s borders. The 
original Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which Britain and France had carved up the 
former Ottoman Empire for themselves, foresaw the vilayet of Mosul to be 
joined with the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.442 Soon, though, 
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Britain was forced to change its mind and persuaded France to cede control 
over Mosul. What ultimately tipped the scales for the incorporation of the vilayet 
of Mosul and its Kurds into the British mandate of Mesopotamia and thus a la 
longue into Iraq were first and foremost military and religious factors: once 
Mustafa Kemal’s victories in the Turkish War of Independence had thwarted any 
hopes for a unified Kurdish state, Britain required an easily defensible, i.e. 
mountainous frontier with the Republic of Turkey, perceived as aggressive in its 
territorial ambitions and feared to be in cahoots with Bolshevik Russia. Of equal 
importance for London and Baghdad were the Sunni Kurds maintaining a 
balance against the Shi’i sectarian dominance in newborn Iraq – their inclusion 
guaranteed a desperately needed religious equilibrium, an aspect King Faisal 
was explicitly adamant about.443 By incorporating the Mosul vilayet into the 
British Mandate of Mesopotamia and by establishing the ‘Brussels Line’, agreed 
on as the border between Iraq and Turkey in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 5 June 
1926,444 Britain drove a permanent divide between the Kurdish lands, 
separating communities that had lived in close contact and social interaction for 
centuries, cut off Mosul – a traditional thoroughfare for goods from Aleppo and 
Anatolia to Persia – from its natural commercial links and forced it to coexist 
with Baghdad and Basra to the south, who historically had always been oriented 
towards the Gulf and whose ethnic, religious, economic, and societal 
composition differed markedly from the Kurdish north.445  
In sum and using Abraham Lincoln’s famous analogy, when the British 
released Iraq into independence-on-paper-only in 1932,446 they left a house not 
only internally divided against itself but built on quicksand. A shaky monarchy 
headed by a child-king447 presided over a system of proverbial instability – 
illustrated by countless coup attempts and Britain being forced to temporarily re-
occupy the country in 1941 – patronage, rampant corruption, artificially fuelled 
and rumbling on local conflicts, arrant social inequality, uneven modernization 
campaigns, the gradual transition into the status of a rentier state dependent on 
oil revenues, and cash-crop agriculture subject to fluctuations of the volatile 
1930/40s global market.448 This quasi-colonial legacy of the Iraqi polity has 
given rise to a debate about the  extent to which the ‘artificiality’ of the state 
created by the British imperialist power can explain Iraq’s troubled history of 
myriad sectarian divisions, proliferation of violent conflicts, and brutal 
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dictatorships.449 This debate is taken up by Stansfield who sums it up as a 
perception of Iraq being ‘cobbled together’ to satisfy the imperialistic strategic 
and geo-economic requirements of the British quasi-colonial power, and 
this description is then commonly used as the starting point to explain Iraq’s 
twentieth-century development, and, as a logic conclusion to such explanations, 
that it is Iraq’s existential fate to suffer under a succession of non-democratic 
governments M From a constellation of dissociated peoples living in different 
geographical spaces, the modern state of Iraq was doomed to succumb to various 
manifestations of authoritarian rule because this was the only mechanism by which 
the fractious country could be held together.450 
Stansfield holds against this reading of the genealogy of the Iraqi state in the 
twentieth century that ‘virtually all states are to some extent, as human 
constructs, “artificial”’, and goes on that,  
the argument also presupposes that social and political characteristics in twentieth-
century Iraq remained in a state of stasis, rather than one of dynamism and 
development. Why should it be presumed that just because Iraq was artificial in the 
1920s nearly a century of existence as a state should not have endowed it with 
some form of societal consciousness?.451 
  While I agree with Stansfield that all states are social constructs – which, in 
my opinion and as elaborated earlier, does not make them artificial but 
constructed and performatively enacted realities – I do not agree with his 
implicit interpretation that therefore all states are the same, a constructivist 
variant, or ‘clichéd constructivism’ in Brubaker’s terminology, of the neo-realist 
view of the international system composed of states as ‘like units’ discussed in 
the previous section. This chapter’s comparison between the processes of state 
formation in Turkey and Iraq show that their origins and the polities resulting 
from these formative struggles could not be more different: on the one hand a 
state that was forged by a widely supported nationalist struggle against 
imperialist invaders and occupying forces and whose founding ideology drew on 
a rich canon of myths of origin, and on the other hand an arbitrary creation that 
corresponded with the geo-strategic needs of an imperialist power but whose 
people had nothing in common other than the polity that was imposed upon 
them and its alien ruler serving these imperialist needs. In other words, one 
does not have to go far, does not even have to go outside the region and 
belabour examples of imperialist states such as Britain or France versus post-
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colonial states such as Iraq or Syria, to highlight their different origins and 
trajectories; for an empirical example that not all states are the same, that they 
are not ‘like units’, that a colonial and non-colonial past makes a profound 
difference for their future development one just has to turn to a comparison 
between Iraq and neighbouring Turkey. Stansfield is correct though, in pointing 
out that there was nothing pre-destined about Iraq’s progression in the twentieth 
century, that it was not necessarily ‘doomed’ to authoritarianism and state 
collapse, that one should not ‘presume’452 that it could not have developed 
differently; yet, the fact that it did not, that it succumbed to authoritarianism and 
sectarian violence is a result of and can be explained by its quasi-colonial 
legacy, of the fundaments, structures and parameters the British quasi-colonial 
power established.453 To deny these different preconditions specific to the post-
colonial state, in my opinion, would not only be factually wrong but also 
represent a failure to recognise the role European imperialist powers have 
played in shaping the non-European world and the historic and moral 
responsibility that comes with that recognition – a recognition that, as detailed 
earlier, is unfortunately notoriously underdeveloped in a Eurocentric explanatory 
IR that often tends to whitewash its imperialist past. Finally, I would argue that 
Stansfield, throughout his monograph on Iraq, gives a detailed answer to his 
own question as to why ‘nearly a century of existence as a state should not 
have endowed Iraq with some form of societal consciousness?’454 Because the 
parameters set to ensure imperialist control and exploitation during the British 
Mandate of Mesopotamia persisted and were made sure to continue in the post-
colonial state of Iraq, reaching from Britain’s repeated military interventions 
there, to oil concessions that benefitted foreign proprietors, to local elites 
collaborating and profiteering from these systems of dependence, exploitation 
and internal division, to the inviolability of state borders enshrined in 
international law and the modern international system, to the construct of the 
modern sovereign nation state itself.455  
 
The origins of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Iraq 
In the British occupied Kurdish territories in what is today’s Iraqi Kurdistan, 
the Kurdish rebellions in the north – see below – had the immediate effect of 
proving the Turkish Republic more conciliatory on the question of the future 
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status of the former Mosul vilayet. For the British, who, as part of their wider 
redrawing of maps of the entire Middle East, had once championed an 
independent Kurdish state and who had been on the verge of outright war with 
Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist forces for almost six years, this respite meant that 
they could close the last chapter of contention with the Turkish Republic and 
embark on re-shaping their share of the Middle East to their visions.456 For the 
Kurds, it meant the ultimate division of their homeland when on 5 June 1926 
Britain and Turkey reached a bilateral agreement for the former vilayet of Mosul 
to be incorporated into the British Mandate of Mesopotamia.457 Before this, 
Kurds in Southern Kurdistan had been kept in limbo for eight years on their 
future status. Eight years in which the prospect of independence under British 
suzerainty was held out, subsequently replaced by pledges of a special status 
within Iraq under British direct administration; yet, ultimately these grand 
schemes came to naught, all promises shot down in just another treaty signed 
on distant shores. 458 Eight years in which the Kurdish leaders’ particularisms 
and factionalisms allowed the British and the Turks to play them off against 
each other and use them as a bluff in the road up to Lausanne and after.459 As 
in Turkey, the Kurdish tribal leaders in Southern Kurdistan sought their fortune 
with the political system of indirect rule familiar to them – a benevolent suzerain 
interfering in local affairs as little as possible – rather than experimenting with 
the unknown, an ideology that must have appeared utopian and unrealisable. It 
should come as little surprise then that the first Kurdish nationalist leaders in 
Iraq on a supra-regional stage emerged from the rows of disgruntled sheikhs 
who felt excluded from the cornucopia Whitehall poured over their peers and 
frequently, arch-enemies.460 
In the end, notwithstanding the fact that the League of Nations 
acknowledged that the Kurdish lands of the Mosul vilayet had historically never 
been part of what was called Iraq, and voicing serious doubts about the state’s 
survivability,461 all Geneva held out for the Kurds was a vague form of autonomy 
and the guarantee of local administration and education in Kurdish as the 
official language in those areas predominantly inhabited by Kurds.462 And yet 
this consolation prize constitutes the prime difference between the Kurdish 
situations in Iraq and Turkey, and consequently accounts for the diverse paths 
Kurdish ethno-nationalisms have taken in both countries. While in Turkey, until 
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recently, the mere existence of the Kurds as an ethnic minority has been 
denied, Iraq’s Kurds enjoyed a vague right to autonomy and local self-rule 
confirmed by the highest international body, the League of Nations. ‘These 
provisions were expressed to constitute international obligations to protect the 
civil and political rights of the Kurds and their rights as a minority group’.463 As a 
result, the Kurdish nationalist struggle in Iraq, centred on the implementation of 
these guarantees, was determined by phases of on-and-off negotiations and 
collaboration with the central government, and, its initial stage aside, remained 
local in its orientation rather than pursuing a pan-Kurdish agenda. As will be 
repeatedly emphasized throughout this study, the Kurdish nationalist leaders in 
Iraq had more to gain from forcing Baghdad to accept the autonomy they could 
refer to in cold print, signed and sealed by the predecessor of the United 
Nations, than from embarking on an adventurous secessionism in pursuit of (re-
)uniting the Kurdish lands. In sum, Kurdish leaders in Iraq had come to terms 
with the concept of the sovereign nation state almost from day one and sought 
to eke out a degree of self-government within these confines rather than 
challenging the principle by way of secession. 
In the first decades of the Iraqi state there was little room for ethno-
nationalist divisions, though. The fight against the excesses of an exploitative 
state of dependency and the common struggle against British imperialism and 
its puppet regime in Baghdad united all national movements in Iraq, their 
ethnicity in most cases coming a distant second. This unity of purpose explains 
the formation of seemingly impossible coalitions of Kurds with pan-Arabists, 
Nasserists with Ba’athists, Communists with the petty bourgeoisie, and 
intellectuals with day labourers against a state whose short-sighted 
modernization campaigns had driven them off the fields and into urban skid 
rows.464 In the Kurdish case, these odd alliances were personified in the 
controversial figure of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, until 1943 a mere regional 
brigand, after World War Two the legendary leader of Kurdish nationalism in 
Iraq. Although hailing from a distinguished pedigree of religious leaders 
associated with the Naqshbandiyya order of Sufis, he, at the end of the day, 
was a particularist warlord from the mountainous outback whose constituency 
lived off raids on neighbouring tribes, who had distinguished himself by several 
unsuccessful local campaigns against the central government.465 And yet Mulla 
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Mustafa, whose boundless personal ambition was only checked by his fickle 
strategic foresight, accomplished what his rebellious peers had failed to 
achieve: to amend their personal vendettas to a ‘national’ level by appealing to 
Kurdish national consciousness, mustering alliances with Kurdish urban leftist 
movements.  
For in the beginning, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq did not proliferate from the 
mountains with which it has become mythically associated, but blossomed in 
the cities, among urban intellectuals and impoverished day labourers. The 
effects of the Great Depression, a painful slump in tobacco prices,466 
Kurdistan’s prime cash crop, and their exclusion from the oil bonanza, 
aggravated by constant political turmoil after Faisal’s death in 1933, allied 
Kurdish with Arab nationalists in the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), uniting them 
in their struggle against imperialist exploitation, governmental corruption, and 
the tribal chiefs and aghas who collaborated with and lived on the system of 
Britain’s ‘empire on the cheap’ that accrued all economic and strategic benefits 
while offering the Iraqi people very little in return.467 ‘Shared spaces for Arabs 
and Kurds within the anti-imperialist movement encouraged the Kurds’ 
collective identity as Iraqis to become salient alongside their sense of Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism’.468 The anti-imperialist parties’ greatest deficiency, though, 
was their lack of manpower; their clandestine cells in the urban centres, 
intellectual debating societies, and combat organs were a powerful force when it 
came to talking the talk, but walking the walk required rebellious tribal chiefs like 
Mullah Mustafa, who could muster the manpower to challenge the imperialist 
order. These individual components – the ideological appeal of nationalism and 
Mullah Mustafa’s command over the malcontent tribes – if merged, could prove 
a composition with the potential to unhinge the notoriously unstable Iraqi state. 
And merge they did.  
The short, glorious and epic last stand of the Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad469 – a Kurdish Soviet-backed separatist polity born out of the chaos of 
post-World War Two Iran and the dawn of super power rivalry in the Gulf – not 
only gave the Kurdish nationalist movement in neighbouring Iraq wings, and 
boosted Mulla Mustafa’s stardom but once again, most dramatically, confirmed 
the need for tribal-nationalist cooperation. While distinguishing himself in the 
military defence of Mahabad, across the border in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa was 
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unwilling to accept a subordinate role to Mahabad’s Kurdish Democratic Party 
of Iran (KDP-I).470 He envisioned the alliance he had entered with the 
Communist Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation) Party to act as a catch basin for 
the myriad embryonic Kurdish nationalist organizations that failed to make a 
difference on their own, with him helming the Kurdish anti-imperialist struggle in 
Iraq. This alliance required a new organisation, which while independent from 
Mahabad’s KDP-I, would carry on its spirit as the vanguard of Kurdish 
nationalism in Southern Kurdistan. This alliance was the birth hour of the KDP, 
the Kurdish Democratic Party.471 
The union between Mullah Mustafa, who ‘like any good tribal leader (M) 
was constantly seeking to widen his [personal] regional authority’,472 and urban 
nationalists can be characterized as ‘a marriage of convenience, albeit with 
suspicion on both sides’.473 He routinely put the interests of the land-owning 
tribes he represented before the class struggle advocated by the urban 
nationalists around Ibrahim Ahmed and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani. The 
resulting ‘conflict between the two groups [within the KDP] has become a 
characteristic of Kurdish politics ever since’.474  
The 14 July 1958 Revolution by Nasserist Free Officers under Abd al-Karim 
Qassem was a watershed event for Iraq and the wider Middle East.475 It toppled 
the British-backed monarchy, terminated the state of quasi-colonial dependency 
and, having dissociated the country from the Western camp, turned Iraq into a 
pawn in the dominant super power confrontation. For a decade it brought to 
power an array of (pan-)Arabist dictatorships of various political couleures and 
Cold War alignments, each succeeding the other with increasing regularity often 
through more or less bloody coups. Most importantly though, the multiethnic 
alliances that had brought down the monarchy ruptured and ‘the political space 
became more clearly ethnicised, centralised, and militant’.476 In post-1958 Iraq, 
competing ethno-nationalisms amplified and faced each other in an 
incrementally violent struggle over the future of Iraq, setting both Kurds against 
Arabs and Iraqi against pan-Arabist nationalism.477  
However, it would be a gross simplification to understand the Kurdish 
nationalist movement as merely a reaction to (pan-)Arabist aggression in the 
ensuing confrontations between Kurdish nationalists and tribal alliances with the 
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(pan-)Arabist regimes in Baghdad over autonomy, self-rule, and cultural rights 
for Iraqi Kurdistan that escalated into a series of full-scale Kurdish wars.478 On 
the contrary, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq had become a full-
fledged political actor that was instrumental in bringing down consecutive 
regimes, militarily stood its ground in three full-scale wars, inflicted such heavy 
casualties on the forces of the Iraqi government and destabilized the country to 
such an extent that it forced every new regime coming to power to the 
negotiation table.479 A pattern emerged in which Nasserists or Ba’athists did 
made ample concessions on Kurdish self-rule – and thus antagonized their own 
constituencies – not because they genuinely believed in the need for nation 
building, but because they realized that Kurdish nationalists and Mulla 
Mustafa’s tribal alliances had the potential to bog them down in costly 
campaigns in the mountains. Weakened in fruitless military campaigns and 
having lost face politically, they were toppled by their own armed forces and/or 
their (pan-)Arabist competitors.480 The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 
1960s was a force to be reckoned with, the purchase, pacification and 
integration of which the survival of the central government depended. Mulla 
Mustafa recognized his role as the one force capable of tipping the scales and 
wielded his power by calling in ever larger concessions with considerable skill. 
No matter how excessive his demands, he balked at claiming actual 
independence,481 which might have resulted in the various (pan-)Arabist ethno-
nationalist factions uniting against the Kurds. Instead he shrewdly maintained 
his edge and the inter-Iraqi balance of power. 
Another reason for Mulla Mustafa’s political restraint was the fact that his 
Iraqi Kurdish nationalist camp was as internally divided as his (pan-)Arabist 
opponents in Baghdad. In 1964, long simmering tension within the KDP 
between the leftist political bureau, headed by secretary general Ibrahim Ahmed 
and his son in law Jalal Talabani, and Mulla Mustafa over the latter’s autocratic 
leadership erupted, resulting in an irrevocable split right down the party’s ranks, 
from which a decade later the PUK would emerge.482 
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The origins of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey 
Any analysis of the origins of Kurdish ethno-nationalisms in the Middle East 
in general and of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey in particular is faced with 
the puzzling question as to why the Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia failed so 
spectacularly to capitalise on the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the 
new order crafted at Sèvres. After all, Section III Articles 62-4 of the Treaty of 
Sèvres foresaw a Kurdistan region whose future political status was to be 
determined by public referendum, a region that included the vilayet of Mosul 
and indirectly held out the prospect of an independent Kurdish state.483 And yet, 
ironically, it was the Kurdish tribes, who would have gained most from a defeat 
of the Kemalist opposition to the Sèvres order, who became one of the Turkish 
Nationalists’ staunchest confederates – a strategic choice comparable to a 
scenario where Czechs, Croats, and Slovaks might have sided with the dying 
Habsburg monarchy against the prospect of independent states they were 
promised by the Allies at Saint Germain-en-Laye and Trianon. How come the 
Kurds acted so blatantly against their best national interest to play a significant 
part in shutting this unique window of opportunity? 
The answer is, there was no Kurdish national interest at this time. Unlike 
Turkish nationalists, the Kurds had not yet reached a stage in their ‘national 
temporality’,484 which would allow them to rally the masses for a common cause 
behind an internally and externally legitimised leader. Indeed, most Kurdish 
decision makers in eastern Anatolia were staunch Ottomanists fighting for the 
retention of the status quo, not to revolutionise it.485 In addition, externally 
fuelled, inner-Kurdish divisions and the continual re-tribalisation policies of past 
Ottoman central governments prevented the Kurds from exploiting their once-in-
a-nation’s-lifetime chance for statehood when the Allies signed the death 
certificate of the Ottoman Empire at the Treaty of Sèvres, and turned them into 
hapless late-comers in the scramble for national self-determination. Once this 
unique window of opportunity – the implosion of an empire – was closed, they 
had to take on modern nationalising states who, protected by the principle of 
state sovereignty, dealt with their minorities as they saw fit. 
Not long after expelling the Greek invaders with their Entente allies, having 
wrested from the latter a revision of the Sèvres treaty at Lausanne in July 1923 
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– that permanently buried any hope for a Kurdish state486 – the Turkish 
nationalists showed their true colours. In the decade after Lausanne, the 
Turkish state attempted to perpetrate ethnocide against its Kurdish minority; the 
juggernaut of Kemalism, the new nationalist doctrine of the victorious, emerging 
Turkish Republic, literally wiped out any embryonic notions of Kurdish 
nationalism that may have existed, politically paralysing the Kurdish people for 
the coming generation. Once Kemalism’s external enemies had been defeated, 
Turkish nationalists rigorously forced through their modernising reform agenda. 
On 1 November 1922, the Sultan was deposed; on 29 October 1923, the 
Republic proclaimed; and on 3 March 1924, the Caliphate abolished – for good 
measure, associations on religious grounds were forbidden, all medresses 
(religious schools) closed, and all tarikats (Sufi orders), the cornerstone of folk-
Islam in the Kurdish lands, were banned.487 Within eighteen months, all bonds 
uniting Kurdish identity with the state were severed, all the Kurds had fought for 
during the War of Independence was squashed, not by imperialist, Christian 
guns, but by the stroke of a pen from their nominal brothers in faith, the 
Kemalist reformers in Ankara. 
It is impossible to underestimate the importance the abolishment of the 
Caliphate had on the development of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey. As a 
direct consequence, it triggered what Hakan Yavuz categorizes as ‘the second 
stage in the construction and politicization of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in 
Turkey’.488 Both urban Kurdish nationalists and rural tribal leaders watched 
Turkish nationalists’ doings with mounting concern. They felt betrayed by 
Ankara’s ‘sell-out’ on the Mosul vilayet489 – until recently portrayed by Atatürk as 
a constitutive part of watan never to be sacrificed, now bartered away for British 
comity, thus effectively tearing Kurdish lands apart490 – threatened by the 
increasing dominance of Turkishness, and its gradual elimination of the Kurdish 
element from the official domain. Above all, they were appalled by the Turkish 
nationalists’ relentless dismantling of Ottoman institutions. Here, the sacrilege 
committed when abolishing the Caliphate mattered most to the predominantly 
pious Kurds in eastern Anatolia. It was the politico-religious dimension of the 
Caliphate, an implicit safeguard against ethno-centrist hegemonic ambitions 
within the ummah, which when banished into the dustbin of history, forged an 
alliance between urban Kurdish nationalists and tribal sheikhs.491 The ruthlessly 
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imposed secularisation and modernisation reforms of the Kemalist regime thus 
forged an alliance between ideological antagonists that would have been 
inconceivable a few years earlier, and provoked a rebellion that shook the 
young Republic to the core.  
In February 1925, the revered clergy, Sheikh Said of Piran, managed to rally 
15,000 Zaza tribesmen behind his ethno-religious flag that took the Turkish 
Republic 52,000 soldiers to crush by mid-April.492 This rebellion has to be 
acknowledged as a turning point in the history of the Kurds in Turkey for three 
reasons. First, the failed Sheikh Said revolt of 1925 forged and cemented the 
entente between urban nationalists and religio-tribal chieftains that was to 
determine the Kurdish proto-nationalist movement in Turkey for the next 
decade. Second, until 1938, in response to the mounting unparalleled 
suppression, it triggered a chain of more than three-dozen Kurdish 
insurrections, ranging from local skirmishes to full scale military operations 
across international borders culminating in the doomed Kurdish Ararat Republic 
and the ethnocidal massacres of the Dersim campaign.493 Eastern Anatolia had 
become a permanent war zone in a protracted ethnicised conflict, which in 
terms of territorial spread, destruction of livelihoods, human casualties, and 
costs in troops and resources for the Turkish state unseen since the War of 
Independence.494 Third, and most lastingly, the Sheikh Said rebellion served as 
a pretext for the Turkish state495 to unleash its arsenal of ethnic cleansing 
campaigns and Turkification-by-force programs with the clear intent of 
destroying Kurdish ethnic identity496 – a textbook-like application of what 
Heather Rae has, as discussed earlier, called ‘pathological homogenisation’. 
During these thirteen years of repression [1925-38], struggle, revolt, and 
deportation M more than one and a half million Kurds were deported [or] 
massacred M The entire area beyond the Euphrates M was kept under a 
permanent state of siege until 1950.497 
 
In the years immediately before and after Dersim, the Turkish state, in 
addition to renaming Kurdish settlements with Turkish aliases and outlawing the 
Kurdish language,498 systematized its ethnic cleansing campaigns by employing 
deportations, summary mass-executions, death marches, and the razing of 
hundreds of villages to the ground. From the perspective of the Turkish state, 
Kurds had become nonentities; they were to be either ‘turkified’, i.e. assimilated 
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as non-ethnic Turkish citizens, or eliminated outright. By 1940, the ethnocide of 
the Kurds in Turkey seemed complete.499 Co-opted by force, deported, or 
summarily executed, Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Northern Kurdistan appeared 
to have vanished into thin air when the smoke over Dersim cleared. The 
decades between the massacre of Dersim and the gradual revival of Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism on the political stage in the 1960s may seem to have been 
lost, yet Hamit Bozarslan makes a compelling case for Kurdish ethnicised 
conscience, suppressed in the political arena, finding its niche in the cultural 
domain where it ensured Kurdish ethnic identity’s survival and re-emergence, all 
the more forceful a generation after the last Kurdish rebellion had been 
crushed.500 
For Kurdish ethnic identity to gain ground, it required fundamental changes 
in the Turkish political system. Ironically, it was political reforms, liberalisation 
efforts, and the emergence of civil society in Turkey that encouraged the 
radicalisation of Kurdish ethno-nationalism that would ultimately lead to the 
emergence of the PKK.  
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5.) KDP and PUK 
 
The KDP 
In the previous chapter it has been outlined that the origins of the KDP in 
Iraq are rooted in an alliance between Kurdish urban leftist movements and 
traditionalist rural tribesmen who felt excluded from the quasi-colonial systems 
of patronage the British had introduced to ensure compliance with the nascent 
Iraqi state and its underdeveloped political structures. The most prominent of 
these tribes was the Barzani clan, deriving its name from the village of Barzan 
in the remote Kurmanji-speaking mountain areas of northern Iraq just south of 
the border with Turkey. In the turbulent era of the dissolution of the Kurdish 
emirates during the tanzimat reform era, the Barzani family, whose local 
authority derived from their religious status as sheiks of the Naqshbandi Sufi-
order, had earned a reputation as a safe haven for political refugees, ‘a sort of 
utopian society’ that soon became ‘a centre of emerging Kurdish nationalism’.501 
Although it would be more correct to speak of a centre of political dissent – 
since, as detailed earlier, it would be a case of reading contemporary categories 
into the past to identify Kurdish nationalist sentiments prior to the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire – it can be argued that from the days of the division of the 
Kurdish lands in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1926 the Barzanis acted as the 
leaders of a series of uprisings against the political order imposed on them by 
London, Baghdad and Ankara, and that the rebellion Sheikh Ahmad Barzani 
launched in 1931 against the Iraqi government can be read in the context of 
wider Kurdish rebellions in the region, most prominently the concurrent Ararat 
Rebellion in Turkey.502 In this campaign Sheikh Ahmad’s younger brother Mulla 
Mustafa earned his first military spurs; combat experience that had Mulla 
Mustafa become the commander in the defence of the ultimately doomed 
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran.503 The frequency and apparent ease in 
which these cross-border alliances between various Kurdish movements were 
formed in the first decades after the imposition of the sovereign nation-state 
principle on the region not only attest to a notorious inability of the weak 
nationalising states to control their territory, but also to the existence of a 
degree of solidarity among Kurdish tribes and movements transcending the 
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recently established borders. To deduce from this degree of solidarity, however, 
common ethnicity as the independent variable determining relations between 
various segments of Kurdish societies in all four nationalising states of Iraq, 
Turkey, Iran, and Syria, as the ethnic alliance model and related groupist 
frameworks do in their reification of ethnic identities, would be a gross 
simplification of the complex dynamics within the matrix of interests, identities, 
and resulting behaviours of actors in this context. 
The ambiguity and complexity of dynamics in these relations becomes 
apparent in Mulla Mustafa’s machinations, who, while defending the KDP-I’s 
Mahabad in Iran,504 tried to capitalise on his involvement with the KDP-I for his 
own ends, namely to craft an umbrella organization uniting under his leadership 
the traditionalist tribal alliances in the rural hinterland and secular leftist 
movements such as Komala-i-Liwen (Young Men’s Organisation), Hiwa (Hope), 
and Shoresh (Revolution) in the more cosmopolitan, educated, urban centres of 
Sulimaniyah and Kirkuk.505 Mulla Mustafa can be credited with the realisation 
that, ‘for a Kurdish movement to succeed, the tribes needed to work with the 
educated urban political parties, along the lines of the KDP-I’.506 Yet, in these 
attempts, though, Mulla Mustafa was opposed by the leader of the Iraqi branch 
of the KDP-I, Ibrahim Ahmed, whose loyalty to Mahabad and a more expansive 
pan-Kurdish nationalism cum socialism forbade his involvement in Mulla 
Mustafa’s contrary, traditionalist and narrow ambitions, limited to self-
determination within Iraq. The new KDP, officially formed at the party’s first 
congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946, thus could have remained a flash in 
the pan, had it not been for the fall of Mahabad and the execution of its leaders 
in March 1947 – dealing the KDP-I an almost lethal blow – that forced Ibrahim 
Ahmed to consider a merger with Mulla Mustafa’s Iraqi KDP that was born out 
of competition with the very KDP-I Ahmed represented.507 Ironically then, 
although the success of the KDP and Mulla Mustafa’s rise to stardom with the 
Kurdish nationalist camp in Iraq was only made possible by the fall of Mahabad, 
the immediate effect of this military defeat meant for him a decade of exile in the 
Soviet Union;508 an absence from the political scene in Iraq during which the 
new party’s fate was determined by Ibrahim Ahmed.509 Upon Mulla Mustafa’s 
return from exile in the wake of the 1958 Free Officers coup in Iraq, animosities 
between his traditionalist tribal constituencies who thrived as feudal landholders 
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and the socialist Politburo under Ahmed’s leadership advocating for land 
reform, would gradually intensify. The genealogy of the KDP so far and its 
internal contradictions is summed up by Stansfield: 
The KDP had been formed by an uneasy alliance of tribal and urban leftist 
elements, with both attempting to take advantage of the other, but with the urban 
leftists falling into the alliance with the tribes through the charisma and 
achievements of Barzani. The arrival of more radical and energetic leftists such as 
Ibrahim Ahmed again strengthened the left and the scene was set for the future 
internecine political fights which came to characterise Kurdish politics from then 
on.510 
One aspect that illustrates these internal divisions particularly well is the 
formation of the irregular Iraqi-Kurdish forces, the peshmerga, literally translated 
as ‘those who face death’.511 When in 1961 the Qassem regime resorted to 
direct military action against Barzani and the KDP, the animosities between the 
KDP Politburo, ‘ever wary of forming dependencies on the tribal militia of 
Barzani’,512 and Mulla Mustafa, likewise, forbidding the KDP to operate in his 
tribal stronghold along the Turkish border, resulted in the establishment of an 
irregular force within the sphere of influence of the Politburo between Raniyah 
and Sulimaniyah, whose ranks were swelled by Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi 
army. Soon, ‘the army cadres managed to develop [these guerrilla] into a rough 
mountain fighting force’513 superior in military knowhow and ideological 
motivation to Mulla Mustafa’s tribal militias, and it is largely thanks to the 
peshmerga the Kurds prevailed against Qassem’s nominally more advanced 
forces.514 
These internal divisions within the KDP turned out no longer bridgeable and 
openly erupted to the surface in 1964. After initially having struck a compromise 
on Kurdish self-governance with Qassem’s successor, the Ba’athist regime 
under Abdul Salam Aref and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Mulla Mustafa was forced 
under military pressure to accept a political accord that made no mention of 
Kurdish autonomy; what made matters worse in the eyes of the KDP Politburo 
was the fact that Mulla Mustafa had not even bothered to consult the party 
before accepting a lesser deal on behalf of all Kurds in Iraq,515 and that he had 
indicated to the Ba’athist government that ‘he had no objection to the abolition 
of political parties’516 – a move the KDP Politburo could only interpret as an 
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existential threat. When the Politburo revolted, Mulla Mustafa had leading 
members of the body such as Ibrahim Ahmed and his son-in-law, Jalal 
Talabani, expelled and later persecuted into exile in Iran, where they formed a 
breakaway faction,517 from which a decade later the PUK should emerge.  
While the significance of the 1964-split and the resulting KDP-PUK rivalry 
cannot be emphasised strongly enough as the most decisive factor to determine 
the development of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Iraq for four decades, the 
immediate consequences of the expulsion of the so called ‘Ahmed-Talabani 
faction’ meant for Mulla Mustafa the freedom to assert his absolute control over 
the party by cleansing it from all internal opposition. In turn, his absolute 
dominance in the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq significantly 
strengthened his position via Baghdad, where the bloodless coup of July 1968 
brought the Ba’athists to power for the second time in Iraq.518 President Ahmad 
Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy, Saddam Hussein, had learned their lesson from 
their previous fray with Mulla Mustafa and tendered full recognition of Kurdish 
cultural and political rights in Iraq; in short, they bid ‘the best deal ever offered to 
the Iraqi Kurds. At the time of signing, the agreement was hailed as a sincere 
move towards solving the Kurdish problem by all parties’.519 This was precisely 
what the Ba’athists resolved to accomplish – not with the intent of truly crafting 
a multiethnic Iraqi nation but an accommodation of Kurdish demands dictated 
by necessity. Quite simply, the regime’s survival depended on reconciling and 
appeasing the Kurds. The ‘11 March 1970 Manifesto’, as the groundbreaking 
agreement came to be known, stipulated the Iraqi constitution would be 
amended to read ‘the Iraqi people is made up of two nationalities, the Arab 
nationality and the Kurdish nationality’;520 promised to join all areas with a 
Kurdish majority in a self-governing unit, where Kurdish would be an official 
language; pledged to allocate generous special funds for the development of 
the Kurdish region along with the execution of overdue agrarian reform; and 
guaranteed proportional distribution of positions in government, bureaucracy 
and the armed forces, including a Kurd as vice-president of Iraq. Indeed, ‘the 
period 1970-4 saw de facto autonomy throughout the region with the KDP 
effectively controlling it through the appointment of the governors. During this 
period, the Kurds learned the techniques of administration and government’.521 
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No wonder the accord ‘has remained the Kurds’ favoured foundation stone for 
future relations with the rest of Iraq’.522 
Much ink has been spent on why the newly found Ba’athist-Kurdish harmony 
was so short-lived. Ex post, both sides accused the other of having acted in bad 
faith and having failed to implement crucial stipulations of the deal from the 
beginning. Had the political space become ethnicised to an extent that made 
Arab-Kurdish reconciliation structurally impossible? Did the Ba’athists actually 
propose the accord as a ruse to lull the Kurds until they could consolidate power 
in Baghdad and felt strong enough to strike? Did Mulla Mustafa overplay his 
hand by insisting on the incorporation of oil-rich Kirkuk into the Kurdish 
administered area and, as Ghareeb suggests,523 maintain antagonism with the 
central government so his own position in Kurdistan could not be challenged by 
the Ahmed-Talabani faction? Most probably a combination of all the above 
factors played a role. What can be established beyond speculation is that the 
apple of discord poisoned relations soon after the ink had dried on the ‘11 
March Manifesto’. In a strategic miscalculation, Mulla Mustafa entered an 
unholy alliance with the Shah of Iran, the United States and Israel against the 
pro-Soviet Ba’athist regime.524 Soon thereafter though, betrayed by his allies525 
– Iran struck a lucrative deal with Ba’athist Iraq in Algiers that secured its 
unrestricted access to the Schatt al Arab – and his forces routed by a 
determined and well-trained Iraqi Army, Mulla Mustafa’s forces suffered a 
complete rout. More than a personal defeat – he died four years later of lung 
cancer in American exile526 – the reverse of 1975 signalled a changing of the 
guard within the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. The era of Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani’s dominance and the pre-eminence of local special interests over the 
reformist wing of the KDP had come to a drastic end. However, the fiasco of 
1975, with the admitted benefit of hindsight, can also be interpreted as a 
transition from one phase of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Iraq to another; one in 
which the movement was set on a broader fundament with two parties, the KDP 
and the PUK – founded in the same year and as a direct consequence of Mulla 
Mustafa’s miscalculations – competing for influence; a new phase in which 
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq was to ascend to a mass-scale movement 
encompassing all strata of society and ultimately blossoming into what became 
called the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. 
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After a series of internal feuds, divisions and reunifications in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as a result of the devastating defeat of 1975 and the systemic 
dissonance between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘progressives’ that had troubled the 
KDP ever since its founding, the KDP ultimately remained firmly within the 
grasp of the Barzani clan, especially after the death of its most outspoken 
internal critic, Sami Abdul Rahman, in an Ansar al-Sunna suicide bombing in 
Erbil in February 2004.527 After the death of Mulla Mustafa his sons Idris and 
Massoud jointly led the KDP restored in Iranian exile until, after Idris suffered a 
heart attack in 1984, Massoud became undisputed leader, supported by his 
nephew, Idris’ son, Nechervan Idris Barzani. The question of succession in the 
KDP after Massoud, from today’s vantage point, seems limited to a competition 
between his son Masrour and his nephew Nechervan Barzani. No wonder then 
that ‘critics of the KDP claim that the KDP decision-making process is 
dominated by the immediate family of Massoud and Nechervan Barzani, with 
the rest of the party being little more than the implementing agency of the 
family’s wishes’,528 and while giving itself a veneer of democratically legitimated 
internal decision-making and elections for leadership at party congresses – the 
fact that ‘the KDP is the only party in Iraqi Kurdistan that has had a continuous 
programme of party congresses and conferences’ is prominently stressed by 
Massoud Barzani529 – that these conferences and the party’s main bodies such 
as the Central Committee are seen to merely act to rubberstamp the decisions 
made by the party leadership, that is essentially the Barzani clan. ‘When his 
enemies denounce him as a tribal, feudal man, they mean that Massoud 
[Barzani] does not distinguish between his own family’s interest and those of the 
Kurdish people as a whole’.530 In fact, it would not be grossly exaggerated to 
view the KDP as a vehicle for the power politics and political ambitions of the 
Barzani clan, today exhibiting, rather than the ‘democratic centralism’ identified 
by Stansfield and Anderson531 – see below – the ‘dynastic republicanism’532 of 
other (Arab) Middle Eastern states.533 ‘The post-colonial political orders and the 
ideologies that underpinned them, once emancipator vanguards on behalf of 
independence and republicanism, seem today to be regressing back into 
monarchism (read here as rule through hereditary succession)’.534 Sadiki further 
expounds: 
The dynamic of ‘privatization’ of power must be appreciated through sound 
understanding of both ‘hereditary succession’ and ‘dynastic republicanism’ as 
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central to what is called here ‘ruling complex’ or murakkab al-kursi. Literally, the 
notion of ‘comfortably sat’ or ‘positioned’ the Arabic word ‘murakkab’ denotes, 
divulges the ‘free-rider’ element involved in lubricating the wheel of political 
patronage-clientelism. There is a labyrinth of dependent or ‘parasitic’ social forces 
that owe their status and preservation to Arab ruling houses. These forces exist at 
both the apex and bottom of the political pyramid. They represent many interests 
tied to the ruling houses by way of dependence on the status quo. They are 
secular and religious, military and civilian, tribal and non-tribal, and public and 
private. They make the news; they guard the locus of power; they represent, 
endorse and defend the system; they occupy the market and the religious pulpit; 
and they close their minds to the possibility of an ‘alternative’ order or rulers. In 
return the system ‘feeds’ them the distributive rewards (status, resources, 
officialdom, self-preservation), deepening and nurturing their dependence. This 
whole ‘murakkab’ or stratum serves as a prop for the system; and the system 
reciprocates this supportive function.535 
The privatization of power based on patronage-clientilism, or as commonly 
referred to in the region as wasta, pervades every aspect of political and social 
life in Iraqi Kurdistan and is blatantly obvious to anybody conducting even a few 
days of field research there. On this aspect the PUK-controlled territories of 
Iraqi Kurdistan do not differ much from the KDP-dominated areas. What 
distinguishes the latter from the former, in addition to its rapid descent into 
authoritarianism with all the accompanying symptoms of human rights violations 
– routinely denounced by Human Rights Watch536 and other international 
human rights watchdogs,537 problematised in several media outlets538 as well as 
by governmental agencies539 and further discussed in Part Three – is the aspect 
of ‘dynastic republicanism’ and the system of ‘hereditary succession’, not unlike 
the pre-‘Arab Spring’ regimes analysed by Sadiki, with all political power resting 
with one family, the Barzanis. 
 
The PUK 
[When a]sking ardent backers of either the PUK or KDP what the policy and 
ideological differences between the two parties M I have yet to receive an answer 
that goes beyond the contention that one party fights more valiantly for the Kurdish 
cause, while the other allies itself with the hated central government more 
frequently. Iraqi Kurds not too closely attached to either party, however, tended to 
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ascribe the differences to the leaders’ personalities, interests, and old tribal 
rivalries.540 
When confronted with this quote, one of the founders of the PUK, Omar 
Sheikhmous, had to admit that today the ideological differences between PUK 
and KDP are minimal – both promote a separatist Kurdish ethno-nationalism 
with the aim of wresting ever greater autonomy from the Iraqi state – but that 
the ‘main difference between KDP and PUK is their style of leadership’.541 
Stansfield and Anderson542 have identified ‘democratic centralism’ as the 
organisational principle of both parties. While, as detailed above, I argue the 
KDP is better characterised by ‘dynastic republicanism’ due to the dominance of 
the Barzani family and the principle of hereditary succession, I concur with 
Stansfield and Anderson that ‘democratic centralism’ best describes the 
organisational structures and decision-making processes of the PUK.  
‘Democratic centralism’ as a political concept, ‘was first formulated in the 
revolutionary movement in Russia. At that point it constituted simply a call both 
for organisational cohesion and for the adoption of democratic procedures in the 
Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party’ as the Bolsheviks had experienced 
them during their exile in Western Europe. ‘To some extent [they] succeed[ed] 
in building these desiderata’ – such as party elections and the freedom of 
expression – ‘into their political practices’.543 Soon thereafter the imperative for 
internal cohesion, the centralist element came to supersede the democratic 
one, though. As Vladimir Lenin put it, ‘the principle of democratic centralism M 
implies universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb 
the unity of a defined action; it rules out all criticism which disrupts or makes 
difficult unity of action decided upon by the party’.544 In practical political and 
organisational terms this qualification meant that internal debate about policies 
in the designated bodies was tolerated, even encouraged, yet once a decision 
had been made by the party leadership it was expected to be implemented 
unconditionally and without further opposition. ‘Once policy has been 
established by the party leadership, after vigorous internal debate, it must be 
implemented without dissent by the rank and file. Thus, the structure is 
democratic on the way up ...’, – expressed in, for example, elections at routinely 
held party congresses, where ‘the higher tiers are elected by the lower’ M – ‘but 
authoritarian on the way down’.545 This inherent authoritarianism in policy 
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implementation has a tendency to descend into rather dictatorial structures with 
a strongly centralised leadership cadre, who, if its actions are not to be 
questioned, is itself increasingly rarely challenged from within the party.546 One 
of the most prominent critics of Lenin’s democratic centralism, Leon Trotsky 
who ultimately paid for his dissent with his life, observed the pattern that, ‘the 
party organization (the caucus) at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; 
then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organization; and finally a 
single “dictator” substitutes himself for the Central Committee’.547 In other 
words, and this particularly holds true for the Stalinist era of democratic 
centralism, ‘to criticise the leader is to betray the party and its ideals; thus the 
leader becomes infallible’;548 and party elections and congresses, once for a 
more or less open debate, become exercises in rubber-stamping pre-formulated 
policies and predetermined leadership cadres, the most prominent 
contemporary example being the National Congresses of the Communist Party 
of China, which meets at least once every five years to exercise the ‘democratic 
element’ of its version of democratic centralism. It has to be said, though, that 
the PUK, from its inception, constituted too heterogeneous a merger of diverse 
political movements and local power bases to ever achieve such a pure form of 
democratic centralism, yet in essence, at least until the Gorran split in 2009, the 
organising principle of a somewhat more ambiguous democratic centralism than 
in contemporary China applies to it.549  
As has been mentioned, the nucleus of the PUK was the progressive 
‘Ahmed-Talabani faction’ of the Politburo that in 1964 split from the traditionalist 
majority of the KDP in defiance of Mulla Mustafa’s authoritarian rule, and then 
lingered in exile for a decade. What moved them back onto the political stage in 
Iraq was the fatal blow the KDP had been dealt in 1975 resulting in the Kurdish 
nationalist movement in Iraq yearning for an alternative to Mulla Mustafa’s 
brand. ‘The collapse of the KDP in 1975 was such a traumatic event in Kurdish 
history, comparable to Mahabad; it affected Kurds in all parts, in Turkey, in 
Syria M everywhere there was a need for a new movement, not-aligned with 
the West [who had betrayed the KDP] and self-sustained’, Omar Sheikhmous 
summed up the public sentiment in Iraqi Kurdistan and beyond after this 
watershed moment.550 Jalal Talabani and his followers, together with new KDP 
Politburo dissidents and more radical, ‘third way’ Maoist student movements, 
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intended to capitalise on the public mood and the implosion of the KDP. In the 
late 1960s, with disillusion with Soviet-style Communism growing in the Third 
World, Maoist revisionism that put greater emphasis on nationalist liberation 
than its Soviet counterpart, rapidly gained ground among radical leftist NLMs in 
Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. These ideological shifts 
reached Iraqi Kurdistan through left-wing parties in Iran M who were against the 
old-style Communist parties, and through Palestinian parties and literature. To 
young, politically minded Kurds, such a combination of socialism with Kurdish 
nationalism proved to be highly attractive, particularly when faced with the 
increasing autocracy of Barzani and the infighting within the KDP Political 
Bureau.551 
At the time of the March 1970 Manifesto, which these movements criticised 
as a concord between traditionalist Kurdish landholders and the dictatorial 
central government, these groups were little more than disparate cells lacking 
any overarching structure that could combine their ‘third way’ ideology into a 
more coherent political force. As with the KDP three decades earlier, it took a 
man from a rather traditionalist background, deeply embedded in the religio-
tribalist structures of the Qadiri tekiye of Sufism,552 to band together these 
diverse elements into a political umbrella organisation of his own design. In 
fostering contacts with Maoist student cells in Baghdad and Kurdistan in the late 
1960s/early 1970s Jalal Talabani, or Mam Jalal, ‘uncle Jalal’ as he is 
affectionately called in Iraqi Kurdistan,553 put to good use his connections and 
reputation from his student days, where ‘in February 1953, he secretly [had] 
helped to establish the Kurdistan Student Union-Iraq and [had become] its 
secretary-general’.554 This rapport, which, from his exile in Damascus, he kept 
nourishing by keeping in contact with student groupings in Iraq, Talabani 
capitalised on when he played a crucial role in the formation of a single party, 
Komala, to unify these diverse student cells in June 1970 under the leadership 
of Newshirwan Mustafa, the editor of the influential Maoist student magazine 
Rizgary who in 2009 would fall out with Talabani and form the Gorran party.. 
Yet Komala was only meant to be the first step in Talabani’s plan to form an 
alternative Iraqi Kurdish nationalist party to the KDP. In order to advance his 
designs the Maoist students had to be allied with KDP dissidents and those 
members of the politburo in opposition to Mulla Mustafa’s authoritarian 
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leadership style – and for this alliance the 1975 collapse of Kurdish armed 
resistance and Mulla Mustafa’s defeat proved the necessary catalyst. When in 
March 1975 Mulla Mustafa gave the order to cease all hostilities against the 
central government, Komala and peshmerga units loyal to Talabani refused,555 
while Talabani held secret meetings in Damascus, Beirut, and Berlin to unite 
Komala with the KDP dissidents under a new umbrella organisation. The co-
founders – Jalal Talabani, Newshirwan Mustafa, Fouad Masoum, Kamal Fouad, 
Adil Murad, Omar Sheikhmous, and Abdul-Razaq ‘Faili’ Mirza – first got 
together for preliminary discussions on 22 May 1975 in Talitla Restaurant in 
Damascus, a week later in a meeting in Berlin between Talabani, Newshirwan 
Mustafa and others the final decision for the formation of the PUK was 
reached,556 and the party was officially established in Damascus on 1 June 
1975 with the declared aim of: 
organising the revolutionary, patriotic and democratic forces of the Kurdish people 
in the form of a broad democratic and patriotic front that allows the fighting unity 
and coexistence of the different progressive tendencies under the leadership of a 
Kurdish revolutionary vanguard.557 
The immediate success of the PUK can be explained mostly by two 
factors:558 (1) when Mulla Mustafa had surrendered to the central government, 
they were the only Kurdish nationalist grouping with the manpower, logistics, 
and organisational capacity to take up arms and continue the nationalist 
struggle against the Ba’athist regime; (2) the PUK constituted a radical 
alternative to the worn down, defeated KDP, Mulla Mustafa’s high-handedness 
and his autocratic leadership that appeared to many Kurds to serve tribal-
traditionalist interests first. Another factor that markedly distinguished the PUK 
from the KDP – and arguably made it more attractive to young radical 
nationalists who liked to think in non-hierarchical terms – was that ‘the PUK was 
not a unified party in the sense of the KDP, but was more of a broad semi-
front’,559 a front that, rather than the KDP, who, arguably with limited success, 
had tried to unite disparate social and nationalist movements within one party, 
understood itself as an umbrella organisation with the ambition and potential to 
harmonise these varying but often overlapping directions, to craft a certain 
nationalist unity out of diversity. Ultimately, though, ‘too many ideological 
compromises were made to traditionalist elements M and in order to gain mass 
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appeal M [from] land reform [to] women’s rights M [and] the PUK lost its 
ideological fervour with the negotiations in 1983’560 between Talabani and 
Saddam Hussein (to be discussed in Part Three). In the end, the PUK’s Maoist 
nationalism turned out quite bourgeois, resulting in its ideological and nationalist 
direction becoming virtually indistinguishable from the KDP, as ascertained 
earlier by Romano.561 
Due to its heterogeneous structure the main difference between KDP and 
PUK is the latter’s internal decision making process, characterised by 
‘seemingly more opaque’ structures, and with PUK politburo meetings being 
described as ‘highly charged and chaotic’, as being notoriously ‘dominated by 
arguments and tense discussions’.562 The heterogeneity of the party is also 
reflected in the fact that until the early 1990s the various groupings of the union 
held their own congresses, and ‘that the first [actual] PUK Congress was [only] 
held in 1992, and was not followed until early 2001’.563 The one element that 
holds these disparate elements together is Jalal Talabani, whose leadership 
style, rather surprisingly and unbefitting the role of primus inter pares he is often 
forced to play, is usually described as more mercurial and dictatorial than 
Massoud Barzani’s.564 Nonetheless, Talabani managed to not only hold his 
PUK together but to field a formidable opposition to the resurgent KDP in the 
1980/90s. Little wonder then that when Talabani left the political stage of Iraqi 
Kurdistan for becoming President of Iraq in April 2005, his absence came to be 
keenly felt, and the party structures started to crumble until in 2009 a 
disillusioned Newshirwan Mustafa split along with many second-rank followers 
to form their own party, Gorran, who in local elections in Iraqi Kurdistan in 
September 2013 defeated the PUK on its very home turf.565 
Another element that distinguishes the PUK from the KDP, of particular 
interest in the context of this study, is the more pan-Kurdish direction its 
founders originally intended. As a matter of fact, the imperative for an 
alternative to KDP’s focus on limiting its nationalism to Iraq, that is reaching an 
accord with the central government on a generous autonomy status, had been 
one of the driving forces behind the negotiations on the formation of the PUK, 
with a strategic consideration to widen the nationalist struggle to Iran and 
Turkey explicitly discussed during the months leading up to June 1975. Future 
co-founders of the PUK such as Abdul Razaq Mirza reached out to the KDP-I in 
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particular,566 yet the Iranian Kurdish parties proved hesitant to enter an alliance 
with an Iraqi Kurdish movement just a few months after Mulla Mustafa had 
collaborated with the Shah’s regime against them.567 Likewise, and despite the 
fact that one of the co-founders of the PUK, Omar Sheikhmous, hailed from 
Syria, Talabani shied away from teaming up with Kurdish movements in Syria, 
which would have alienated his most influential external backer, the Assad 
regime in Damascus. For Sheikhmous the final decision made by Talabani – ‘he 
pushed for it’, Sheikhmous recalled – to confine the PUK, like the KDP, to an 
‘Iraqi-Kurdistan only’-policy came as a particular disappointment.568 However, 
even if a pan-Kurdish platform for the PUK was abandoned before the launch of 
the party and during its early days, the legacy of this debate is reflected, when 
compared to the KDP, in the PUK’s more international orientation and its closer 
liaison with Kurdish nationalist movements in Iran and Turkey that occasionally 
could result in actual material cooperation,569 most prominently and  importantly 
in the context of this study, when the PUK came to save the PKK from sinking 
into insignificance in 1979. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the PUK 
contributed in no small fashion to the PKK becoming the most redoubtable 
ethno-nationalist insurgency in Kurdish history. 
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6.) The PKK 
 
The origins of the PKK 
The PKK was born out of the distinctive features of the socio-economic and 
political space in Turkey in the late 1960s / early 1970s. Perhaps at first rather 
surprisingly the military coup of 1960 ushered in an era of political pluralism with 
a new constitution in the following year, safeguarding the principle of democratic 
checks and balances, the separation of powers, and civil liberties from elevated 
freedom of expression to granting trade unions the right to strike as well as 
constructing an electoral system conducive for governing coalitions in order to 
avoid single party rule as during the Demokrat Parti (DP) era.570 While to some 
extent established party politics continued – such as the reliance of major 
parties on political machines in Eastern Anatolia headed by feudal Kurdish 
landholders that could guarantee votes571 – on the other hand the political 
space, or one should rather say corset, was forced open by the emergence of 
the Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TWP), the first official party 
positioned clearly outside Kemalist state doctrine and the first socialist party to 
win representation in parliament;572 what is a more significant first in the context 
of this study is that the TWP was the first political party in Turkey to 
acknowledge the Kurds as a distinct people with grievances and legitimate 
demands in Turkish society. ‘For the first time since the founding of the republic, 
a legal political party had come to recognise the existence of a Kurdish minority 
within national borders’.573 
The reason why the TWP proved so attractive to Kurdish voters – in the 
1969 elections four of the 15 TWP MPs were Kurds – was not only its openness 
towards emerging Kurdish ethnic consciousness but also has to be seen as a 
function of the massive socio-economic changes Eastern Anatolia experienced 
during this decade. The Menderes government had already introduced a laissez 
faire capitalist program of free enterprise and import-substitution 
industrialization574 that, hand in hand with technological advances in the 
mechanization of the agricultural sector, hit the traditional stratum of Kurdish 
society, sharecroppers who paid the feudal landlords an agreed proportion of 
the crop, exceptionally hard. The liberalised economic climate allowed feudal 
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landlords to accumulate ever wider tracts of land, and mechanization provided 
them with a leverage to force sharecroppers to accept ever more exploitative 
rent arrangements.575 ‘Former sharecroppers in both the mountains and the 
plain’s of Turkey’s Kurdish region increasingly became transformed into 
seasonal agricultural workers, or were forced to migrate either to Kurdish cities 
or to the West of Turkey, if not out of the country altogether’.576 This rural 
exodus, with often the population of entire villages migrating to Izmir, Ankara, 
and Istanbul, swelled urban shantytowns where inhabitants eked out a meagre 
existence under most precarious conditions – a development known in Turkish 
as gecekondular, entire districts of built-over-night shanty-neighbourhoods.577 In 
the urban centres of Anatolia and the Mediterranean, Kurdish migrants came 
into contact with organised labour movements and were exposed to the 
teachings of Marxism-Leninism that promised them a better future in a socialist 
government. The mounting challenge of a radical, popular left, spurred on by 
events in Europe and the success of Marxist insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, momentously polarised the political space in Turkey and deeply 
unsettled the Kemalist establishment; in response Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş 
founded in 1965 the Nationalist Action Party (MHK, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), 
whose notorious youth wing, the Grey Wolves, attacked leftist movements in 
open street battles.578 
By 1971 the program of economic reform had demonstrably failed, the 
Turkish state was bankrupt,579 and the politico-military establishment had lost 
tolerance with its experiment in democratic pluralism. For the second time in the 
history of the Turkish Republic the military intervened with the intent of imposing 
a cooling phase on the country and cleansing the political system of radical 
leftist elements;580 one of its first victims was the TWP, banned in 1971. For a 
short while the military could afford to lend itself to the illusion of having brought 
the situation under control: the 1961 Constitution had been amended, curtailing 
civil liberties and granting the National Security Council extended powers, 
special courts had been introduced to effectively do away with radical leftists, 
the Grey Wolves strengthened and trained by CIA instructors as part of 
‘Operation Gladio’, martial law imposed in Eastern Anatolia, the media gagged, 
and the autonomy of universities truncated.581 In 1973 the military felt confident 
enough to reintroduce parliamentary democracy and acquiesce into a general 
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amnesty the following year.582 Yet, if they had thought they could pacify the 
country and redirect the political space into well-trodden Kemalist channels, 
they were in for a surprise. If anything, the polarised political space turned out to 
be nothing but a precursor to the unprecedented political violence of the 1970s 
that reached almost civil war-like dimensions, pitting the state apparatus and 
the ultra-nationalist, paramilitary Grey Wolves against a myriad of radical leftist 
movements, who after 1974 came out of  hiding and fought for such diverse 
ideals as enhancing civil liberties, workers rights and economic equality, 
defeating the capitalist-imperialist nexus, or outright socialist world revolution.583 
It was in this polarised climate of proliferating political violence that the PKK was 
born, and its emergence can be understood as a combination of a complex of 
manifold but interrelated socio-economic and political factors, which can only be 
cursorily summarised here: from wider global phenomena,584 the imposition of 
laissez fare capitalism and top-down modernisation programs that on the one 
hand fuelled inequality in agrarian Eastern Anatolia but on the other hand 
radicalised migrant workers, the continuation of policies of ‘pathological 
homogenisation’585 with their outright denial of the existence of Kurdish identity, 
and ‘opportunity structures’ unique to the condition of the political space in 
Turkey.586 On the one hand the Kemalist politico-military establishment was no 
longer able to maintain the traditional order and in its attempts to re-establish 
order by force achieved little but a radicalisation of its opponents, and on the 
other hand a progressive political opposition that mollified the worst excesses of 
the Kemalist establishment’s repression and sought to widen the political space 
in order to potentially win the radical left as a partner in forcing open the 
Kemalist corset for democratic pluralism and eventually the creation of a more 
egalitarian society – the doctrine of a national democratic revolution or milli 
demokratik devrim.587 Those attempts quite naturally were bound to fail, since 
the radical left understood the legal opposition as not much different from the 
Kemalist establishment and used the widened political space for its own ends.  
Given these parameters it is easily discernible that ‘the PKK does not have 
its political background in Kurdish politics M but [was] born from the 
revolutionary left in Turkey’.588 Initially what became the most potent insurgency 
in Kurdish history was nothing more but a group of radicalised students in 
Ankara – three Kurds, Abdullah Öcalan, Ali Haydar Kaytan, and Cemil Bayık; 
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and three Turks, Kemal Pir, Haki Karer, and Duran Kalkan – of whom some 
happened to cohabit and who spent their leisure time wallowing in revolutionary 
utopias.589 The part of town where they lived was a classic, predominantly 
Kurdish gecekondu with the potential of many sympathetic ears for their rhetoric 
of national liberation, class struggle and socialist revolution. Another important 
political platform for ideological exchange and the recruitment of sympathisers 
was the socialist student organization Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Öğretim 
Derneği (Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association, ADYÖD), of whose 
leadership committee Öcalan became a very proactive member.590 When 
ADYÖD was closed down by the state authorities in December 1974, the group 
had learned the hard way that in the contemporary political system to effect 
revolutionary change by legal means and as part of an official movement was 
doomed to fail. They determined to go underground in rural Eastern Anatolia. 
Given the group’s urban background in student movements, this move may 
seem puzzling at first. Yet the relocation appears not first motivated by 
nationalist liberation ideology, i.e. perceiving Turkey’s Kurds as a distinct ethnic 
group that needed to be liberated from the assimilationist dominance of another 
ethnic group, the Turks, but born out of the Guevarist foco-theory (or ‘nucleus’ 
theory) of guerrilla warfare that put the disenfranchised peasants at the 
vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.591 In other words, at the time Öcalan and 
his followers perceived the Kurdish peasants of rural Eastern Anatolia, 
analogous to the proletarian worker in Marxist-Leninism, in class terms first and 
ethnic terms second, and understood them as a vanguard in a class-based 
revolution turning Turkey as a whole into a socialist utopia.592 When the group, 
then operating under the name Kurdistan Devrimcileri (‘Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries’ or Şoreşgerên Kurdistan in Kurdish) or nicknamed Apocular, 
the ‘followers of Apo’, of ‘uncle’ Öcalan, reconvened in Ankara in late 1976 to 
assess their relocation to Kurdistan, the strategy was deemed a success. The 
group had attracted about 300 recruits, many of them ‘university and teacher’s 
school students or drop-outs. Their origins were rooted in the poor, mainly 
landless villagers that comprised the overwhelming majority of Kurdish society, 
families with close to a dozen children, illiterate M, and a tough life based on 
small-scale farming and animal husbandry’.593  
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Abdullah Öcalan 
Abdullah Öcalan was born in 1949 to a poor peasant family in the village of 
Omerli in Sanliurfa province. The conditions in villages in Eastern Anatolia like 
that of Öcalan’s was evocatively described in a 1983 Le Monde article: 
Each family had a few chickens and possibly five or six goats. The agha would visit 
occasionally to reaffirm his authority and assign work. This consisted mainly of 
labour on the cotton plantations of the Mesopotamian plain M All except the very 
old and very young would descend to the plain daily to work an eleven-hour day. 
For this the rates of pay were US$1 for a child, $1.50 for a woman, and $2 for a 
man. Villagers reckoned they had a 30 percent mortality rate among the 
children.594 
It appears fair to say that from earliest childhood on Öcalan was exposed to 
arrant human suffering, appalling poverty and the gross inequality and 
exploitative nature of the latifundia-like system of agriculture in Turkey’s Kurdish 
provinces with the local agha not only domineering over a host of cheap labour 
forced to exist in slave-like conditions but de facto reigning as master of life and 
death. And yet, although Öcalan failed the exam for entering military school, in 
1966, he was given a second chance in an Ankara high school training young 
students for a career in the civil service.595 There, like many young Kurds of his 
age,  
[he] began to explore [his] identity while in high school or university. Some fell 
under the sway of a teacher or youth leader who was a secret Kurdish nationalist, 
others came to see the contradiction between their personal lives – in which they 
were raised in a Kurdish-speaking village, listening to Kurdish radio emanating 
from across the border – and the public ideology that insisted that Kurds were 
actually Turks. Like Öcalan, many were simply swept up in the leftist movements 
and Kurdish radicalism that burgeoned in the late 1960s.596  
Öcalan’s enchantment with radical Marxist-Leninism was a gradual process 
that did not ensue in earnest until the military coup of 1970. The brutal 
crackdown of the state apparatus on student organisations left a lasting 
impression on him and he began to actively participate in street rallies and 
public protests – an engagement that earned him a seven month imprisonment 
at Ankara’s Mamak Military Prison, where he made good use of the time served 
by devouring the prison library’s stock on Marxist literature and forming close 
ties to fellow, politically more advanced inmates from the Ankara radical student 
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groups. It was thus in prison that Öcalan received his political education, a time 
he later fondly recalled as ‘my transition to becoming a professional 
revolutionary’.597 Upon his release in October 1972, Öcalan had internalised the 
lesson many radical leftists took from the coup and three years of military rule – 
that political change and democracy in Turkey were not realisable by peaceful 
means within the official channels of the political system.598  
So far, though, nothing in his biography helps to explain how within a year 
after his release from prison Öcalan came to occupy a relatively dominant 
position within ADYÖD. If anything, Öcalan’s conversion to nationalism and 
Marxist-Leninism was comparatively recent and he lacked the political network 
and prestige of many of his peers. What is even more puzzling to many analysts 
– and here I openly admit the limitations of a researcher sitting in the comfort of 
a European university library or flying in for a few months of field research when 
compared to those colleagues from a Kurdish background who have actively 
experienced, grown up among, and lived the struggle for liberation – is the 
messianic Führerkult that later developed around Öcalan, the god-like devotion 
he still enjoys among many of Turkey’s Kurds and in the diaspora even more 
than a decade after his imprisonment. Whatever one may think of Massoud 
Barzani and Jalal Talabani, they are two leaders of nationalist movements who, 
at one time in their lives, have actively commanded their peshmerga in the field; 
Öcalan on the other hand has directed the PKK fighters from the relative 
comfort of his (generous) residences in Lebanon and Syria, from the time of his 
departure into exile until his expulsion from Damascus in October 1998. Despite 
this lack of combat experience and relatively limited exposure to personal risk, 
despite the pathological irreconcilability and ruthlessness bordering persecutory 
delusions with which he habitually had PKK dissidents hunted down and killed, 
despite his ‘conversion’ and public apology during his trial which one finds hard 
not to interpret as quite an obvious attempt to save his own skin, Öcalan’s 
capture by the MIT provoked dozens of Kurds to self-immolate in protest, and 
until today his name is considered with reverence as the embodiment of the 
Kurdish struggle for self-determination in Turkey by, inexplicably to me at least, 
a multitude. 
In his analysis of Öcalan’s leadership, Ali Kemal Özcan, as would seem 
natural, belabours Max Weber’s conceptualisation of ‘charismatic authority’.599 
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Weber famously differentiated between three types of legitimate authority,600 (1) 
traditional authority, in which a social group, due to historically established or 
hereditary structures, accepts its subordination to an individual or elite as can 
be found among priesthood, family clans, tribes, etc..; (2) rational or legal 
authority, where leadership is regulated and legitimised through norms on which 
at least a majority of the group (democratically) agrees; and (3) charismatic 
authority, where it is the ‘charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed 
by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his 
exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief 
in his charisma’.601 Weber understood charisma as ‘a certain quality of an 
individual personality, by virtue of which he set apart from ordinary men and 
treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities’.602 However, both Weber and Özcan drawing 
on his concept, rightly comprehend charismatic authority, that is ‘resting on 
devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained 
by him’603 as a discursive process, as a social phenomenon which, in reference 
to what has been discussed earlier, only gains meaning through the discourse, 
that is through the relationship between the leader and his ‘followers’ or 
‘disciples’.604 In other words, and as already elucidated by Foucault,605  
charisma is not a thing that can be possessed by an individual. Neither does it 
emerge automatically from certain circumstances regardless of individual qualities 
and initiative. Stated more precisely, charisma is a process that exists only in social 
relationships. It is a product of the qualities and actions of individuals and 
situational factors, but the nature of the situation is its most important 
determinant.606 
After identifying the phenomenon as a discursive process, Weber devotes 
his analysis to how charismatic authority becomes routinized and 
institutionalized, since ‘for Weber, it was not the moral teachings that become 
routinized but the personal authority of the charismatic individual once he 
transferred his command to an impersonal, stratified order’.607 In The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization Weber convincingly explains that it is 
primarily in the interest of the administrative or bureaucratic strata of the group 
or organisation for the charismatic authority of the leader to become 
institutionalised, since these strata derive their own authority by reference to the 
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leader’s charismatic qualities;608 in other words, their authority rests on the 
‘reification’609 of the leader’s charisma, a process Lee calls ‘the ramifications of 
an individualised hegemony’.610 While these soundly argued theoretical 
deliberations help us in appreciating charismatic authority as a discursive 
process in general, and furnish an understanding of how, over the years, 
Öcalan’s individual charisma became routinized and institutionalised within the 
‘bureaucratic structures’ of the PKK to the extent that when he was captured 
and imprisoned the mere reference to Öcalan, the symbol, sufficed for his 
successors to ensure obedience within the party, they do not shed greater light 
on the Messianic devotion with which Öcalan is regarded and venerated by so 
many Kurds in Turkey outside the PKK. Nor, as Özcan admits, does it explain 
‘what is unique to Kurdish societal praxis, and its interaction with Turkey’s 
Kurdish policy, is that the routinization of Öcalan’s charisma has been reified 
before the institutionalization of the party. Even, one may say, the routinization 
firmly took place without the party having institutionalised’.611 
Due to similar command structures, processes of successful organisational 
restructuring after devastating defeats, the importance of cross-border 
sanctuaries, and their involvement in the international drug trade Vera Eccarius-
Kelly compares and contrasts the PKK to Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC);612 I, however, concur with David 
Romano that, in particular with respect to the insurgencies’ leadership figures, a 
perhaps more fitting comparison would be Peru’s Sendero Luminoso.613 Both 
insurgencies share a cell-like structure organisationally, their involvement in the 
international drug trade, and their Marxist-Leninist/Maoist liberation ideology is 
roughly comparable; however, unlike Öcalan, Abimael Guzmán, the founder of 
the Shining Path, was a highly educated university lecturer. Like Öcalan, 
though, he directed the liberation struggle from the relatively safe distance of 
constantly changing hideouts, refusing to soil his hands with commanding his 
guerrilla in combat or carrying out the countless killings he ordered; the 
pathological and seemingly senseless brutality of violence almost habitually 
meted out as punishment for ‘regime collaborators’ and internal dissidents from 
within the organisations’ ranks or from among the constituency they claimed to 
fight for, often in gross disproportion to their engaging the regimes’ regular 
forces in combat, is another characteristic they share. Finally, when captured in 
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September 1992, Guzmán, like Öcalan, cut a deal with the state authorities to 
save his skin, declared the peoples’ war over and called for peace and national 
reconciliation, leading to group divisions that left Sendero Luminoso even more 
disunited and weakened than the PKK less than a decade later.614  
It is a common misperception and an act of intellectual hubris to believe that 
after studying a subject in depth researchers should have all the answers; in 
fact, I consider it a thorough research process if my inquiry leaves me with more 
questions than answers. And so, after having analysed both movements, the 
PKK and Sendero Luminoso, for years, I admit that I still fail to fully comprehend 
why so many members of these insurgencies not so much willingly followed 
their leaders into death – for their leaders never led them into combat – but how 
such dubious figures like Abimael Guzmán and Abdullah Öcalan succeeded in 
indoctrinating tens of thousands of their followers to self-sacrifice.  
 
The PKK’s ideology and official formation 
In his insightful discourse analysis of the PKK ideology, Cengiz Gunes 
surveys the major literature of the past two decades on the PKK.615 With an eye 
on the parameters of this study, and since there is no need for reinventing the 
wheel, I will draw in my analysis on his observations. Aside from the official 
propaganda of the Turkish state apparatus and affiliated mouthpieces such as 
the Washington-based Institute of Turkish Studies and The Turkish Research 
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), it appears 
that recent scholarship is struggling to locate the PKK within the 
nationalist/secessionist spectrum of contemporary NLMs. On the one hand, 
Kirişci & Winrow argue, ‘it would seem inappropriate to allocate to “the Kurds” a 
particular label M it would seem that the Kurds are an amalgam of Turkic, 
Armenian, and more dominant Indo-European groupings, M the origins of the 
Kurds are hence somewhat obscure’,616 an unease with applying the social 
category ‘nation’ to the Kurds, shared by White,617 that does not prevent Kirişci 
and Winrow from explaining the PKK sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan along the lines 
of an ethnic alliance. On the other hand, Barkey & Fuller contest:  
The PKK’s program mirrored the slogans of the extreme Left: Kurdistan with all of 
its four segments, controlled by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, represented the 
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weakest link in “capitalism’s chain” and the fight against imperialism was a fight to 
save Kurdistan’s natural resources from exploitation.618 
They continue: 
In fact, behind the left-wing rhetoric, the PKK had always been a nationalist 
movement. Its promise to save the exploited of the Middle East notwithstanding, its 
very formation represented a break with the Turkish Left and abandonment of the 
“common struggle” M Hence, its assumption of a nationalistic image is in fact not 
just in keeping with the times but also a return to its real self.619 
As Gunes criticises correctly, Barkey & Fuller seem to imply that 
nationalism and ‘left-wing rhetoric’ are contradictory ideologies, a somewhat 
astonishing claim given the long and well established history of, for example, 
African and Asian NLMs, where both ideologies merged harmoniously, as did 
nationalism with liberalism in 19th century Europe. As a matter of fact, 
nationalism is [always] strongly connected to other political ideologies and 
nationalist movements are involved in some other aspects of political demands. 
This is evident in the Kurdish case because since the creation of Turkey, Kurdish 
national demands were articulated within various discourses; initially within the 
Islamist conservative discourse (the early 1920s), as a modernist discourse (1920s 
and 1930s), under-development (1960s), Marxist-Leninism (1970s and 1980s), 
and, finally, democracy (1990 onward).620  
The significance of this observation, to which I will return shortly, cannot be 
underestimated since no ideology, be it nationalism, Communism, or liberalism, 
operates within a societal vacuum but always in tandem with and in opposition 
to other ideologies and discourses nor does it not change, fluctuate, develop 
over time and within an overall dynamic discourse – again the example of the 
union between nationalism and liberalism guiding the revolutions of 1848 and 
many national liberation movements in Europe since then is the example 
routinely referred to by modernist theoreticians, and in this case study, as 
elaborated earlier, the KDP and PUK are also instructive examples. 
Earlier, I have outlined how the PKK emerged from the radicalised political 
left in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. By then a reading which situated  the 
Kurdish peasant as the ‘oppressed nation’ in its abstracted form – trapped and 
exploited in a feudal structure of permanent dependence and in a dichotomous 
relationship with its constitutive other, the ‘oppressor nation’, that is the wider 
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global capitalist-imperialist nexus and its local agents, the Turkish bourgeoisie 
and Kurdish aghas – was widely held among the Turkish radical left and 
emerging, more explicitly among Kurdish liberation movements.621 The question 
that increasingly divided the emerging Kurdish liberation movements such as 
Kemal Burkay’s Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (TKSP, Türkiye Kürdistan 
Sosyalist Partisi) from its peers in the TWP was twofold: first, the debate on 
whether societal change was achievable in socialist union of Turkish and 
Kurdish liberation movements and within the officially sanctioned channels of 
the political system, and second, a growing perception of Kurds in a national 
rather than merely abstracted form, whose liberation from oppression would 
have to include their dissociation from their Turkish ‘brethren’. Already in 1974 
Burkay declared: 
Turkish governments have prevented and delayed, in economic and cultural terms, 
the nation-building process of the Kurdish people. Their freedom has been 
subjected to bloody suppression and terror. Force is used to keep Turkish 
Kurdistan under control and to suppress the Kurdish people’s democratic 
revolution. The Turkish bourgeois government reduced Kurdistan to the status of a 
colony.622  
By conceptualising Kurdistan as a colony, the Turkish establishment as a 
colonialist power, as a co-protagonist in the global capitalist-imperialist nexus 
whose society overall benefitted from the subjugation of the voiceless Kurdish 
masses, Burkay went a step further than the earlier ‘oppressed nation’ – 
‘oppressor nation’ dichotomy. He understood the ‘Kurdish nation as, 
divided by the combined efforts of the imperialist, racist, and feudal reactionary 
forces, and which has been forced to live under the yoke. Because of this, in 
Kurdistan, the feudal relations have not been defeated and a bourgeois democratic 
revolution has not occurred. Therefore the main contradiction for the Kurdish 
people is national.623 
In his writings Burkay, one may say, thus equates Turkey’s Kurds with 
those societies in Africa still under the colonial yoke – Portugal granted its 
colonies independence in the following year after decades of wars of liberation 
– who cannot follow the traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary trajectory of 
feudalism-capitalism-socialism since the system of colonial dependence, while 
having allowed Turkey to progress to the capitalist stage, still held them captive 
in feudalism. Burkay’s concept of national liberation and the nation is therefore 
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still class-based, with nations being defined according to what stage they 
occupy in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary trajectory.624 Despite this reasoning, 
Burkay did not advocate secession from Turkey:  
[Burkay] did not envision a complete separation between the Kurdish national 
movement and the Turkish socialist movement. In fact, their close cooperation and 
unity was possible and needed because both movements had common interests 
and shared goals M Greater cooperation between the revolutionary movements 
would be the most productive strategy as it would increase the likelihood of both 
revolutions.625  
The TKSP’s ‘goal was to achieve a federal Kurdish state within Turkey’,626 
very similar to the struggle for political autonomy advocated by the PUK in Iraq.  
The PKK is therefore not the first Kurdish liberation movement in Turkey to 
have conceptualised the Kurds as a nation apart from Turks, nor is it the first to 
have called for a unification of the Kurdish lands to overcome the imperialist 
division, established at Lausanne, that was widely seen as the root cause for 
the Kurds’ persistence in feudal dependence, nor to have identified the Kurdish 
aghas as the local collaborators with and greatest profiteers from the quasi-
colonial system of feudal dependence  – all these positions PKK and TKSP 
shared.627 What set the PKK apart from the TKSP and other similar 
organisations in Turkey’s Kurdish political landscape are three factors: (1) the 
PKK’s significant contributions to the Kurdish nationalist discourse in Turkey 
during the late 1970s/early 1980s becoming increasingly ethnicised – here 
Öcalan’s writings reach from rather obscure, pseudo-historical attempts at 
establishing a connection between today’s Kurds and the ancient Medes to the 
mythification of the annual Newroz (New Years)-celebrations628 – resulting in 
the conceptualisation of the Kurdish nation altering in the 1980s from class-
based to ethnic, thus converting the struggle for Kurdish liberation into an 
ethno-nationalist conflict; (2) the emphasis on the Turkish part of Kurdistan 
forming the vanguard in reuniting all Kurdish lands into an ‘Independent, United 
and Democratic Kurdistan’,629 as, for example, outlined in a 1982 Manifesto: 
Only the struggle in Centre-North-West Kurdistan Kurdistan in Turkey can lead the 
Kurdistan national liberation movement. This is because this part represents more 
than half the area and population of Kurdistan and more importantly it is the area 
where the new social forces have broken the backward old social structure and are 
the most developed.630 
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Therefore, although the PKK committed to the revolutionary trajectory that 
the liberation and unification of Kurdistan would constitute but a preliminary 
stage to the wider, regional (if not global) socialist revolution, it more explicitly 
than any other Kurdish NLM in Turkey entertained, at least in principle, the 
pursuit of secession. While it is important, in terms of the PKK’s ideology, to put 
this pursuit of secession within the context of a wider socialist revolution – an 
aspect Barkey & Fuller seem to neglect in the above quoted passages – it can 
be ascertained, and in fact is crucial to strongly emphasise for the purpose of 
this study, that the PKK is the only (sic!) modern Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
movement that not only advocated for secession and an actual (not just 
abstracted) unification of all Kurdish lands but actively fought for these 
principles in all four parts of Kurdistan. As will be detailed throughout Part Three 
of this study, this constitutes the major difference between PKK and KDP/PUK 
and, naturally, had them become competitors and antagonists. Finally, (3) the 
PKK differed most profoundly from other Kurdish movements in Turkey, such as 
the TKSP, in allowing for the armed struggle, that is a guerrilla insurgency – to 
which all other parties only paid lip service, if that – to be tantamount with its 
political work; in fact, the armed struggle was considered an integral part of it.631 
This guerrilla insurgency was to be directed against the organs of the Turkish 
state, the Kurdish aghas as imperialist profiteers from the system of feudal 
dependence in Kurdistan, (internal or external) collaborators with both agents, 
and competing Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey that refused to accept 
a subordinate role to the PKK’s dominance in the struggle for national liberation 
– given their ideological proximity and the PKK’s ruthless pursuit of gaining 
dominance over all other Kurdish nationalist movements in the region, it should 
come then as no surprise that the PKK clashed with the TKSP as early as 
1975.632  
In the short duration from the group’s departure from Ankara until the PKK’s 
official founding on 27 November 1978, these ideological positions were 
developed and refined in the years thereafter. If one tries to identify a symbolic 
signifier to highlight the differences between the PKK, KDP, and PUK, its 
founding moment may serve as well as any other: while the KDP was launched 
at an official congress in Baghdad (sic!), and the PUK initiated over the course 
of several meetings with its founding members jet-setting between Damascus, 
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Beirut, and Berlin, the PKK was inaugurated in a clandestine gathering in the 
rural backwater of Fis village outside Diyarbakir, where Abdullah Öcalan was 
voted general secretary of the new party, and Cemil Bayık his deputy.633 
However, within less than a year of this historic meeting, the party faced 
complete annihilation. All through 1978/9 the writing was on the wall that the 
Turkish military was gearing up for another coup – ominous signs which 
Abdullah Öcalan, who fled the country in July 1979, read correctly so that when 
on 12 September 1980 Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren announced military 
takeover, Öcalan listened to the broadcast from the safe distance of 
Lebanon.634 Most of his unfortunate followers, less endowed with the gift of 
providence, were either killed or ended up in jail during the military crackdown 
immediately before, during, or after the coup. For the PKK, the period of military 
rule from 1980 until 1983 constitutes a double-edged matter: on the one hand, 
the party gained widespread public recognition, with its members bravely 
defending their struggle for national liberation at show trials and enduring often 
fatal hunger strikes in prison635 – so that by 1983 the PKK as the sole ‘true’ 
defender of Kurdish self-determination was on everybody’s lips.  On the other 
hand,  with most of its members killed, imprisoned or dispersed in exile, the 
1980 coup left the PKK effectively comatose; it would have been nothing but a 
footnote in Kurdish history, had it not been for the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
parties, the PUK and KDP, resurrecting it.  
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7.) Conclusion 
 
Any attempt to summarise the vastly different dynamics and trajectories of 
state-formation in the twentieth century Middle East would go well beyond the 
confines of this study – in fact it is questionable whether in light of the diverse 
genealogies of polities such as Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
the Gulf States, etc. any such attempt is possible and whether here the 
generalising categorisation ‘Middle East’ is not as misplaced as in other 
contexts – which is why I refer to others for so copious a task,636 and will limit 
myself to herausarbeiten a few commonalities and differences in state-formation 
and Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey and Iraq pertaining to this study: 
(1) ‘The impact of British rule in shaping modern Iraq has been 
second only to that of Ottoman rule’,637 Phebe Marr highlights the importance of 
the watershed moment that was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the 
occupation of the territories between Suez and the Shat-el Arab by imperialist 
(British and French) forces in the aftermath of World War One and the 
transformation of most of these territories into League of Nations-decreed 
mandates, administered by the imperialist powers. The ‘Mandate System’ 
constitutes a most peculiar synthesis of the Wilsonian doctrine of self-
determination and the strategic interests of the imperialist powers, and while 
holding out independence for the future, for the time of the Mandate System, 
‘the creation of British and French mandates masked a de facto policy of 
colonial domination virtually indistinguishable from that found elsewhere in the 
British or French empires at the time’.638 Consequently, those polities who were 
created by and gained independence through the Mandate System, such as 
Iraq, can be considered post-colonial states. 
(2) Insofar then, Iraq exhibits the triple-legacy of colonialism identified 
for post-colonial states earlier: an unresolved nationalities question due to the 
arbitrary imposition of state borders reflecting the strategic needs of the (quasi-
)colonial power rather than the actual ethnic composition on the ground; a 
system-immanent authoritarianism due to the (quasi-)colonial power running an 
‘empire on the cheap’ that ensured compliance through a ‘divide-and-rule’ 
maxim that played local elites and their constituencies off against each other; a 
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system of lasting dependence on a volatile world market dominated by the 
‘capitalism-imperialism nexus’ due to the collaboration of local elites in this 
nexus and the economic structure of the post-colonial state as a rentier state 
providing in unequal exchange cash crops, cheap labour, or, in the case of Iraq, 
oil for advanced technologies and FDI. 
(3)  Turkey, on the other hand, is the only successor state of the 
Ottoman Empire that defended itself successfully against the Mandate System 
and therefore, although closely associated with the West during the Cold War 
and as dependent on the volatile world market as the next state, can be 
considered to have experienced a more genuine national development that – 
despite differences – more closely resembles the process of state-formation in 
Europe than the post-colonial state. Due to the dominant role of the military and 
the precursors of the CHP in the Turkish War of Independence, combined with 
the Führerkult around Atatürk, the political system in Turkey until well into the 
1980s, however, can also be considered as inherently prone to 
authoritarianism, illustrated in the quip of former President Süleyman Demirel 
that ‘God first created the Turkish military and then He realized He had 
forgotten something and added the people as an afterthought’.639 
(4) Both Turkey and Iraq, though, were forced into the corset of the 
modern international system with its defining principle of the inviolability of state 
borders. This external imposition of a state system, an alien form of 
governance, in whose formulation and configuration the new subjects had no 
say, markedly distinguishes the European experience in state-formation from 
most of the rest of the world, in particular the Middle East. Here, 
state makers [were compelled] M to attempt to consolidate their power through the 
development of political institutions while simultaneously attempting to justify the 
existence of their various states and regimes to populations for whom the very idea 
of the territorial nation-state, the specific boundaries of existing states, and the 
concept of secular authority lack legitimacy. This situation is decidedly different 
from the state-building experience in Western Europe. In that case, the state 
developed conterminously with the state-system. As a result, there was no external 
intervention to impose boundaries upon the region.640 
In addition to the earlier detailed differences this disparity between co-
creator and recipients of the specious blessing of the principle of self-
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determination is what sets apart most profoundly the processes of state 
formation in Europe from the experience of the post-colonial state: the former 
was not only present at the creation of the modern state-system but actively 
took part in its design, while the latter was left with no alternative but to simply 
come to terms with it. Consequently, the stringent corset of state-centrism did 
not allow either Turkey and Iraq or the ethnic minorities within their borders to 
seek a solution for their unresolved nationalities questions outside this system, 
i.e. the redrawing of borders or secession. 
(5) As far as the nationalities question is concerned, in Iraq, one can 
identify a sectarian discourse based on the classic ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary 
opposites of Kurds versus Arabs and Sunni versus Shi’a with each thus defined 
group struggling for influence in the post-1958 state. Aside from cursory and 
short-lived episodes no ruler in Baghdad ever attempted a sincere project of 
nation-building, of crafting a new, more broadly defined and inclusive sense of 
communality. The doctrine of Turkification, on the other hand, can be 
understood as a peculiar form of racist ‘civic nationalism’ that did not allow for 
any expressions of ethnic or religious pluralism. Ethnic and religious minorities 
in Turkey until the 1990s seen as fifth columns in the service of foreign agitators 
and interests, were either assimilated or annihilated.   
(6) As for the genealogy of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, before World 
War One Kurdish nationalism was largely limited to cultural societies and literati 
circles in Istanbul, developing and becoming salient when the borders of the 
nationalising states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria were already drawn. As a 
consequence thereof, the process of Kurdish identification has been oriented 
towards varying constitutive others and has been shaped by the political, social, 
and economic contexts in the respective countries and societies. While Kurds in 
Turkey were confronted by an effectively and ideologically strong nationalising 
state that denied them their very identity, Kurds in Iraq faced a notoriously weak 
state which, lacking any coherent national legitimisation, was torn apart by 
legion internal divisions. Consequently, while Kurds in Turkey became the 
victims of a cataclysmic ethnocide before their national consciousness became 
salient, Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Iraq blossomed along, and often in 
collaboration with the manifold currents of (pan-)Arab ethno-nationalism, which, 
until the second half of the 1970s, frequently bestowed upon Kurdish leaders 
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the role of kingmakers in inner-Iraqi power struggles. This role was exacerbated 
by Iraq – unlike Turkey – becoming an early battlefield of super power rivalries 
during the Cold War, which had its Kurdish parties enjoy the dubious privilege of 
serving as their proxies. 
Ultimately, while in Turkey the traditional Kurdish elites were either 
shattered early on, or largely co-opted by the nationalising state, traditional 
societal structures in Iraq not only prevailed but tribal leaders often formed the 
vanguard of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement. In light of these different 
trajectories it then appears justifiable to conclude with Martin van Bruinessen, 
the only scholar who has conducted extensive ethnographic field work in all 
major parts of Kurdistan, ‘it might, in fact, be more apt to consider the Kurds not 
as one, but as a set of ethnic groups’,641 and to speak of Kurdish ethno-
nationalisms in plural rather than a singular, which would imply an ethnic group 
defined by cross-border unity, communality and solidarity that is, in this case, 
absent. And yet it is such presupposed cross-border unity, and communality by 
which the internationalization of the so called ‘Kurdish conflict’ is explained by 
the ethnic alliance model and related groupist frameworks of explanatory IR. 
160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Three 
  
161 
 
  
162 
 
8.) The Origins of the PKK Sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan 
 
PKK-PUK collaboration in Lebanon and Syria 
The conventional narrative in most of the literature that deals with relations 
between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish parties – rather in passing and without 
much scrutiny ascribing it to either an ethnic alliance or instrumentalist 
explanatory model – has these relations start with the ‘Declaration of Solidarity’ 
between the PKK and KDP of 1983. One of the eminent authorities on the PKK 
in the 1980s, the Turkish journalist Ismet Imset, for example, states 
unequivocally, ‘in fact, there was no major cooperation between the PKK and 
the Iraqi Kurds until 1983’.642 This view, however, is demonstrably wrong. As 
this study reveals, an Iraqi Kurdish party, the PUK, was in fact the very player 
who made the PKK’s survival after the Turkish military coup of 12 September 
1980 possible, whose vital support enabled the PKK to rise from the ashes of 
marginalization to become the most potent insurgency in Kurdish history. In 
sum, and in light of what will be detailed in the following, it is no exaggeration to 
assert that without the good offices of the PUK, the PKK may have ceased to 
exist in 1980. 
By 1978, the Turkish state had imposed martial law in most south-eastern 
provinces, with the military penetrating every village in large numbers and thus 
making it increasingly difficult for PKK insurgents to carry out their at first rather 
amateurish operations. Although Öcalan claims that due to his foresight the 
organization managed to extract most of its top commanders from Turkey into 
the safety of neighbouring Syria just in time,643 ‘the military intervention did 
deliver a blow to the PKK M Of the thousand or so detainees convicted of 
belonging to the PKK, a number were M Central Committee members and 
included some of Öcalan’s most trusted comrades’; many of them ‘died in 
prison and others further weakened the organisation by becoming informers’.644 
There can be little doubt that the radical left in Turkey had been dealt a 
devastating blow by police operations under martial law and the 12 September 
military coup; in security operations between 12 September 1980 and 31 March 
1981, ‘a total of 19,978 suspects were caught and put on trial in the three years 
of military rule and only 916 of these were from the right or extreme right 
163 
 
organisations; M 15,500 suspects were charged with membership in or 
engaging in the activities of the left-wing organisations M [of which] the PKK 
took the largest toll’645 – and that the PKK would have suffered a fate similar to 
sister organisations like the TKSP, had it not established relations with a 
sympathetic foreign government, the regime of Hafez al-Assad in Syria. It is 
these relations with the Syrian government on which Imset focuses in his 
subsequent analysis, but without asking how they were established in the first 
place, how a political refugee and then no-name like Abdullah Öcalan managed 
to secure for his newcomer organisation the support of the mighty Syrian 
intelligence service, the mukhabarat. For in July 1979, Öcalan fled to Syria via 
Lebanon, where, for three months, he came to stay with Adel Murad, one of the 
co-founders of the PUK. At the time, like most of the PUK leadership, Murad 
lived in exile, where from Beirut, in his day job, he covered political events in 
Iraq and Iran for Lebanese newspapers, yet in fact coordinated the PUK’s 
activities in Lebanon. Murad recounts his first encounter with Öcalan: 
One evening I met with two of my Iranian contacts who told me that two persons 
had come from Turkey, that they were the new left there, important people I should 
meet M They were very secretive, always concerned about security, even a bit 
scared M we met then in my apartment at night, that was the first time I met 
Abdullah Öcalan. With him was a woman, her name was Myriam, I had no idea 
who she was, she only spoke Turkish, no Kurdish M we sat down and Öcalan 
started talking, for an hour he kept going, but I could barely understand anything, 
his Kurdish was difficult [to understand], the Iranians, who spoke Turkish, had to 
translate M I let Öcalan – his name was Ali then, nobody knew that it was Öcalan, 
and later I organised a passport for him on the name of Ali, a Jordanian passport – 
so I let Öcalan stay with me until I could find a translator M Öcalan did not like the 
Iranians [translating] our talks, he later said he wanted to talk to me directly 
because I’m a Kurd M so I got a translator, and Öcalan stayed with me M in the 
end he stayed for three months in my apartment.646 
Murad not only organised a translator but also sought approval for his talks 
with Öcalan from the PUK leadership. ‘I wrote Mam Jalal [Talabani] and 
informed him about this new Turkish group, and that they wanted us to help 
them setting up contacts here in Lebanon. He answered that I should go ahead 
and help them but to proceed with caution because we had no clear idea who 
they were.’647 Murad did as he was told and brought Öcalan in touch with Nayif 
Hawatmah’s Syrian-backed Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
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(DFLP). Murad attended the long conversations between Hawatmah and 
Öcalan, and recalls that at the end of the first meeting Hawatmah ‘gave him ten 
Kalashnikovs and [later] promised him [more] assistance M Within weeks 
dozens of young fighters of Öcalan’s group came from Turkey, we received 
them and sent them on to the Palestinian camps in the Beqaa [Valley].’648 
Murad’s portrayal of events appears plausible for three reasons. First, as 
will be shown shortly, the collaboration between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties, far from a credit one would seek to take in the current political 
discourse, is a matter the latter generally tend to downplay if not outright deny. 
To some extent then, Murad, who served as Iraq’s Ambassador to Romania 
and currently as general secretary of the PUK Central Committee, yet has no 
reputation of keeping his opinions about the fossilised and corrupt structures of 
the party to himself, when admitting to the crucial role his party played in 
accommodating the PKK in its hour of need, acts against the current discourse 
and the image the Iraqi Kurdish parties generally tend to cultivate these days. 
Second, Murad can refer to a picture of himself with Öcalan taken during the 
days when the PKK leader stayed at his apartment in Beirut. The PUK was thus 
instrumental in throwing the comatose PKK a lifeline by facilitating contacts with 
the Palestinian NLMs operating in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Third, Aliza 
Marcus in her account of the PKK’s early years hints to as much when she 
writes, ‘in late 1979 or early 1980, Öcalan succeeded in getting a meeting in 
Beirut M with the DFLP. This meeting, probably arranged by Kurds Öcalan met 
in Beirut M’.649 For the first time in the literature on the PKK I can now 
substantiate and document that the Kurds in Beirut to which Marcus refers were 
Adel Murad and the PUK leadership.  
Shortly after their first meetings the DFLP agreed to host and train a small 
number of PKK fighters in its camps in the Syrian controlled Beqaa Valley, most 
prominently the Helwe Camp.650 ‘The offer was not unusual. At various times, 
the DFLP trained Nicaraguan Sandinistas, Iranian leftists, Greek Communists, 
and even the odd Saudi’.651 In addition to wider ideological fraternity and 
solidarity among Marxist-Leninist NLMs, ‘the DFLP likely also had more 
concrete reasons for helping. Giving shelter to other leftist revolutionaries 
allowed the DFLP to promote the image of an important, international 
revolutionary movement M and it helped them pad their numbers at a time of 
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rising tensions with Israel’.652 By the time of the 12 September coup in Turkey, 
the numbers of PKK fighters the DFLP hosted had swelled to an extent that the 
DFLP could no longer accommodate them. But ‘Öcalan, in the meantime, [had] 
successfully established similar training arrangements with other Palestinian 
organisations. This allowed the PKK to spread its people among the different 
Palestinian factions, including Yasir Arafat’s Fatah, George Habash’s Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Samir Ghosheh’s Palestinian Popular 
Struggle Front, and the Lebanese Communist Party’.653 
One of the PKK fighters who arrived in Lebanon via Syria in the wake of the 
coup was Selahettin Çelik. He recounts his journey:  
As soon as we crossed the border, [Syrian intelligence] knew about us M The 
Kurds in whose houses we stayed, they had to inform the authorities about us M 
We took Arab names, the Syrians gave us identity cards, M and we moved on to 
Lebanon M We felt bad about relying on [Syrian] help M They treated the[ir own] 
Kurds very badly, we knew that, we saw that M but there was nothing we could do 
about it. We needed [Syria’s support] to get to Lebanon. We would not risk any 
trouble with them.654 
What can be established at this point beyond any doubt is that without the 
logistical support of the Syrian regime in channelling PKK fighters escaping 
Turkey to Lebanon and furnishing them with identity cards and that without the 
armed training and logistics the PKK received from the DFLP and other 
Palestinian NLMs, Abdullah Öcalan and his fledgling insurgency would have 
been finished. To Aliza Marcus Selahettin Çelik summed it up: 
In reality, we were finished as an organisation after 1980. We had no strength in 
Europe, in Turkey we were in prison. But in Syria we could gather ourselves 
together. The minute we got money we used it to send people to Europe [to work in 
the Kurdish communities there]. From the Palestinians we learned things. We 
learned about making demonstrations for martyrs, about ceremonies. We did a lot 
of reading on a people’s war [together], we also had armed training. They gave us 
clothing, cigarettes. We owe the Palestinians something.655 
What can be further established is that the Assad regime in Syria has a long 
tradition of using regional NLMs as proxies to fight or at least to sting more 
powerful neighbours, many of which it has issues with. This practice reaches 
from its support of Palestinian organisations in the parts of Lebanon it controlled 
in both fighting Israel but also its antagonists in the Lebanese Civil War, to 
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hosting Jalal Talabani and the PUK in Damascus to deal a blow to the Ba’athist 
regime in Baghdad with which it was at an ideological enmity, to today 
employing Hezbollah to fight the Syrian opposition in the Syrian Civil War since 
2011. With its most powerful neighbour in the region, Turkey, the Syrian regime 
had many unsettled disputes, from Turkey’s annexation of the province of Hatay 
in 1939, originally part of the French Mandate of Syria, to its Güneydoğu 
Anadolu Projesi  (GAP) development project for southeastern Anatolia with a 
series of hydro-electric dams and mass scale irrigation sapping the waters of 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, to its alleged shelter of the Muslim Brotherhood 
after the Hama insurrection in 1981.656 Hosting the PKK in the Syrian-controlled 
parts of Lebanon, facilitating its collaboration with Syrian-backed Palestinian 
NLMs, and providing logistical support was a convenient tool to deal Turkey a 
blow by proxy, all the more convenient since Syria’s involvement came with the 
advantage of political deniability.657 In the years after 1980 both PKK-Syrian and 
PKK-Palestinian collaboration increased substantially, to the extent that Öcalan, 
who had resettled to Damascus, ‘was enjoying Syrian hospitality to the best of 
his benefit M he owned a villa in Damascus, travelled around in a red Mercedes 
provided for him from Syria and was protected by Syrian Kurds who are still his 
only bodyguards. In every way, he was living the life of a Syrian official’.658 
Likewise, the PKK presence in the Beqaa Valley had increased so much that it 
had taken over control of the Helwe Camp, and in 1981 and 1982 the 
organisation held its first two congresses abroad there.659 What is more, while 
Syria adamantly prohibited any agitation against the regime among its own 
Kurdish population, it gave permission for the PKK to recruit fighters from within 
their ranks, ‘hoping this would redirect local Kurdish attention away from fighting 
for change inside Syria’.660 On the phenomenon of Syrian Kurds being recruited 
by the PKK with the encouragement of the Assad regime, Omar Sheikhmous, a 
Syrian Kurd, recounts: 
[The PKK in Syria] had very good recruiters, especially among students and 
women. They were clever in recruiting youngsters, who were sent to Lebanon first 
and then to Turkey. For Syrian Kurds, the PKK was very attractive because they 
Syrian Kurdish community was corrupt and factionalised and Syrian intelligence 
had infiltrated it M About 30-35% were recruited by government organs. It was 
mainly state security that worked as an initiator and organiser. They had a number 
of contacts in the Syrian community, mainly in Ifrin, Damascus, Qamishli, and 
Aleppo. There was a clear agreement: “You’ll be sent to fight in Turkey and 
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therefore you’ll not be asked for military service, and after several years you come 
back” M When the recruits left Syria, security kept their identity cards. There were 
two considerations behind this: First of all, they could not easily return but needed 
permission of security to do so. Second, if they were killed or tracked in Turkey, 
there would be no reflection on Syria.661 
Not even the fact that Öcalan was living the high life in Damascus courtesy 
of the Syrian authorities illustrates the scope and depth of the support his group 
received from the Assad regime as well as these practices of forcibly recruiting 
Syrian Kurds into the ranks of the PKK.  
 The question remains to what extent the PUK, another proxy Syria hosted 
and supported generously since its founding, after its initial part in paving the 
way for PKK-DFLP cooperation, played a role in further facilitating contacts 
between Syrian authorities and the PKK. Sarkho Mahmoud, who lived as a 
student in Damascus during the 1980s and from 1985 on was one of the PUK’s 
external representatives in charge of liaison with other Kurdish and non-Kurdish 
political parties there, observed on whether the PUK facilitated contacts 
between the PKK and the Syrian authorities: ‘we made the door open for them 
M through the Iraqi opposition in Syria, in which we were very strong, we 
helped them to set up talks with the Syrians.’662 In the same interview he further 
claimed that PUK members had also assisted in establishing contacts between 
the PKK and the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya.663 When I asked Adel 
Murad, Sarkho Mahmoud, and Omar Sheikhmous why the PUK had lent a 
helping hand to the PKK, who, after all, just before the coup distinguished itself 
mostly by fighting Kurdish parties in Turkey which the PUK had traditionally 
been affiliated with, such as Kemal Burkay’s TKSP, all gave more or less the 
same answer: ‘We were young, we were naïve. We dreamt of building a large 
anti-imperialist front all over the Middle East, including many Kurdish parties 
and organisations from many countries. So, we reached out and helped any 
group we could work with M and we hoped that [the PKK and other Kurdish 
parties in Turkey] would mend their differences.’664 In light of these lofty 
declarations, the ethnic alliance model appears at first sight an apt explanatory 
framework to account for the PUK’s support of the PKK in 1979/80, therewith 
saving it from obliteration. However, even though ideational factors appear to 
have determined the PUK’s behaviour towards the PKK – material interests can 
be ruled out since the PUK had little to gain, and the PKK refugee have-nots 
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had nothing to give in terms of material benefits – a few important qualifications 
must be put in place that ultimately render untenable common ethnicity as the 
determining variable in explaining these acts of solidarity. First, the ethnic 
alliance model, strictly speaking, does not apply here since the PUK neither 
controlled a state of its own nor did it ‘play a role in policy making’665 in a 
neighbouring state; both PUK and PKK were political refugees, leading a paltry 
existence in exile, with little to lose from working together and equally 
dependent on the charity of others. During the time in question for our current  
analysis nobody, neither the PUK, nor the DLFP, nor the Syrian government, 
could have foreseen the PKK’s rise to becoming the most potent insurgency in 
Kurdish history within less than a decade; consequently, they must have 
thought their support of Öcalan’s group of little, almost negligible consequence. 
Adel Murad makes a point when emphasising that he ‘saw no great difference’ 
between offering Öcalan a couch to sleep on and facilitating contacts with the 
DFLP, since the consequences and extensive impact of his doing so were 
impossible to anticipate at this moment.666 They were seen as simple acts of 
charity and hospitality towards an ideologically related Kurdish organisation in 
need. The concurrence of two ideational factors, ethnicity and a radical leftist 
ideology, constitutes the second caveat to common ethnicity as the determining 
variable for categorising their relations and to the ethnic alliance model serving 
as an applicable explanatory framework. Omar Sheikhmous above remarks 
illustrate that for the PUK, the PKK’s Marxist-Leninist pedigree counted as much 
as the fact that both were Kurdish organisations fighting for national self-
determination. In particular in light of both groups’ collaboration with the 
Palestinian NLMs operating in Lebanon, who had no ethnic ties with the Kurds, I 
would find it very difficult if not impossible to draw a clear line between political 
ideology and ethnicity determining these groups’ behaviours. This difficulty 
becomes even more apparent when extending the level of analysis to include 
the Syrian government, in whose case only instrumentalist but no ideational 
factors appear to have determined the behaviour of the Assad regime, the PKK, 
and the PUK with each availing themselves of the other for their own strategic 
and materialist ends; when bringing the Syrian Kurds and their prominence in 
the ranks of the PKK into the equation, the situation appears again less clear-
cut, though. Here, a host of ideational factors667 as well as material interests, 
i.e. avoiding conscription into the Syrian military, seem to account for their 
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joining the PKK. In sum, I would argue that this first example of PKK 
collaboration with external actors, when considering the whole body of evidence 
at all levels of analysis – PKK-PUK, PKK-PUK-Palestinian NLMs-Syrian 
government, and PKK-Syrian government-Syrian Kurds constellations – in its 
entirety already attests as to why the simplifying reductionism of either the 
ethnic alliance model or instrumentalism fall short of convincingly explaining the 
PKK’s various ‘alliances’. Instead it supports the case I have made in this study 
for appreciating these actors’ relations as a complex, shifting, and situational 
matrix of identities and interests,as advocated by Fierke,668 in which each 
actor’s motives ought to be studied individually as well as in their interaction 
with each other in order to get a workable grasp of the matrix’ dynamics.   
 
The PKK pitching camp in Iraqi Kurdistan 
When considering the dire conditions of the PKK in 1980 there can be no 
doubt that the PUK was instrumental in resurrecting Abdullah Öcalan’s fledgling 
organisation from the dead. Likewise, when considering the PKK’s expansion in 
numbers, military strike capability, enhanced sophistication in tactics of guerrilla 
warfare through military training, equipment, and overall professionalization 
between 1980 and August 1984, when it actively launched its insurgency in 
Turkey, there can be little doubt about the extent to which the support of the 
Syrian regime of Hafez al-Assad and the Palestinian NLMs operating in Syrian-
controlled Lebanon proved instrumental in achieving this transformation. Not 
only had the collaboration with Syrian intelligence and Palestinian NLMs, 
facilitated by the PUK, provided the PKK with a second life, it allowed it to 
consider, in 1984, the transition from individual hit-and-run strikes to an 
elaborate guerrilla campaign based on the classic Maoist three-stage model of 
guerrilla warfare, later adapted by Vo Nguyen Giap, of (1) mobilization through 
targeted propaganda among the peasantry and contention of the authorities’ 
security forces in the region through guerrilla warfare, (2) equilibrium through 
protracted conflict and mobile warfare, thus sapping the authorities’ resources 
and public support, and (3) general counteroffensive as part of mass-scale 
public uprising against the authorities.669 This transition is epitomised in the 
creation of the PKK’s Vietcong-style armed wing, the Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan 
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(HRK, Kurdistan Freedom Unit),670 renamed into Arteşa Rizgariya Netewa 
Kurdistan, (ARGK, People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan) in 1986.671 
What the PKK dramatically lacked though was a strategically suitable 
geographical launch pad for its first strikes into Turkish territory. The flat, arid 
terrain of the Turkish-Syrian border was incompatible with guerrilla warfare, and 
the Syrian regime proved hesitant to become that directly involved in the PKK’s 
launch of military strikes.672 When faced with this predicament of having a 
guerrilla ready to strike but no access to the theatre of operations, the second 
Iraqi Kurdish party, the KDP, stepped in to save the day for the PKK. In July 
1983, at first sight perhaps surprisingly, the KDP and PKK signed an accord of 
mutual cooperation, titled ‘Principles of Solidarity’, that was made public in the 
following year.673 In this eleven article long declaration both parties committed 
to a joint effort, ‘depend[ing] on the force of the Kurdish people’ against ‘every 
kind of imperialism and the struggle against the plans and plots of imperialism in 
the region’; they further pledged to seek and further ‘cooperation with other 
revolutionary forces in the region and to effort the creation of new alliances’.674 
Wary of each others’ past though, in article 10, KDP and PKK pledged  not to 
interfere in each other’s internal affairs, providing ‘that the organisations would 
not side with actions which could damage the unity of the parties and that they 
should respect the organisational and political independence of each other’;675 if 
this principle were violated, the covenant foresaw a modus in which the 
aggrieved party would inform the other of its objection, then issue a warning, 
and if not altered, would be at liberty to terminate the compact.676 In October 
1984 Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Öcalan met in Damascus for the first and 
only time to publicly unveil their alliance with the communiqué even translated 
into Arabic.677 
To be sure, the history of Kurdish ethno-nationalism is full of ephemeral 
acts of cross-border cooperation between the various Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
parties and the four nationalising states; rarely though has such cooperation, 
normally rather dealt with in clandestine fashion, took on such formal a 
character with public announcements and a detailed set of regulations. At least 
on paper then we can speak of a classic strategic alliance here between the two 
Kurdish parties that, although not explicitly including a clause of mutual defence 
or stipulations for collective military action, resembles a military alliance insofar 
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as the KDP granted the PKK access to its territory and joint use of its 
infrastructure, i.e. camps, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Consequently, even before the 
accord was made public, the PKK established its largest camp yet, called Lolan 
camp, in the inaccessible mountainous border area of Iraq and Turkey – a camp 
that tellingly also acted as the KDP’s regional headquarter and clandestine 
radio station as well as a base camp for the Iraqi Communist Party.678 The 
importance of this development cannot be underestimated, since by granting 
access to and sanctuary on its territory, the KDP provided the PKK with the one 
element Öcalan was missing in his strategy: a launch pad with direct access to 
the target state for projecting guerrilla operations into Turkey in a territory as 
suitable for irregular warfare as the jungles of Vietnam or peaks of Afghanistan. 
This most advantageous position provided the PKK with the ideal conditions, in 
August 1984, to carry its guerrilla war into Turkey, a war that has lasted now for 
three decades, making it thus one of the longest examples of guerrilla warfare 
in modern history, and costing 50,000 lives – a war that arguably would have 
been difficult if not impossible to launch had the KDP not granted the PKK 
sanctuary. Also, the PKK sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan, together with Syria’s 
support of Öcalan’s group, allowed the Turkish politico-military establishment to 
portray the Kurdish uprising in southeast Anatolia as an external problem and 
the PKK as agents controlled from abroad by shadowy regional powers 
conspiring against Turkey.679 
For any insurgency the blessings of sanctuary are obvious, have been 
highlighted by guerrilla commanders from Mao Tse-tung to Ernesto Che 
Guevara, to Vo Nguyen Giap as well as theoreticians of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency,680 and I have detailed them together with providing a more 
nuanced model of insurgency-sanctuary state relations elsewhere.681 Idean 
Salehyan is the latest in an array of political scientists who have highlighted the 
importance of international borders to shelter insurgencies from the jurisdiction 
of their target states.682 If we conceptualise the international system as a 
conglomerate of sovereign states that, as three main paradigms of explanatory 
IR would have it, exercise absolute power and control within their border but 
have little or no legal basis to prosecute subversive elements abroad, it is 
plainly clear why protest movements, NLMs or insurgencies find it attractive to 
evade persecution, imprisonment or torture by relocating most of their 
172 
 
operations into the territory of a neighbouring state well-disposed to their cause 
– geographical proximity being an additional factor in their favour, as 
insurgencies usually cannot project force across long distance. By going 
abroad, insurgencies thus not only successfully dodge the judicial, policing, and 
military powers of the target state, they also significantly raise the stakes of the 
conflict by internationalising it. They not only win a material and logistic 
supporter for their cause but also a potent patron in international fora and 
bodies that are in most cases ‘states only clubs’. The insurgencies therewith 
also make it more costly for the target state to prosecute them: doing so would 
violate the sovereignty of the neighbouring state and risk the condemnation in 
international bodies that comes with it, hazard an inter-state confrontation 
between two regular, more or less well-equipped armies, and even if the target 
state is willing to take that risk and intervene abroad, in most cases it would 
result in a lengthy and costly occupation to extirpate the insurgency and the 
neighbouring state’s support of it.683 Erin Jenneand Clayton Thyne demonstrate 
how the assistance of foreign governments and the higher costs resulting for 
the target state to combat them, significantly increases the bargaining position 
of the insurgents and may induce them to raise and radicalise their demands.684 
‘Thus, the inclusion of additional parties to the bargaining environment can 
make it more difficult to find an acceptable settlement because external 
patronage alters expectations about the domestic balance of power’.685 
Ironically then, the very principle of state sovereignty that holds international 
borders sacrosanct and all too often the internal affairs of states’ untouchable, 
to the same extent and when finding sanctuary in a neighbouring state, befits 
the (secessionist or separatist) insurgency that seeks to topple or revolutionise 
this order. In these aspects of sanctuary I agree with the cited analysts; what I 
do not agree with, and what I seek to problematise in this study, is the tendency 
to reduce the motives for political action of states, parties, NLMs or insurgencies 
– whether they are the recipients or givers of sanctuary – to singular 
explanatory factors such as common ethnicity or material interests and by doing 
so, to reify these factors and the discourses from which they emerge. 
For this study then, the central questions in this context are why the KDP, at 
first sight rather unexpectedly, reached out to the PKK, entered a formal 
alliance with Öcalan’s group, granted it access to its territory and sanctuary, and 
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even allowed it to share its infrastructure such as camps, supply lines, and 
means of communication. As with the PUK, at cursory inspection a lot seems to 
speak for the ethnic alliance model as an explanatory framework. After all, when 
justifying his alliance with Öcalan, even Massoud Barzani himself boasted: 
For us, it is always a source of pride that in the regions that we have liberated with 
the cost of our blood, we have opened the area as a fortress for every Kurdish 
fighter. We signed the alliance with the PKK with this logic and for these 
reasons.686 
At closer scrutiny, though, such lofty declarations are revealed as strategic 
essentialisms, maintaining an essentialised version of the group, the pretence 
of group cohesion and solidarity for strategic purposes. If we as scholars 
though, rather than calling it into question, adopt the strategic essentialisms of  
ethno-nationalist elites like Massoud Barzani as the basis of our enquiries or 
take on ‘categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social 
analysis’,687 as the ethnic alliance model and related explanatory frameworks 
propagate, we contribute to the reification and substantialisation of the ethno-
nationalist elites’ primordialism and to the reproduction of its logic. Having said 
that, in order to reiterate the central point of critique of this study of the 
preeminent approaches of explanatory IR to explaining ethnic conflict, and 
before discussing alternative explanations, it is only proper to clarify why I am 
confident to discount Barzani’s declaration of solidarity based on common 
ethnicity as a strategic essentialism. 
Other than the PUK, where at least in its early stages and only to a certain 
degree ideological congruities with the PKK are identifiable, the ethno-
nationalisms of KDP and PKK are strikingly dissimilar. As a matter of fact, up to 
1983, more than anything else, KDP and PKK can be seen as antagonists. Not 
only did the PKK, as the only modern Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, 
advance a secessionist ethno-nationalist agenda, while the KDP’s at best can 
be understood as separatist which by default would have put the former at odds 
with the KDP whose self-perception as the grand old party of Kurdish self-
determination in Iraq would not have tolerated Öcalan’s competition on its very 
home turf, while the PKK saw itself as the vanguard for the liberation and 
unification of all Kurdish lands. What is more, PKK and KDP can be located at 
the opposite ends of the spectrum of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. From even 
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before the founding of the PKK, for Öcalan the KDP had embodied all that was 
wrong with Kurdish ethno-nationalism, the very reason for its failure, and he 
never tired of castigating Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his successors as adhering 
to a ‘primitive’ and ‘defeatist’ ideology in speech after speech.688 Also, in its very 
founding declaration of 27 November 1978, the PKK explicitly positioned itself 
against the KDP’s strategy of wresting from the state concessions for Kurdish 
autonomy, which, through acceptance and facilitation of the division of the 
Kurdish lands, it understood as nothing but attempts at playing into the hands of 
imperialist nationalising states.689 Öcalan elaborated: 
The KDP program for autonomy is not accidental. This represents the special 
interests of Kurdish feudals, and it is an instrument to develop them into a 
bourgeoisie M The feudal class cannot demand more than autonomy. They do not 
go against their interests. Independence is against the interests of the Kurdish 
feudals. The struggle for independence means the death of the Kurdish feudals. 
Only the forces of the proletariat can achieve independence.690  
Given the opposing ideologies of PKK and KDP, these tirades and 
declarations were more than strategic essentialisms or examples of mere ethnic 
outbidding; the antagonism with the KDP was rooted in the very core of the 
PKK’s perception of itself as a Marxist-Leninist NLM with the declared objective 
of liberating the oppressed Kurdish masses not only from the nationalising 
states that denied them the expression of their ethnic identity but also the 
Kurdish tribal landlords that participated and profiteered from this system of 
oppression and exploitation. And, as has been detailed earlier, these Kurdish 
tribal landlords were the founding constituency of the KDP, and the Barzanis 
were not only prominent representatives of this stratum of Kurdish society but 
also the most potent champion of their interests. What is more, in this role the 
Barzanis were not limited to Iraq, but, as has been shown in the previous 
section, had inspired the founding of an affiliated party in Turkey, the KDP-T by 
Faik Bucak, one of the wealthiest landlords in the Siverek area.691 These very 
feudal landlords and Kurdish aghas who made a profit from collaborating with 
the Turkish state and who acted in elections as a political machine for the 
established parties, the PKK had designated its prime target during its early 
years of operation. As a matter of fact, nothing illustrates this ideological 
primacy and therewith the antagonism with the KDP better than the fact that on 
30 July 1979 the PKK dared as one of its signature feats an assassination 
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attempt on Mehmet Celal Bucak, the head of the Bucak tribe – that had 
constituted the founding core of the KDP-T – and a deputy of in the governing 
coalition with the right-wing MHP.692 
It therefore seems not very plausible, as some authors claim,693 that the 
KDP entered the alliance with the PKK in order to strengthen its pan-Kurdish 
credentials, deeply impaired after the collapse of Mulla Mustafa’s 1975 revolt 
and the split with PUK. Why, of all organisations advocating Kurdish self-
determination in Turkey, would the KDP have entered an alliance with the one 
most opposed to its own brand of Kurdish ethno-nationalism? Why the only 
Kurdish NLM that laid claim to leading the Kurdish struggle for self-
determination not only in Turkey but also in Iraq, where it would have competed 
with the KDP? Why then open the door to Iraqi Kurdistan for the PKK, giving it 
access to this political stage? Furthermore, the argument that the KDP sought 
to boost its pan-Kurdish credentials appears even less probable given the fact 
that, at the same time as Massoud Barzani extended his hospitality to the PKK, 
the KDP launched an attack on its sister organisation in Iran, the KDP-I, on 
behalf of its ally, the Khomeini regime in Tehran, and as part of the wider Iran-
Iraq War that had started with Iraq’s invasion of 22 September 1980.694 In light 
of these doubts and of the overall KDP-PKK antagonism, ideational factors 
appear to hold little purchase in explaining why the KDP entered an alliance 
with the PKK in 1983, granted it access to and sanctuary on its territory, and the 
ethnic alliance model and related frameworks can be discarded as a plausible 
explanatory model for these developments and the parties’ motives. One 
additional caveat, already mentioned in the context of the PUK, also applies to 
the KDP’s support of the PKK three years later: the KDP simply could not have 
foreseen the PKK’s ascendance from second rank guerrilla in the pocket of the 
Assad regime to becoming the Middle East’s most potent insurgency over the 
course of just a few years, and therefore can be excused for not fully 
appreciating what it actually bargained for.  
Ensconced in its sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan and with direct access to the 
designated theatre of operations in Turkey, on 15 August 1984 the PKK began 
in earnest its peoples’ war for the liberation of Kurdistan with dual attacks on the 
towns of Semdinli and Ehru, and in October of the same year, in a deliberate 
propagandistic strike, stepped up its activities with another widely publicised 
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attack coinciding with President Kenan Evren’s visit to the area;695 in the spring 
of 1985 the PKK fought its as yet toughest battle in Siverek with 60 casualties 
among guerrilla, security forces and civilians.696 These successful attacks 
caught the Turkish politico-military establishment by complete surprise,697 
allowing the PKK, who by early 1985 was operating with at least 200 guerrillas 
active inside Turkey at any time, to intensify its propaganda among the Kurdish 
village population with the aim of persuading them to join the insurgency and to 
ultimately prepare the ground for a general mass uprising.698 Yet, by mid-1985 
the Turkish army had not only significantly stepped up its military presence in 
the area but also introduced the system of ‘village guards’, Kurdish villagers 
armed, paid, or at least as often press-ganged into the service of the army, to 
defend remote villages against guerrillas operating in the area, thus effectively 
creating state-sanctioned death squads and paramilitary services.699 Within in a 
year the PKK insurrection had turned into a full-scale civil war with tens of 
thousands to perish and millions to become internally displaced. 
If ideational factors cannot explain the KDP-PKK accord, what are the 
motives behind the parties’ behaviour? In the current political discourse and 
climate, in which KRG politicians try their hardest to project the image of a 
reliable partner of the West and in which the Kurdistan Region is completely 
dependent on Turkey politically and economically, the KDP understandably 
would prefer their past alliance with PKK to be forgotten. These attempts at 
rewriting and whitewashing history sometimes take on a bizarre form, such as 
when I interviewed the Chief of Staff to President Barzani, Fuad Hussein, and 
he outright denied that the KDP ‘had ever supported or collaborated with the 
PKK’.700 Such brazen denials, in light of how well documented events and the 
‘Principles of Solidarity’ accord are, not only are an insult to the intelligence of 
the questioner but let today’s decision makers in the KRG appear surprisingly 
unprofessional in plying their political trade; indeed, rather than cloaking it, they 
offer us an insight into how uncomfortable they must be in coming to terms with 
their past. Alternatively Imset and McDowall suggest an instrumentalist 
explanation for why the KDP invited the PKK onto their territory.701 In May 1983 
the Turkish military had launched a substantial raid in the Iraqi-Turkish border 
region in pursuit of Kurdish militants who had fled there from Turkey but its 
attacks indiscriminately hit them and Barzani’s peshmerga who had just 
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returned there from Iran alike. Imset and McDowall hypothesise Barzani 
intended to create a buffer between his forces and the Turkish border, a buffer 
zone he planned the PKK to fill for him. This explanation, though, seems not 
plausible. If Barzani had feared Turkish incursions into his territory, why would 
he invite an organisation whose presence surely would trigger further retaliation 
from the Turkish military – a chain of events that unfolded precisely in this 
fashion once the PKK had pitched camp there?  
I, for one, believe the KDP-PKK alliance of 1983 is rooted in the eternal 
rivalry between KDP and PUK and wider geo-political changes in the region. 
Since the PUK had sent peshmerga into the field to continue Iraqi Kurdish 
resistance against the regime of Saddam Hussein in the wake of the collapse of 
Mulla Mustafa’s uprising, KDP and PUK were embroiled in a de facto civil war, 
yet both sides were too weak to gain an upper hand.702 The situation 
dramatically changed when in September 1980 Saddam Hussein invaded Iran 
and the entire region was flung into a war the like the Middle East had not 
witnessed since World War One, with more than a million casualties. In this 
confrontation of titans, the KDP, scraping a living in exile in Iran, opposing 
Baghdad, and dependent on whoever was in power in Tehran, whether the 
Shah or Ayatollah Khomeini, took sides from early on, and since 1981 was 
employed by the Iranian Revolutionary regime against the KDP-I.703 For the 
PUK the outbreak of the war posed a profound predicament. Nominally allied 
with and dependent on Damascus and Tehran against Baghdad, it, on the other 
hand,  was not keen on siding with its archenemy, the KDP against the KDP-I, 
who it still hoped to woo into a wider, more pan-Kurdish platform. In this 
decisive stage, Talabani, who had been encouraged in this move by KDP-I 
leader Ghassemlou, displayed shrewd brinkmanship by staking the fate of his 
party on one card: he accepted the overtures of Saddam Hussein for 
negotiations that, with Saddam Hussein driven into a corner, Talabani hoped 
could yield an even more generous autonomy statute than Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani’s 1974 ‘March Manifesto’ and cement his leadership of all Iraqi Kurds. 
In the spring of 1983 the PUK sided with the KDP-I against Iran, which in turn 
joined forces with the KDP in attacks on the PUK,704 and in December of the 
same year the PUK officially entered negotiations with the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. In a 2000 interview with PBS’ Frontline Talabani recalls: 
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When we went to Baghdad in 1983, [Saddam Hussein] received us and was very 
kind to us. He said that by coming here, you have done some historical 
achievements. First of all, your homeland is in danger, you are coming to protect it 
from Iranian invasion. Second, he said, “you came to cooperate with us while your 
party is in a weak position.” Third, he said that you are not supporting invaders, you 
are supporting your government, your people. And he said, “you have done 
historical favours and we owe you.” He told me, “Jalal, I will give you something, 
some Kurdish demand that will raise you not only in the eyes of Iraqi Kurds but with 
Iranian Kurds and Turkish Kurds.” And he looked at Tariq Aziz and he said, “this 
nationalistic political position of PUK must be studied in Iraqi history and in the 
schools.”705 
Yet for the PUK, Talabani’s brinkmanship backfired spectacularly. Not only 
did other Iraqi Kurdish groups such as the ICP refuse to heed his call for 
rapprochement with Baghdad, the negotiations opened rifts within his own 
party; the picture of Saddam Hussein and Talabani kissing cheeks remains until 
today one of the most iconic images of Iraqi Kurdish leaders betraying their own 
people,706 while Saddam Hussein, who only played for time, dragged on the 
negotiations without committing to much, and the PUK was expelled from Syria 
in 1983 for its changing sides.707 After more than a year of fruitless talks, and 
after having lost considerable public and inner-party support as well as major 
allies, most prominently the Assad regime, Talabani had to accept that he had 
been duped, and in 1986 he reluctantly reconciled with the KDP and the Iranian 
regime, accepted arms and provisions from the latter, and joining the fight 
against Saddam Hussein.708 
Yet throughout 1983 and 1984 the prospect of a PUK-Baghdad alliance had 
posed a very clear and present danger to the KDP, an alliance with the potential 
to expel it from Iraqi Kurdistan for good and, if Talabani’s negotiations for Iraqi 
Kurdish autonomy would have succeeded, would have doomed the KDP to a 
meagre existence at the margins of the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
discourse. McDowall, for example, states when discussing an April 1983 PUK 
attack on the KDP and ICP, ‘in some circles the PUK was suspected of working 
in tandem with Baghdad, and possibly even Ankara’.709 Given the dimension of 
this threat looming on the horizon during the crucial months of mid-1983, it 
seems logical that the KDP was eager to augment its military capacities by 
opening its territory to organisations that could be used for fending off an all-out 
attack by the PUK and the Iraqi army. It further seems logical that the PKK, 
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whose ranks by then had grown substantially, was seen as having the potential 
to come to the KDP’s assistance in times of need. A KDP-PKK alliance was 
therefore in the best strategic interest of the KDP, and the vital threat of a PUK 
alliance with Baghdad might have proven enough for the KDP to temporarily put 
aside their ideological differences with the PKK; likewise, the prospect of 
sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan and direct access to the designated theatre of 
operations on the eve of  Abdullah Öcalan’s intended launch of his military 
campaign surely would have outweighed his reservations to side with the, as he 
saw it, ‘primitive’, ‘defeatist’, and ‘bourgeois’ KDP. To identify the KDP-PUK 
antagonism and the shifting regional alliances during the early stages of the 
Iran-Iraq War as the driving force behind the KDP-PKK accord gains even 
further plausibility when considering the fact that KDP and PKK shared the 
same external supporters. While the PUK’s relations with the Assad regime 
deteriorated all through 1983 until it was formally expelled from Damascus at 
the end of the year, with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, the KDP found itself at 
the same side as the regimes in Tehran and Damascus; likewise, the PKK’s 
collaboration with the Khomeini regime can be documented for as early as mid-
1979 when Adel Murad was approached in Beirut by Iranian agents on Öcalan’s 
behalf and had intensified since then.710 It is therefore conceivable that KDP 
and PKK were encouraged to mend their differences by the nationalising states 
backing them and that, at least to some extent, the KDP-PKK alliance was 
concocted in Tehran and Damascus. While naturally it proved difficult to provide 
a smoking gun substantiating this rational for the KDP’s behaviour, it is a 
reading leading analysts of Kurdish ethno-nationalism I interviewed – Abbas 
Vali, an intimate expert on the workings of the Iranian regime and its relations 
with Kurdish parties in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, and Doğu Ergil, an expert on the 
PKK and the Turkish politico-military establishment and Turkish intelligence, 
among them – deem ‘absolutely plausible’.711 It is, until confronted with more 
plausible alternative interpretations, the reading of events I will settle for in this 
study. In sum then, it therefore seems that when analysing the relations 
between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationaslist parties and the matrix 
of identities and interests that constitutes these relations, for this particular 
episode and for the timeframe under consideration, the years 1983/4, 
materialist/strategic interests appear to outweigh ideational factors in 
determining both parties’ decision making. 
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If Talabani’s flirtation with Saddam Hussein did not pay off for the PUK, 
neither did Barzani’s alliance with the PKK for the KDP. Turkey retaliated 
against the August 1984 PKK offensive with a vengeance. On 15 October 1984 
Ankara and Baghdad signed a security protocol that allowed Turkish troops to 
penetrate Iraqi territory up to five kilometres in hot pursuit of PKK fighters, and 
in the following years launched several air raids of alleged PKK camps in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the most severe occurred on 15 August 1986, killing 200, among 
them many Iraqi Kurdish civilians and KDP peshmerga.712 By this time, the KDP 
had realised that instead of an ally – the PKK did no such thing as to join forces 
with the KDP against the PUK – they had incurred Turkey’s wrath, resulting in 
heavy casualties in repeated indiscriminate Turkish air raids. Since 1984 the 
KDP had tried to persuade the PKK to abstain from operations that could 
provoke Turkish air raids, but the PKK proved undiscerning. Selahettin Çelik, 
who attended one of these meetings with the KDP in 1984 in Iran (sic!), 
recalled, ‘we listened to Idris Barzani, assured them of our good intentions, and 
then chose to ignore them.’713 Consequently, after another heavy Turkish 
attack, in May 1987, the KDP, as per the requirements of the ‘Principles of 
Solidarity’, issued a formal warning to the PKK, before severing relations 
completely and declaring the accord null and void.714 Little surprise then that 
once the KDP-PKK alliance was severed, Öcalan reverted to his usual rhetoric, 
denouncing the Barzanis as ‘traitors of the Kurdish movement, enemies of the 
Kurdish people’.715 By then, the PKK had entrenched itself in several camps in 
Iraqi Kurdistan under its exclusive control, and there was precious little the KDP 
could do about it. The PKK had come to Iraqi Kurdistan to stay and still does so 
after thirty years. 
 
Al Anfal 
In the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War the regime of Saddam Hussein 
perpetrated a genocidal ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurdish minority 
in northern Iraq. The Anfal Campaign, named after the eighth sura of the Qu’ran 
on the spoils of war, lasted from March 1987, when Ali Hassan al-Majid was 
appointed Saddam Hussein’s viceroy in northern Iraq, until 1989, and 
comprised of targeted ground and aerial bombing of villages with chemical 
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agents, the systematic destruction of villages, mass deportations, and the 
operation of concentration camps.716 According to Human Rights Watch, during 
the campaign the Iraqi authorities and their local willing executioners killed 
50,000 to 100,000 civilians, destroyed 4,500 villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, attacked 
250 villages with chemical weapons, and removed tens of thousands from their 
homesteads by force.717 A distinct component of the Anfal Campaign was a 
programme of ‘Arabization’ that expelled Kurdish inhabitants from northern 
villages and cities – most prominently oil rich Kirkuk – and replaced them with 
Arab settlers from southern and central Iraq, a factor that significantly 
contributes to the current ethnic tensions in the affected areas.718 The tragic 
climax of the Anfal Campaign was the attack on the town of Halabja on 16 
March 1988 with mustard gas, VX, and sarin, in which 5,000 civilians, mostly 
women and children were killed.   
To dispel any notions of ethnic group solidarity once and for all, the PKK 
watched the juggernaut of Saddam Hussein’s genocidal ethnic cleansing 
campaign from the sidelines; what is more, it directly profited from it. With the 
KDP, PUK, and any non-organised Iraqi Kurdish resistance broken, with their 
armed forces ground down to a nub, and with their leaders, backs to the wall, 
desperately holding on to the last vestiges of territory or being pushed across 
the borders into Iran, the PKK reigned supreme in Iraqi Kurdistan. By 1988/89, 
with the PKK able to field several thousand fighters,719 no one, not even the 
mighty Iraqi army, could contest the PKK for its absolute control over the Iraqi-
Turkish border region. In fact, the Iraqi army had no intention of doing so; on the 
contrary, the demise of KDP and PUK, the PKK’s absolute control over the 
border region, and the formidable challenge it posed to the Turkish state had 
raised Baghdad’s interest in Abdullah Öcalan’s group and encouraged it to 
intensify its attempts at establishing lines of communication with the PKK. This 
PKK-Baghdad link became public when, in 1991 during the chaos of the Iraqi 
Kurdish uprising in the wake of the Gulf War, the PUK came upon a series of 
top secret Iraqi documents that it passed to the Turkish Daily News and the 
London-based Arabic daily Al Hayat. The Turkish Daily News’ article from 12 
August 1992 read:  
In a document marked top secret correspondence contains details of a meeting 
between officials of the security services and Baran Ahmed , who was described in 
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the document as the PKK official in charge of the Hakkari, Semdinli, and Cukurca 
regions. Baran was said to have direct contact with Öcalan. According to this 
document, Baran offered his party’s readiness to cooperate in intelligence affairs, 
including gathering intelligence on Turkish and American military facilities in Turkey 
and to fight the KDP of Barzani. Another document contained details of information 
supplied by contact from the PKK about the movement of Turkish and American 
troops in the southeast areas and the different types of planes, weaponry, and so 
on at the [U.S.] Adana (Incirlik) base. In exchange of this information and readiness 
for cooperation Baran reportedly asked the Iraqis to widen the relations between 
the two sides officially on higher levels M In fact, Baran had also asked for all Iraqi 
troops in the region to ignore the presence of the PKK and for Baghdad to provide 
[them] with printing facilities and weapons, i.e. BCKs, RPGs, and 60mm mortars. 
He even said that the PKK was willing to pay for these supplies.720 
These documents gave substantial weight to what the Iraqi Kurdish parties 
had suspected of the PKK for several years: that the PKK, in exchange for 
equipment, weaponry, and the Iraqi army turning a blind eye to the their 
activities, provided the very regime that had just perpetrated genocide against 
the Iraqi Kurds with intelligence on them, indeed, even offered to fight them for 
Baghdad. 
This picture corresponds with the information I gathered in interviews with 
PKK dissidents. They all indicate that between 1985/6, when relations with 
Barzani’s KDP deteriorated, and until the ‘Principles of Solidarity’ accord was 
formally renounced in May 1987, relations between the PKK and Iraqi army and 
intelligence services subsisted on a low, informal level, with neither side 
committing to anything substantial, and from 1987/8 on gradually intensified.721 
However, both the sequence of events as well as the nature of the information 
the PKK provided to Iraqi intelligence are crucial here. Until 1990, in the run up 
to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein would have had little interest in 
intelligence on U.S. air force deployment in Turkey and, while intelligence on 
Turkey was always welcome, Iraqi intelligence was primarily interested in 
gathering information on the KDP – an understandable prioritisation since it was 
fighting the KDP (and PUK since 1986) in the life and death struggle that was 
the Iran-Iraq War. The implications of this chronology and the fact that it is 
conceivable that the PKK provided Iraqi security services with intelligence on 
the KDP in 1987/8, however, are nowhere mentioned in the literature and are 
too woeful even for PKK dissidents to contemplate, which is why they all 
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remained reticent about details in my interviews with them. For it would mean 
appreciating that the organisation they belonged to, believed in, fought and 
sacrificed so much for, through sharing intelligence, assisted the regime of 
Saddam Hussein in perpetrating genocide against ‘their fellow Kurds’, that this 
intelligence was used by Iraqi security services and armed forces in executing 
the al Anfal campaign. 
Given the means at my disposal and the limits of conducting ethnographic 
research on such a potentially sensitive topic, it proved impossible to further 
substantiate the nature, breadth, and depth of the Iraqi regime’s relations with 
the PKK during these crucial years. Yet, the possibility and plausibility alone of 
the PKK providing Iraqi security services with intelligence on the KDP during the 
genocidal al Anfal campaign – or at the very least to directly benefit from it – 
reveals any attempts by IR scholars to label the PKK sanctuary in Iraqi 
Kurdistan an ethnic alliance and to belabour ethnic group solidarity between 
PKK and KDP/PUK as the main explanatory factor for interpreting the relations 
between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish parties not only as factually untenable 
but also as utterly cynical. 
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9.) The Kurdish Wars of the 1990s 
 
1991 – The annus mirabilis for the Iraqi Kurds 
1991 was the year of wonders for the Kurds of Iraq, in which, out of the 
debris of utter defeat and the suffering and grief of genocide, like a phoenix 
from the ashes, they emerged almost born again, and, virtually overnight, came 
to determine their own fate by crafting the most independent political entity in 
Kurdish history. The chain of events leading up to 1991 was triggered by 
Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in the previous year, and his 
transmogrification from courted ally of the international community against 
revolutionary Iran, to pariah against whom an international military alliance was 
forged. To be sure, though, the beginning of the year did not augur any such 
auspicious developments for the Iraqi Kurds. On the contrary, the year started 
with them suffering another devastating defeat. 
On 15 February 1991, in the midst of the Allied air campaign and about a 
week before the launch of the ground campaign to liberate Kuwait, U.S. 
President George H. W. Bush addressed the Iraqi people via Voice of America: 
There is another way for the bloodshed to stop: and that is for the Iraqi military and 
the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, 
the dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations’ resolution and 
rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.722  
Similar appeals were made by US political and military leaders as well as 
U.S.-funded radio stations in Saudi Arabia and Egypt all through February, and 
yet when the Iraqi people heeded this call and took matters into their own 
hands, it came as a complete and inconvenient surprise to the Gulf War 
Allies.723 Equally surprised were the leaders of KDP and PUK, Massoud Barzani 
and Jalal Talabani, who since 1988 had joined forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Front (IKF), in their exile in Iran, when, beginning with Raniyah on 4 March, the 
Kurdish population in Iraq rose in a spontaneous and uncoordinated mass 
uprising, called Repareen, that encompassed every strata of Kurdish society, 
even the detested jash – literally ‘donkey’, a derogatory term for Iraqi Kurds who 
had been cooperating with the Saddam Hussein regime.724 Within days the 
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peshmerga of the IKF had joined the public and liberated every city in northern 
Iraq except Kirkuk and Mosul, and Talabani was dreaming of marching on 
Baghdad.725 Yet, with the uprising failing to spread to the Sunni Arab centre of 
Iraq and international aid not materializing,726 Saddam Hussein was at liberty to 
launch a counter-offensive by the end of the month, which crushed the Kurdish 
resistance, similar to the failed Shi’a revolt in the south, within days.727 The 
onslaught of Saddam Hussein’s troops on Kurdish civilians and the refusal of 
the U.S. administration to impose restraints on his indiscriminate attacks 
triggered a wave of up to 2.5 million refugees heading for the Turkish and 
Iranian borders.728  
This turn of events came as a shock to Turkey. Finding itself between a 
rock and a hard place, either having CNN broadcast the Turkish military 
refusing millions of civilian refugees entry into Turkey and safety – thus leaving 
them at Saddam Hussein’s mercy or freezing to death in wintry mountains – or 
adding hundreds of thousands of Kurds to Turkey’s southeastern Anatolia, 
already on the brink of its own Kurdish mass uprising, and thus rendering the 
security situation there completely uncontrollable, President Turgut Özal 
personally intervened with President Bush and British PM John Major for a 
quick solution to the humanitarian crisis.729 The significance of this development 
and sea change in Turkish foreign policy cannot be underestimated. For more 
than four decades Turkey had cooperated with whatever regime held power in 
Iraq in suppressing the struggle for self-determination and political autonomy of 
its Kurdish population, as well as all too often indirectly collaborated in 
Baghdad’s military offensives and pogroms against them.730 Now, in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War and the failed Iraqi Kurdish uprisings, Turkey, nolens 
volens and almost overnight, found itself occupying the unusual role of senior 
champion of the fate of Iraq’s Kurds in the international arena. What is more, 
Turkey, the hitherto implacable opponent to any form of Kurdish political 
autonomy in the entire region, against its will but pushed into this role by rapidly 
developing events, was to play midwife to the emergence and survival of the 
most independent political entity in Kurdish history. 
Urged by Turkey, France, and Iran, and with the U.S. abandoning its 
reservations due to Turkish-French-British pressure, on 5 April, the UN passed 
Security Council Resolution 688 that demanded from Iraq an end to the violent 
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repression of its people and assistance for the international humanitarian 
organizations in gaining access to the refugee population, as well as for Iraq to 
cooperate in all international efforts to alleviate the suffering of the affected 
population. It is worth noting that Resolution 688 made no mention of the no-fly 
zones the Gulf War Allies established north of the 36th and south of the 32nd 
parallel, and that the military aspects of what became known as ‘Operation 
Provide Comfort’ – or ‘Operation Safe Haven’ by its British name – were based 
on the Allies’ liberal interpretation of the wording in the resolution.731 Provide 
Comfort not only prevented Saddam Hussein from capitalizing on his victory by 
dealing the Iraqi Kurds the final blow, but over a few months it also forced him 
to recognize the futility of seeking a military solution.732 At the eleventh hour, the 
Iraqi Kurds had been rescued by the most unlikely and most self-serving savior, 
Turkey.733 I concur with Frelick and Kirisçi that Provide Comfort served for the 
main part the security interests of states, and that the needs of the Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees were of secondary importance;734 for if Turkey had not perceived this 
onrush of refugees as a security threat – and since Turkey, with the world’s 
attention centred on Iraq after the Gulf War, could not afford to cold-shoulder 
the refugees as it had done just three years earlier during the Anfal campaign – 
it is highly questionable whether the international community would have come 
to the rescue of the Iraqi Kurds. What is more, as will be discussed in the next 
section, visionary Turgut Özal had his own ideas for a rapprochement between 
Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish parties, a vision for which his intervention during 
the 1991 refugee crisis was just a first step.735  
When in October 1991 the negotiations between the Iraqi Kurdish parties 
and Baghdad on an autonomy statute broke down without result, Saddam 
Hussein, demonstrably a man of questionable strategic acumen, took a most 
unusual step. In an attempt to starve the Iraqi Kurds into submission he 
imposed an economic and administrative embargo on northern Iraq by 
withdrawing the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the state – from policemen to 
tax collectors, from civil servants to teachers – freezing salaries of Kurdish 
employees, and stripping anybody who sought to enter northern Iraq off fuel 
and food supplies, thus essentially forcing the Iraqi Kurdish population to 
subsist under a double embargo, an external one imposed by the UN on the 
whole of Iraq and an internal one levied by Saddam Hussein on the Iraqi 
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Kurds.736 Saddam Hussein calculated that the harsh conditions of winter 
combined with the burden of more than a million refugees and IDPs would 
overexert the international community’s assistance and the IKF’s political and 
organizational capabilities, forcing the latter to accept an autonomy agreement 
largely on his terms. This, however, proved a strategic miscalculation second 
only to his invasion of Kuwait the previous year. Not only did he withdraw his 
forces to a line running from the Syrian border to south of Dohuk and Erbil, west 
of Chamchamal, and southwest of Kifri, thus abandoning considerably more 
territory than designated either as the safe haven imposed by the international 
community or the no fly zone north of the 36th parallel – thus voluntarily 
relinquishing control over the area that roughly corresponds with today’s 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq.737 What is more important, his blockade created a 
political vacuum in northern Iraq, a new political space the Iraqi Kurds, for the 
first time in history, could potentially frame and organize on their own, without 
consultation or confrontation with the central government in Baghdad.  
In this, though, the Iraqi Kurdish parties knew they would have to tread with 
extreme caution since any step towards wider self-determination would be 
interpreted by their neighbours and the West as an attempt at independence, in 
the worst case leading them to reconsider their protection of the safe haven and 
no fly zone as well as their economic and developmental assistance, both on 
which the IKF and the Iraqi Kurdish population depended wholesale.738 Barzani 
and Talabani therefore must not have taken lightly the step to hold general 
elections for a legislative assembly in order to provide the people with a 
democratically elected administration that could fill the void Saddam Hussein 
had left behind, and they were routinely warned against ‘go[ing] down the road 
of elections’ by U.S. military on the ground and officials in Washington.739 
Despite the risk of losing their precious international support, KDP and PUK 
proposed to hold elections for a legislative assembly for 3 April. After a month’s 
delay the elections were actually held on 19 May 1992, resulting in 45 percent 
for the KDP and 43.6 percent for the PUK in the 105 seats strong parliament, 
and on 4 June the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed, run 
jointly by KDP and PUK.740 
The elections of 19 May, ‘for all the haste in its preparation and the 
occasional cases of fraud and malpractice [was] an historic moment’, not only 
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because ‘it demonstrated almost uniquely outside Israel and Turkey, the ability 
of a Middle Eastern electorate to conduct a peaceful, multi-party election’,741 but 
also, and more importantly, can be considered the birth hour of Kurdish self-rule 
in Iraq as well as, in the political science literature,  the Kurdish de facto state in 
Iraq.742 It has to be emphasized, though, that this Kurdish self-rule in Iraq came 
about entirely by accident, can be considered the singular, outstanding 
aberration of historic patterns of the regional and international powers dealing 
with Iraq’s Kurdish minority, a true annus mirabils that would have been 
impossible without the profound sea change in the political dynamics of the 
Middle East generated by the Gulf War. As in Kosovo, the international 
community had created a so called de facto state by accident, rendered the 
autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdish people possible through their intervention but 
without plan or intent. In actual fact, in light of the historic trajectories outlined in 
Part Two, the decisions by the Turkish state, however it saw its hands forced by 
events beyond its control, to mutate almost overnight, from an opponent to a 
backer of the Iraqi Kurds in the international arena, and Saddam Hussein’s 
choice to leave them to their own devices can be understood as the most 
momentous event in Iraqi Kurdish history since the implosion of the Ottoman 
Empire. This event, which unexpectedly resulted in Iraqi Kurdish self-rule, 
however, came at the price of complete dependence of the Iraqi Kurdish parties 
and the fate of their political entity on external actors, most prominently Turkey 
– a dependence that has shaped Iraqi Kurdish politics ever since, in particular 
the KDP and PUK’s dealing with the PKK.743  
 
First Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish overtures towards harmonization 
If 1991 was the annus mirabils for the Iraqi Kurds, then 1990 was the year 
in which the PKK reached the zenith of its power. To be sure, the military 
confrontation with the mighty Turkish state, combined with its strategy of forced 
depopulation of hundreds of villages in southeastern Anatolia and the 
paramilitary system of ‘village guards’, had repeatedly dealt the insurgency 
heavy blows.744 On the diplomatic front, Turkey’s pressure on Syria to curb its 
support for the PKK finally appeared to bear fruit when in 1987 both countries 
signed a security protocol, after which the PKK was no longer able to conduct 
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raids into Turkey from Syrian territory.745 This, however, was compensated by 
the strategic position the PKK had gained in Iraqi Kurdistan, where, after the 
accord with the KDP had broken down, they had struck a similar deal with the 
PUK in May 1988.746 As has been shown, though, by 1988, the PKK enjoyed 
unrestrained control over the Iraqi-Turkish border and was no longer in need of 
collaboration with the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties. What is more was 
the change of dynamics of the armed struggle in Turkey itself. On 13 March 
1990 the PKK had conducted a raid in the Mardin-Savur region in which thirteen 
guerrillas died. The funeral procession of one of these fallen insurgents turned 
into an outpouring of public anger, which law enforcement tried to muzzle by 
force, lighting a spark that triggered a wave of public demonstrations in the tens 
of thousands throughout the entire region.747 This people’s uprising, often called 
the Kurdish Intifada or Serhildan, fundamentally altered the dynamics and 
nature of the guerrilla campaign in Turkey, propelling the PKK insurgency, to 
their great surprise and without taking an active role in this spontaneous 
development,748 from the first stage of guerrilla warfare, discussed earlier, to 
what appeared the brink of the third and final stage: a general counteroffensive 
as part of mass-scale public uprising against the authorities. With the Serhildan, 
‘the guerrilla fight had taken on a mass character. Urban centres became a 
theatre of daily guerrilla operations. The numbers of guerrilla fighters multiplied 
M there was no part of Kurdistan, in which the guerrilla could not operate and 
carry out raids’.749 For a brief moment, the PKK appeared to have brought the 
mighty Turkish state to its knee. 
In the end, though, the PKK failed to capitalise on the potential of the 
Serhildan:  
In fact the PKK had little capability to guide or move these demonstrations forward 
M One reason was the difficulty of operating in an urban environment M [where 
the PKK yet] had not placed special emphasis on establishing themselves M 
[another is that] it seems logical to assume that PKK commanders, who saw 
themselves as leading the Kurdish fight, also were concerned that these protests 
might somehow draw attention and people away from the guerrillas’ struggle.750 
Whatever the PKK’s reasons for not sufficiently making strategic use of the 
public uprising that erupted in 1990 and continued until 1994 with noticeable 
sparks in demonstrations during the annual Newroz celebrations, the events in 
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the aftermath of the Gulf War that fundamentally reconfigured the power 
constellations of the Middle East proved as much a watershed moment for the 
PKK as for the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties. The most immediate and 
for the PKK most dramatic change wrought by the events in March/April 1991 
was that the Iraqi Kurds had become completely dependent on the PKK’s 
opponent, Turkey. Not only did the Turkish parliament have to approve the use 
of Incirlik AFB by Allied fighter jets for patrolling the no fly zone in Northern Iraq 
as part of Operation Provide Comfort;751 what is more, virtually all international 
development aid for the destitute Iraqi Kurdish population had to pass through 
Turkey. Hoshyar Zebari, a KDP foreign policy spokesman and future Foreign 
Minister of Iraq, summed up the Iraqi Kurds’ plenary dependence on Turkey 
aptly: ‘Turkey is our lifeline to the West and the whole world in our fight against 
Saddam Hussein. We are able to secure allied air protection and international 
aid through Turkey. If [Operation Provide Comfort] is withdrawn, Saddam’s units 
will again reign in this region and we will lose everything’.752 As a result of this 
novel and yet absolute dependence on Turkey, KDP/PUK could ill afford any 
move that might antagonize their benefactor – all the more since this benefactor 
had already developed a queasy feeling about Iraqi Kurdish self-rule increasing 
by the day, a development for which it saw itself as at least indirectly and 
partially to blame. The Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties therefore had to 
drastically reconsider their relations with the PKK since, they correctly assumed, 
Turkey would not tolerate backing an incipient Iraqi Kurdish political entity 
whose emergence was anyway anathema to Ankara, to continue its support or 
indulgence of the PKK on its territory. These strategic considerations were 
given further impetus by the unprecedented attempt of Turkish President Turgut 
Özal in reaching out and establishing quasi-formal relations with KDP/PUK in 
the spring of 1991. 
Much speculation has been devoted to whether Özal, a true visionary 
ahead of his time, merely reacted to rapidly unfolding events or pursued a grand 
vision that, in addition to drawing on the good offices of the Iraqi Kurdish parties 
to open a channel to the PKK,  even allegedly intending to bring Iraqi Kurdistan, 
the former vilayet of Mosul, back under Turkey’s orbit;753 according to Robins, 
‘Özal argued, Turkey should bring the impoverished northern Iraqi economy into 
its orbit, as a way of maximizing Turkish influence in the territory. Özal believed 
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that for as little as $30-40 million Turkey could create a relationship of 
dependence’.754 While these speculations, to which I add my two cents worth 
elsewhere,755 would go beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say here that 
in the talks detailed below Jalal Talabani allegedly repeatedly offered Iraqi 
Kurdish collaboration if Turkey wished to annex Iraqi Kurdistan in the aftermath 
of the Gulf War756 – an offer that, to put it mildly, would put his understanding of 
national self-determination at odds with the modernist and explanatory IR 
definition discussed earlier – and that today, as will be detailed subsequently, 
this relationship of dependence appears widely accomplished.  
What can be established here is that as early as 20 February 1991 – four 
days before Coalition forces entered Kuwait (sic!) – the public relations officer of 
President Özal, Kaya Toperi, called the Kurdish journalist Qamran Qaradaghi of 
Al Hayat at his office in London and asked him to communicate to Jalal 
Talabani that President Özal wished for him to come to Ankara for a meeting. 
Qaradaghi, who enjoyed close personal relations with Talabani and later 
became his press secretary, recalls that during an interview a week earlier, it 
had been Özal who had done most of the questioning, showing great interest in 
Qaradaghi’s opinion on the rapidly developing situation in Iraq, the political 
positions of KDP and PUK as well as their relations with the PKK, to which 
Qaradaghi replied, ‘Mr. President, if you are that interested in all these issues, 
may I suggest, why not reach out and establish direct contact with Jalal 
Talabani and Massoud Barzani. I am certain they would welcome such a 
move.’757 A week later Qaradaghi had Özal’s answer, on which he acted 
quickly. On 8 March Talabani and Mosheen Dezayee, Massoud Barzani’s 
representative, ‘arrived together in Istanbul on a flight from Damascus and were 
immediately flown to Ankara’s military airport by personnel of the National 
Intelligence Organisation (MIT)’758 to meet with the under-secretary in the 
Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Tugay Özceri, on Özal’s behalf. The fact that 
Talabani left Iraqi Kurdistan in the midst of the Repareen illustrates the 
importance he accorded to this meeting, a sensational diplomatic breakthrough 
he appraised as, ‘a new page ... turned in relations between Turkey and the 
Kurds of Iraq’.759 Further,  
he stated that he had assured the Turkish officials that the Kurds did not want to 
establish an independent state in northern Iraq and then explained that, “Turkey 
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has for years been putting forth effective and significant obstacles to the struggle 
we have been waging in northern Iraq. We wanted to explain our goals and 
eliminate Turkey’s opposition M We were received with understanding”.760 
If, for Jalal Talabani, this first official engagement at the highest level of 
Turkish officials with representatives of the Iraqi Kurds – followed by a second 
meeting two weeks later when the Repareen was about to collapse761 – was the 
diplomatic sea change he portrayed it to be, it also lets President Özal’s 
initiative on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds and his role in bringing about Operation 
Provide Comfort appear in a different light, as part of a greater strategy not only 
to save the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein but also to ensure their 
dependence on and solid establishment in Turkey’s geo-strategic orbit.762 To 
some extent, one may say that with these meetings, the establishment of the 
safe haven and Operation Provide Comfort on Özal’s initiative, together with the 
fact that all international aid for Iraqi Kurdistan passed through Turkey and that 
the Turkish parliament had to renew every six months permission for Operation 
Provide Comfort allied fighter jets to operate from Incirlik AFB, the first steps 
towards an Iraqi Kurdish client relationship with Turkey were laid – a client 
relationship which closely resembles the economic and strategic dependence 
President Özal allegedly had in mind for them.  
For Özal’s representative, though, the main issue of interest in these first 
talks was the PKK and what role the Iraqi Kurdish parties could play as 
intermediaries in the process of national reconciliation Özal planned, and in 
which he, overall, acted independent of and in opposition to the Turkish politico-
military establishment.763  Özal, an economist by trade who had recently begun 
to refer in public to his own Kurdish ancestry, perceived the so called ‘Kurdish 
Question’ in Turkey as mainly a problem of cultural divides and structural 
underdevelopment, which he thought could not be addressed militarily but by 
massive official investment programs in southeast Anatolia and by granting the 
Kurdish population of Turkey certain cultural rights.764 In recognition of the 
potential of the Serhildan to widen into a mass scale uprising, for a brief window 
of opportunity Turkish officials were willing to experiment with gestures of 
opening the political space for dialogue. In an unprecedented move, on 7 June 
1990, Turkish authorities had permitted the formation of the first explicit Kurdish 
political party, Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP or People’s Labour Party) after seven 
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Kurdish MPs had split from the SHP,765 and President Özal called for a lift on 
the ban on the use of Kurdish language in public everyday but not official 
discourse.766 Özal intended to now expand on this window of opportunity by 
reaching out to Abdullah Öcalan, who likewise had shown signs of distancing 
himself from his maximal demand for Kurdish independence. After lauding Özal 
for his initiative – ‘To tell the truth, I did not expect [Özal] to display such 
courage ... In this context, he shamed us ... He has taken an important step’767 
– Öcalan announced in an interview with AFP that the PKK ‘might opt for a 
diplomatic-political solution’, that he would consider holding ‘conditional’ 
negotiations with Turkish authorities, and ‘the PKK no longer sought 
independence, just “free political expression” for Turkey’s Kurds’.768 
To broaden and expand on this opening Özal required an intermediary of 
renown and with direct access to Öcalan in Damascus. He found this 
intermediary in Jalal Talabani, who, conveniently, was also politicaly dependent 
on Turkey. The first personal meeting between Talabani and Özal took place in 
Ankara in June 1991, where KDP/PUK were given permission to open liaison 
offices in Ankara, and, to ease the Iraqi Kurdish leaders’ travel restrictions, both 
Barzani and Talabani were given Turkish diplomatic passports (sic!).769 Thus 
well equipped, Talabani assumed his role as mediator and repeatedly met 
Öcalan for talks in Damascus during October, and in November announced that 
the PKK was willing to declare a four months ceasefire.770 Such promising 
announcements turned out grossly premature, though. Not only were the talks 
between Talabani and Öcalan complicated by the Turkish military continuing its 
incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters – Imset lists five major 
raids by the Turkish air force for the period between August and October 
alone,771 at the very time when Talabani was trying to win Öcalan for a 
ceasefire – but also by the fact that President Özal considered a unilateral PKK 
ceasefire as a first conciliatory step to pave the ground for political 
consultations, while Öcalan considered a ceasefire his ultimate concession after 
Turkey met some of his demands. In sum, it has to be said, that ‘Özal had many 
good intentions but no concrete plans whatsoever’ on how to practically engage 
the PKK in talks and what specific issues such talks should cover.772 Not only 
that, but Özal, after his rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders had 
become public, increasingly acted in isolation from the politico-military 
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establishment, the MIT, the media, and PM Demirel,773 and it was questionable 
whether he could muster the political backing to implement any concessions 
made.774  
What further exacerbated the situation was that, while Özal may have 
deemed Talabani the ideal intermediary, Öcalan saw him as merely a puppet of 
the Turkish state willing to do Ankara’s bidding in exchange for protection and 
international backing of the emergent Iraqi Kurdish polity. ‘Öcalan sarcastically 
declared that Talabani had written him from Ankara to “lay down your arms 
unilaterally, accept a ceasefire, come to Ankara and sit at the table with obscure 
people, and be thankful and grateful for whatever you are given’”775. Talabani’s 
attempts then at ‘mediating with muscle’,776 a rare case when the mediator 
himself resorts to coercive measures to facilitate conflict parties yielding some 
of their demands, led to the IKF issuing an ultimatum in February 1992 that ‘if 
the PKK failed to cease activities against Turkey [from Iraqi Kurdish territory], it 
would be purged from the region’,777 only further antagonised Öcalan. He went 
on to denounce, as had become routine by then, Barzani as a ‘collaborator ... 
reactionary, feudal person, and a primitive nationalist’, and accused him and 
Talabani of ‘trying to stab the PKK in the back by cooperating with Turkey ... 
The first thing we must do is remove these leeches ... They espouse the views 
of the fascist Turks. These two leaders are now our enemies’.778 
Within Öcalan increasingly feeling cornered – on 25 December 1991 the 
Soviet Union had dissolved, putting a succesful Marxist-Leninist world 
revolution in greater doubt than ever before, the Turkish military, as part of 
Operation Provide Comfort, had gained access to Iraqi Kurdistan, and a military 
alliance between KDP/PUK and Turkey appeared an ever greater possibility – 
increasingly there was a storm brewing between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties. Öcalan must have felt as if his room to manouevre became more limited 
by the day, and the condition of the PKK camps, caught between the Turkish 
border and international troops operating in Iraqi Kurdistan together with the 
KDP/PUK peshmerga, more desparate.  
I suppose he felt like losing control of events, in Turkey and Southern Kurdistan. In 
Turkey we did not know how to react to the [mass protests], how to respond to the 
public sentiment, how to make use of it for our struggle, how to channel it. In 
Southern Kurdistan he feared losing the leadership in the Kurdish struggle [for self-
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determination] to Talabani and Barzani. He feared them joining forces with Turkey 
against the PKK.779  
With the tide of international and regional events turning against him, 
Öcalan decided to take the bull by the horns and embark on a path of 
escalation. In an interview with the Turkish daily Milliyet on 26 March 1992 
Öcalan announced the founding of a regional affiliate for Iraqi Kurdistan, the 
Partiya Azadiya Kurdistan, (PAK or Kurdistan Liberation Party), designated to 
politically challenge KDP/PUK on their very home turf.780 Although even Çelik 
admits that the PAK ‘never exceeded its marginal existence’,781 and PUK 
representatives, with the benefit of hindsight, have discounted the PKK’s 
regional branch as a ‘non-issue’,782 at the time the founding of PAK must have 
appeared to Talabani and Barzani as an intolerable provocation. Graver than 
that though were the ever increasing small-scale military clashes between the 
PKK and Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga, mainly of the KDP. Those isolated clashes 
came to a head when, in Zakho on 29 June 1992, the KDP reportedly ordered 
the killing of the Sindi tribal leader Sadik Omer for joining PAK; in retaliation the 
PKK assassinated the local KDP commander in Dohuk, which again was 
answered by the KDP launching a full scale offensive against the Sindi tribe and 
attempting to blockade the PKK camps at the Turkish border.783 On 24 July, 
Öcalan retaliated by ‘succesfully placing an embargo on trade between Turkey 
and northern Iraq’784 by shelling the Harbur border through which virtually all 
international aid and imports for Iraqi Kurdistan passed.  
This PKK-imposed ban threatened to cut the Iraqi Kurds’ economic lifeline, as local 
drivers, in fear of the consequences, stopped taking supplies to northern Iraq. 
Soon a shortage of foodstuffs and medicine resulted, and prices doubled and 
trippled. The PKK asserted that it would lift the trade ban only if Barzani would 
remove his blockade of the PKK camps.785 
If the founding of PAK had been merely a political provocation, and the 
clashes with the Sindi tribe can still be understood as brawls at the tribal level, 
the PKK’s embargo of the Harbur border posed an existential threat to the 
survival of Iraqi Kurdistan. ‘The effects [of the PKK’s] actions were felt 
immediately,’ Mohammed Tawfiq, then a PUK official in Dohuk near the border 
crossing, remembered,  
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every day less goods came from Turkey, there were shortages of food, of fuel, of 
medicine. Prices went up, people could no longer afford the most basic goods ... 
We were very vulnerable then, completely dependent on imports from Turkey and 
[international] aid. The PKK tried to exploit this, tried to turn our people against us, 
have them lose faith in our government ... less than a month after the first free 
government in Kurdistan was formed we had to fight for our survival.786 
It was a fundamental challenge the KRG could not afford to leave 
unanswered, and Barzani and Talabani took up the gauntlet. Barzani declared: 
Öcalan’s men acted as if they were the authorities and started to control roads and 
collect taxes ... [they] threatened to expel the government and parliament from 
Erbil. They said they would hang all those “who sold out the homeland” ... They 
even threatened to expel us from Dohuk and Sulimaniyah and started to form 
espoinage, terrorism, and sabotage networks inside cities. It has unequivocally 
been proven that they are conspiring and planning to undermine the existing 
situation in Kurdistan and its experiment in democracy and national self-
determination.787 
On 30 September 1992, the war of words escalated to an actual armed 
confrontation with the IKF forces launching a major offensive against the PKK 
all through Iraqi Kurdistan, and on 26 October the Turkish army joined the 
fray.788  
The fighting was focused on two main fronts – the area around Bahdinan known as 
Haftanin and the Xarkuk/Biradost region close to the Iranian border where the PKK 
guerrillas were being “sandwiched” – a word coined by the Turkish press from a 
statement made by Jalal Talabani – between Turkish warplanes on bombing 
missions and peshmerga forces, mainly from the KDP, PUK, and Biradost tribe’s 
own militia on the ground. The three-pronged advance came to be codenamed the 
“Sandwich Operation” ... [Yet] apart from the aerial bombardments by the Turks, 
most of the action in this war was concentrated after dark, peshmerga against 
guerrilla 789 
Cornered between the Turkish military and the peshmerga of KDP and 
PUK, the PKK formally surrendered to the latter on 30 October. Osman Öcalan 
was transported with a small delegation to Erbil where he signed a ceasefire 
agreement obliging the PKK to cease all activities of a military nature in the 
territory controlled by the KRG, to abandon all its camps along the Turkish 
border and acquiesce in being removed to camps to be designated by the KRG, 
as well as to stop all its involvement in political activities aimed against or 
197 
 
agitating against the Kurdistan Regional Government and the parties 
comprising it.790 In exchange, about 1,700 PKK fighters were resetlled to Zaleh 
camp north of Sulimaniyah were they were allowed to keep all their weapons, 
ammunition, and supplies, as well as to continue their peaceful political 
activities for as long as they did not oppose the activities and policies of the 
KRG.791 
When analysing the brief war between the IKF and the PKK two aspects 
require further scrutiny. The PKK has always claimed that KDP and PUK had 
formed an alliance with Turkey to crush them,792 and Çelik contends that since 
June 1992 Talabani and Barzani had repeatedly met with the commander of the 
Turkish Gendarmerie in the region, Gen. Eşref Bitlis, and the commander of 
Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (JITEM, Gendarmerie Intelligence and 
Counter-Terrorism Organisation), Gen. Cem Ersever, in Erbil and in army 
barracks in Silopi to prepare and coordinate their forces for their attack on the 
PKK.793 The PUK vociferously denies these claims, and refers to a KRG public 
statement from 28 October calling for Turkey to withdraw its forces from Iraqi 
Kurdish territory.794 However, when examining the events that led up to the war, 
in particular in light of the rapprochement and closer political ties between the 
Özal presidency and KDP/PUK leaders, the role Özal had intended for Talabani 
as an intermediary between himself and Öcalan, the role Turkey played in 
establishing and policing the Iraqi Kurdish safe haven – with Turkish military on 
the ground – and the gradual and entirely predictable escalation of the conflict 
between KDP/PUK and PKK, Henri Barkey concludes, ‘from a military 
perspective, it would have been grossly negligent if [Turkey and the IKF] had 
not coordinated their actions, politically it is difficult to imagine that they did 
not’795 – an assessment with which I completely agree. Once Talabani’s 
mediation efforts had proven fruitless and relations between the PKK and the 
KRG deteriorated rapidly, it simply would not have made any sense for the IKF 
to take on the PKK on its own with the Turkish military across the border alert 
and ready to strike.  
The second concern relates to the generous terms with which the PUK 
allowed the PKK to surrender – relocation to camps in PUK controlled territory 
and the PKK fighters keeping all their weaponry and ammunition – terms of 
surrender that had not been discussed with the KDP, and about which Barzani, 
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who wanted to finish off the PKK, was reportedly furious.796 What is more, when 
the PKK fighters were transported to Zaleh camp, the PUK commander Mustafa 
Chawrash, of his own accord and ‘as a gesture of goodwill’, he declared, even 
equipped them with additional light weapons and ammunition from PUK 
stocks.797 Why, if the PKK were forbidden to carry out any military activities on 
Iraqi Kurdish territory, would the PUK allow the guerrilla fighters to keep their 
weaponry? Why did the PUK, after acting in alliance with the KDP during the 
conflict and when facing the unique opportunity of ridding themselves once and 
for all of the PKK, accept a unilateral ceasefire with the PKK not only without 
informing its coalition partner but presenting Barzani with a fait accompli? I 
cannot help but speculate that, while individual field commanders like Chawrash 
might have acted on their own initiative, he must have still done so within a 
discourse, an overall sentiment in the PUK, propagated by its leadership, that 
did not want the PKK to be finished off. If that is the case one has to wonder 
what motivated this discourse, what interests and identities bred this sentiment? 
Could the notion of ethnic group solidarity explain the PUK’s change of heart? 
While such subjective feelings of relatedness and kinship ties again may have 
played a role at the individual level, it seems somewhat implausible that after a 
month’s heavy fighting Talabani suddenly came to perceive the PKK as ‘kin’. It 
seems more plausible that if the PKK had been annihilated in October 1992, 
Talabani, the designated intermediary of President Özal, would have been 
considerably less useful to Turkey. In the lopsided relationship of complete 
dependence on Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds had very little to give, no leverage worth 
speaking of except for the influence they supposedly could exert on the PKK. 
Would it not make sense then to keep this factor in play for as long as possible, 
to have the PKK card up their sleeve for future use, to continue exerting this 
one leverage on Turkey for as long as the situation permitted? Furthermore, as 
developments just eighteen months later would prove, the harmony between 
PUK and KDP during the Repareen and the first two years of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government proved short lived. There were already signs on the 
horizon that the proverbial antagonism between both parties would erupt again 
– as it did with a vengeance in 1994. Is it not conceivable then that Talabani 
shrewdly kept the PKK alive, against his allies’ wishes, and relocated them, fully 
armed, to a camp in PUK controlled territory to be able to draw on this 
formidable fighting force in case of new tensions with the KDP? Admittedly, 
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such a reading of events is done with the benefit of hindsight, but it not only fits 
the historic pattern outlined here so far but it again, when discussed, is deemed 
plausible by other authorities on the politics of the Iraqi Kurdish parties.798 
If Talabani indeed pursued such brinkmanship, it paid off for him almost 
instantly. In December he took up his mediation efforts with Öcalan in 
Damascus again, allowing him on 8 March 1993 to present President Özal with 
the Öcalan’s surprisingly conciliatory terms for a ceasefire: 
(1) I am giving up the armed struggle. I will wage a political struggle in the future. 
(2) I am withdrawing my past conditions for holding talks to resolve the Kurdish 
problem. Turkish officials can hold talks with Kurdish deputies in the National 
Assembly. (3) We agree to live within Turkey’s existing borders if the necessary 
democratic conditions are created to allow us to do so.799 
Without waiting for a Turkish response, Öcalan even went a step further 
and on 17 March 1993, together with Jalal Talabani, declared a unilateral PKK 
ceasefire at a historic press conference in Lebanon.800 Öcalan proclaimed: 
[Turkey’s Kurds] want peace, dialogue, and free political action within the 
framework of a democratic Turkish state M We hope that the Turkish authorities 
will understand that this question cannot be resolved militarily, and that the Kurdish 
people, their existence, their language, their identity, and their rights cannot be 
ignored M We are not working to partition Turkey. We are demanding the Kurds’ 
human rights (cultural, political, and so on) in the framework of one homeland.801 
The importance of the monumental step of the PKK declaring a unilateral 
and unconditional ceasefire cannot be underestimated. With it, ‘the PKK 
intended to issue two signals M its readiness for negotiations, and, on the other 
[hand], the turning back from its ultimate aim of creating a Kurdish state. The 
PKK no longer insists on this demand but instead strives toward the aim of 
finding a federalist [re]solution [to the conflict] within Turkey’.802 It therefore 
constitutes not only a fundamental shift in the PKK’s nationalist ideology but 
also the most auspicious window of opportunity for a peaceful solution to the 
PKK conflict in Turkey in the 1990s. Alas, this unique opportunity came to 
naught with the untimely death of Turgut Özal of a heart attack on 17 April 
1993, after which the Turkish politico-military establishment, who had always 
been wary of his initiative, reverted to a hard, militaristic line towards the PKK. 
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This episode in relations between the PKK and KDP/PUK clearly shows that 
the ethnic alliance model has no explanatory value for understanding actors’ 
behaviour in this internationalised ethno-nationalist conflict. As an explanatory 
model for analysing and conceptualising the relations between an insurgency 
and a supposedly ‘co-ethnic’ political entity where it found sanctuary, in the 
case of the PKK sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1991 until 1993, it has no 
analytical purchase, not only because instead of an alliance, the parties were 
fighting each other, but for the reasons as to why the fighting occurred. The 
ethnic alliance model claims that ‘conflict between a state and an ethnic group 
will escalate to the international level when other elite members of that same 
ethnic group play a role in policy making in another state and that state finds the 
first state to be politically relevant’.803 If we put aside for a moment the fact that 
the PKK and KDP/PUK, as has been argued throughout this study, cannot and 
should not be categorised as belonging to the same ethnic group, what is 
particularly striking here is that at the very moment when KDP/PUK played the 
most significant role in policy making in the territory and political space where 
the PKK had found sanctuary – that is when they crafted a political entity not 
nominally independent from but acting and performing statecraft independently 
from Baghdad as a so called de facto state – which is when the ethnic alliance 
model is supposed to become most relevant, they turned on the PKK. And I 
would argue, they turned on the PKK to protect that very political relevance the 
ethnic alliance model lists as a prerequisite for an ethnic alliance. In other 
words, dependent on Turkey and the international community for their very 
survival, KDP/PUK had to confront the factor that could jeopardize their newly 
gained political relevance; that is, they fought the PKK because it posed a vital 
threat to their political relevance.  
When both KDP and PUK were just one of dozens of insurgencies 
operating in the 1980s Middle East, they did not have much to lose from forming 
a temporary alliance with the PKK. Yet, when their status changed in 1991, 
when they gained political relevance as the recipient of international aid and 
diplomatic as well as military backing, precisely because they feared they could 
lose this political relevance, they had to turn on the PKK. As Rex Brynen has 
detailed,804 and I have expanded on elsewhere,805 a sanctuary state will always 
have to walk a tightrope between hosting an insurgency on its territory 
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enhancing or putting its sovereignty at risk. For example, it can be argued that 
at least temporarily Honduran strongman General Gustavo Álvarez benefitted 
from hosting on its territory the CIA-backed Contras during the 1980s,806 while 
Jordan hosting Palestinian fida’iyyin not only threatened to undermine the 
Hashemite dynasty’s hold on power but the very survival of Jordan as a state, 
which is why they were bloodily expelled in 1970/1 in what became known as 
the ‘Black September’.807 While I will argue that in the 2000s the KRG 
performed such brinkmanship, trying to gain political capital via Turkey from the 
PKK’s presence on its territory, in 1991/2 the emergent Iraqi Kurdish political 
entity, however defined, was in no position and too dependent on Ankara and 
the international community to dare any such tightrope walks. In addition, from 
24 July 1992 on, when the PKK imposed an embargo on traffic between Turkey 
and Iraqi Kurdistan, it not only posed an indirect threat to the political relevance 
of KDP/PUK – potentially provoking Turkey to sever its ties with them or to 
intervene militarily – but directly menaced the very survival of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government just a month after its inauguration.  
In the literature the thirty days war between the PKK and KDP/PUK in 1992 
is often referred to as the first stage of birakuji or ‘fratricidal war’ that came to 
define Iraqi Kurdish history in the 1990s,808 and in the case of Özcan and Tahiri 
is used as an example of the manifold ‘internal divisions’ that have prevented 
the Kurds from gaining statehood. Yet, as I have continually maintained 
throughout this study, it would be wrong for us analysts to categorise Kurds 
from Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as belonging to the same ethnic group. For 
this reason, it would likewise be wrong to portray the conflict between the Kurds 
of Iraq, the KDP and PUK, and Kurds from Turkey and Syria, the PKK, as an 
‘intra-group ethnic conflict’ or a ‘fratricidal war’; by the same token, theories of 
factionalism do not apply to this case since if they do not belong to the same 
group, they cannot be factions of it. Likewise, manifestations of the conflict such 
as the strategic essentialisms of ethnic outbidding should not be misinterpreted 
as the conflict’s causes. To be sure, Öcalan never tired of decrying Barzani and 
Talabani as ‘collaborators, reactionaries, feudal persons, primitive nationalists’, 
and ‘leeches’, who collaborated with the ‘fascist Turks’, and, as cherished in 
PKK ideology, may have genuinely believed that his organisation fought on 
behalf of and for the national self-determination of all Kurds, and that he could 
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speak with greater authority on their behalf than either Barzani and Talabani. 
Yet, to infer ethnic groupness from these acts of ethnic outbidding, from these 
strategic essentialisms, would amount to taking Öcalan’s beliefs and preaching 
as gospel – something the intended audience, brainwashed for years in PKK 
training camps or persecuted by assimilationst nationalising states may have 
done sincerely with their hearts and minds or out of necessity, but which we 
scholars, for whom such restraints do not apply, should be hesitant to do. The 
strategic essentialisms and calculated radicalisation of ethnic outbidding do not 
make an ethnic group, as the Manichean categorization of being ‘with us, or 
against us’ does not make those who opposed George Bush’s invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 sympathisers of terrorism. 
If these attempts at explaining ethnic conflict with ethnicity hold little 
purchase, instrumentalist explananda appear to better capture the dynamics of 
relations between the PKK and KDP/PUK and what motivated their actions. To 
be sure, the actions of these parties during the first half of 1992, that led to the 
thirty days war of October, can be reduced to material, in this case security 
interests. The PKK feared an emerging IKF-Turkish alliance, and the KRG 
feared that the PKK’s presence on its territory would either antagonise Turkey 
or that the PKK would directly challenge their authority, as it did when it shut 
down border traffic in July. While these realist accounts are accurate, I feel they 
do not capture the whole picture, and that it would be not only reductionist but 
also erraneous to completely discard identity as an explanatory factor. For I 
would argue that in 1991/2 Iraqi Kurdish identiy, if such a generalisation can be 
made, entered a critical period of transformation that is still ongoing today. Over 
the course of just a few months the Iraqi Kurds, until then either ignored or 
(ab)used by the international community, saw their fates altered from being the 
victims of a genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing to becoming the fosterlings 
of the international community; they had to come to terms with and adjust their 
perceptions as well as their behaviours towards the very power, Turkey, that 
until then had opposed Kurdish autonomy in Iraq most ardently becoming their 
benefector; and finally, they came to exercise the first cautious steps in crafting 
a political entity, however defined, of their own control and acting independently 
from the Iraqi government that had oppressed them for generations. Certainly, 
such a fundamental transformation in their self-perception altered their interests, 
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as, in turn, did the strategic interests of having to adapt to rapidly changing 
developments affect the transformative process of their identities. I would be 
hard pressed to determine a causality in these developments, of either identities 
shaping interests or interests being a function of identity, but would argue that 
both went hand in hand as a complex matrix of identities and interests shaping 
actors’ behaviour and actions – and therefore would make a strong case for 
studying them as such. 
 
All out civil war 
If for explaining the first stage of what is commonly, and as has been 
shown, wrongly referred to as birakuji or Kurdish ‘fratricidal war’ we have to 
belabour a complex matrix of shifting interests and emergent identities, for the 
second stage, terms such as ‘intra-group conflict’ or ‘civil war’ seem more 
appropriate and the traditional instrumentalist arsenal of explanatory IR suffices 
to explain the conflict between KDP and PUK that turned violent in the first half 
of 1994. Naturally, both parties accused each other of bad faith, of betraying the 
national unity of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and of selling out the 
Kurdish people and Iraqi Kurdish self-determination to external forces. ‘The 
PUK called the KDP “international traitors” and counter-revolutionaries, the 
betrayers of Kurdish nationalism for party interests’.809 The KDP proved in no 
way inferior in their heated rhetoric: 
The Jalalis’ [followers of Jalal Talabani] war this time more than any time is against 
the Kurdish people and their interests. The PUK and Jalal Talabani have 
established a culture of jashati [treason] in Kurdish history. The PUK’s attack is a 
careful plan in coordination with the enemies of the Kurds to destroy the Kurdish 
Regional Government in Iraqi Kurdistan M If the KDP is attacked by the enemies of 
Kurdistan, the Kurdish heroes will smash them M long live the peshmerga of the 
KDP and Barzani.810 
Such exercises in ethnic outbidding and strategic essentialisms, as 
instructive as they are for discourse analysis, should not disguise the fact that 
they are merely expressions and manifestations of the conflict that must not be 
mistaken as its causes. Virtually all analysts agree that in the on and off conflict 
between KDP and PUK from 1994 until 1998 ideological and ideational factors 
played no role,811 that it can be best described by theories of factionalism.812 
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Any appeals to national unity were appeals to a myth, since, despite auspicious 
beginnings in 1992, ‘essentially, the elected parliament had been carrying out 
decisions made at the party headquarters of the KDP and the PUK, rather than 
in the KRG legislature. Both parties’ administrations were based on 
clientilism’.813 At the end of the day, this civil war was nothing more and nothing 
less than a power struggle over supremacy in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which the 
decades-old antagonisms between both parties, detailed in Part Two, openly 
came to the surface. Additionally, very material interests resulting from the 
configuration of the political space in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992 played a major 
role. The 1992 elections, in which although, as Jalal Talabani had put it, 
‘everyone ended up dissatisfied with the results’, ‘all Kurdish parties accepted, 
albeit reluctantly, in order to safeguard the unity of Kurdish ranks and to portray 
the Kurds as civilised people before the world’,814 had produced a fifty:fifty 
power-sharing deal between both parties. However, when in December 1992 a 
smaller party merged with the KDP this carefully calibrated equilibrium 
threatened to come out of balance. ‘These changes did indeed send 
shockwaves through the PUK camp and altered the balance between the 
groupings partaking in the already strained power-sharing system of 
governance M The inclusion of the smaller parties created a sharp polarization 
between the PUK and the KDP’.815 The KDP, who had already fared slightly 
better in the 1992 election, was eager to exploit this advantage. ‘In January 
1994, the Central Committee of the KDP met and, believing to have been 
strengthened by coalescing with the smaller parties, decided that the 50:50 
system was no longer the favoured method of power-sharing. Massoud 
[Barzani] subsequently proposed M that a new election should take place in the 
immediate future’.816 
Other factors also turned out to the PUK’s long-term detriment.  One of the 
major sources of income for both parties were the duties collected at the Harbur 
border gate as well as revenues from smuggling goods from and into Turkey, 
Iran, and Syria. Of those borders the PUK controlled only parts of the one with 
Iran, and had for long suspected the KDP of not declaring and submitting all 
duties from Harbur to the KRG institutions, thus leaving the PUK at a precarious 
financial disadvantage.817 With the KDP eyeing snap elections and a majority 
government, the PUK ran risk of losing millions of dollars in revenue, putting the 
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party’s survival in question. What aggravated the PUK perhaps most, though, 
was that while virtually all of the KDP’s territory was protected by the 
internationally patrolled no-fly zone, the majority of PUK territory, including its 
stronghold Sulimaniyah, lay south of the 36th parallel, and therefore was at 
constant risk from the Iraqi army. In sum, in almost every aspect the PUK felt 
either short changed or that the political space since 1992 had developed to its 
distinct disadvantage. ‘The PUK felt itself being gradually squeezed out of 
power and starved of finances. Hence the PUK was probably the party that 
initiated the 1994 civil war, in an attempt to redress the worsening balance of 
power in Iraqi Kurdistan’.818 
The first round of fighting in May 1994 was triggered by a banality,819 but ‘by 
the beginning of June more than 600 civilian and military deaths had occurred in 
fighting throughout much of Kurdistan. In late May PUK forces seized the 
Kurdish parliament building in Erbil M [and] the fighting threatened the 
continuation of much needed international aid’.820 Over the next four years 
thousands of Iraqi Kurds came to perish in the civil war that escalated into a 
regional conflagration drawing in all of the Kurdistan Region’s neighbours and 
major powers further afield. Initially all regional powers, who after the turmoil of 
the Gulf War, saw a stabilised Iraqi Kurdistan as a strategic priority, tried to 
prevent the civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan from getting out of hand. ‘Turkey, Iran, 
and, ironically, even Baghdad also offered to mediate M while in late January 
1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton sent a message to both Barzani and Talabani 
in which he warned, “We will no longer cooperate with the other countries to 
maintain security in the region if the clashes continue”’.821 Over the course of 
the next three years the U.S. repeatedly threatened to cut off its international 
aid and even end its military protection of the Iraqi Kurds through Operation 
Provide Comfort. Kenneth Pollack, then Director for Near East and South East 
Asian Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC), recalls:  
We used everything we got to get them to stop their fighting each other that only 
played into the hands of Saddam. We used incentives and disincentives, 
threatening to terminate our military engagement in the CTF [Combined Task 
Force for OPC I and II and from 1997 on Operation Northern Watch]. That 
message was absolutely sent. We clearly said, we’re not going to support you, if 
you keep fighting each other, if you keep bringing in the Iranians and Saddam.822 
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It seems that by late 1994 the war had gained a momentum of its own, with 
the antagonisms between KDP and PUK built-up over decades fully unloading, 
and no party able or willing to give ground, and even their most powerful 
external supporters, the U.S. and Turkey, proving unable to bring their clients 
under control for longer than the ink on another futile peace agreement took to 
dry.823 Of all regional powers, it was Turkey that most feared a long-term 
destabilised Iraqi Kurdistan. ‘Turkey saw harmony among the Iraqi Kurds as a 
way to prevent the M PKK from raiding Turkey from Iraqi Kurdish territory. Civil 
War between the KDP and PUK, however, created opportunities for the PKK to 
[re-]establish camps in northern Iraq’.824 Consequently, Turkey pursued a dual 
strategy of stepping up its military incursions into northern Iraq – with two major 
offensive from March until May and then again in July1995 – to prevent the PKK 
from regaining lost ground, while at the same time acting as a mediator in two 
major rounds of talks between KDP and PUK in Silopi in the summer of 1994 
and in Ankara in 1996/7.825 Turkey’s fears proved well-founded since the PKK 
not only managed to take advantage of the chaos of war and regained the 
camps at the Turkish border it had abandoned in 1992 but, on 26 August 1995, 
also launched a major offensive against the KDP.826 The PKK claims that it 
acted on its own accord – its press organs announced that the KDP had ‘to be 
wiped out because it was backing Turkey’s bid to crush the PKK’ and for forty 
years had been ‘in league with the Turkish intelligence services’827 – and denies 
that it attacked the KDP in concert with the PUK.828 This, however, seems as 
unconvincing as KDP/PUK claiming they had not coordinated their 1992 attacks 
on the PKK with Turkey. Both PKK and PUK received support from the same 
external actors, Iran and Syria, and the PKK prepared its assault on the KDP 
from PUK territory. ‘For their own ulterior motives such regional powers as Syria 
and Iran, as well as the PUK, apparently encouraged the PKK. The former two 
states acted because they did not want to see their U.S. enemy successfully 
broker an end to KDP-PUK strife M while Talabani sought in effect to open a 
second front against Barzani’.829 On a short term basis, it seemed as if 
Talabani’s brinkmanship of letting the PKK live to fight another day from three 
years earlier had paid off. As he should have expected, though, in the long run, 
the PKK’s offensive against the KDP provoked Turkey to intervene directly in 
the conflict on the side of the KDP. On 14 May 1997, Turkey invaded northern 
Iraq with 50,000 troops, and in September, with its tanks advancing to within a 
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few miles of Erbil, even shelled PUK positions along the strategic Hamilton 
Road.830 For what may somewhat be euphemistically coined Turkey’s ‘partisan 
peace-making’,831 Talabani had stronger words. For him, ‘Turkey has discarded 
its neutral role and is now an ally of Barzani.’832 
The civil war’s darkest hour occurred when, on 31 August 1996, Barzani 
joined forces with Saddam Hussein against the PUK and their combined forces 
took Erbil, and later on its own (but generously equipped by the Iraqi Army) 
conquered the PUK stronghold Sulimaniyah, to which the U.S. responded with 
cruise missile strikes on command and control facilities in Iraq proper.833 For 
many Kurds until today this 1996 KDP-Iraqi army alliance against the PUK is 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s day that will live on in infamy; for Kurdish-born analysts like 
Tahiri it is further testimony of Kurdish tribalist ‘backwardness’ and their 
nationalist parties’ incapacity for national unity,834 and Ali Kemal Özcan even 
goes so far as to identify ‘“treason” as an inseparable element of the Kurdish 
ethnic personality (sic!)’.835 Supposedly more detached observers too, come to 
a similar, in my opinion troublesome conclusion: 
Tribalism, factionalism, and splits correctly constitute the standard historical 
narratives of organised Kurdish nationalism. The traits these stories manifest have 
been the major internal obstacles to the creation of both Greater and Lesser 
Kurdistans M This factionalism may be seen as rooted in the paradoxical but 
nonetheless intimate connection between particularistic “tribal” loyalties and 
universalistic “modern” nationalist ideologies M The “tyranny of cousins” has 
certainly been part of Kurdish culture, along with fratricide, feuding, and fatuous 
divisions.836 
Such juxtapositions of arbitrary values such as ‘tribalist’ and ‘backward’ 
versus ‘modern’ and ‘civilised’ are troublesome for their blatant normativism 
alone. As Ernest Gellner observed: 
Nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any other kind of group, 
which through luck, effort or circumstances succeed in becoming an effective force 
under modern circumstances. They are only identifiable ex post factum. Tribalism 
never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as true nationalism, and 
no one will dare call it tribalism.837 
What is even more troublesome for the historic baggage such normativisms 
carry and what in my opinion becomes neither intellectually nor ethically 
justifiable is when we scholars as categorisers start ascribing certain derogatory 
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psychological or social connotations and characteristics such as ‘backward’, 
‘treasonous’ or ‘fratricidous’ as cultural attributes or traits to whole ethnic 
groups, nations, or people. Not only are such normativisms borderline pseudo-
scientific, they have the potential of getting us dangerously close to a cultural 
stereotyping of what should be a bygone era in the social sciences. 
Ultimately, in 1998, the U.S. and Turkey reached two separate crucial 
diplomatic breakthroughs, each with a major impact on Kurdish history. In early 
September the U.S. finally succeeded in bringing Talabani and Barzani to the 
negotiation table in Washington. After two days of heated negotiations both 
leaders reached an accord, hailed as the ‘Washington Agreement’, that ended 
the Iraqi Kurdish civil war and was presented with great fanfare and under the 
aegis of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the world on 17 September 
1998.838 While it is difficult to establish a direct relation,839 it is quite striking that 
a month later President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, 
adopting an official U.S. policy for regime change in Iraq and designated certain 
groups in Iraq as recipients of covert funding to bring about the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime.840 On 4 February 1999, President Clinton revealed 
what groups would qualify for U.S. assistance with both KDP and PUK featuring 
prominently on the list. The fact that the bill was introduced for a vote in the 
House of Representatives on 29 September,841 less than two weeks after 
Barzani and Talabani had signed their peace accord, is too conspicuous for 
coincidence, and leads one to believe that the ‘Washington Agreement’ was 
sweetened by the promise of millions of dollars of covert funding and KDP/PUK 
being enhanced to the status of quasi-official allies in U.S. efforts to bring about 
regime change in Iraq.842 
For the PKK the ‘Washington Agreement’ was bad news. The PKK had 
demonstrably benefitted from the civil war between KDP and PUK and regained 
most of the ground lost in 1992, which is why Gunter’s theory that the PKK 
deliberately attacked the KDP to torpedo the Drogheda peace talks between 
both parties843 could very well hold some merit. For as long as the two Iraqi 
Kurdish parties were fighting they would not interfere with the PKK setting up 
camp at the Turkish border again, and the PKK could shape the outcome of the 
struggle by strategically throwing its weight behind one combatant as the 
situation required. The prospect of KDP and PUK reaching a lasting settlement 
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and returning to Washington’s and presumably Ankara’s good graces was 
therefore inherently against the PKK’s interest. In the same weeks as Barzani 
and Talabani were making peace in Washington, though, the PKK was dealt a 
much heavier blow when, after more than fifteen years, Turkish diplomatic, and 
in this case even overt military pressure finally paid off, and the Syrian 
government expelled Abdullah Öcalan on 9 October 1998.844 With that dramatic 
turn of events began the PKK leader’s four months desperate odyssey through 
Europe until his capture by Turkish intelligence in Kenya on 15 February 
1999.845 It was a blow from which the PKK would not recover. 
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10.) The PKK and Iraqi Kurdistan in Post-2003 Iraq 
 
The PKK after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan 
For an insurgency like the PKK, so strictly structured around a 
Führerprinzip, in which Öcalan’s often seemingly endless ideological musings 
were considered gospel and his orders dogma, the capture, show trial, and life 
sentence for its leader amounted to the most severe blow the group had to 
endure in its history, and it appears a miracle that it survived this at all. The 
more since to many of its rank and file, Öcalan’s ‘conversion’ during the trial 
must have appeared as a betrayal of all they had fought and often given their 
and their families’ lives for. At first Öcalan declared an end to the two decades 
long armed struggle and encouraged his guerrilla to lay down arms: 
I want to make an important appeal. I want to offer a peace congress to the PKK. If 
the government extends a hand to us for peace, the PKK will become the state’s 
most powerful ally M I am calling for an end to the armed struggle. The PKK 
should stop resisting the democratic state M My authority in the organization is 
unbroken. If the government gives me a chance, I can make the PKK fighters come 
down from the mountains within three months.846 
For any PKK fighter in the field this alone must have been difficult to come 
to terms with. Not only did Öcalan call for a unilateral ceasefire and promised 
the Turkish authorities his and his cadres’ full cooperation, he called the Turkish 
state – who tens of thousands of Kurds in decades of PKK indoctrination had 
come to see as the relentlessly assimilationist and oppressive enemy – a 
‘democratic state’. And yet Öcalan went even further in a statement of 2 August 
1999, in which he questioned the armed struggle of the PKK over the past two 
decades itself, and tried to portray himself as a reasonable man of peace while 
blaming others within the organization for the escalation of the conflict since the 
1980s: 
It can hardly be said that military activities under the leadership of the PKK had 
developed into a proper guerrilla warfare in terms of basic strategy and tactics. 
Even more wrong would it be to suppose that the way of warfare of the high-
ranking responsible persons had been the way I wanted it to be M Especially in 
1997, under the name of an offensive against village guards, there were attacks on 
civilians, among them women and children, that should never [have been] the 
211 
 
target of military attacks M I find it important that people know that I was involved 
in quite a tough struggle against this from 1987-97 M It is not difficult to find out 
that the activities that harmed the PKK most have mainly happened in that period 
and by the hands of people like these who tried to take control by themselves.847 
What is surprising is that these barely disguised attempts by the PKK leader 
to save his own skin and avoid the death penalty by portraying himself as the 
man who can persuade the PKK insurgents to lay down arms, and therefore be 
of greater use to the Turkish state alive, are taken by analysts like Hussein 
Tahiri as a genuine analysis of the PKK’s ideological, strategic, and tactic 
errors. Tahiri claims:  
Öcalan realised that with the tribal structure of Kurdish society with such a deep 
division and so much contradiction the demand for an independent Kurdish state 
based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine was too ambitious a demand. It could not be 
realised at this stage, so cultural rights could be more appropriate for the Kurds in 
Turkey.848  
I would argue that this reading of Öcalan’s complete about-turn, that 
strikingly occurred not while in command of the PKK and able to stop the killing 
of tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians, members of the Turkish state 
apparatus, and his own men and women, but when facing the death sentence, 
says less about Öcalan’s realisations about the structure of Kurdish society than 
the author’s bias.849 This example is certainly instructive for discourse analysis 
in so far as it shows how Öcalan as a symbol can still shape the perceptions, 
identity, and Weltanschauungen of many Kurds; what is more significant for 
immediate political developments, though, was that the PKK command, 
although at first issuing orders that Öcalan, who was feared to be influenced by 
the Kurdish state apparatus, were to be ignored, heeded his call and 
implemented a unilateral ceasefire from 1 September 1999 on that lasted until 1 
June 2004.850 
At this stage, though, when analysing the PKK’s evolution from the capture 
of Abdullah Öcalan until today, one has to ask, in the words of Doğu Ergil,  
when we say “the PKK”, who are we talking about today? Are we talking about 
Öcalan on İrmalı, the fighters in the mountains in Qandil, the TAK [Teyrêbazên 
Azadiya Kurdistan or Kurdistan Freedom Falcons], the criminal networks that 
sustain the organisation and profiteer from trading drugs, weapons, and smuggling, 
or the many affiliated organisations in the diaspora in Europe? And where do the 
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legal Kurdish political parties like the BDP [Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, in Kurdish 
Partiya Aştî û Demokrasiyê or Peace and Democracy Party] fit into the picture?851  
To this I would answer, to a greater or lesser extent all of the above actors 
need to be taken into consideration. This heterogeneity and multi-layerdness 
that not only makes the post-1999 PKK so difficult to analyse but also 
complicates the on and off peace process since the Turkish state not only has 
no clearly identifiable interlocutor with which to negotiate but also, once a 
comprehensive deal had been struck, it is not at all certain whether all the 
various actors subsumed under the today rather vague term ‘PKK’ would abide 
by it. This heterogeneity is a result of the chaotic period from 1999 until 2004/5, 
in which the organisation tried to respond to the capture of its leader, his 
demands for a political reorientation towards political dialogue with the Turkish 
state, mass scale defections of prominent cadre members, and an increasingly 
hostile international environment in the wake of 9/11, the consolidation of the 
Iraqi Kurdish polity, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the rise of the AKP in 
Turkey. It is reflected in a rapid succession of party congresses that often ended 
in heated disputes, divisions, prominent defections and power struggles 
between the group’s leaders, attempts at re-branding and re-naming the 
movement, and giving it a new ideological direction that took until 2003 to gain 
consistency and logical clarity. At its Eighth Congress in April 2002 the PKK 
changed its name into Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê (KADEK, 
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) in order to emphasise its 
commitment to non-violent struggle for Kurdish cultural and civil rights within the 
democratic framework of the Turkish state. The congress declared:  
Our Congress has ascertained that with the realisation of the Kurdish national 
awakening the PKK has completed its historical mission and [by accomplishing 
this] has irrevocably occupied an important position in [the] history of [the Kurdish 
people]. In light of this our Congress has resolved to terminate all activities under 
the name PKK by 4 April 2002.852 
Yet in November 2003 KADEK abolished itself and was re-launched as 
Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel, People’s Congress of Kurdistan) in order 
to make the party more politically inclusive, allowing for former Demokrasi 
Partisi (DEP, Democracy Party) MPs to hold prominent positions within its 
ranks, only for the organisation to re-establish itself as PKK in 2005.853 
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Naturally, these organisational and ideological revisions, shifts and new 
orientations did not come unopposed; the most prominent of these defections 
occurred in August 2004, when, after losing out in a power struggle with the 
faction around Murat Karaylian and Cemil Bayik, Osman Öcalan and Nizamettin 
Taş left the PKK to found a rival organisation, the Partîya Welatparêzên 
Demokratên Kuristan (PWD, Patriotic and Democratic Party of Kurdistan), with 
former Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP, People’s Democracy Party) MP 
Hikmet Fidan that among other differences with the Karaylian/Bayik faction, 
advocated for a closer cooperation with KDP and PUK. After Fidan was 
assassinated in Diyarbakir in July 2005, and two other prominent party leaders 
killed in a car bomb in Iraqi Kurdistan the following year – Osman Öcalan and 
Nizamettin Taş harbour no doubt that the PKK was behind the assassinations – 
the party descended into obscurity, though.854 
As significant as these structural shifts, factional feuds, and defections are 
for analysis, our prime concern is with the PKK’s ideological re-orientation after 
1999, and in particular its re-conceptualisation of national self-determination. 
The ideological paradigm shift that started to emerge from Öcalan’s prison 
writings855 constitutes an amalgam of anarchist conceptualisation of society 
cum critique of the nation state, utopian socialism, feminism, and a rather 
obscure Mesopotamian historicism.856 Central to the post-1999 PKK ideology, 
and of prime interest for this study’s deconstructive approach to state 
sovereignty, are the concepts of ‘radical democracy’ and ‘democratic 
confederalism’ developed by 19th century anarchist theoreticians Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and Peter Kropotkin.857 Those writers conceptually 
opposed the ideology of liberal, democratic nationalism prevalent in 19th century 
Europe, and developed an alternative model to the centralising nation state for 
how society is rooted in a purportedly ‘truer’ form of democracy, federalism, and 
regionalism. While Proudhon recognised that the liberal, mass democratic, and 
centralised nation state had the potential of turning into a majority-sanctioned 
despotism of elites promoting ever more comprehensive homogenisation of 
society in order to maximize their control over it,858 Bakunin developed the 
utopian concept of a global federalism replacing individual, competing, and 
authoritarian nation states. Taking the pre-1848 Swiss Confederation as an 
example, Bakunin envisioned a federalism that is rooted in an individualist and 
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regionalist conceptualisation of society, resulting in a bottom-up and voluntary 
collectivisation of people, goods, and means of production into communes, and, 
on the long run, into a global confederation: 
All the supporters of the League should therefore bend all their energies towards 
the reconstruction of their various countries in order to replace the old organisation 
founded throughout upon violence and the principle of authority by a new 
organisation based solely upon the interests, needs, and inclinations of the 
populace, and owing no principle other than that of the free federation of 
individuals into communes, communes into provinces, provinces into nations, and 
the latter into the United States, first of Europe, then of the whole world.859 
Bakunin, though, emphasised the completely voluntary character of any 
political federation and formation into a polity; a community that could be as 
freely dissolved by its members as it was formed: 
Just because a region has formed part of a state, even by voluntary accession, it 
by no means follows that it incurs any obligation to remain tied to it forever. No 
obligation in perpetuity is acceptable to human justice M The right of free union 
and equally free secession comes first and foremost among all political rights; 
without it, confederation would be nothing but centralisation in disguise.860 
This anarchist conceptualisation of a democratic, communally based, 
organised society in confederation with other equally structured societies is in 
direct opposition to the liberal, modernist understanding of nation and state 
advocated by explanatory IR, as discussed in Part One. It challenges the 
hegemonic concept of nation, national self-determination, and the state on four 
fundamental levels: (1) similar to Marxism, it argues that the formation of 
political units, i.e. modern sovereign nation states, advanced by modern liberal 
nationalism is a (bourgeois) elite project and therefore not truly democratic, 
contradicting the equation of liberal democracy and modern nationalism that 
constitutes the key criteria of the modernist understanding of nationhood; (2) 
instead of the top-down implementation of nationhood and state sovereignty, it 
argues for a voluntary association of free individuals at the grass-roots level 
that, if desired, pursue an equally voluntary project of confederation with other 
like-minded communities that is at any time reversible; (3) due to the fact that 
any political community is voluntarily entered, it can as freely be dissolved or 
abandoned, therefore, unlike the modern nation state and the state-centric 
system, valorising the right to secession as one of its founding principles – in 
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other words, to them, self-determination only makes sense with an implicit and 
comprehensive right to secession, an ideal, as has been shown, the liberal 
modernist understanding of the principle of explanatory IR denies; finally, (4), in 
particular Proudhon argues that such a voluntary confederation of individuals is 
better suited to accommodating diversity within society than the assimilationist 
and pathologically homogenising nation state discussed in Part One.  
Öcalan, who identifies the organisation of societies into states as the 
‘original sin’ of humanity,861 argues that the ‘democratic confederalism’ he 
advocates, ‘builds on the self-government of local communities, and is 
organised in the form of open councils, town councils, local parliaments and 
larger congresses. The citizens themselves are agents of this kind of self-
government, not state-based authorities’.862 These local councils and various 
forms of self-governance in the Bakunian sense, united in a democratic 
confederation, Öcalan sees as the prime driving force behind Kurdish liberation 
and unification. I therefore agree with Akkaya & Jongerden,863 who argue that 
authors like Özcan864 got it wrong when claiming that the PKK has abandoned 
the struggle for an independent and united Kurdistan. The post-1999 PKK 
ideology therefore,  
does not mean the abandonment of the ideal for a united Kurdistan, but rather that 
this ideal is aimed at in a different way. The ultimate aim of independence is no 
longer embodied in the realisation of a classical state, but in the establishment and 
development of self-government M Instead of a classical state-building process, 
that is, from above, establishing the overarching structures of governance, a 
process of constructing Kurdistan from below is being attempted, that is, a 
genuinely democratic confederalism.865 
I further agree with the authors that the PKK today advocates in theory a 
compelling alternative to the hegemonic state-centric international system of 
assimilationist and pathologically homogenising modern nation states for whom 
sovereignty all too often means the suppression of democracy and self-
determination. The post-1999 PKK therefore not only ‘successfully reinvented 
itself’ but ‘Öcalan’s critique of the (classical) concept of the nation-state brings 
him to a fresh conceptualization of politics. He considers the nation-state as 
outdated, and instead pleads for a system named democratic confederalism as 
an alternative to the state’.866 Consequently, it would be wrong, to apply, as 
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Özcan does, to the post-1999 PKK the same understanding of nationalism, 
national self-determination, and independence as to the pre-1999 PKK, for 
while the latter can be conceived with the traditional understanding of these 
principles of explanatory IR, the former revolutionises and ontologically 
challenges them. It has to be said, though, that as intellectually intriguing as this 
alternative concept of political communal organisation is, in practice, the PKK 
with its authoritarian organisational structure and its ongoing attempts to 
monopolise the Kurdish political discourse remains as much an obstacle to its 
realisation as the nationalising states it opposes.  
In practical terms, from 2000 until its return to the armed struggle in 2004, 
the PKK tried to facilitate a national democratic dialogue on cultural and 
democratic rights for Turkey’s Kurds, in which it was assisted by the affiliated 
Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP, Partiya Civaka Demokratîk in Kurdish or 
Democratic Society Party), who until its ban by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
in 2009, propagated an ideologically related ‘Project for Democratic 
Autonomy’.867 In terms of organisational structure the novel concept of 
democratic confederalism is implemented in the PKK encouraging the formation 
of regional sister-organisations such as Partiya Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan (PJAK, 
Kurdistan Free Life Party) in Iran, Partiya Yekita ya Demokratik (PYD, 
Democratic Union Party) in Syria, and Partiya Careseriya Demokratik a 
Kurdistane (PCDK, Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party) in Iraqi Kurdistan,  
united under the umbrella organisation Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, 
Kurdistan Democratic Confederation). This re-conceptualization of national self-
determination through democratic confederalism, though, not only brought the 
PKK into conflict with the nationalising states as well as with the U.S. state-
building project in Iraq, but also reignited its ideological antagonism with KDP 
and PUK. 
 
The KRG-AKP rapprochement 
The Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties entered the new century as much 
divided as they had spent the previous one. The Washington Agreement had 
put an end to the armed confrontation but left the so called Iraqi Kurdish de 
facto state partitioned into two power blocks corresponding with the two 
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segments of territory KDP and PUK had militarily and politically controlled since 
1996. Those two regions were run as separate political entities. In Erbil the KDP 
administered its territory through a third KRG cabinet, and in Sulimaniyah the 
PUK established its own third cabinet; virtually every executive and legislative 
structure, government ministry, bureaucratic institution, and civil service existed 
in double,868 resulting not only in a disproportionately inflated bureaucratic 
apparatus cum cumbersome decision making process but also a reification and 
protraction of the proverbial factionalism between both parties. On the other 
hand, once the fighting had stopped, the two KRGs could refer to a gradually 
improving economy869 as well as to learning, practising, and to a certain degree 
mastering apart what they had failed to execute together: running an 
increasingly efficient political and bureaucratic administration.870 The qualified 
success of the two KRGs leads Stansfield to conclude that not only would a 
unified administration have been unfeasible at this stage, but that the era of 
peaceful division actually yielded tangible benefits for the Iraqi Kurdish political 
system and the people both parties governed: 
If there is one lesson to be learned from Kurdistan in the 1990s, it would be that the 
KDP and PUK have difficulty coexisting peacefully when asked to work closely 
together M Mistrust continues to be palpable, and competition underlies the entire 
relationship M The historical baggage of nearly half a century of continuous rivalry 
and episodic fighting weighs heavily on both the KDP and the PUK M [but] the 
executive governmental structures have matured considerably under the divided 
political system M [and] the capability of Kurds to govern their own country has 
obviously been enhanced by these actions.871 
Yet, again, as in 1991, the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties were 
forced by external actors and events to put aside their differences and 
cooperate. And, as in 1991, at the outset of the second U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
prospects for the Iraqi Kurds to benefit from this campaign again looked dire. 
Understandably, in its war plans for Iraq the Bush administration conceded 
greater importance to Turkey and the opportunity to open a second, northern 
front than to the quibbling Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties. In Ankara, in 
2002, a new political party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and 
Development Party), had come to power that not only substantially differed in its 
composition, ideology, and constituency from any previous mainstream Turkish 
party but soon were to revolutionise and lastingly alter the Kemalist consensus 
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on which the Turkish political system had rested since the founding of the 
Republic.872 The dilemma the new Turkish government posed for the Bush 
administration was not so much about the price Washington would have to pay 
to win Ankara over for its invasion of Iraq, but that even if Washington were to 
pay what was asked of it, the AKP leadership could not guarantee whether it 
could get enough of its MPs in line to back in parliament the stationing of U.S. 
troops on Turkish soil, where a majority viewed what they saw as an ‘imperialist 
crusade’ against a fellow Muslim country without legitimization or justification, 
extremely critically.873 With tens of thousands of U.S. troops waiting off Turkish 
ports to disembark, crucial time in the run up to the vote ticked away haggling 
over what Turkey expected in compensation, and U.S. diplomats trying to 
square the circle of getting the Iraqi Kurds to agree to a Turkish troop presence 
in a buffer zone extending up to 40 kilometres into Iraqi Kurdistan – as 
expected, the Turkish military was keen to make the best of an inevitable war it 
opposed in principle by extending operations against the PKK  – which 
Massoud Barzani threatened to meet by force.874 For the Iraqi Kurds, when war 
loomed on the horizon in February 2003, it did not so much promise the 
downfall of their nemesis in Baghdad as it did threaten the possible end of their 
de facto independent polity and their exercise in self-government at the hands 
of a Turkish occupation.  
Despite these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, it came as a surprise to 
everyone involved when, in a historic and extremely narrow vote on 1 March 
2003, the Turkish parliament rejected the U.S. request for a second, northern 
front to be staged from Turkish soil.875 With some pathos but not lacking in 
accuracy the most fortunate incident of the vote of the Turkish parliament 
against taking an active role in the US-led Iraq War can be considered the 
second birth hour of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.  
For the Kurds of Iraq the outcome of 2003 could be seen as a best case scenario, 
since it removed the hated Saddam Hussein and kept the Turkish army out of their 
territory. Since they were the only group in Iraq which firmly supported US policy, 
and had substantial forces on the ground which Turkey lacked, it was the Iraqi 
Kurds, rather than the Turks, who emerged as America’s most effective local 
allies.876 
219 
 
Consequently, they became the main beneficiaries of U.S. state-building in 
Iraq, while Turkey had taken itself out of the equation and of having any say in 
the unfolding political future of its southern neighbour. The political gambit at the 
highest stakes on the future status of the Kurdistan Region in 2004/5 forced the 
Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties to collaborate and speak with one voice in 
Baghdad. The incentive of permanently enshrining their autonomy status in the 
constitution, together with their pre-eminence as key U.S. allies, and the 
magnitude of the damage further disunity could cause, compelled KDP and 
PUK to succeed in what had eluded them for more than three decades: to at 
least at the surface bury the hatchet of factionalism and implement a power-
sharing deal fit for the purpose of representing the Kurdistan Region by 
common consent. The unification process of the two KRGs started with the 
January 2005 elections that resulted in Massoud Barzani being elected 
President of the Kurdistan Region by the Iraqi Kurdish National Assembly in 
June – a development eased by his old rival, Jalal Talabani, becoming 
President of Iraq in April – and culminated in the ‘unification agreement’ of 
January 2006.877 This agreement allowed the two parties to effectively 
monopolise the political space in Iraqi Kurdistan by forming consecutive 
coalition governments, in which the key posts of prime minister and 
parliamentary speaker rotated routinely, and ministries as well as their budgets 
were allocated in back-room deals among the parties’ strongmen and 
hopefuls.878 While it can be argued that Talabani’s departure for Baghdad 
eased the implementation of mechanisms of power-sharing, the absence of 
leadership in the PUK in Iraqi Kurdistan, together with a growing public 
frustration over the dominance of the two parties, soon became acutely felt, 
resulting in 2009 in Gorran to split from the PUK under the leadership of 
Newshirwan Mustafa.879 Since then Gorran has made a name for itself and 
significantly increased its share of the Iraqi Kurdish vote mostly at the expense 
of the PUK;880 this, coupled with Jalal Talabani’s rapidly deteriorating health 
after a debilitating stroke, led me to suggest that it may be about time for 
obituaries to be written on the PUK.881 The almost comatose condition of the 
PUK and its leader has allowed Massoud Barzani and the KDP – after a wave 
of public protest in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ was silenced by force, 
intimidation, and playing the nationalist card in Kirkuk882 – to reign supreme in 
Erbil.883 
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The historic decision by the Turkish parliament to deny the U.S. a second, 
northern front in its 2003 invasion of Iraq not only saved the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq from Turkish occupation, it also resulted in an unprecedented period of 
strained relations between Washington and Ankara that extended to the U.S. 
client polity in Erbil.884   
For five years, between 2003 and 2008, Turkey refused to have any dialogue with 
us, they simply did not talk to us, they did not even talk to the US M there were no 
political consultations, no talks on how to deal with the PKK, no negotiations on 
Kirkuk or on the post-conflict order of Iraq M only silence. We wanted to engage 
them in dialogue on many issues but could not get them [to talk to us].885 
By imposing a de facto political embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan and pursuing a 
stubborn, and ultimately self-defeating refusal to engage in any meaningful 
political dialogue with the Bush administration – who after what it considered a 
betrayal in 2003 was not keen to amend relations either – the Erdoğan 
government virtually took itself out of the equation of having any say in the post-
war restructuring of Iraq.886 By 2007 the AKP leadership had to realise that its 
obstructionism was leading nowhere and was no longer sustainable. This 
recognition had primarily four reasons:   
(1) First and foremost it illustrates recognition by the Turkish government of 
the dramatically altered nature and political status of the Kurdistan Region in the 
post-2003 order of Iraq. In the negotiations for the Transitional Administrative 
Law (TAL) of 2004 and the Iraqi Constitution of the following year the Iraqi 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties got all they had bargained for, with a ‘highly 
decentralized’ system that ‘gave the Kurds a victory by recognizing KRG control 
in the north and allowing it to continue government functions in these regions, to 
retain control over police and security, and to tax in KRG areas’.887 Ironically, 
the biggest negotiation victory for the KRG in the TAL had originally been 
intended to placate the Sunni Arabs,888 who felt overall left out from the 
dialogue on the future order of Iraq, by granting a provision for a two-thirds 
majority vote in three governorates to block the adoption of a new constitution, 
thus providing the KRG with an iron-clad veto on any future political 
arrangement that would not enshrine the principle of ethnic federalism in the 
constitution,889 leading Brendan O’Leary and Khaled Salih to delight: ‘Kurdistan 
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is, in short, legally secure for now. Its existence is official. Its status can be both 
secured and extended’.890 
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 merely cast in stone the principle of ethnic 
federalism for which the TAL had already prepared the ground.891 ‘On this 
issue, the Kurds won virtually all the arguments. They insisted on a distribution 
of power between the central government and regions, which gave the latter 
priority. The Kurds worked to weaken the authority of the central government M 
they managed to get a weak central government and a highly decentralized 
polity’.892 Article 111 of the constitution turned out to stipulate that ‘in case of a 
conflict between regional and national legislation, the region would prevail M [in 
sum,] the federal government was given few exclusive authorities’.893 
For the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties the prevalence of the principle 
of ethnic federalism that enshrined their national self-governance in the three 
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Al Sulaimaniyah in the Iraqi Constitution 
constitutes unquestionably the greatest accomplishment in their seventy year 
struggle for national self-determination, leading Brendan O’Leary to conclude, 
‘on paper Kurdistan [is] freer within Iraq than any member state within the 
European Union’.894 Of equal importance, and both an expression as well as a 
function of Iraqi Kurdistan’s altered political status, was the fact that every day 
the rest of Iraq descended more into the chaos of ethno-sectarian civil war, Erbil 
came to be seen in Washington as the only stable and reliable partner in Iraq. 
Turkish foreign policy simply could no longer afford to ignore that the Kurdistan 
Region had become a key U.S. ally in the region nor, that even when it limited 
its relations to the Iraqi government, its main interlocutors – President Jalal 
Talabani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari – were Iraqi Kurds and naturally 
represented Iraqi Kurdish interests to a perhaps greater extent than Iraqi 
positions.   
(2) Due to several setbacks in Turkish foreign policy since the AKP had 
come to power and in response to the dramatic changes in regional power 
constellations the U.S. occupation of Iraq had brought about, Turkish political 
scientist and advisor to PM Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, hailed as the ‘brains 
behind Turkey’s global reawakening’,895 developed a paradigm shift that would 
revolutionise Turkish foreign policy; subsumed under the catchword ‘strategic 
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depth’ the new, less paranoid Turkish foreign policy doctrine, instead of 
perceiving Turkey’s neighbours as an inherent threat, sought to engage them in 
projects of mutual interests and to capitalise on the rich legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Middle East and beyond.896  
(3) The Turkish military-politico establishment, with the PKK conflict again 
intensifying since 2004, would have to rely on U.S. acquiescence, if not active 
cooperation for carrying out any cross-border operations into Iraq.  
(4) While the Turkish politico-military establishment kept snubbing the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Turkish business there not only had stayed on but 
was booming, and Turkish business associations increasingly exerted pressure 
on the AKP government to abandon its obstructionism and back up Turkish 
investments in the region with a diplomatic rapprochement.897  
Many opinion makers and scholars cum retired politicians in the U.S. policy 
world bemoaned the deterioration of relations with as crucial an ally as Turkey 
and behind the scenes prepared the ground for reconciliation and a 
reinvigorated partnership that would also include the KRG.898 Their efforts bore 
fruit when during a state visit to Washington on 5 November 2007 PM Erdogan 
managed to convince President Bush that both countries were allies in the ‘War 
on Terror’ and that the PKK was a vital threat to the two countries’ strategic 
interests in the Middle East; both sides reached an agreement on military 
intelligence cooperation and, it is safe to assume in light of developments in the 
following month, tacit U.S. approval of limited Turkish incursions into northern 
Iraq in pursuit of the PKK.899 ‘In effect, America would now give a green light to 
Turkish operations in northern Iraq, provided they were limited to attacks on the 
PKK and did not cause unnecessary civilian casualties’.900 Thus well provided 
for with U.S. political backing and ‘real time intelligence’, the Turkish Air Force 
flew the first sorties against PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan since the Iraq War on 
16 December 2007 that were followed by a substantial ground incursion in 
February 2008.901 Although the KRG engaged in the usual pro forma 
condemnation of the attacks,902 Iraqi Kurdish leaders’ consternation appears 
less convincing with Jalal Talabani capitalising on improved relations and 
intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey and visiting Ankara in his 
capacity as President of Iraq on 7 March 2008,903 merely a week after Turkey 
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had withdrawn its troops from northern Iraq. Indeed, Wikileaks cables from the 
U.S. embassy in Ankara indicate that U.S. support with real time intelligence of 
Turkish military operations in northern Iraq was conditional to Turkey mending 
its differences with the KRG.904 During Talabani’s visit it stands to reason then 
that he made use of his unique position as President of Iraq and leader of the 
PUK to prepare the ground for a Turkish-KRG rapprochement. In sum then, the 
diplomatic build up to the 2007/8 Turkish incursion into northern Iraq in its 
seemingly endless war with the PKK, via Washington’s good offices, resulted in 
Turkey abandoning its policy of isolating the KRG and entering into a political 
dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish parties after five years of strained relations. 
‘Without the political cover that the American help provided, the [AKP] 
government would have faced even fiercer domestic opposition to extending 
any olive branch to Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds for their part toned down their 
criticisms of Turkey and especially of the air strikes’.905   
After February 2008, which in retrospect can be identified as a watershed 
moment, relations between Ankara and Erbil improved profoundly and, from a 
current perspective, lastingly. The first direct meeting at the highest political 
level since the days of Turgut Özal between representatives of the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties and the Turkish government took place in Baghdad on 1 May 2008, 
when KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu and the Turkish Special Envoy Murat Özçelik, in which both sides 
reached an accord on improving political and economic ties and, in foresight of 
the AKP’s ‘Kurdish Initiative’ in the following year, agreed on jointly working 
towards a political solution of the ‘Kurdish Question’ in southeast Anatolia;906 an 
agreement that was further substantiated by the establishment in November 
2008 of a Trilateral Commission between the US, Turkey, and Iraq – 
prominently represented by the KRG – with a joint command centre in Erbil to 
facilitate security cooperation between all parties in setting active steps against 
the PKK.907 These first substantial steps towards strategic cooperation and 
political rapprochement between  Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan were followed up 
by even higher level contacts when during the ‘Kurdish Initiative’ and in 
acknowledgment of the KRG’s role in it, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu met 
President Barzani in October 2009 in Erbil, the first personal meeting by 
President Barzani with PM Erdoğan in Ankara on 4 June the following year, and 
224 
 
ultimately culminated in the historic first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq in March 2011, when, with much pomp, they jointly 
inaugurated the new Erbil International Airport and the Turkish Consulate in 
Erbil.908 In light of Turkey’s relations with the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties 
since the creation of the state of Iraq and subsequently the Kurdish political 
entity in northern Iraq as outlined in this study, it is impossible to underestimate 
the historic significance of this rapprochement between the KRG and Turkey’s 
AKP government. This sea change signals nothing less than, at least in relation 
to the Kurdistan Region, the AKP overcoming the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’  that has 
determined Turkish identity and foreign policy ever since the founding of the 
Republic. Today, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is no longer seen by the decision 
makers in the AKP as pursuing pan-Kurdish separatism or as an external agent 
inciting ethnic divisions among Turkey’s Kurdish population but as a strategic 
partner in the region with largely complimentary interests and policies. This 
paradigm shift in perceptions becomes even more momentous given the 
relatively short time frame in which it evolved, from utter political boycott in 
2007, when PM Erdoğan announced, ‘I met with the Iraqi President and Prime 
Minister. I won’t meet with any tribal leader M I won’t meet with Barzani,’909 to 
declaring during Barzani’s Ankara visit less than three years later:  
We [Erdogan and Barzani] will build together a very solid bridge in bilateral 
relations between Iraq and Turkey and between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey 
especially. We will be in touch. We will also engage in economic cooperation. We 
will act together on energy and infrastructure.910 
The climactic improvement of relations is all the more astonishing since on 
the one issue that has determined Turkey’s perception of and interaction with 
the Iraqi Kurdish political parties, their ambivalent relations with the PKK and its 
presence on Iraqi Kurdish territory, very little actual progress beyond symbolic 
gestures was made. True, the KRG initiated policies that restricted the freedom 
of movement of PKK political representatives in Iraqi Kurdistan and made it 
more difficult for journalists to reach the PKK camps in the Qandil mountains.911 
By the same token, Iraq, which is in this case effectively the KRG since the 
influence of the central Iraqi government at the Iraqi-Turkish border is practically 
nil, Turkey, and the U.S. have established a political dialogue and operational 
infrastructure to combat the PKK on Iraqi territory, yet five years after this 
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mechanism has been set up its effectiveness remains to be seen. The fact is 
that the PKK is still entrenched in its stronghold in the Qandil mountains, and 
the KRG has not done significantly more to change this fact since 2008 than 
before the KRG-AKP rapprochement. Yet if the thawing of relations and 
paradigm shift in Turkey’s perception of its Iraqi Kurdish neighbours cannot be 
explained by the very issue that dominated them for three decades, what other 
factors brought about this dramatic sea change? 
I would argue that an overriding explanandum is the changed self-
perception of Turkey, both at the political level but also in the public discourse, 
together with a growth in self-confidence since the AKP came to power. Today’s 
Turkey is a regional, geo-strategic and economic powerhouse, a member of the 
G20, who actively shapes politics in the Middle East and beyond, whose 
Turkish Airlines have become a major carrier transporting Turkish investors to 
every part of the globe,912 and who, at least during the early stages of the ‘Arab 
Spring’, was hailed by Western and Turkish media alike as a model to be 
emulated by the democratic regimes hoped to gain power in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, and Yemen.913 The AKP brand offered to optimists a promising 
version of how Islam, capitalism, traditional values, and democratic freedoms 
can be successfully merged; the fact that this optimism has waned both in 
Turkey and the countries in the region who were supposed to emulate it does 
not negate the fact that for a while Turkey was seen as a regional model, which 
had a profound effect on Turkish identity, self-perception and foreign policy. An 
equally cogent explanandum is the fact that the AKP, while not being the first 
Turkish government to recognise that its ‘Kurdish Question’ cannot be solved by 
military means, was the first government not only willing to go where no other 
Turkish mainstream party had gone before but also, due to its own eternal strife 
with the Turkish military, the Kemalist ‘Deep State’, and the Turkish judiciary, 
was able to outplay those forces traditionally opposed to any democratic 
reforms or engagement with Turkey’s explicitly Kurdish parties, interest groups, 
and political movements. In so far the AKP can be seen as fundamental in 
bringing both these changes about, thus altering Turkish society perhaps more 
radically than any political party since the days of Atatürk.  
As far as relations between the AKP and the KRG are directly concerned, I 
would argue that the AKP recognised the wisdom in the old colonialist adage 
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that the flag, i.e. politics, follows trade. What is remarkable is that despite the 
political embargo Ankara had imposed on the KRG from 2003 until 2008, 
economic relations between both trade partners kept booming:  
By early 2007, the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and northern Iraq had 
grown to an estimated $5 billion a year. In addition, Turkish contractors had 
secured an estimated $2 billion worth of construction contracts, including large 
infrastructure projects such as airports, highways, universities, housing complexes 
and even the new KDP headquarters. By early 2007 there were estimated to be 
1,200 Turkish companies in northern Iraq, creating 14,000 jobs for Turkish citizens 
in northern Iraq and employment for several hundred thousand more back in 
Turkey. The KAR even received around 10 percent of its electricity from Turkey. 
Much of the trade was conducted between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. Several Iraqi 
Kurds, including relatives of KDP President Massoud Barzani, had also established 
companies inside Turkey which exported food and consumer goods to northern 
Iraq. However, the Turkish contractors in northern Iraq also included several 
businessmen who were known to have strong Turkish ultranationalist sympathies 
or links to the AKP government.914 
Those Kurdish investors from Turkey who constituted a major power base 
of the AKP increasingly exerted pressure on their government to assist them in 
making gains in this important foreign market rather than continually posing 
obstacles to the inroads Turkish businesspeople made.915 This factor gained 
even greater significance with the Kurdistan Region transforming from an 
importer to a major supplier of energy to Turkey.916 Today, there can be no 
doubt that Turkey effectively dominates the Iraqi Kurdish market: 
Economic relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region are excellent, and 
both sides are enjoying substantial benefits from our close economic cooperation. 
Today, about 20,000 Turkish citizens are permanently living and doing business 
here. Half of all foreign companies registered in the Kurdistan Region are Turkish. 
Five major Turkish banks are operating here, 20 Turkish schools and institutions of 
higher education are educating the future generation of Turkish citizens living here 
and of the local population, 600 Turkish construction companies are involved in 
large-scale infrastructure projects, and Turkish Airlines and other private Turkish 
carriers operate daily flights between several major Turkish airports and Erbil and 
Sulimaniyah, which has boosted tourism and contributed to easing business 
relations. Overall, Turkey has a trade volume with Iraq of about $12 billion last 
year, of which 70 percent is with the Kurdistan Region.917 
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As a matter of fact, to put this in perspective, for two consecutive years in 
2011 and 2012 Iraq was Turkey’s second biggest export market after the EU,918 
which, if 70 percent and counting of this trade is accounted for by the Kurdistan 
Region, underscores the paramount importance bilateral trade has for both 
polities and consequently for their relations. I would even go so far to argue that 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Turkey’s southeast Anatolia by now 
constitutes one of the economically most integrated areas in the Middle East. 
This alignment of economic interests has been accompanied by an 
increasing consonance of strategic interests in the region, in particular in Syria, 
where both the KRG and the AKP government from early on have taken an 
unambiguous stance against the Assad regime, and radical Islamist 
insurgencies alike, and although Massoud Barzani was forced to strike a 
temporary strategic understanding in Erbil in July 2012 between the KDP-
backed Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the PYD branch of the PKK, yet 
both leaders, Barzani and Erdoğan, would doubtlessly prefer a KDP-controlled 
alternative to the current PYD dominance among Syria’s armed Kurdish 
opposition.919 In that case then, the U.S. and Turkey, the latter in particular, may 
try to avail themselves of Barzani’s pan-Kurdish appeal to reduce the PYD’s 
influence within the KSC to a sufferable limit and, through the Iraqi Kurdish KDP 
and its Syrian Kurdish  allies, at least have a say in the political future of Syria’s 
Kurds. 
Ironically, southeastern Anatolia became the very arena where the AKP has 
already clearly tried, and arguably succeeded in capitalizing on and exploiting 
for its own ends the image of Iraqi Kurdistan as a beacon of hope for wider 
Kurdish political and cultural aspirations and of its leader Massoud Barzani as a 
Kurdish leader the AKP not only can work with but also as an alternative to 
Abdullah Öcalan’s radicalism. Under pressure by the Gezi Park Protests 
widening to a wave of mass civil society protests engulfing Turkey’s major 
cities,920 PM Erdoğan landed perhaps his as yet greatest PR-coup by meeting 
with President Barzani in Diyarbakir, the ‘spiritual center’ of Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey, on 18 November 2013. There Erdoğan not only broke the taboo of 
referring for the first time in a public address to ‘Kurdistan’ as a territorial 
concept and listened to Barzani addressing the crowds in Kurdish, both 
statesmen also enjoyed the performance of Shivan Perwer, another legendary 
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figurehead of Kurdish ethnic identity, who after 37 years in exile had returned 
with Barzani to his homeland. Barzani, in turn, concluded his speech with 
shouting in Turkish, “Long live Turk-Kurd brotherhood, long live freedom, long 
live peace,’’.921 At this stage it is not clear whether both leaders have formed a 
genuine, albeit temporary partnership designed to ensure their mutual political 
survival and intend to form a united front of conservative parties against the 
PKK and the BDP,922 who threatens to cost Erdoğan dearly in upcoming 2014 
elections, or whether it is just another attempt at both sides manipulating each 
other. What I would argue is, is that Barzani lending the struggling Erdoğan a 
helping hand in the very ‘spiritual capital’ of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey for 
decades dominated by the PKK and BDP (and its predecessors) was a 
deliberate snub of both movements, and that Barzani increasingly intends to 
extend his appeal as the leader of the freest political entity in Kurdish history 
and the promise of self-determination – however defined – the Iraqi Kurdish 
experiment holds for so many Kurds beyond the borders of the Kurdistan 
Region. Ultimately, both sides appear to have entered a true marriage of mutual 
conveniences then: the AKP instrumentalises Barzani and Iraqi Kurdistan’s pan-
Kurdish appeal and significance in the Kurdish ethno-nationalist discourse in 
Turkey and beyond, and by doing so not only keeps the PKK and BDP at bay 
but also tries to influence this discourse in line with its interests, and Barzani 
enjoys and tries to expand on his role of pan-Kurdish figurehead by the grace of 
the AKP.923  
What is also remarkable about this marriage of mutual conveniences is that 
both sides have reached this point by bracketing the very issue that had 
dominated their relations for the past three decades, the PKK’s status in Iraqi 
Kurdistan,924 and by doing so have reached on the long run a mutual 
understanding on how to jointly deal with this issue. To this extent then, the 
KRG-AKP rapprochement at the end of the 2000s, as I have expanded 
elsewhere,925 can be understood as a textbook case of de-securitization. 
Securitization theory,926 in a nutshell, holds that very few issues in the social 
world are per se threats or security issues, but that what we come to perceive 
as threats or security issues is contextual, contingent, and part of a social 
process and discourse. Not unlike ethnic identity as a social category, a security 
issue then is constructed through perceptions and performances, first and 
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foremost by labeling it a security issue or a threat in the political discourse 
through a speech act: 
With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this 
usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying security something is done (as in betting, 
giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security”, a state representative 
moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special 
right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.927 
Proponents of securitization theory therefore argue that ‘issues can become 
security issues by virtue of their presentation and acceptance as such, rather 
than because of any innate threatening qualities per se’.928 Securitization is then 
the ‘shifting [of] an issue out of the realm of “normal” political debate into the 
realm of emergency politics by presenting it as an existential threat’,929 and, if 
the social agent who does the securitizing of the relevant issue is seen by the 
public as someone who speaks with authority, such as the military, scholars, or 
the government, the public is likely to accept this transformation from non-
security to security issue and the measures introduced to meet this existential 
threat as justified. In other words, the process of securitization not only covers 
the speech act of labelling something a security issue but the entire social 
process and discourse that comes with and results from it. De-securitization 
then is the reverse of the process of securitization, as it describes the social 
discourse in which an issue is shifted back from ‘the realm of securitization and 
emergency politics M into the realm of “normal” or technical political debate’.930 
In our case, for decades since the founding of the Turkish Republic, the 
Turkish politico-military establishment has perceived and portrayed the possible 
emergence of a Kurdish autonomous political entity, let alone an independent 
state, in a neighbouring country as an existential threat to the territorial and 
political integrity of the Turkish watan, mostly because it was feared that such a 
polity would first fuel the desire for separatism among Turkey’s Kurdish minority 
and then lend political and perhaps even military support to their struggle for 
national self-determination. Yet, as we have seen in the case study, the desire 
for national self-determination among Turkey’s Kurds and the insurgency of the 
PKK for those ends predate the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish polity at 
Turkey’s borders, and in the two decades since the Kurdistan Region de facto 
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became autonomous, one would be hard pressed to argue that the existence of 
such a polity per se has increased the risk to the territorial integrity of Turkey – 
on the contrary, while before 1991 northern Iraq was as notorious a source of 
unrest, lawlessness, and political anarchy as they come, once the KRG 
established its control there, Turkey at least has an interlocutor to address with 
its security concerns, hold accountable, and can, as has been demonstrated, 
cooperate with on several issues . 
By the same token, Turkey defined its relations with the KRG until 2008 
primarily through a security lens, that is what determined relations between Erbil 
and Ankara was almost exclusively the presence of the PKK on Iraqi Kurdish 
territory and how to deal with it. Here, again, while the Turkish politico-military 
establishment could have chosen to focus on other, non-threatening issues 
such as economic cooperation – as it ultimately did – for over fifteen years it 
chose not to, determined to perceive the KRG exclusively within the realm of a 
security issue. What the AKP accomplished then after 2008 by to some extent 
bracketing the PKK issue from its relations with the KRG and focusing instead 
on areas where cooperation was easily achievable and mutually beneficial, is 
shifting the issue at hand – relations with the KRG – from the realm of 
securitization or emergency politics to a level of a “normal”, more technical, and 
economically as well as politically lucrative discourse. In other words, it 
desecuritized Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. What is even more 
remarkable than this respectable feat in itself is the dynamic that developed 
from it. For the issue of relations with the KRG not only got desecuritized, by 
bracketing the most controversial aspect – the PKK presence on Iraqi Kurdish 
territory – by first instead focusing on areas of mutual interest such as trade 
relations and strategic cooperation in Syria, both sides (the AKP and KRG) 
paved the ground for political cooperation on the very issue Turkey had always 
feared in the context of an autonomous Kurdish political entity at its borders: 
how such an entity would affect its own Kurdish population and their desire for 
national self-determination. If the past three years are anything to go by, the 
answer must turn out positively and most reassuringly for the Turkish politico-
military establishment since KRG leaders not only proved willing to assist the 
AKP in shaping the Kurdish ethno-nationalist discourse in Turkey in a direction 
in line with AKP thinking, but both sides, the KRG and AKP leadership, even 
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discovered that their strategic interests via the Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
discourse in Turkey corresponded, offering ample room for collaboration in 
imprinting their partnership on this identity discourse. The AKP leadership 
believes that through Massoud Barzani, who is politically and economically 
dependent on Turkey in Iraqi Kurdistan, they can influence the Kurdish ethno-
nationalist discourse at home. Both sides clearly benefit from holding up 
Barzani as a moderate and conservative alternative to the PKK’s radicalism as 
well as to the BDP with whom the AKP has to compete for votes in southeast 
Anatolia, and both sides intend through their partnership to shape Kurdish 
ethnic identity in Turkey as sympathetic to the AKP. In sum, I would say, using 
Lord Ismay’s famous maxim for NATO as an allegory, the purpose of their 
partnership in the ethnic discourse among Turkey’s Kurds is to keep Barzani in, 
the BDP down, and the PKK out.  
As in the theoretical section, I argue here that instead of a causal sequence 
between identities and interests, in which either interests determine one’s 
identity – as neo-realists would have it – or, as systemic constructivists argue, 
for interests to be a function of an agent’s identity, identities and interests 
should be conceptualised as a complex matrix with no identifiable sequence or 
hierarchy. I, for one, in the current ethnicised discourse in southeast Anatolia, 
would be hard pressed to determine where precisely Massoud Barzani’s 
strategic interests to exert his influence beyond Iraqi Kurdistan and to 
collaborate with the AKP end, and his self-perception as a (pan-)Kurdish leader 
with wider nationalist appeal who feels an evolving degree of communality and 
solidarity with Kurds across the border begins. The complex dynamics of this 
situational, shifting, and ambiguous matrix is one aspect of Iraqi Kurdish identity 
at the outset of the 21st century – or at least, given the limitations of this study, 
of the self-perception of Iraqi Kurdish leaders at this watershed moment in 
Kurdish history. 
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The PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties in the 2000s 
Relations between the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties and the PKK in 
the early 2000s were as much defined by complex ambiguities and 
ambivalences as they had been in the 1990s. While on the one hand rumours 
were spreading that while on the run in Rome Abdullah Öcalan might be offered 
asylum by the PUK in Iraqi Kurdistan,931 less than two years later PUK and PKK 
were fighting again. The reasons for this round of hostilities between September 
and December 2000 remain opaque. ‘The reason never was clear – the PKK 
claimed Talabani’s PUK party attacked first, the PUK accused the PKK of 
breaking an agreement to stay in its mountain redoubts – but it probably had a 
lot to do with maintaining group unity and giving PKK fighters some sort of 
armed focus,’ Marcus speculates.932 Gunter as well as Brauns & Kiechle,933 on 
the other hand, argue that the PUK had been pressured by Turkey into 
attacking the PKK. The Turkish military certainly showed no willingness to agree 
to the unilateral ceasefire the PKK had declared in September 1999; on the 
contrary, it seemed as though after the capture of Öcalan the Turkish military-
politico establishment was determined to defeat the PKK once and for all – 
illustrated by a series of cross-border incursions throughout 1999, in which the 
Turkish military was assisted by the KDP.934 In line with its ceasefire of 
September 1999 the PKK formally asked the KDP to cease hostilities in 
November 1999, and Cemil Bayık pledged that ‘despite the attacks launched by 
the KDP, the PKK had no intention of responding’;935 yet the KDP chose to 
ignore the PKK overtures for peace. Interestingly, this episode of KDP-PKK 
fighting is not mentioned in the literature; on the contrary, Gunter portrays the 
PUK-PKK fighting of September and December 2000 as an isolated incident, 
which the KDP refused to join, and in which the PUK tried to remove the PKK 
from the Qandil mountains, where they had established themselves in 1998, in 
order to open the area for a direct trade route with Turkey.936 To me it seems 
that after dragging its feet for two years after the Washington Agreement, the 
PUK had finally been persuaded by Turkey through incentives and disincentives 
to join its operations to kill off the PKK;937 why the KDP sided with Turkey in 
1999, yet refused to join the Turkish-PUK alliance in its fight against the PKK in 
September and December 2000 remains a mystery, though. 
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While this episode fits the already established historic pattern of rapidly 
shifting temporary alliances and antagonisms between the Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalist parties and the PKK, what profoundly altered the dynamics of their 
relations, as it did for the entire Middle East, was the Iraq War. It had not been 
lost on the PKK that, unlike in 1991, the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003 to stay 
as an occupying force. Doubtlessly, it had also noted with a sigh of relief that 
Turkey had taken itself out of the picture with its parliament’s refusal to grant 
U.S. forces the opening of a second, northern front. Finally, the PKK, like the 
rest of the world, must have conjectured that after the initial quick victory, the 
U.S. was about to fundamentally re-shape the political order of the Middle East 
and would not refrain, if necessary, from toppling one hostile regime after the 
other with Syria and Iran being the most likely next candidates on the list, which 
would leave the PKK with nowhere to go. With the U.S. the dominant power in 
the Middle East in the spring of 2003, it would not seem far-fetched to venture 
the guess that the PKK would have been eager to reach some kind of 
accommodation with the new hegemon that would allow it at least to remain in 
Qandil. It is in this context that the proverbial sphinx of Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
movements, PJAK, comes into play, for which no analyst is able to reach a well-
grounded and conclusive explanation.  
 On the face of things PJAK is a sister-organisation of the PKK operating 
under the KCK umbrella and within the concept of democratic confederalism to 
advance, by military means if forced to, Kurdish cultural and civil rights within a 
confederal Iran. That is at least how today’s PKK and PJAK want it understood, 
with the PKK admitting that they and PJAK share logistics, facilities, supplies, 
and men in their mutually operated bases in the Qandil mountains at the Iraqi-
Turkish-Iranian border, yet are to be seen as separate but equal,938 similar to 
the PKK’s sister organisation PYD in Syria. PJAK asserts its aims are to ‘unite 
the Kurdish and Iranian opposition, to change the oppressive Islamic regime in 
Iran and to establish a free democratic confederal system for the Kurds and the 
Iranian peoples.’939 For the Turkish politico-military establishment PKK and 
PJAK are essentially the same, two sides of the same coin,940 which, based on 
the principle the enemy of my enemy is my friend, has lead to increased 
Iranian-Turkish anti-terror cooperation, despite the Iranian Regime’s past 
support of the PKK.941 At the same time, the blogosphere and Iranian media are 
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brimming over with allegations that the U.S. has used PJAK as a proxy to 
destabilize Iran, a conspiracy theory also detailed in more respectable 
publications,942 and, as could be expected, by the peerless Seymour Hersh.943 
However, as is the nature of the beast with covert operations, all claims are 
hardly ever sufficiently substantiated and often amount to not much more than, 
for example, a local security official in the border area in 2007, when asked 
whether the CIA or U.S. Special Forces were covertly training PJAK fighters, 
answering with a smile, ‘I’m allowed to say no, but I’m not allowed to say 
yes.’944 
One angle none of these sources mention and that is also absent from the 
sparse scholarly literature on PJAK is what I came across in my field research. 
Two prominent PKK dissidents, Osman Öcalan and Nizamettin Taş, 
independently of each other, claim that when PJAK was founded in 2003 it was 
their brain-child with the explicit agenda of gradually transforming the PKK into 
PJAK and winning U.S. support for continuing a peaceful political dialogue with 
Turkey, while simultaneously using PKK fighters to destabilize the Iranian 
regime for the Bush administration.945 In that they intended to copy the 
Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK, or People’s Mujahideen of Iran), a dissident group 
cum micro insurgency Saddam Hussein had hosted at Camp Ashraf near 
Baghdad, and for whom more substantial evidence exists that the U.S. at least 
toyed with the idea of using them as proxies against the regime in Tehran in 
their post-2003 hubris.946 Unlike what the official PKK party line asserts, that 
PJAK is an expression of democratic confederalism and the regional branch of 
the KCK, Öcalan and Taş – who fell out with each other while still in the PKK 
and again after their PWD alternative project failed – claim that during the 
chaotic days before 2003/4 when the PKK tried to formulate a coherent strategy 
and ideology, PJAK was conceived as a means to continue the political 
dialogue with Turkey under tacit U.S. backing, while, quid pro quo, providing 
PKK fighters for the Bush administration’s clandestine war against Iran. In other 
words, they intended for the PKK to become PJAK, and only when they had 
been forced out of the PKK in August 2004 and driven to pursue their third way 
project with the PWD, PJAK had been appropriated by the PKK leadership and 
integrated into its democratic confederalism strategy.947 Asked whether this 
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initiative bore any fruits, whether they managed to reach out to American 
officials to get support for PJAK, Nizamettin Taş remembers:  
N. T.: In the second half of 2003 and the first half of 2004 we met with many 
Americans in Mosul, in Baghdad, here in Hewler for talks. We asked them for 
money, for supplies, and weapons to fight in Iran. 
Q.: Who were these Americans you met? 
N. T. They were military commanders and intelligence officers working here in Iraq. 
Q.: Do you remember what organization or institutions they worked for? What their 
functions in Iraq were, what their ranks were? 
N. T.: No, I don’t remember [those details], but they were high-ranking American 
military intelligence. We had about ten meetings with them, and we had the 
Americans agreeing to our proposal M But in these days all strategic decisions had 
to be approved by [Abdullah Öcalan], and he said no to our meetings. 
Q: So you are saying that in these talks you were close to reaching an agreement 
with the Americans you met to supply you with weapons to fight in Iran, but that 
nothing came of it because Öcalan forbade it? 
N. T. Yes, the Americans agreed to supply PJAK, they wanted us to work with 
them, but Öcalan disagreed with it M That’s why we left the PKK. 
Q.: Why did Öcalan disagree with this initiative? Would it not have been good for 
the PKK to receive American support? 
N. T. It was not Öcalan speaking. He was controlled by Ergenekon. It was not him 
making decisions, it was Ergenekon.948 
 
The scope of this study does not allow me to pursue this angle further and I 
do not advocate any specific theories or explananda on PJAK, but, if Taş’ 
account is credible, it would explain the sporadic meetings between U.S. 
officials and PKK leaders so many sources report of, why it took the U.S. until 
2009 when the Obama administration came in, to designate PJAK a terrorist 
organisation,949 and why, in the period of 2003 until 2007, during which Ankara 
had fallen out of Washington’s graces, all remained quiet on the KDP/PUK-PKK 
front: the two Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties may have waited to see what their 
major external backer, the U.S., had in plan for PKK/PJAK.  
By the same token is it conceivable that during this period of insecurity from 
2003 until 2008, when relations between Ankara and Erbil improved, and while 
the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties were negotiating in Baghdad over the scope, 
contours, and boundaries of their political entity within a federal Iraq, they 
preferred to keep the PKK as an ace up their sleeves, as a form of leverage that 
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could be employed if Turkey were to oppose the political structure of the new 
Iraq that turned out distinctly in the KRG’s favour. Until 2008, when Turkey 
nolens volens came to terms with the enhanced status of the Kurdistan Region, 
KDP and PUK knew that any increase in Iraqi Kurdish autonomy was anathema 
for the Turkish politico-military establishment that would see it as a first step 
towards future independence – these Turkish fears applied in particular to the 
inclusion of oil-rich Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Region, which it was presumed, 
would provide Erbil with the economic muscle to declare independence in the 
future.950 The Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties had very little to counter this 
perception. No matter how often their leaders went on the record that they did 
not intend to pursue a unilateral declaration of independence and were not 
preparing for it, the Turkish politico-military establishment would not abandon 
the almost pathological impression – dating back, as has been shown, to the 
post-World War One era – that its Kurdish minority together with Kurds abroad 
were conspiring with external actors, in this case the U.S., to divide the Turkish 
watan. If Turkish decision makers could not be convinced of the Iraqi Kurds’ 
non-secessionist intentions, KDP and PUK logic might have dictated, Ankara 
would have to be offered something else to appreciate their willingness to 
cooperate with Turkey in a re-structured Iraq, and to acquiesce into the KRG 
gaining political and territorial ground in this as yet to be constructed polity. Of 
the little leverage KDP and PUK had on Turkey, the PKK card would have been 
the strongest, either played by offering their good offices in finding a political 
solution to the conflict or by collaborating in a final military assault on the PKK, 
in exchange for Turkey not posing an insurmountable obstacle in the pro-
Kurdish political reconstitution of Iraq.951 Naturally, most KRG officials reject any 
notions that the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties would have considered the PKK 
presence on their territory a leverage to be used against Turkey when the 
situation called for it. The paraphrased official post-2005 KRG line on the PKK 
is:  
The PKK is an issue external to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. It is a domestic issue 
for the Turkish state, and therefore any solution to it has to be found in Turkey, and 
primarily by Turkey. We believe and advocate for this position to be a peaceful, 
political dialogue, and pledge to do anything in our power to assist such a dialogue, 
but there is nothing we can do against the PKK in the mountains at our border with 
Turkey.952 
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 When reminded that since the KRG claims to be in quasi-sovereign control 
of its territory it has an obligation to neighbouring states to prevent attacks from 
insurgencies from its territory on neighbouring countries, the usual paraphrased 
response is either, ‘we are part of the federal state of Iraq and share this 
responsibility with the Iraqi state’ – an astonishing attempt at having it both 
ways, since the KRG would not tolerate Iraqi troops policing its border with 
Turkey – or,  
we fought the PKK in the 1990s, suffered many casualties in these wars, but failed 
to dislodge them – as did the Turkish military on dozens of occasions. How are we 
to succeed in a task, in which the mighty Turkish military failed? M There is no 
military solution to the PKK’s presence in the mountains, only a political one. But 
this political solution cannot come from us, it has to come from Turkey, we can only 
assist in it.953 
One high-ranking official representing the KRG abroad with whom I talked, 
while denying that the KRG has used the PKK as leverage on Turkey in the 
past, at least considered the potential for the PKK presence to be used as a 
leverage in future KRG-Turkish negotiations:  
As a government, and [Turkey] too, any two parties, they would leverage anything 
they have, they would be dumb not to M I’m not saying that we use it as a 
leverage, M on all these issues such as the status of Kirkuk there was no dialogue 
with Turkey [between 2003 and 2008], Turkey refused to engage with us or the 
Iraqi government, but now that relations [with Turkey] are good M I think we should 
leverage everything, that’s would you do as a government negotiating with other 
governments.954 
Naturally, the Turkish government disagrees with the official KRG line on 
the PKK presence on its territory: 
Even if we accept that the KRG cannot prevent the PKK from carrying out attacks 
on Turkey from Iraqi territory – to which the Iraqi state, of which the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq is a part, would be obligated by international law – there are many 
ways the KRG could limit the PKK’s freedom to operate on Iraqi territory. My 
government has very openly and repeatedly stated that we think the KRG has not 
done enough in this regard, but we appreciate that recently they have been putting 
means into place that limit the PKK’s capabilities.955 
Notwithstanding the means the KRG put in place in 2011 to limit the PKK’s 
freedom to operate on its territory, such as curtailing access for journalists to 
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Qandil – which prevented me from conducting interviews there – I find it hard to 
believe that a joint military operation of Turkey, the U.S., and the KRG after 
2008, when these parties had mended their differences, would not be able to 
dislodge the PKK from its mountain strongholds. ‘The question is not whether 
the KRG can do this together with Turkey and the U.S., but whether they want 
to do it. The KRG lacks the political will to enter such an alliance to fight the 
PKK, it is not in their interest,’ Denise Natali, an authority on Iraqi Kurdistan who 
lived there for many years, agrees.956 Several Iraqi Kurdish journalists I talked 
to in Erbil and Sulimaniyah share this view that if there had been the political will 
of the KRG to join an alliance with Turkey and the U.S. to expel the PKK from 
its territory, they could have accomplished it, but that the KRG has no interest in 
doing so. Having established that, opinions differ on why the KRG lacks the 
political will to confront the PKK as part of an international alliance. Some say 
that Iraqi Kurdish and Kurdish opinion worldwide would not tolerate KRG 
peshmerga fighting fellow Kurds on Turkey’s behest, while others argue that 
such a war would claim too many lives, and yet others again agree with the 
position that it is politically more expedient for the KRG to have a weakened 
PKK on its territory, where it can be controlled and potentially used in a trade-off 
with Turkey.957 
I would argue that, when reasoning for using the PKK as leverage in future 
negotiations with Turkey, the above quoted KRG official got the sequence of 
strategic thinking wrong. During the period when Turkey boycotted the KRG 
from 2003 until 2008 it would make sense to keep the PKK card up one’s 
sleeve, not as leverage – since hardly any contacts took place between both 
parties – but to use as an asset in case Turkey’s boycott would transform into 
outright obstruction. Today, since Turkey-KRG relations are excellent, trade is 
booming, and both governments cooperate on a host of economic and strategic 
issues, from joint energy projects to supporting the same clients in the Syrian 
Civil War, exerting leverage with the PKK would be counterproductive. What is 
more, in the current political discourse, with the KRG trying to portray itself 
globally in costly media and lobbying campaigns as an island of peace and 
prosperity open for business and investment, the PKK is no longer an asset but 
a disturbing factor. This became apparent when I interviewed the KRG Minister 
of Trade, Sinan Abdulkhalq Ahmed Chalabi, and reminded him that we had met 
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the previous year with a student delegation from the University of Exeter, of 
which a good number were Kurds from Turkey. The minister was in a foul mood 
since on a screen behind us CNN was broadcasting images into the world of 
Turkish fighter jets bombing PKK positions on Iraqi Kurdish territory while he 
was preparing to host the Erbil International Trade Fair, the biggest economic 
event the Kurdistan Region had staged in its history. ‘Yes, I remember, you 
were here with these militants,’ the minister grumbled. ‘They kept saying, “we 
are from Northern Kurdistan.” Why use the same language as these militants?’, 
he said and pointed at the screen. ‘Why not say, we are Kurds from Turkey?’958 
Intriguingly, here we had a minister from the freest political entity in Kurdish 
history using the same semantic line of argument the Turkish state had 
employed for decades, objecting to Kurds using the word Kurdistan. He then 
kept taking issue with the ‘reckless militancy’ of the PKK jeopardising everything 
the Kurds in Iraq had accomplished, compromising relations with Turkey, driving 
away business and foreign investors, and discrediting the Kurdistan Region as 
an economic hub for the region.959 Today, as in October 2011 when this 
interview was conducted, the strategic thinking of KRG decision makers is 
primarily investment-oriented, and the PKK is seen as bad for business;960 in 
this world view the PKK’s presence in Iraqi Kurdistan is certainly not seen as an 
ace up their sleeves but, at the very least, a disruptive element, or, in the 
language these decision makers understand best, a disturbance term in 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory used to calculate the rate of return of the economic 
asset the Kurdistan Region constitutes. 
Again, though, I believe the relations between the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist 
parties and the PKK in post-2008 Iraqi Kurdistan cannot be explicated by 
instrumentalist explananda alone, that is by being reduced to material interests. 
If that were the case, since the PKK is a disruptive element to the peace and 
progress of the Kurdistan Region, the KRG would join forces with Turkey to rid 
themselves once and for all from them. That they have not taken military action 
against them since 2000 – given the incessant fighting of the 1980s and 1990s, 
this decade of peace appears almost an eternity – I believe, is a function of the 
evolving identity of Iraqi Kurdistan that is currently in a process of rapid 
transformation, and therefore is one facet to the variations of Kurdish identity of 
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the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties. Aliza Marcus concludes her study on the 
PKK with the observation: 
”Turkey’s Kurds used to face Istanbul,” remarked M Tayfun Mater, a former activist 
in the militant Turkish left, and an often prescient commentator. He meant that 
many Kurds, whether or not they backed the PKK, once believed the answer to the 
Kurdish problem lay in the multicultural streets of Istanbul, that Kurds and Turks 
may jointly come up with a mutually agreeable solution. “But these days, they face 
Iraq,” he said.961 
A similar point is made by Akkaya & Jongerden, representative of many 
accounts on the post-2005 Kurdistan Region, that ‘Iraqi Kurdistan M as an 
autonomous, self-ruling territory M turned out to be a center of attraction for 
many Kurds’.962 Indeed, it was this image of hope for the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq to become a champion of Kurdish civil rights in the wider Middle East that I 
took from my 2005 travels through southeastern Turkey and my talks with 
Kurdish friends from Turkey and Iran in Vienna that lead me to write my 2007 
novel and induced me to study the relations between the PKK and the Iraqi 
Kurdish nationalist parties. In 2010, I attended a presentation of the KRG 
Representative to the UK, Bayam Abdul Rahman at SOAS in London, where 
she was beseeched by the mostly Kurdish audience for the KRG to advocate on 
this group’s behalf with the Iranian government, to be more outspoken on the 
dragging ‘Kurdish Initiative’ with Ankara, to demand from Damascus to grant 
Syrian Kurds citizenship, to plea with the Danish government to stop its 
indictment against ROJ-TV, etc.963 – demands very often beyond the KRG’s 
level of influence with regional or European governments, and yet, still in 2010, 
despite critical voices starting to question the KRG’s potential to act as a 
saviour for Kurds throughout the region,964 the narrative of hope that the freest 
political entity in Kurdish history would advocate on the behalf of Kurds 
everywhere has persisted among many. Ever since the days of Mulla Mustafa, 
while strategically pursuing an Iraqi Kurds-first policy, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have 
basked in the glory of being seen as spiritual figureheads of the Kurdish 
struggle for self-determination in all parts of what is called Kurdistan, yet today, 
when this allure has actually become part of the perception of the Kurdistan 
Region by other Kurds and has aroused very real demands and expectations, 
this role seems to often ask too much of Iraqi Kurdish leaders. ‘There are so 
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many expectations of our leadership by Kurds everywhere,’ Abdul Rahman 
admitted later. 
Expectations we cannot always live up to M we will always be sympathetic to 
Kurds struggling for human or cultural rights everywhere in the region and here in 
Europe and will never tire to advocate on their behalf but first and foremost we are 
committed to the well being of [our] people in Iraqi Kurdistan M [which] sometimes 
puts limitations on what we can do.965 
These limitations become particularly acute when Iraqi Kurdish evolving 
identity as the freest political entity in Kurdish history, and the wider Kurdish 
expectations that come with that perception, clash with the strategic interests of 
the KRG to maintain Turkey’s goodwill towards the Kurdistan Region. The 
resulting complex matrix of identities and interests that often mirrors a tightrope 
walk or ‘delicate balance’ the KRG is compelled to strike, as Michael Gunter has 
observed.966 In other words, identity does matter in PKK-KDP/PUK relations in 
the 2000s but not in the simplistic notion the ethnic alliance model suggests of 
the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties forming an alliance with the PKK against 
Turkey – which has been soundly disproven with this study.  Instead these 
relations operate in a more complex matrix of shifting interests and evolving 
identities that can explain why the KRG, despite material interests suggesting it, 
cannot afford to act militarily against the PKK on Turkey’s behest: to do so 
would run counter to the configurations of the complex matrix of Iraqi Kurdish 
identities and interests in the 2000s, and as such the refusal of the KRG to 
engage the PKK militarily is to be seen as part of this matrix in permanent flux. 
This tightrope walk of balancing identities and interests that constitute the 
meaning of Iraqi Kurdish identity in the 2000s/2010s both via Turkey but also 
Kurdish expectations in the region and diaspora, becomes apparent with the 
KRG’s attempts to assist the 2009 ‘Kurdish Initiative’ of the AKP government 
with a pan-Kurdish peace conference aimed at facilitating a peaceful solution to 
the PKK conflict. Just within its first two years in power the AKP government 
had implemented more far-reaching reforms of Kurdish minority rights than any 
previous Turkish government – from lifting the state of emergency in the 
provinces of Southeast Anatolia where it was still enforced to removing 
restrictions on the use of Kurdish language in public, to permitting limited radio 
242 
 
broadcasting on private channels and tolerating Kurdish language education at 
private schools.  
While those reforms were not new and indeed most were introduced before the 
AKP took office [by previous governments in order to prepare the ground for 
accession talks with the EU], it was the AKP that turned them into a coherent 
reform agenda, had the political will and talent to sell them to an often sceptical 
public, and allocated the financial and other resources that were needed to 
implement them M For the most part, the AKP M has carefully crafted its reform 
agenda around the concepts of individual rights and general minority rights rather 
than Kurdish collective rights as such – a position that also happens to be aligned 
with the predominant EU approach to such matters.967 
The AKP’s reforming zeal stalled, though, when the PKK ended its 
unilateral ceasefire in 2004. With military casualties in southeast Anatolia 
mounting and TAK carrying out terrorist attacks on civilian targets and tourist 
infrastructure in Istanbul and Turkey’s coastal resorts in the summer of 2006,968 
the government of PM Erdoğan was forced to launch a series of major 
offensives into Iraqi Kurdistan in late 2007 and early 2008, that, although 
militarily ineffective, as discussed earlier, brought the U.S. government and the 
KRG back on Turkey’s side. The military impasse, combined with the AKP 
competing with the DTP for the ‘Kurdish vote’ and a new, less paranoid foreign 
policy doctrine that instead of perceiving Turkey’s neighbours as an inherent 
threat sought to engage them in projects of mutual interests, lead to a shift in 
the public discourse with civil society organisations and business associations – 
most prominently the Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation, TESEV) – demanding a 
reconsideration of the state’s approach to Kurdish minority rights and the PKK 
conflict. Although at first hesitantly, the AKP took up the cue,969  and under the 
leadership of the Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay started to engage in a far-
reaching dialogue with civil society organisations to prepare the ground for 
extensive political, social, and economic reforms – since July 2009 dubbed the 
‘Kurdish Initiative’ – that were supposed to culminate in a grandiose ‘National 
Unity Initiative’ and, a pet project the AKP had pursued since 2007, the drafting 
of a new constitution embracing the diversity of Turkish society.970 Despite such 
auspicious openings, ‘it soon became evident M that the AK Party had not 
thought out its Kurdish Initiative very well and then proved rather inept in trying 
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to implement it’.971 While ‘representatives of Kurdish civil society, Kurdish 
intellectuals, and leftist political activists expressed frustration about the glacial 
pace of progress, and the ease with which demands for increased democratic 
rights had been framed as ethno-nationalist, divisive, or separatist in spirit’,972 
PKK and DTP misused the government’s offer of amnesty for a publicity stunt 
that scared the Turkish public away from considering more far-reaching 
concessions and eroded popular support for the Kurdish Initiative.973 It is 
debatable whether the AKP ever sincerely pursued a reformist agenda with the 
potential of breaking the three decade long stalemate between the Turkish state 
and the PKK,974 and whether the PKK with its various sub-divisions and 
competing decision-making bodies was ever willing and able to respond to 
conciliatory gestures and a genuine national dialogue for peace in kind. The fact 
is that by the end of 2009 the AKP had lost interest in pursuing its Kurdish 
Initiative any further; the banning of the DTP by the Constitutional Court on 11 
December was merely the death blow to an already wasted away 
momentum.975 
 All throughout 2009, though, Iraqi Kurdish and international media were 
abuzz with the proposal for a pan-Kurdish peace conference to be held in Erbil 
and hosted by the KRG, that not only for the first time would bring together all 
main Kurdish parties to discuss ethno-nationalist conflicts in all four parts of 
wider Kurdistan but also to accompany the Kurdish Initiative of the AKP 
government.976 Simultaneously, the possibility of Scandinavian countries 
granting high-ranking PKK leaders asylum was explored,977 and allegedly CIA 
officers even went to Qandil to persuade the PKK to lay down their arms.978 
There were clear indications that a substantial international effort was under 
way to find a peaceful solution to the PKK conflict and for confidence building 
measures between the KRG and the AKP government that appeared to follow 
the script of a 2007 report by David Phillips, a U.S. scholar held in high regard 
by policymakers in both Erbil and Ankara, in which he had laid out precisely 
such a roadmap for peace;979 in April 2009 Phillips and the Atlantic Council of 
the United States hosted a first promising workshop between Turkish and Iraqi 
Kurdish delegates in Washington.980 However, as in Turkey, by the end of 2009 
the momentum suddenly petered out and the initiative disappeared from the 
headlines. Theories for the failure of the KRG supporting the AKP’s Kurdish 
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Initiative with a pan-Kurdish summit abound, the most obvious being that the 
KRG abandoned the idea when the AKP aborted its own Kurdish Initiative, 
which it was supposed to accompany. Phillips believes that Turkey’s whole 
‘Kurdish Initiative amounts to nothing M that the AKP never was sincere about 
it, never put the necessary political capital behind it,’ and in addition that ‘any 
PKK presence at such a conference [in Iraqi Kurdistan] would have legitimised 
the PKK, an impossible scenario for Turkey M when they realised that they 
pulled the plug.’981 Others believe that Turkey, after initial support, backed off 
from approving the summit at the eleventh hour when it realised the risks that 
would inevitably come with dozens of Kurdish delegates from all four countries 
coming together discussing their right to national self-determination. ‘I think it 
was typical of Nechervan Barzani, one of his many over-ambitious projects that 
was not thought through enough, not discussed with all parties, and lacked 
political backing and planning,’ Abbas Vali evaluated the KRG plans for a pan-
Kurdish conference.982 One of my Iraqi Kurdish journalist contacts concurred, ‘it 
was a vanity project. And when the Turks saw where this was heading, they 
shut it down.’983 In retrospect the KRG plan to host a pan-Kurdish conference in 
Erbil may seem to have lacked planning and did not sufficiently take into 
account Turkey’s reaction to the idea of dozens of Kurdish delegates 
congregating in Erbil to discuss the future of Kurdish national identity on a 
national and supra-national level. To me it seems more than just one of the 
many KRG vanity projects, though. I would argue it looks like a genuine attempt 
to bring the centripetal forces that constitute the dynamic matrix of shifting 
interests and evolving identities of the current Iraqi Kurdish political space into 
harmony, to square the circle, if you want, of strategic interests via Turkey, and 
taking a more active role as a figurehead in the Kurdish nationalist discourse to 
satisfy the expectations of so many Kurds abroad. The fact that the KRG-
sponsored pan-Kurdish summit ultimately fell through then does not diminish its 
illustrative value in showing the workings of the matrix of identities and interests 
that constitutes the contemporary nature of Iraqi Kurdish political space and the 
nationalist discourse.   
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Iraqi Kurdistan – a political entity within but at the same time apart 
from Iraq 
Another aspect that shapes this matrix of identities and interests and has a 
significant impact on the relations between the KRG and Kurdish ethno-
nationalist parties in other parts of what is called wider Kurdistan, is the image 
of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a beacon of hope, a source of emulation or a 
model case for and potential supporter of Kurdish national self-determination 
beyond Iraq. In order to appreciate the significance of this image and to 
evaluate its political and ideational potential in a wider ethnicised Kurdish 
discourse cum struggle for national self-determination, one needs to return to 
the question about the nature and status of the current Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
In other words, one needs to ask what is actually meant by ‘the freest political 
entity in Kurdish history’, what are its freedoms and constraints, how are those 
expressed in political practice, which is what I will focus on for the remainder of 
this chapter. 
Strictly speaking, from a perspective of international law only, the case of 
Iraqi Kurdistan is quite straightforward: it is an autonomous region within the 
federal Republic of Iraq. In terms of political realities, though, the case is all but 
clear-cut. For what kind of autonomy or federative status are we talking about 
here? The degree of autonomy the Kurdistan Region enjoys in Iraq surpasses 
all comparable international cases of federally structured states, whether the 
U.S., Russia, Scotland within the UK, the regions of Flanders and Wallonia in 
Belgium, the Basque region in Spain, Quebec in Canada – none of these 
international precedents can claim a degree of autonomy and self-governance 
comparable to the Kurdistan Region.  
The Kurdistan Region has its own parliament, and its President Massoud Barzani 
M is the commander in chief of the Iraqi Kurdish armed forces M estimated 
127,000 deployable men that, despite this being stipulated in the constitution, have 
not yet been integrated into the Iraqi Army and likely never will. With a population 
of 4.7 million and an annual GDP of $20 billion, the Kurdistan Region, in sheer 
economic figures, plays in the same league as independent states like Albania, 
Cambodia, and North Korea. International investors continue to  flock there, major 
European carriers like Lufthansa operate direct flights to its capital Erbil, where five 
star hotels run by the Kempinski and Hyatt group are mushrooming, and all major 
EU countries as well as the US, Korea, Japan, and Russia have consulates or 
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interest sections there. The Kurdistan Region itself entertains representations that 
are de facto embassies in three dozen countries.984 
When evaluating the degree of autonomy the Kurdistan Region enjoys in 
Iraq, including de facto autonomous foreign representation and control of its 
own armed forces, one cannot help but agree with Brendan O’Leary that 
‘Kurdistan [is] freer within Iraq than any member state within the European 
Union’;985 yet the member states of the European Union are still independent, 
sovereign states. If the degree of de facto independence Erbil enjoys from 
Baghdad exceeds that of London, Paris or Berlin from Brussels, how is it then 
justifiable to analyse the status of the Kurdistan Region in legal terms only and 
to content oneself exclusively with what is written on the non-blushing paper of 
the constitution? 
Such a strictly legalistic approach appears even less justifiable because the 
KRG since 2005 has spared no effort in unilaterally expanding on its freedoms 
in defiance of the central government in Baghdad – in particular on the two most 
controversial issues the constitution failed to adequately address: the status of 
the so called ‘contested territories’ and the question of who ultimately controls 
the natural resources and resulting revenues in the autonomous region.  
Provisions on oil and gas were often ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. Oil 
and gas were owned by all the people of Iraq “in regions and governorates” (Article 
109), but management of these resources from “current fields” was to be 
undertaken “with” producing regions and governorates, making this a shared 
responsibility; so, too, was the distribution of proceeds, in proportion to the 
population (Article 110).986 
Given the paramount importance of the state’s vast oil and gas reserves for 
the economies and prosperity of Iraq proper and the Kurdistan Region, it should 
come as no surprise that for nine years now Erbil and Baghdad have failed to 
reach a comprehensive legislative accord on the exploitation, licensing, 
management, pipeline infrastructure, and distribution of revenues of the wealth 
of natural resources within the territory controlled by the KRG.987 The failure to 
reach a hydrocarbon law by common consent and the ambiguities in the 
language of the constitution have led the KRG to repeatedly invoke Article 115 
that ‘states the supremacy of regional laws over federal laws,’ and according to 
their interpretation, ‘can be invoked if no agreement is reached on the 
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management of oil and gas resources and the distribution of proceeds’.988 Thus 
supposedly legally covered, the KRG has kept going about unilaterally awarding 
exploitation licenses to international oil companies in circumvention of the 
central government, most prominently to Exxon Mobil in 2011/2.989 
The issue of the Kurdistan Region’s control over Iraq’s natural resources 
becomes even more explosive in those areas with an assumed Kurdish majority 
population yet outside the Kurdistan Region’s jurisdiction, the so called 
‘contested territories’, the most prominent being the oil rich city of Kirkuk.990 As 
has been mentioned previously, Kirkuk, before Saddam Hussein’s Arabization 
campaign was an ancient, multiethnic city with an inherently fluid identity of 
Arabs, Turkmen, Jews, and a large Kurdish community.991 It appears futile to 
discuss whether Kirkuk in recent history actually had a Kurdish majority 
population;992 what matters here is the paramount symbolic value of the city as 
the prime urban centre of the Kurdish community in Iraq, and as a means to 
right the wrongs of the Saddam Hussein era, which led Jalal Talabani to once 
call it ‘our Jerusalem’.993 After the 2003 war Kurds returned to Kirkuk in large 
numbers, supporting the argument that if today a referendum on the status of 
Kirkuk were held, the outcome presumably would go in favour of joining the 
Kurdistan Region.994 Such a referendum is precisely what Article 140 of the 
Iraqi Constitution foresaw being held by 31 December 2007,995 yet given the 
incessant ethnic tensions in the city, in 2006 the US Iraq Study Group 
recommended that ‘international arbitration is necessary to avert communal 
violence’ and for the referendum to ‘be delayed’,996 an opinion consented to by 
the UN, who, among several alternatives, advocated either for a special status 
of Kirkuk or for an afore negotiated compromise to serve as the basis for a 
future referendum.997 Since then, as with a national hydrocarbon law, the 
process has stalled, all parties to the conflict routinely employ local militias as 
proxies in the contested territories, leading to charged standoffs between the 
KRG peshmerga and the regular Iraqi army, as had happened in Khanaqin in 
Diyala province in 2008 and again in 2012,998 as well as in Kirkuk during the 
Kurdish mass protests of 2011.999 
On most of these issues Turkey, since 2008, has come to either indirectly 
back the the KRG via Baghdad, directly profited from it, as in the case of energy 
supplies, or at least rescinded obstacles it had posed previously to thwart Iraqi 
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Kurdish expansionism – all to the extent that some Turkish commentators 
lamented that the AKP had sacrificed good relations with Baghdad to support 
the KRG,1000 and for Bill Park to conclude that, ‘indeed, the KRG now appears 
as an almost isolated beacon of Turkey’s “zero-problems” approach to its 
neighbours’.1001 With respect to Kirkuk, Ankara, for whom the city and its oil 
resources’ incorporation into the Kurdistan Region had long constituted a red 
line, downgraded the support for its local proxy, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF, 
Irak Türkmen Cephesi).1002 In December 2011, the Vice-president of Iraq, Tareq 
al-Hashimi of the cross-sectarian Iraqiyaa party of former PM Iyad Allawi, 
confronted with politically motivated charges by the Maliki government, fled to 
the Kurdistan Region, who refused Baghdad’s request to extradite him.1003 After 
a diplomatic row as between two sovereign states, Hashimi escaped to Turkey, 
where he resides today, protected by state security,1004 and where Barzani 
visited him in April 2012, after, in a joint press conference with PM Erdoğan, 
condemning PM Maliki’s ‘increasing authoritarianism’ and his ‘stirring ethnic and 
sectarian’ tensions in Iraq.1005 As of today, the most brazen Kurdistan Region-
Turkish joint venture in defiance of nominal Iraqi sovereignty occurred in the 
following month when PM Erdoğan announced that the two governments, 
together with Exxon Mobil, would build a new network of pipelines directly 
linking Turkey to the Kurdistan Region’s rich oil and gas reserves.1006 Since until 
now most of the Iraqi Kurdish oil and gas exports have reached Turkey through 
the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, outside the KRG’s territorial control, this step 
indicates a major shift in Ankara’s thinking towards recognition of Erbil’s 
sovereign control of its natural resources at the expense of the Iraqi central 
government. Given this degree of diplomatic exposure, and in a most ironic 
twist of fate, it appears no exaggeration to suggest that the AKP government in 
Turkey has replaced the U.S. after the American troop withdrawal in 2011 as 
the main external backer of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy via Baghdad.1007 In 
December 2012, PM Nechirvan Barzani alluded to as much when he was 
interviewed on the possibility of Iraqi Kurdish independence: 
I believe, yes, we have a very good opportunity. But we have a lot of challenges as 
well. How we can — I mean an independent Kurdistan — first of all we have to 
convince at least one country around us. Without convincing them, we cannot do 
this. Being landlocked we have to have a partner, a regional power to be convinced 
and internationally, a major power to be convinced to support that.1008 
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While Barzani might be overly optimistic in hoping that the ‘one country 
around us’ he is referring to, which is obviously Turkey, would eventually 
support Iraqi Kurdish independence, the degree of Turkish-KRG collaboration 
against Baghdad has reached a level that the power who originally conceived of 
and nurtured their rapprochement, became increasingly concerned. Francis 
Ricciardone, U.S. ambassador in Turkey warned: 
Turkey and Iraq have no choice but to pursue strong ties if they want to optimize 
the use of Iraq’s resources and export them via Turkey. If Turkey and Iraq fail to 
optimize their economic ties, the failure could be worse than that. There could be a 
more violent conflict in Iraq and [the chances of] disintegration of Iraq could be 
[strengthened].1009 
Joost Hiltermann of the ICG was even more explicit when observing, ‘the 
U.S. government is very pleased with [the] rapprochement between Turkey and 
KRG, but it will not support an alliance between Ankara and Arbil that would 
tear Iraq apart.’1010 All the more since in America, despite the initial enthusiasm 
about Iraqi Kurdistan as the ‘sole success story’ of the Iraq War,1011 in light of 
increasing authoritarianism, unbridled corruption and human rights violations in 
the Kurdistan Region,1012 the media coverage has become more critical.1013  
Nonetheless, the degree of constitutional and extra-constitutional freedoms 
the Kurdistan Region enjoys leads Denise Natali to still treat it as a de facto or 
quasi state and James Harvey to call it a ‘de facto independent territory’ despite 
its federal status within Iraq.1014 Likewise, Gareth Stansfield, after initially 
embracing the federal/regional principle for Iraq,1015 appears to have increasing 
doubts as to whether the Kurdistan Region’s current status is not merely a 
transitional state towards full independence. After declaring that ‘the Kurdistan 
Region has matured into an institutionalised reality in territorial, political, and 
economic terms’, he outlines a scenario that although ‘hypothetical’ is 
‘constructed on facts and events that have come to pass in recent years’1016 for 
the Kurdistan Region to declare independence by 2016. Tellingly, in Stansfield’s 
scenario, it is again Turkey that comes to the KRG’s rescue with a military 
intervention, after the latter suffered a rout at the hands of the Iraqi army over 
Kirkuk. By the same token, Ofra Bengio speculates that Barzani is pursuing a 
‘creeping independence M until the Kurdish leadership is sure that Ankara and 
Washington would accept Kurdish independence as a fait accompli’,1017 a 
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scenario she further elaborates in a monograph and op-eds.1018 Again, as a 
decade earlier, it is explanatory IR scholars and their state-centric determinism 
that collaborate through their categorisations in creating the ‘realities on the 
ground’ in ethnicised discourses. Realities that, according to them, then permit 
only one ‘pragmatic’ solution: to translate said ethnic divisions, which have been 
portrayed as but are not independent of the discourse that constitutes them, into 
institutionalised divisions, i.e. long term, the breakup of a state into two or more 
independent sovereign nation states.  
Yet, is it actual independence that Massoud Barzani and the KRG are truly 
after? While in a public opinion poll in 2012, 60 percent of 2,500 questioned in 
all three provinces supported the idea of the Kurdistan Region becoming an 
independent state1019 – a significant drop from a provisional referendum held in 
2005 in which 99 percent endorsed independence1020 – Hussein Tahiri alleges, 
‘historically M it was the Kurdish leadership who would be asking for an 
independent Kurdish state while the Kurdish masses lacked those sentiments. 
After the invasion of Iraq it has become the Kurdish masses who are 
demanding a Kurdish state, while [their] leaders do not’.1021 Admittedly, The 
Iraqi Kurdish leaders’ statements in this context are inconsistent and often 
contradictory. In January 2005, for example, Massoud Barzani declared: 
I am certain there will be an independent Kurdistan, and I hope to see it in my 
lifetime. Self-determination is the natural right of our people, and they have the 
right to express their desires M When the right time comes [a Kurdish state] will 
become a reality.1022  
On the other hand, as recently as in April 2012, in what might have been 
one of his last major interviews, Jalal Talabani went on the record: 
Not only is independence not possible, but also now it is in the interest of the 
Kurdish people to remain within the framework of Iraq M it is within the framework 
of a democratic federal Iraq that we are engaging in all activities, and we have all 
kinds of freedom and we have all possibilities, but we must be realistic. A politician 
who wants to serve his people must lead people in a way that serves their interests 
M Imagine the Kurdish Parliament decided to be independent. Even if none of 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq or Iran fought the new state with arms, but simply closed the 
borders, how could anyone get there? So we must be realistic, we are enjoying our 
rights now.1023 
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Such ambiguities and contradictions are understandable, though, given that 
international support for Kurdish independence today appears no greater than 
in 2005. Despite the AKP-KRG rapprochement, I believe, a unilateral Iraqi 
Kurdish declaration of independence is a red line not even PM Erdoğan would 
permit Massoud Barzani to cross, and the U.S. opposition to Iraqi Kurdish 
independence, to me, seems to have increased rather than tapered off since 
2005. Insofar then, from a perspective of realpolitik, Barzani using the threat of 
declaring independence as leverage via Baghdad, yet in actual terms refraining 
from crossing this bridge too far makes perfect sense. Nonetheless, it is an 
opinion routinely encountered in the cafes of Iraqi Kurdistan when sitting 
together with journalists, political activists, or students critical of the KRG and 
Barzani’s leadership that the Iraqi Kurdish president has no intention of 
pursuing independence but is actually content to emulate the Kurdish emirates 
of early modern times, where hereditary rulers enjoined a considerable degree 
of autonomy from the Sublime Porte.1024 
In the many military clashes between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the border region the Kurdish tribal 
federations inhabited became of paramount strategic importance to both sides. 
‘As a result, Kurdish allegiance to the two empires fluctuated during th[e 
sixteenth] century, indicating that the Kurds were not passive partners in the 
state-tribe interaction’,1025 allowing Kurdish tribal leaders, often successfully, to 
play their temporary imperial overlords off against each other. One prominent 
example is Sharaf Khan IV of Bitlis - whose grandson, Sharaf Khan V, authored 
the famous Şerefname on the history of Kurdish dynasties in eastern Anatolia – 
other examples include, ‘when in the war of 1578-90, the Kurdish lords of Bitlis 
and Hakkari were able to use their allegiance to the Ottomans to extend their 
own territories. In 1605, however, the defection of some of the Kurdish leaders 
to the Safavids was a factor in Shah Abbas’ victory’.1026 Successive Ottoman 
dynasties tried to bring the wayward Kurdish principalities under closer central 
control. They introduced a system of sancaks (district), governed by a 
sancakbeyi, and several sancaks constituted an eyalet or beylerbeyilik 
(province), where executive authority lay with the beylerbeyi, later vali 
(governor) as the representative of the sultan.1027 In general, ‘the beys of 
frontier regions enjoyed greater autonomy than the beys who ruled sancaks 
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closer to the center’1028 – with the most remote sancaks, bordering a hostile 
empire, such as Safavid Iran, enjoying the greatest degree of autonomy. In 
order to better control the vacillating Kurdish emirs and to further integrate their 
dominions into the administrative structure of the empire, ‘hereditary succession 
was granted to the Kurdish beys loyal to the Ottoman state, an exceptional 
privilege in the Ottoman administration, M and the Ottoman state was 
extremely careful to ensure that power remained in the hands of the same ruling 
families’.1029 In a few cases of sancaks, referred to as hükümets at the Iranian 
border, the degree of self-rule went even further: 
The state preferred not to interfere in their succession and internal affairs, and 
contented itself with recognising the authority of the rulers. The sultan issued 
official diplomas of investiture to show his approval M They neither paid taxes to 
the Ottoman state nor provided regular military forces to the sipahi army.1030 
As has been briefly outlined earlier, the more these autonomous Kurdish 
principalities became integrated into the administrative structure of the empire 
and the more the central government succeeded in asserting its authority there 
through the beylerbeyi, the more Kurdish self-rule at the border came to fade 
during the second half of the seventeenth century, culminating in the last 
Kurdish emirate of Botan being abolished by force in 1847 as part of the 
tanzimat reform process.1031 
Is it conceivable then that Massoud Barzani pursues a more conservative, 
historical understanding of national self-determination that, while at odds with 
the modernist paradigm of the independent sovereign nation state being the 
end to all nationalist means, is more in tune with Kurdish cultural tradition and is 
distinguished by the principle of hereditary succession, mirrored in Sadiki’s 
‘dynastic republicanism’ that, as has been outlined earlier, defines the KDP? 
Additionally, such an alternative approach to national self-determination would 
also better reflect the realities on the ground than many disgruntled Iraqi 
Kurdish liberals’ urge for independence, since independence does not seem 
achievable in the current regional power constellations. Also, I would hazard the 
guess, it matters a greater deal to Massoud Barzani that Turkey and 
Exxon/Mobil are jointly developing oil and gas pipelines with the KRG in 
defiance of the central government in Baghdad than if Iraqi Kurdistan were 
recognised as an independent state by, say, Nicaragua, as is the case with 
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Abkhazia. An alternative and more traditionalist approach to national self-
determination then, whether inspired by the historic experience of the Kurdish 
emirates or not, far from being ‘backward’ and ‘tribalist’ as Tahiri charges,1032 
exhibits a greater degree of pragmatism, of making due with what is feasible in 
terms of realpolitik, than the, upon reflection seemingly utopian, demands for 
independence.  
In one crucial aspect at least, though – aside from the fact that any historic 
analogy from Medieval or early modern times should be treated with extreme 
caution when discussed in the context of the political status of Iraqi Kurdistan in 
twenty-first century – Massoud Barzani’s position in today’s Iraqi Kurdistan as a 
frontier region between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria differs significantly from the 
historic cases discussed. For unlike the Kurdish emirs, today’s Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders not only dominate politics at the periphery, but also hold considerable 
sway at the centre of the polity they nominally are part of:  
The President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, is [also] the leader of M [the] PUK, the 
foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari [of the KDP], is a Kurd, as is one of the Deputy 
Prime Ministers, the Minister of Trade and several other lesser portfolios; 57 of 325 
Iraqi MPs are members of Kurdish lists who played the role of kingmakers after the 
2005 and 2010 elections.1033 
As a matter of fact, and quite ironically in light of developments thereafter, 
today Nuri al-Maliki would not be prime minister of Iraq, had it not been for 
Massoud Barzani  throwing his weight behind him after arduous eight months of 
horse-trading, when the March 2010 elections at first produced the secular, 
cross-sectarian Iraqiyya alliance of former PM Iyad Allawi as numerical winner 
at the polls.1034 Such a temporary collaboration between Barzani and Maliki may 
appear at first sight perplexing, yet Toby Dodge points out that both Maliki’s 
Islamic Dawaa Party and the KDP belong to the political elite that had benefitted 
and thrived on the muhasasa principle, ‘the division of cabinet posts according 
to sectarian quotas, with its assertion of religious and ethnic identity, its defence 
of elite interests and its encouragement of both personal and political corruption 
and government incoherence’.1035 To this ‘elite pact’ the victory at the polls of a 
movement on an explicitly secular, non-sectarian platform with an agenda to 
transform the political landscape in Iraq away from ethno-sectarian binary 
opposites towards a more pronounced Iraqi identity, ‘was a direct threat’,1036 
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which is why Maliki and Barzani cooperated in neutralising Iraqiyaa in yet 
another government of national unity.1037 As a result of these complex 
dynamics, not only had ethno-sectarian divisions and those politically benefitting 
from them again triumphed, but relations between the Kurdistan Region and the 
central government in Iraq are not exclusively antagonistic but considerably 
more ambiguous than commonly portrayed. While some analysts argue that the 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership would not dare breaking from Iraq for fear of losing the 
seventeen percent of revenues from national oil and gas reserves due to the 
Kurdistan Region according to the constitution1038 – an argument increasingly 
sounding less convincing as the Kurdistan Region’s vast untapped natural 
resources may have the potential of making it self-sufficient in a not too distant 
future – it is these inner-Iraqi power constellations and machinations, I would 
argue, that provide the most convincing argument against a unilateral 
declaration of independence of the KRG any time soon: for as long as the 
Kurdistan Region nominally remains part of Iraq, its leaders can influence the 
political space and process within its perceived constitutive other – a luxury no 
so-called de facto state has, and the KRG would relinquish of necessity with 
independence. For the same reason, it appears worth pondering, Turkey might 
benefit from a perpetuation of the status quo rather than – as Stansfield and 
Bengio argue,1039 and some Iraqi Kurdish leaders may hope – coming to the 
KRG’s rescue in a unilateral bid for independence: through the KRG as a client 
entity, Ankara, to some extent, can influence the political space and process in 
Iraq as a whole, which is a considerably bigger benefit than just securing an 
independent Iraqi Kurdistan within its orbit. 
Aside from the admittedly limited applicability of historical parallels to 
contemporary polities, the above historical analogies then describe the present 
configurations of power, authority, sovereignty, and self-rule in Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region only to some extent. Yet, the simplistic and dichotomous 
approach of explanatory IR, simply asserting whether sovereignty exists or not, 
is no less incomplete. This constructed exclusivity of sovereignty that 
supposedly clearly demarcates an ‘inside’ sphere of domestic order from an 
‘outside’ of chaos and anarchy, an ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and arbitrates zones of 
exclusivity and universality, is, in the words of Cynthia Weber, the founding 
‘myth of [explanatory] IR’,1040 yet as has been shown in Part One, is an 
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epistemological and ontological fallacy that in its simplicity not only fails to 
capture the complexity of the actual social world but also, as the constitutive 
element of the sovereignty discourse, does not exist prior to that discourse. 
Consequently and since the principle of sovereignty as an act of representation 
that seeks to establish stable, fixed, and pre-given binary opposites as natural 
facts where there are none beyond the discourse of which said acts of 
representation are part, it remains ‘forever in the realm of discourse and 
cultural, not in the realm of natural’,1041 and should be studied as an expression 
of said discourse rather than the factual reality it is portrayed to be. If the binary 
opposite of sovereignty as clearly demarcating fixed and stable zones of 
inclusion and exclusion prior to the discourse that constructs it does not exist in 
any state, the fallacy of this paradigm becomes most apparent in the case of 
contemporary Iraq. Here, the contradicting conceptualisation of sovereignty and 
ethno-sectarian groupness, when, after reifying, essentialising, and 
substantialising ethnic divisions, attempting the thus constructed identity groups 
to coalesce and co-exist in the political form of a state without having nurtured 
any sentiments or allegiances to a shared communality beyond those groups, 
has rendered a situation where it is patently impossible to distinguish between 
an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, a ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’’, clear-cut zones of 
inclusion and exclusion. The result is not only an inherently dysfunctional state 
but also a Kurdistan Region within but at the same time apart from Iraq. The 
nature of the Kurdistan Region as a political entity within but at the same time 
apart from Iraq, in which as an everyday practice political identity is (re-
)negotiated within and constituted by a discourse among the inhabitants and 
political leaders of the Kurdistan Region, Iraq proper, the neighbouring countries 
and their ethnic minorities, and the international community at large; in other 
words it is re-producing day-in, day-out its distinct form of identity anew, and 
according to rapidly changing configurations of the matrix of identities and 
interests what it means to be an Iraqi Kurd. 
 Such a discursive practice of political and ethnic identities cannot be 
captured by the simplistic and epistemologically as well as ontologically flawed 
principle of sovereignty of explanatory IR. Its failure to explain the 
heterogeneous, often contradictory, and ambiguous realities of this discourse 
becomes even more apparent given the fact that the discourse on national self-
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determination does not necessarily follow the established, modernist and 
Eurocentric discourse of the sovereign, independent nation state as the 
culmination of all nationalist endeavours. On the contrary, Iraqi Kurdistan may 
be described as the site where three distinctly different concepts of national 
self-determination collide: (1) the hegemonic but at the same time Eurocentric 
and inherently contradictory understanding of explanatory IR; (2) the PKK’s 
concept of ‘democratic confederalism’ that, in rejection of the centralising and 
homogenising nation state, seeks to craft a more democratic society from the 
bottom up through communes, local collectives, and voluntary federations 
based on individualism and regionalism that embraces the inherent diversities 
and manifold identities of a society; (3) a more traditionalist understanding of 
self-governance grounded in the Kurdish historic experience as a border region 
between empires where the political space is determined  by conflicting, and at 
large ritualised suzerainties rather than exclusive sovereignties, and where 
dynastic republicanism, charismatic leadership, individual prowess, and 
personal achievement of elites is of greater relevance for governance and the 
relations between several nominal suzerains and their autonomous tributary 
than institutionalised practices and the letters of a constitution. The existence or 
mere possibility of these two alternative conceptualisations to national self-
determination – in the case of the PKK’s ‘democratic confederalism’ the 
essence of the party’s ideology, in the case of the latter, at this point, mostly 
educated speculation – amounts to nothing less but a substantial rejection of 
the claim of universal applicability of the modernist paradigm. Again, this makes 
Iraqi Kurdistan such an ideal case for studying the diversities the discourse on 
national self-determination, far from being a one way street, can pursue. 
This rejection of the universalist claim of the modernist paradigm and the 
resulting identity discourse and political practice that constitutes what it means 
to be an Iraqi Kurd as well as co-constitutively shape the parameters of a polity 
within but at the same apart from Iraq cannot be adequately captured by the 
one-size fits all, exclusivist, essentialist, and highly normative concept of 
sovereignty. Insofar then, all the above detailed actions of the KRG and the 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership – whether their attempts to erode Baghdad’s control 
over Iraqi Kurdistan’s natural resources and oil/gas revenues, the seemingly 
endless strife over the future of the ‘contested territories’, the role as kingmaker 
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in inner-Iraqi power struggles, the rapprochement between AKP and KRG, and 
the resulting Turkish backing of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, the lobbying activities 
in Western capitals, the image of an island of peace and prosperity in a region 
defined by conflict and chaos that is purported,  and ultimately the competition 
with the PKK, in Syria and elsewhere, for a pre-eminence in the (pan-)Kurdish 
ethno-nationalist discourse – are but expressions of the complex matrix of 
identities and interests at play in today’s Iraqi Kurdistan. To this extent then, 
Iraqi Kurdistan is neither an anomaly of the international system, as Caspersen 
& Stansfield argue for ‘de facto states’ in general and the Kurdistan Region in 
particular to be understood,1042 or a case sui generis but a clear expression and 
manifestation of the discursive character of the matrix of identies and interests 
that constitutes the political entities we study in IR. 
Ultimately then, reading this matrix as discursive practice liberates us as 
analysts from having to play soothsayers, tea-leaf readers, and from occupying 
too interventionist a role as co-protagonists in the ethno-nationalist conflicts we 
set out to describe. For by routinely invoking the modernist state-centric 
paradigm with independent statehood as the defining aspiration and desired 
outcome of any struggle for national self-determination, political scientists of the 
explanatory IR persuasion already pre-determine the trajectory of such conflicts, 
define its character through categorization, and collaborate with the ethno-
nationalist elites and their strategic essentialisms in directing the political 
discourse in one and only one direction. From this perspective, a failure to 
ultimately achieve independent statehood is all too often seen as a result of the 
dynamics of the conflict – that is the stronger party, at least to some extent, 
prevailing and thwarting the aspirations for national self-determination of a 
people either on the battlefield or at the negotiation table. The possibility that 
independent statehood has not and may still not be the ‘natural’ aspiration of 
the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, that they may consider it as corresponding with their 
strategic interests and ideational values to seek alternative expressions of a 
more qualified sovereignty, is rarely taken into account in their analysis. For to 
do so would fundamentally contradict the modernist state-centric paradigm and 
the pre-conceived notions about the nature of nationalism of these scholars 
and/cum practitioners. In a nutshell, it would substantially challenge the state-
centric founding myth of IR. And yet scholars of the explanatory IR persuasion 
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keep clinging fast to this reading of national self-determination, even though, as 
has been shown in this study, at least until 1992 – perhaps even later, given the 
episode when Talabani offered Özal Iraqi Kurdistan for annexation – the Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders harboured no demonstrable aspiration for independent 
statehood and since then continue to send mixed and deeply ambiguous 
signals. If they remain ambivalent about it – whether out of pragmatic, strategic 
calculations or for differing perceptions of nationhood – why are we scholars as 
categorisers then more explicit, essentialising, and deterministic than the 
situation evidently demands? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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11.) Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study has been to deconstruct explanatory IR’s 
understanding, frameworks, and concepts of ethnic conflict by employing a 
constitutive theory-grounded approach. In the theory section the focus has been 
on a critical reading of the discourses and narratives on ethnic conflict 
explanatory IR has constructed and established. Those narratives and 
discourses are characterised by a positivist, essentialist, and substantialist 
belief that the social world can be divided, measured and categorized into 
organic, static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous and bounded units and that 
these ethnic groups can be analytically equated with states, thus ascribing them 
with social agency as unitary or unitarily acting protagonists of ethnic conflict.In 
their examinations of ethnic conflict explanatory IR operationalizes ethnic 
identity as either the dependent variable, merely a political tool utilized by ethnic 
elites and entrepreneurs (and the masses) in their pursuit of mostly material 
interests, and thus of only extrinsic value in attempts to comprehend and 
capture the dynamics of ethnic conflict, or as the independent variable, where 
ethnic conflict is tautologically explained with ethnicity. Not only have the 
epistemologies, ontologies, and methodologies of this discourse been exposed 
as fallacious, it has also been shown how closely they correspond with the 
narratives set forth by the ethnic elites and entrepreneurs these studies set out 
to study. By reifying ethnic groups, presenting them as factual, static, 
substantive, distinct, homogeneous and bounded units of the social world that 
can be ascribed with social agency explanatory IR scholars not only play into 
the hands of ethnic elites and their claims to represent the group in an 
antagonistic relationship with the other, through their way of portraying the 
composition of the social world they often further accentuate, substantiate, and 
occasionally write those ideational lines of division that constitute them into 
existence.  
These themes and points of critiques have been taken up in the case study, 
in which, by way of examining the relations between the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-
nationalist parties and the PKK from the early 1980s until the present, I have 
shown the frameworks of explanatory IR on ethnic conflict, in particular the 
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ethnic alliance model and instrumentalism, to fail in adequately explaining the 
dynamics and complexities of their relations. The ethnic alliance model 
operationalizes ethnic identity as the independent variable and more explicitly 
than any other explanatory IR framework analytically equates the ethnic group 
with the state; instrumentalism, on the other, that deploys ethnic identity as the 
dependent variable all too often reduces it to a mere political tool with which 
shrewd and calculating ethnic elites manipulate the docile masses in pursuit of 
material interests, thus admitting it only extrinsic value and no explanatory 
qualities. While one could say that both are thus situated at opposite ends of the 
spectrum of explanatory IR’s approaxch to ethnic conflict, I have argued that a 
systemic constructivism and instrumentalism in particular exhibits a tendency of 
reifying the structure via the agent.  
In the case study I have demonstrated that neither instrumentalism nor 
ethnicity as the independent variable, on their own, comprehensively explain the 
motives and behaviour of the actors determining the relations between the Iraqi 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties, KDP and PUK, and the PKK. There are 
instances where instrumentalism, that is predominantly interests shaping 
policies and identities being reduced to political or propaganda tools, as when 
the KDP granted the PKK sanctuary on its territory in the early 1980s either on 
order of its external backers in Iran and Syria or in a failed attempt to win the 
PKK as a potential ally against its nemesis, the PUK. Likewise, the civil wars of 
the 1990s between KDP/PUK and the PKK and later PUK/PKK and KDP can be 
understood as violent expressions of regional rivalries and factionalisms in the 
case of the latter, and as dictated by the complex political necessities of the first 
Kurdish de facto state and its dependence on Turkey and the international 
community at large. Yet, instrumentalism cannot sufficiently explain why the 
Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties started to collaborate in the first place – 
after the military coup in Turkey the PUK literally saved the PKK from oblivion – 
nor, as I have argued the complex dynamics and shifting alliances of today’s 
Iraqi Kurdistan both within Iraq and all the more when adopting a wider 
geographical lense and including the KDP’s attempts at positioning itself as a 
regional champion of wider, perhaps even pan-Kurdish aspirations for national 
self-determination in Turkey and Syria,  
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The case against the ethnic alliance model is even more clear-cut. First, as 
I have demonstrated by way of an extensive historical excursus in Part Two, 
aside from epistemological objections, it would be untenable to categorize the 
Kurds in the Middle East as one ethnic group, that is Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, 
and Syria all belonging to the same ethnic group with common ideational 
boundaries and constitutive others and characterised by networks of intra-ethnic 
solidarity and mutual committments. On the contrary, already in the historical 
excursus I have shown that Kurds in Iraq and Turkey are defined by their 
relations and boundaries towards different constitutive others – the Kemalist 
and Ba’athist regimes in Ankara and Baghdad – and followed a completely 
different trajectory in their processes of becoming and being nationalist. 
Second, given the almost proverbial rivalry between KDP and PUK it would be 
completely fallacious to conceive of the Iraqi Kurds as a unitary actor or unitarily 
acting political entity that can be analytically equated with a state. Third, and 
perhaps most damning for any attempts to showcase the PKK sanctuary in Iraqi 
Kurdistan as an example of an ethnic alliance, as it is routinely done in the 
literature, the relations between PKK and KDP/PUK are more often determined 
by rivalry and armed conflict than by solidarity and cooperation. As a matter of 
fact, at the very moment when the ethnic alliance model is supposed to have 
come into effect, when Iraqi Kurdistan became a state-like entity – however 
defined and open to debate – or its main protagonists came to dominate the 
political discourse and exercised territorial control, in the wake of the Gulf War, 
KDP and PUK did not reach out to the oppressed ‘co-ethnic’ minority in Turkey 
and its empowered incumbent, the PKK, but, in alliance with Turkey, attacked 
Öcalan’s group. With that episode at the very least the case against the ethnic 
alliance model and ethnic group solidarity to explain ‘intra-ethnic’ relations and 
the internationalization of ethnic conflict can rest as disproven. 
Yet the purpose of this case study has not only been to show why the main 
frameworks of explanatory IR fail to explain the formation of ethnic identities in 
ethnic conflict, but also to illustrate how ethnicity works in these contexts. 
Grounded in constitutive theory I have argued why I believe that instead of 
explaining the relations between and within so called ethnic groups through 
factual, static, substantive, distinct, homogeneous and bounded categories and 
an artificially measurable division of identities and interests that can be 
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operationalized as dependent and independent variables, the social world is 
better conceived of as a fluid, ever shifting, open-ended, and complex matrix of 
identities and interests. At each stage in the analysis of the relations between 
the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties and the PKK I have paused and made 
a case against explaining it by employing dependent and independent variables 
and for a processual approach that views them as an intricate, never 
completed, eternally unfolding matrix. This, in my opinion, becomes most 
apparent when examining the shifting sands of identities and interests in post-
2003 Iraqi Kurdistan and what it means to be an Iraqi Kurd in the twenty-first 
century. This dense, web-like mosaic of competing sovereignties with the freest 
political entity in Kurdish history existing in permanent transition within but at the 
same time apart from Iraq, pan-Kurdish and parochial identities pulling in 
opposite directions, and strategic considerations and material interests at the 
local, regional, and geo-political level dictating restraint while at the same time 
autonomy has gained a momentum of its own that pulls Iraqi Kurdish leaders – 
sometimes against their will – towards ever wider national self-determination, 
constitutes an ideal and incredibly rich case study to study not so much what 
ethnic identity is but how ethnic identity works. In terms of identities and 
interests Iraqi Kurdistan is constituted and at the same time internally split by 
centrifugal and centripetal forces and ideologies. Large strata of the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe see the freest political entity in Kurdish history as a beacon 
of hope and champion of Kurdish rights for national self-determination across 
the entire region, an aspiration Iraqi Kurdish leaders fear and simultaneously try 
to exploit for their own ends; they try to walk a fine line between expanding their 
polities’ autonomy and not antagonizing their external backers together with the 
status as Washington’s most reliable ally, yet the relative freedom Iraqi 
Kurdistan enjoys and a mainly young population that has never come to know 
Arab rule increasingly questions why they have to continue co-existing in an 
artificial state with Arabs towards whom they feel no solidarity, commonality or 
shared identity; the ambiguous status of ever wider autonomy allows Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders to strengthen their hold onto power at home, where they play 
the ethno-nationalist card against the central government in Baghdad and 
perpetually hold out the promise of independence to their constituency – a 
promise they may never be in a position or want to fulfil – yet at the same time 
their influence in Baghdad allows them to play kingmaker in the formation of 
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every Iraqi government for the past decade; likewise, they remain economically 
and strategically dependent on Turkey, who, aside from Baghdad, quite 
contradictorily poses the biggest obstacle to Iraqi Kurdish independence out of 
fear that it might set a precedent for its own Kurdish population to demand a 
similar status, yet at the same the time Erdoğan AKP utilizes the pan-Kurdish 
reputation and nationalistic pull of Massoud Barzani to sway Kurdish voters in 
Turkey. Given the ambiguities, complex dynamics, and contradictions, of which 
I have just elaborated the most obvious, that constitute the matrix of identities 
and interests in contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan even the most ardent positivist 
would fail to comprehensively explain them by allocating dependent and 
independent variables, divining a definite line parting identities from interests 
and ideational from material motives for actors’s behaviour, let alone translate 
those into quantifiable data. 
Exercising a modernist interpretation of nationalism that views the ethnic 
group as a precursor to an ethnically defined nation and the nation as a proto-
state, explanatory IR often analytically equates the ethnic group with the state, 
thus not only endowing it with social agency but portraying as it as a unitary 
actor or unitarily acting entity. Again, Iraqi Kurdistan serves as a powerful case 
in point why such an equation is untenable. Given the notorious rivalry between 
KDP and PUK with each side even joining forces with their constitutive other, 
the genocidal regime of Saddam Hussein, against their opponent, and their on-
and-off alliances and hostilities with the PKK, the myth of the ethnic group as 
unitary actor is easily refutable. What is more interesting, though, I argue that 
the sovereign nation state is as much a social construct as the ethnic group, a 
social construct, like the ethnic group, based on a constructed dichotomy of 
internal versus external, of order and rule of law at home versus anarchy 
abroad. The occurrence of so called failed states and de facto states illustrate 
the inherent contradictions of this supposedly clear-cut dichotomy. Failed states 
lack internal sovereignty, that is they lost control over parts or most of their 
territory and population, while de facto states exhibit a comprehensive control of 
their claimed territory but lack external recognition as a state by the international 
community. This shows that sovereignty cannot be reduced to a simple 
ascertainment of whether it exists or not but that the real question – as with 
ethnic identity – is how sovereignty works. The complexities, ambiguities, and 
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contradictions of sovereignty at work in the indeterminate political space of 
today’s Iraqi Kurdistan illustrate not only that the presupposed linear 
development from ethnic group to nation, to state may not be at all linear but 
curvy, oscillating, interrupted, in fact, for intrinsic not extrinsic reasons, may 
never reach its supposed conclusion, but also highlights the constructed nature 
of sovereignty better than in so called established states. In established states 
sovereignty is said to exist, period. Iraqi Kurdistan, whose sovereignty is 
contested, provides a much richer case to study how sovereignty actually 
works, how it is enacted through foreign policy, how it harmonises national 
identit(ies) with national interest(s), and that, ultimately, in the post-modern 
world of universal neo-liberal consensus, it can be more important to strike a 
deal on the exploitation of national resources with ExxonMobil or offer your 
constituency the dubious blessings of international brands opening a branch in 
their local shopping mall than being recognised by a handful of second rank 
states as a peer.  
Explanatory IR theory purports to depict the social world as it is, as factual, 
as grounded in reality, as empirically measurable. Rejecting the false idol of 
scientific objectivism that claims to be capable of a detached and rational 
analysis of how the social world works, constitutive theory this study commits to, 
posits all of us researchers that study social relationships as co-protagonists of 
these relations. Contrary to explanatory theory that purports to tell ‘the’ definite 
story about how the social world works, constitutive theory maintains that there 
are myriad interpretations and takes on social issues out there, that the ones 
presented as factual and common-sense are but one possible reading of things 
and that we social scientists will by our very nature as human beings always be 
biased and partisan in the narratives we tell. Yet, even though we are all co-
protagonists of the social world we try to understand and analyse, it makes a 
difference whether we present our findings as one possible reading of actors’ 
motives and behaviour or as the definite account of social interactions and 
relations; it makes a difference whether we have the intellectual honesty to 
acknowledge our role in taking part in influencing and shaping the narratives 
and discourses about our objects of analysis or pretend to deliver a scientifically 
verified ultimate and singular truth that remains irrefutable irrespective of the 
researcher’s ideological disposition and level of engagement with its subject. 
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For, last but not least, it makes a great difference to what extent we become 
involved with our subject of analysis, whether we manage to maintain the very 
minimum of a critical attitude or increasingly come to advocate a certain 
direction or cause in our writings, research, lectures, and testimonials as 
experts at public hearings and parliamentary inquiries. At the very least, we 
social scientists cannot have it both ways, hold up the principles of a detached 
scientific objectivism – anyway an intellectual fallacy – and at the same time 
through our ontologies and methodologies, such as the selection of variables or 
our categorization of ideational groups as social agents, directly or indirectly 
adopt the narratives of our subjects of analysis and thus substantiate their 
claims to legitimacy. 
These are but some of the issues I have raised in my critique of positivist 
explanatory IR’s approaches to ethnic conflict and state sovereignty.  In sum, I 
would like to believe, it amounts to a solid and comprehensive deconstruction of 
the epistemologies, ontologies, models, frameworks, and methodologies of 
explanatory IR’s approach to ethnic conflict and state sovereignty at the 
theoretical and empirical level. However, I, of course, do not claim to have 
provided a definitive account of ethnic identity formation and so called intra-
ethnic relations, state sovereignty or Kurdish ethno-nationalism, nor for my 
findings and insights to have universal applicability. What I offer here is a well-
wrought but basically always highly subjective interpretation of scholars’ role as 
co-protagonists of ethnic conflict, a reality and not the reality of the development 
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, a true account of the relations between the Iraqi 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties and the PKK but not the ultimate truth on them.  
 Further case studies are called for, those that critically examine and 
deconstruct the reification and essentialization of groupness in the discourse on 
ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict, both at the level of ethnic elites as well as 
focusing on the scholarship on these conflicts, and either by scrutinizing the 
intra-group level, as V. P. Gagnon has demonstrated for the former Yugoslavia, 
or by questioning the inter-group level, as is the lens through which this present 
study approaches the complex. At an earlier stage of research, when I intended 
to give the comparative dimension more room, I conducted some preliminary 
research on the discourse on pan-Albanian nationalism and the fear among 
Western policy makers of opening the door for a ‘Greater Albania’ in the run up 
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to 1999 Kosovo intervention and discovered many striking parallels to the 
Kurdish case. Yet, the essentialization and substantialization of ethnic 
groupness is not limited to the Western discourse on ethnic conflict. For 
decades politicians and scholars in India and the state of West Bengal in 
particular portray Bangladeshi immigration as an attempt to create a ‘Greater 
Bangladesh’ by stealth, a subject to which I plan to direct my future research. 
More generally, while this study furnished an in-depth overview of the problem 
of reification of groupness in the study of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict in 
explanatory IR literature, more detailed theoretical inquiries into individual 
aspects and effects of this practice would be desirable; say, for example, how 
they shape the paradigm of consociationalism in ethnic conflict resolution or 
whether the questions raised here would not require a redefinition of 
nationalism and nationhood. In addition to my commitment to the ethical 
concerns I have raised throughout, I would consider it a great accomplishment 
for this study to have acted as an incentive and point of departure for such 
pressing future inquiries. 
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